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 This project had its origins in January 2001, when – during a two-week trip to 
Havana and Matanzas as part of a U.S.-Cuba writers’ conference – I was in training for a 
series of amateur boxing tournaments back home. Without access to a boxing gym and 
unwilling to subject myself to catcalls by running in the street, I chose to train by the hotel 
pools, where – as my fellow writers worked on their tans or cavorted in the water – I 
assiduously jumped rope, did sit-ups and push-ups, and shadowboxed. My regimen, all the 
more unusual for its having been carried out by a woman, came to the attention of a Havana 
sports journalist, Martín Hacthoun, and led to his invitation to profile me for some of the 
national newspapers. Wary of being used for propaganda of whatever sort, I nonetheless was 
too curious not to accept. No native girls or women were boxing in Cuba at the time (or at 
present, to my knowledge), despite the state’s pursuit of international excellence in male 
amateur boxing. Although I was told that a few foreign (non-U.S.) women had recently 
come to Havana to train, none, apparently, blended the pursuits of literary and fistic 
excellence, which was what Martín and many other Cubans found so fascinating.1 
As part of our interviews, Martín invited me to visit the historic Arena Trejo 
gymnasium with him in old Havana. There, I met 1972 Olympic bantamweight champion 
Orlando Martínez, who was training a group of talented youngsters. I was amazed at the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
     1 In the U.S., such distinctions had little bearing in female amateur boxing; many of us pioneers in the late 
1990s and early 2000s were viewed as being too “smart” to volunteer our heads as targets for others’ fists. 
Here, what made me most unusual in the sport was not my Ivy League education or professional credentials, 
but my being Indian American. Despite having lived on my own for several years, I was frequently asked 
(particularly by journalists) how my parents felt about my boxing. 
!
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ingenuity with which, lacking even a full roof, much less adequate equipment, the Cubans 
managed to train. Most of all, I was thrilled by the boys’ fluid performances, especially while 
sparring; I had heard of the Cubans’ stellar ring skills but had never paid much attention to 
them, as few were then active in the professional ranks. Not long afterwards, while strolling 
on the Malecón, the boulevard that abuts the sea wall in Havana, I discussed my excitement 
at having met Orlando and his charges with my friend Michele Reid, who was in Havana 
researching her dissertation and had accompanied me to the Arena Trejo. Whether it was her 
suggestion or mine (I remember it as the former, she as the latter), the idea emerged for me 
to tackle the history of Cuban boxing as my dissertation topic. Upon my return to the U.S., 
further investigations revealed that Cuba’s pugilistic history had never been addressed in any 
comprehensive manner in the scholarly literature, and that the few mainstream works on the 
subject left much to be said. There were hardly any guideposts at all for how to begin, never 
mind complete, such a daunting task. I didn’t know whether I could be the one to do it, but 
I was determined to try. 
Begun amorphously as the collection of any and all materials related to amateur and 
professional Cuban boxing, on the island and abroad – a project that could well have taken 
up the rest of my life –, my doctoral dissertation committee members encouraged me to 
place much-needed temporal and thematic limits on what I proposed to do. Frank Guridy, 
my co-advisor, suggested that I put aside most of my Castro-era materials and instead focus 
on the Republic years, whose cultural historiography was undergoing a renaissance. Virginia 
Garrard Burnett suggested that I leave aside a serious study of colonial-era boxing and 
instead begin my narrative with the Spanish-American-Cuban War, allowing me to focus 
more extensively on the emerging U.S.-Cuba relationship. Frank further encouraged me to 
 vii 
explore the Johnson-Willard bout as it pertained to the development of Cuban boxing and as 
it reflected the deepening of U.S.-Cuban ties. 
 The research of this work took me to several states within the U.S., where I was 
grateful to secure the assistance of many wonderful archivists, librarians, and directors. Ed 
Brophy and Jeff Brophy at the International Boxing Hall of Fame in Canastota, New York, 
literally made me feel at home while examining the hall’s archives, setting up an impromptu 
work station for me amidst the museum collections. At the University of Notre Dame’s 
Joyce Sports Research Collection, Curator George Rugg and his able staff were always 
exceedingly helpful and gracious. I particularly appreciate George’s insights on early boxing 
and wrestling culture in the U.S. and his assistance in locating materials for me that had not 
yet been catalogued. At the Kautz Family YMCA Archives at the University of Minnesota, 
Curator Dagmar Getz and her staff, particularly Reference and Outreach Archivist Ryan 
Bean, offered tremendous assistance in every way possible as I explored that organization’s 
presence in Cuba. I truly enjoyed my conversations with Dagmar about the YMCA’s history 
and much else; I wish her well in retirement. In Coral Gables, Florida, the aid of the Cuban 
Heritage Collection and main library staff at the University of Miami was much appreciated. 
David A. Smith at The New York Public Library’s midtown Manhattan branch has been 
particularly enthusiastic about my project and willing to share ideas and assistance whenever 
I made it to the city. And at my home institution, the University of Texas at Austin, Jorge 
Salinas and other staff members of the Benson Latin American Collection were always ready 
and willing to assist me in whatever ways possible. 
 In Havana, Cuba, many people were generous with their time and eager to extend 
their good will. Four couples in particular helped make me feel at home. Martín Hacthoun 
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and Sonia Rodríguez Febles were my first anchors in Havana, offering me assistance with my 
project in whatever ways they could. Their worldly sophistication, love of sports and culture, 
and perfect English skills made our rare evenings together so much fun. Nidia García and 
her husband Alberto warmly opened their home to me and, conscious of my desire to stay in 
shape, even rigged up a mini boxing gym on their balcony to give me a quasi-private space to 
work out; I deeply appreciate their kindness. Katia González León and Maikel Cardoso 
Vázquez taught me much about bowling (at which they both excel), Cuban baseball, and life 
in contemporary Havana. Katia became my indispensable companion and friend, with whom 
I spent hours roaming the city; without her, I would have been lost in more ways than one. 
Suddenly and quite by accident, Dr. Alejandro Larrinaga (who I met at the national library, 
where he was trying to learn English), his wife Leo, and their daughters, Yahima and Yeika, 
became my second family, inviting me over on Sundays for home-cooked Cuban meals, 
entertaining discussions, televised episodes of Monk, and Cuban radio broadcasts of Murder 
She Wrote. My thanks as well for the friendship and hospitality of Jacqueline Moreira Sosa 
and her family, María de Lourdes Drets Barrasa and her family, and Miriam Nacer. 
My research at the Biblioteca Nacional José Martí (BNJM), Instituto de Literatura y 
Lingüística (ILL), and Museo Nacional de Deporte (MND) in Havana was critical in 
developing this project. I extend my gratitude to the directors and staff members of those 
institutions, particularly to Jacqueline Moreira Sosa at BNJM, Dania Vázquez Matos at ILL, 
and Martha Pérez Viñales, Maikel Cardoso Vázquez, and Katia González León at MND. My 
conversations with Carlos Reig Romero, while few and far between, were nevertheless 
exceedingly helpful in understanding the history of pre-revolutionary Cuban boxing. I am 
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especially indebted to him for providing me with a copy of his book on the YMCA in early 
twentieth-century Havana. 
In the U.S., I have been extremely fortunate to have as dissertation committee 
members five individuals who serve as inspirations to me. Frank Guridy was enthusiastic 
about this project from the moment he signed on; his guidance in matters both academic 
and practical has been indispensable. Most of all, I appreciate his wise counsel in guiding the 
shape of this narrative, sharpening its focus, and questioning my interventions in the 
dominant historiography. I never walked away from a conversation with him without having 
learned something new. The brilliant cultural historian and my co-supervisor, Mauricio 
Tenorio Trillo, now at the University of Chicago, was tremendously influential in my own 
decision to engage in cultural history. More than anyone else I have known, he has been able 
to read my academic mind, knowing where I might be cutting corners and where I truly 
shined. I will always appreciate his masterful insights. Virginia Garrard Burnett never failed 
to offer criticisms tempered with humor and kindness; her insights on religion, especially, 
were essential to my understanding of Muscular Christianity. My graduate school education 
and experience would have been much the poorer without her. Madeline Y. Hsu gave the 
gift of an outsider’s perspective; as a nonspecialist in both sports and Caribbean/Latin 
American history, she articulated precisely where I needed to offer additional exposition and 
where I had offered too much. I am grateful for her razor-sharp analysis and editorial 
abilities, but, most of all, for her willingness to embrace this project. Michele Reid’s many 
observations on race, masculinity, and nationhood spurred me to strengthen the theoretical 
bases of this project. Her practical assistance and enthusiasm were always forthcoming, and 
always welcomed. She has been a close friend, forceful advocate, and discerning critic. 
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In addition to committee members, I must thank Aline Helg, for the critical training 
she provided me on Cuban history and for jointly overseeing my research before her move 
to the University of Geneva; Judith Coffin, for furthering my understanding of gender 
studies and for her willingness to aid in this project; and Marilyn Lehman, History 
Department Graduate Program Coordinator, who was a vital intermediary in navigating the 
doctoral bureaucracy. My gratitude also goes to the University of Texas-Austin History 
Department for research monies to complete this project: a Departmental Fellowship, the 
Carlos E. Castañeda Prize, the Mary Helen Quinn Cooperative Fellowship, and the Dora 
Bonham Award. Additionally, I am grateful for the Centennial Fund grants I received while 
at UT-Austin that enabled me to present my research at various conferences. 
 My close friends, scattered throughout the country, have long been a strong source 
of personal support and comfort to me, in this project and in so much else. I shall not 
attempt to list them all for fear of leaving one out; instead, I ask forgiveness for using the 
“you know who you are” shorthand. I must, however, single out Jessica Vets; a tough love 
advocate if ever there was one, she refused to indulge any fits of self-pity and always sought 
to keep my eye on the prize. I treasure our friendship deeply. 
In Austin, the encouragement of current and former grad school pals, among them 
Frances Ramos, Roy Doron, Norwood Andrews, Kerry Webb, Andrew Paxman, Shereen 
Ilahi, Heather Peterson, Jackie Zahn, Emily Berquist, John Gronbeck-Tedesco, and Marian 
Barber, though we saw each other rarely, was always welcomed. My thanks to Larry Gutman 
for sharing some of his dissertation research on Cuban social clubs with me. Heather Hardy 
never hesitated to offer assistance when needed; I appreciate her many acts of kindness. 
Richard and Lori Lord gave me a home away from home at their one-of-a-kind boxing gym, 
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where I spent many happy hours. Jennifer Lazar literally helped to keep me together. And I 
am grateful for the many other wonderful people – friends, coworkers, neighbors, faculty, 
staff, and peers – who have shared the days with me here. 
 Lastly but most importantly, my family has been my strongest base of support over 
the years. My mother, Bharati Reejhsinghani, M.D., never failed to serve as an example to 
me of what women can achieve when ambition, talent, and will converge. Her emotional and 
financial support – and most of all, her friendship – has been critical to me as I pursued my 
dream of becoming a professor. My father, Nandlal Reejhsinghani, Ph.D. – in his own 
idiosyncratic ways – spurred on my love for history and desire to earn a doctorate. While our 
degrees are in very different fields and were earned in very different contexts, I am proud to 
share those initials with him. My grandfather, Chetan Shahani, who passed away while I was 
an undergraduate, was especially influential in my decision to become a historian; as a child, I 
was fascinated by his many evocative stories of life in colonial and early nationalist India. My 
brothers, Sanjiv and Alok Reejhsinghani, deserve thanks for their generosity and friendship, 
and for helping to maintain my ties to the region where we grew up. 
 Asha and Kali, have – affectionately, if not always patiently – taught me how much I 
still have to learn. Their relentless optimism serves as an ever-present reminder that dreams 
deferred are not always dreams denied. My love to them, and to Bug, who has given us all 
something to look forward to. 
 Finally, Billy Geoghegan has seen me through this project from the very first day, 
and continues to be my staunchest friend, truest advocate, and most perceptive critic. His 
love, patience, advice, sense of humor, and cooking have sustained me over the years. I hope 
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The Meanings of the Boxing Ring in Pre-Revolutionary Cuba 
 
 The Arena Cerveza Cristal, located at the intersection of Infanta and San Martín in 
the capital city of Havana, was the site of many important amateur and professional boxing 
bouts from 1933 to 1943. On the night of Saturday, June 21, 1941, a large crowd had 
gathered inside the arena to witness a much-anticipated fight.1 As was becoming increasingly 
common in Havana rings by mid-century, only one of the two feature opponents was of 
Cuban origin. His name was Lorenzo Safora, and he had emerged from the ranks of the 
Cuban Golden Gloves, the amateur tournament that had been developed a few years earlier 
as a feeding system for new boxers to enter the professional ranks. By fight night, Safora 
was, at only twenty years old, already the island’s bantamweight champion. The other man 
was a 28-year-old boxer who went by the name Small Montana. Born Benjamin Gan in 
Negros, the Philippines, his nom-de-guerre was a mixture of English and Spanish and evoked 
the image of a tiny mountain. Montana’s record was more impressive than Safora’s and 
spoke to his international success. He had held the New York State Athletic Commission’s 
version of the world flyweight championship from September 1935, when he defeated 
Midget Wolgast, to January 1937, when he lost it to Benny Lynch.2 Eladio Secades, a 
                                                
     1 Peter, “Fue anulado el fallo emitido sobre la pelea de anoche entre Lorenzo Safora y el filipino Small 
Montana,” Diario de la Marina, 22 June 1941, p. 19. Unless otherwise attributed, the historical details I provide 
for this bout are taken from this source. 
     2 For background on Small Montana, see The Great Pinoy Boxing Era: Three Decades of Filipino-American Boxers, 
directed by Corky Pasquil and Agrafino Edralin, 1994, and Linda España-Maram, Creating Masculinity in Los 
Angeles’s Little Manila: Working-Class Filipinos and Popular Culture, 1920s-1950s (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2006), pp. 77-78, 85, and 94-95. NYSAC was not the only sanctioning body at the time to issue titles. 
Because Montana did not unify the other versions of the flyweight title, his victory against Wolgast in 
September 1935 is usually described as having been for the American flyweight title. 
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sportswriter for Diario de la Marina, the major Havana daily, considered Montana to be the 
best fighter among the smaller weight classes to have emerged since Cuba’s Black Bill 
(Eladio Valdés) and Kid Chocolate (Eligio Sardiñas Montalvo) over a decade earlier.3 
Three prizefights were scheduled in addition to the Safora-Montana “star bout”: the 
semi-final, as it was known, between Miguel Acevedo and Enrique Rodea, and preliminary 
events featuring Rogelio “Kid” Oliver versus Roberto Martínez and Soldado (Soldier) 
Serrano versus Ramón Crespo.4 As was not unusual in boxing shows at the time, particularly 
in Cuba, the night opened with an amateur match-up featuring Miguel Pena and Dámaso 
Collazo. (Semi-professionals, who were paid less for their ring services than professionals 
but were generally more experienced than amateurs, also at times performed on professional 
cards). All but Rodea, imported from Mexico by the national Cuban sports directorship for 
his debut in Havana rings, were native fighters. The preliminary fights were shorter, lasting 
four or six three-minute rounds (each round was separated by a one-minute rest period), 
versus ten for the main event and eight for the semi-final. The experience of the athletes 
involved was usually in direct proportion to the scheduled length of their bouts; before the 
advent of television, prizefighters were often groomed for years, fighting no more than six or 
eight rounds, before making the jump to main-event status.5 
 Fighting at the bantamweight limit of 118 pounds, Safora and Montana were fairly 
representative members of their countries’ prizefight ranks; the Cubans and Filipinos were 
                                                
     3 Eladio Secades, “Montana vs. Safora: La ciencia del filipino,” Diario de la Marina, 21 June 1941, p. 14. 
     4 Acevedo, who became featherweight champion of Cuba and a world-rated featherweight contender later 
in the decade, was a last-minute opponent for the lightweight Rodea; see “Montana reaparecerá ante los fans 
cubanos el sábado, enfrentándose a Lorenzo Safora, en diez rounds,” Diario de la Marina, 17 June 1941, p. 14. 
     5 Television accelerated this process, particularly in the U.S., because it led to the closure of small clubs 
where younger boxers developed their skills and created a demand for new, clean-cut, mostly white faces 
(made-for-TV boxers, as some called them) to win over suburban audiences. See Chapter 5 for more on TV’s 
impact on prizefighting in Cuba and the U.S. 
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renowned for producing “small men.” (Indeed, Montana was being tested above his weight; 
he was truly a flyweight, who fought – and rarely lost – at that division’s 112-pound limit.) 
Above the flyweight and bantamweight divisions were six other weight classes: featherweight 
(126 pounds), lightweight (135 pounds), welterweight (147 pounds), middleweight (160 
pounds), light heavyweight (175 pounds), and heavyweight (above 175 pounds).6 Other than 
the Serrano-Crespo middleweight match-up, the remaining bouts on the card that night were 
contested at the lightweight limit or below. 
Safora began the first few rounds of their ten-round non-title bout by attempting to 
“box” the Filipino, to outmaneuver him with speed and reflexes rather than overwhelming 
him with power.7 Montana’s style was slower, more cautious, defensive, and by the second 
round the crowd urged him on. In the fourth, Montana hit Safora with a solid shot to the 
belly followed by one to the jaw, knocking out Safora’s mouthpiece. Upon returning to his 
                                                
     6 In more recent times, there has been an explosion of weight classes from the original eight to seventeen, as 
tracked by The Ring magazine; these range from strawweight (105 pounds) to heavyweight (above 200 pounds). 
For the influential magazine’s updated rankings for each weight class, see “The Ring Ratings,” The Ring, 
http://www.ringtv.com/ratings/ (accessed July 16, 2009). 
     7 Since the end of the bare-knuckle era, most right-handed boxers have approached their opponents at an 
angle, with the left foot about shoulder-width in front of the right, and the left hand leading several inches in 
front of the right (the opposite holds for most left-handed fighters, known as southpaws). Other than the jab, 
which is thrown with the leading hand on a straight line from a fighter’s head level to his opponent’s head or 
body and which sets up a series of punches, all punches are “power punches” because they require torquing by 
the lower body – hips, knees, and ankles. Power punches include the straight right or cross (called the straight 
left or cross for southpaws, it is when a fighter throws on a straight line with his rear hand, at the same time 
dropping his center of gravity and thrusting his back hip forward); the uppercut (thrown by either hand at an 
underhand angle from close to one’s body in an upward thrust to the other’s head or body); the hook (thrown 
with the left or right hand to the side of the opponent’s head or body as the front hip drops and turns inward); 
the overhand right or left (thrown from an overhand position at a downward angle, it is the inverse of the 
uppercut and usually thrown to the opponent’s head), and the bolo punch (an exaggerated uppercut using 
extraneous arm movement, thrown more for psychological effect or as a crowd-pleaser than for pure power). 
The bolo became the signature punch of Cuba’s Kid Gavilán, as discussed in Chapter 5. It should be noted that 
not all modern fighters follow the traditional style. Several world champions achieved their titles using 
unorthodox styles, often sacrificing a defensive posture for a more aggressive offense: Floyd Patterson and 
Mike Tyson stood squarely in front of opponents and used a crab-like crouch developed by their trainer, Cus 
D’Amato, and Cassius Clay/Muhammad Ali was notorious for throwing punches from his waist rather than his 
chin. Fighters who succeed using unorthodox styles usually have offensive skills that more than compensate for 
their weaker defenses – hand speed, intricate footwork, tremendous power, a solid “chin” (ability to withstand 
punishment), psychological command of one’s opponents, or some combination of the above. 
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corner at the bell signaling the round’s conclusion, Safora seemed winded. Montana had the 
upper hand in the next four rounds, causing the crowd to begin booing the local fighter. In 
the ninth, the Cuban seemed to recover, lashing Montana with lefts and rights. In the tenth 
and last round, Montana was more elusive, and the two exchanged punches toe-to-toe. 
 Former prizefighter Fillo Echevarría, originally from Spain but long a resident of 
Cuba, had acted as referee; when the last round was over, he called the bout for Montana. 
The two judges, on the contrary, determined Safora to be the victor. This would have meant 
that Safora won by split decision, as the result is known when two of the three scorecards go 
in a fighter’s favor. (Had the referee voted for Safora as well, the Cuban would have instead 
earned a unanimous decision; had he called the bout a draw, Safora would still have won, but 
by majority decision.) Back then, decisions were rendered by two ringside judges, who 
remained seated just outside the ropes, and by the referee, who was known as the “third man 
in the ring”; modern practice uses three judges (up to five in the amateurs) and leaves the 
referee out of the scoring business altogether. Each scorecard was calculated by totaling the 
number of rounds won by each opponent; thus, in theory, a fighter leading on two cards by 
a one-round margin would still defeat an opponent with a nine-round advantage on the third 
card.8 The even number of rounds in many bouts meant that draws were a frequent 
                                                
     8 Most sanctioned prizefights nowadays are conducted using a “ten-point must” system as adopted in the 
Unified Rules of Boxing endorsed by the Association of Boxing Commissions, which represents U.S. and 
Canadian state and tribal boxing commissions. In this system, each round is calculated with the winner of that 
round receiving ten points (although points may be deducted for committing fouls) and the loser nine or fewer 
(an additional point is deducted for a knockdown or if the losing fighter is completely outmatched). In 2000, 
attorneys general from 18 states suggested that a “consensus scoring system” might eliminate some of the poor 
decisions that have occurred under the current system. In consensus scoring, all three judges’ scores would 
need to coincide each round or else a new score would be determined. If the three scores were different, then 
the highest and lowest ones would be tossed out and the median one used; if two judges reached the same 
score, the third judge’s score would be tossed out. This would minimize the influence of a single biased or 
incompetent judge and, theoretically, result in fairer decisions. The consensus scoring proposal was one of 
many the attorneys general suggested to make U.S. prizefighting safer and its results less “arbitrary.” As with 
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occurrence. So, unfortunately, were outright cases of fraud, since poorly paid judges and 
referees could be susceptible to bribes or arm-twisting. (Gambling, then as now, played an 
important role in prizefight culture.) 
At the time of the Safora-Montana bout, the referee was expected to do his job 
impartially but nonetheless to offer his verdict on whether one fighter defeated the other or 
whether the competition was equal. By remaining on their feet at the end of the bout, as did 
Safora and Montana on this occasion, the fighters were demonstrating their ring experience 
and ability to withstand the other’s punishment. Not infrequently, however, the referee 
imposed another result before the scheduled number of rounds were concluded. Fighters 
were disqualified for hitting “below the belt,” south of a man’s natural waistline; for hitting a 
man who was on his way down to the canvas, or already there; and for a number of other 
flagrant violations that could potentially harm an opponent – such as biting, elbowing, or 
punching in the back of the head. Or the referee might prematurely end a bout with a “no 
decision” verdict, should the fighters not be engaged in a competitive contest, for instance, 
or should weather (bouts were often held outside) make further fighting impossible. On 
some occasions, particularly with the advent of television, the referee might shorten one or 
more preliminary bouts before they had begun to allow for sufficient time to stage the main 
attraction. The referee’s intervention was perhaps most common in the event of a technical 
knockout (TKO), when he stepped in to ensure that a fighter in trouble would not endure 
                                                                                                                                            
other such reform efforts in prizefighting, however, this one went nowhere. See James C. McKinley, Jr., “Law 
Officials in 18 States Seek Widespread Changes,” New York Times, 11 May 2000. For the original proposal, see 
“National Association of Attorneys General Boxing Task Force,” May 2000, 
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2000/may/report.pdf (accessed July 19, 2009). 
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further harm. (Knockouts, or  KOs, did not directly involve the referee but instead occurred 
when one man was unable to get up from the canvas upon the end of a ten-second interval.) 
 Although one might have imagined a hometown crowd to be more partisan, the 
Havana denizens were furious at the announcement that Safora had won the decision. They 
made their displeasure known loudly enough that the powerful Director of Sports, Colonel 
Jaime Mariné – who happened to be in attendance – quickly gathered together with the 
sportswriters present and his Assessor of Boxing to exchange opinions on the verdict. They 
must have shared the crowd’s sentiment, for the official ruling was quickly changed to a 
draw – a result that, as one newspaper account stated, was still favorable to the local pugilist 
but at least did not mar the visitor’s record.9 
 I begin my exploration of Cuba’s boxing history with this bout not because it was 
spectacular in its own right – it was not – nor because it had any long-term impact on the 
sport itself – it did not. I begin here because I could just have easily selected any one of a 
thousand other bouts in order to provide a window into the pre-television, pre-revolutionary 
culture of boxing on the island. This bout represents a “typical” mid-century main event 
fight in Havana. Unlike earlier in the century, when foreign boxers came primarily from the 
U.S., Canada, and Great Britain, the 1940s witnessed the arrival of opponents from newer 
boxing centers such as Mexico, Central America, and the Philippines. (U.S. boxers would 
remain fixtures in Havana’s rings until the early 1960s.) Average Cuban fans were not only 
passionate about boxing, they were extremely knowledgeable about it, and (with some 
exceptions) were willing to abandon or at least temper their national, regional, or hometown 
                                                
     9 This point was made in Peter, “Fue anulado el fallo emitido sobre la pelea de anoche entre Lorenzo Safora 
y el filipino Small Montana,” Diario de la Marina, 22 June 1941, p. 19. A fighter’s record is typically given as the 
number of wins, losses, and draws, in that order. 
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loyalties when won over by an opponent’s skills or persistence. The audience at the Arena 
Cristal would have been intimately familiar not only with their home-grown fighter, but also 
with the Filipino who had recently fought two thrilling bouts there with Mexican flyweight 
champion Luis Castillo.10 Moreover, although it was not exactly a common occurrence for 
Cuban sports officials to intervene in an official judging result, it was not rare, either. In the 
U.S. at that time, overturning a verdict in the interests of fairness was not a widespread 
practice; some flagrant judging violation usually had to be uncovered before a result would 
change. In republic-era Cuba, where government regulators had much tighter control over 
prizefighting and where far fewer promoters were active, such official tampering with the 
scoring happened with greater frequency and was viewed as necessary to keep the sport 
honest. 
 Cuban boxing by 1941 had come a long way from its origins in the nineteenth 
century, when it was practiced to a limited extent in exclusive social clubs and other private 
domains. Having fitfully emerged in public spaces during the years of U.S. military 
occupation (1898-1902 and 1906-1909) and in the decade since, boxing remained on the 
margins of both legality and respectability until 1921, when the state formed a boxing and 
wrestling commission. In the interwar period, the number of boxing events staged in Havana 
and the provincial cities exploded as the infrastructure for athletic and recreational facilities 
developed apace. The creation of amateur tournaments such as the Golden Gloves, the 
development of semi-professional boxing as a vehicle to introduce the sport among poor 
youths, and the establishment of Havana as an important site along a regional network of 
                                                
     10 For a contemporary profile on Castillo, including his ties to Cuban boxing, see Harvey Thorne, “New 
Faces: The Ring Presents to Its Readers Short Biographical Sketches of Boys Who Are Making Good – Some 
Are Veterans, Others Novices,” The Ring 20:6 (July 1941), pp. 28-29, 41 (Castillo profile on p. 28). 
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prizefighting centers all helped to build both a domestic base of competitors and audiences 
to watch them. By the time the revolutionary state outlawed professional sports, including 
boxing, in 1962, the sport had become second only to baseball as Cuba’s national pastime. 
 While the study of twentieth-century baseball, particularly in its professional variant, 
has recently gained traction among cultural historians and other commentators on Cuba, 
boxing has remained a curiosity at best, a dated relic of a more innocent time.11 Memoirs, 
novels, and other works set in the late 1940s or 1950s evoke the bygone nature of Cuban 
boxing by referencing popular prizefighters, particularly Kid Gavilán (Gerardo González), 
who entered mainstream (read: middle-class white) U.S. culture via the new medium of 
television.12 If Cuban boxing has any relevance at all today, it is as an example of its current 
practitioners’ astonishing athletic prowess, which for the past forty years has been amply 
demonstrated in amateur rings throughout the world, most notably at the Olympic Games. 
Outside of Cuba itself, where the revolutionary state has excoriated pre-1959 prizefighting as 
a dangerous, exploitative vestige of a corrupt capitalist system, as well as a few dwindling 
circles abroad – such as communities of aging, exiled prizefighters and their descendants in 
                                                
     11 Recent works that explore the history of pre-revolutionary Cuban baseball include Louis A. Pérez, Jr., 
“Between Baseball and Bullfighting: The Quest for Nationality in Cuba, 1868-1898,” The Journal of American 
History (September 1994), pp. 493-517; Louis A. Pérez, Jr., On Becoming Cuban: Identity, Nationality and Culture 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Roberto González Echevarría, The Pride of Havana: A 
History of Cuban Baseball (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Jorge S. Figueredo, Beisbol cubano: A un paso 
de las Grandes Ligas, 1878-1961 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2005); and Adrian Burgos, Jr., Playing America’s 
Game: Baseball, Latinos, and the Color Line (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007). For examinations of 
baseball in revolutionary Cuba, see Paula J. Pettavino and Geralyn Pye, Sport in Cuba: The Diamond in the Rough 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1994); S.L. Price, Pitching around Fidel: A Journey into the Heart of Cuban 
Sports (New York: Ecco Press, 2000); Milton S. Jamail, Full Count: Inside Cuban Baseball (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois University Press, 2000); and Thomas F. Carter, The Quality of Home Runs: The Passion, Politics, and Language 
of Cuban Baseball (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2008). 
     12 For one of many such examples, the first television program witnessed by Carl Reiner – who would 
become one of the most influential writers, directors, actors, and producers on the big and small screens – was 
a U.S. boxing match featuring Kid Gavilán. See Ed McMahon and David Fisher, When Television Was Young: The 
Inside Story with Memories by Legends of the Small Screen (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2007), p. 12. 
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places such as South Florida and New York – there seems to be little current interest either 
in the history of the island’s boxers or in the manner by which the sport took root on its soil. 
Other than the Olympics, for instance, the only times that a discussion of Cuban boxing 
regularly makes it into the mainstream U.S. press is when, sadly, another exiled prizefighter 
has passed away.13 Even the defections of Cuban Olympic gold medalist boxers rarely garner 
wide attention any longer. 
Undoubtedly, this apathy has coincided with a decline in the importance of the sport 
among North Americans and western Europeans.14 While baseball, basketball, and soccer are 
glorified as global sports and football retains its hold on U.S. culture, boxing appears to be 
dying a slow death in much of the developed world, capturing the attention of the public 
only when exceptional (or much-hyped) match-ups are made. Although a discussion of why 
this has occurred is beyond the scope of this dissertation, contributing factors in the United 
States have been the decline of small clubs since the 1950s due to the rise of televised 
boxing; the scandals that plagued the sport for much of the twentieth century, including 
well-publicized associations with organized crime; the rise of Asian martial arts, mixed-
martial arts, and other forms of combat-as-entertainment; and the greater hold of basketball 
in urban environments that typically provided the breeding ground for pugilists. No doubt 
                                                
     13 Cuban baseball, on the contrary, in both its current and historical forms, is far more often on the radar, as 
Major League Baseball’s ranks of Latin American players has increased dramatically and scouts have sometimes 
gone to great lengths to secure Cuban defectors for U.S. teams. For one recent high-profile defection, that of 
pitcher Aroldis Chapman, see Jack Curry, “Yankees May Be Among a Cuban Defector’s Suitors,” New York 
Times, 3 July 2009. Every four years, the World Baseball Classic also helps to raise the profile of Cuban baseball 
in the U.S., though mostly as an elegy to what might have been; see, for example, Alan Schwarz, “Whispering 
Farwell to Cuba’s Dominant Past,” New York Times, 20 March 2009, and Dan Rosenheck, “Cuba’s Pastime: 
Beating Foreign Competition,” New York Times, 13 March 2009. 
     14 An exception is Germany, where boxing is widely watched on public television. Yet while demand for 
professional bouts there remains high, promoters have developed a large portion of their talent pool from 
eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, and Cuba. (The Hamburg-based company Arena Box Promotion, in 
particular, has signed on many of the most high-profile recent Cuban defectors). See Nicholas Kulish, “In 
Germany, Boxing Finds Appreciation and a Hub,” New York Times, 23 February 2008. 
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rises in the standards of living in the U.S. and western Europe have contributed; poverty and 
boxing have long gone hand in hand.15 As a result of these and other factors, boxing in the 
U.S. has become “a niche sport, abandoned by network television and playing to an 
enthusiastic following locked in to cable television and pay-per-view championship bouts.”16 
Yet the current level of apathy toward boxing should not color an assessment of its historic 
importance in the development of many cultures, including Cuba’s. 
While boxing has historically been Cuba’s second national sporting pastime, behind 
baseball, no rigorous historical study of it has been published in any language. The Spanish-
language works that exist on the subject are by journalists or amateur historians in Cuba or 
Miami who concentrate on once well-worn subjects (particularly tales of famous pugilists) 
rather than the nuances of the sport’s history and development. None has a bibliography or 
citations, and most lack an index. Although they appear to be based on newspaper accounts, 
secondary sources, and unpublished or original interviews with former boxers – much of 
which might otherwise be lost to posterity without these authors’ interventions – it is often 
difficult if not impossible to retrace their steps to evaluate their methods and conclusions. 
Most importantly, all display a strong ideological slant: Cuba-based authors such as 
Jorge Alfonso, Jesus Domínguez, and José Luis Llano attack the historic racism and 
exploitation of prizefighting, while expatriates such as Julio Ferreiro Mora, Willy del Pino, 
                                                
     15 Recent exceptions to this rule include seven-time world champion Marco Antonio Barrera, who trained as 
a lawyer in Mexico, and Dana Rosenblatt, a competitive Jewish American boxer. In the U.S. and Europe, the 
link between poverty and boxing has been less evident in the female version of the sport, as many educated, 
middle-class women joined both the amateur and professional ranks in the 1990s and 2000s. But as the novelty 
wears off and consumer demand for competitive women’s boxing remains low (if men’s boxing is now a niche 
sport, then female boxing is a niche within a niche), this trend, too, may be on the wane. 
     16 Glenn Collins, “Gem of the Ring, Guarded by a Professor in Boxing Gloves,” New York Times, 12 August 
2008. This quote is from the author’s interview with Anthony M. Cucchiara, professor of archival management 
at Brooklyn College. Cucchiara is overseeing the process of cataloguing of the archive of Hank Kaplan, the 
famed U.S. boxing historian who passed away in 2007. 
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and Enrique Encinosa condemn how communism prevents athletes from fulfilling their 
ambitions and lifting themselves from poverty.17 There are elements of truth to each side, yet 
in an attempt to discredit the other’s polemics, both tend to caricature the complexities of 
the system they decry and allow ideology to shape the evidence they present. 
I aim to produce a very different history of Cuban boxing, one that is deeply 
grounded in historical study but is multidisciplinary in nature, and one which bridges many 
of the positions described above. I have several points of departure. First, my dissertation 
relies chiefly upon primary sources – newspapers, periodicals, interview transcripts, 
photographs, film footage, government legislation, press releases, and speeches by public 
officials – and is further enriched by secondary material from various disciplines (e.g., 
sociology, gender theory, political science). Given the transnational nature of Cuban 
prizefighting (and, to a lesser extent, pre-1959 amateur boxing), I have not limited myself to 
Cuban materials but rely as well upon U.S. periodicals and newspapers, particularly those of 
relevance to the “sweet science.” 
Second, my research uses archives in multiple sites – Havana, Cuba; Minneapolis, 
Minnesota; Coral Gables, Florida; Austin, Texas; Canastota and New York, New York; and 
South Bend, Indiana – to ensure the broadest range of available materials. At the same time, 
I realize that there are several areas in my work that could benefit from additional 
investigation; whenever possible, I try to indicate as much, both in order to express the limits 
of this project and to encourage future research in this field. 
                                                
     17 See Jorge Alfonso, Puños dorados: Apuntes para la historia del boxeo en Cuba (Santiago de Cuba: Editorial 
Oriente, 1988); Jesus Domínguez and José Luis Llano. La preparación básica de los boxeadores (Ciudad de La 
Habana: Editorial Científico-Técnica, 1987); Julio Ferreiro Mora, Historia del boxeo cubano, 1st ed. (Miami: Selecta 
Enterprises, 1983); Willy del Pino, ed., Enciclopédia del boxeo cubano: Con los acontecimientos boxísticos más destacados 
desde 1910 a 1960 (Miami: Continental Printing, 1998); and Enrique Encinosa, Azúcar y Chocolate: Historia del 
boxeo cubano (Miami: Ediciones Universal, 2004). 
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Third, I build upon the previous literature in several ways. With Ferreiro Mora and 
Encinosa, I believe that the history of Cuban boxing must take into account the trajectories 
of those who left Cuba to pursue their careers after 1959. The stories of the exiles are as 
much a part of Cuban boxing history as are the stories of the people who chose (or who 
were compelled) to stay behind. With Alfonso, Domínguez, and Llano, I do not see amateur 
boxing as a footnote to prizefighting. How a state, especially a poor one, prioritizes amateur 
athletics – which sports it favors, whether it makes them available to individuals of all races 
and classes and to women as well as men, whether athletes are actively recruited and 
encouraged or left to find their own paths to success – tells us a lot about its priorities for 
and expectations of its citizenry and its desire for international prestige in ostensibly non-
political realms. 
 Taking these approaches into account, my dissertation aims to begin to alter 
scholarly opinions on the relevance of boxing to pre-revolutionary Cuban history. In doing 
so, it makes interventions into the historiography of three interrelated fields: Cuban national 
history, U.S.-Cuban relations, and sports history. I will describe each intervention one by one 
– and the trajectory of my own arguments – before detailing the framework of this project. 
 
Historians have increasingly argued for the centrality of culture to the development 
of nation-states. As George Lipsitz puts it, culturally based studies “provide sophisticated 
and convincing arguments about the ways in which the commonplace and ordinary practices 
of everyday life often encode larger social and ideological meaning.”18 These types of 
                                                
     18 George Lipsitz, “Con Safos: Can Cultural Studies Read the Writing on the Wall?” (1991 paper), pp. 11-12, 
quoted in España-Maram, Creating Masculinity in Los Angeles’s Little Manila, p. 8. 
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meaning include, but are not limited to, racial, class, and gendered discourse. Although 
scholars of Cuba have long favored the study of its economic, political, and (to a lesser 
extent) social changes, they have been slower to embrace the study of cultural transmissions 
as representative of and impactful upon the underpinnings of social life. In his study of 
Afro-Cuban music from 1920 to 1940, Robin D. Moore notes that Cuban cultural studies 
have been hampered by an “abysmal state of research on modern presocialist Cuba,” i.e., the 
republic period.19 This imbalance has begun to be addressed in the past decade. In the realm 
of music, Moore’s earlier work has made a significant impact, as has his chapter on the 1950s 
in his monograph on music and the Cuban Revolution. Louis A. Pérez, Jr.’s volume on U.S.-
Cuban relations in colonial and republic-era Cuba, On Becoming Cuban, now serves as an 
originating point for those seeking to comprehend the linkages between North American 
and Cuban cultures. Rosalie Schwartz’s history of tourism in Cuba explicitly links the 
development of cultural industries to the economic and political agendas of the state in both 
the republic and revolutionary eras.20 And several new works on the history of baseball in 
Cuba have strengthened the field even further.21 
While some may question whether boxing is inherently worthy of study (my co-
advisor Mauricio Tenorio Trillo once informed me that many academics view it as the 
equivalent of human cockfighting), I do argue that, one’s personal opinions of the sport 
aside, its examination does provide critical insights into the development of the Cuban 
nation from its early years as a republic to its efforts to embrace socialism in the early 1960s. 
                                                
     19 Robin D. Moore, Nationalizing Blackness: Afrocubanismo and Artistic Revolution in Havana, 1920-1940 
(Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997), pp. 8-9 (quote on p. 9). 
     20 Moore, Nationalizing Blackness; Moore, Music and Revolution: Cultural Change in Socialist Cuba (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2006); Pérez, Jr., On Becoming Cuban; Rosalie Schwartz, Pleasure Island: Tourism and 
Temptation in Cuba (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999). 
     21 See footnote 11 for a list of works on Cuban baseball in the republic and revolutionary eras. 
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On the level of gender studies, an exploration of how advocates of amateur and professional 
boxing (as well as the physical culture movement more generally) made a case for their sport 
offers perspective on the ways in which ideas of Cuban manhood were formulated and 
contested. Analyzing why a disproportionate number of Afro-Cubans began entering the 
prizefight ranks by the 1920s may shed light upon the limited opportunities available to them 
in other occupations and the ways in which the presence of champions such as Kid 
Chocolate helped to impact ideas of race and nation. The transformation of official 
approaches to boxing, from neglect or outright opposition to support and regulation, is 
worthy of discussion, as it can help to discern the priorities of the republican state and the 
manner by which it sought to achieve them. Finally, the turn toward socialism and disavowal 
of prizefighting have too long been viewed as inevitable results of the Cuban Revolution – a 
conclusion that I argue minimizes the complexity of the Castro regime’s early attempts to 
balance the interests of foreign tourism with its ambitious social reform agenda. 
My second intervention is in the historiography of U.S.-Cuban relations. Although 
most previous studies examined this relationship in light of politico-economic ties given the 
island’s former neocolonial status, the recent cultural turn, described above, has complicated 
the picture somewhat. Whether, how, and to what extent boxing became “Cuban” instead of 
simply an American import is at the heart of this dissertation. The U.S. contribution to the 
spread of a culture of prizefighting in Cuba from 1898 on, particularly in geographic areas 
with greater exposure to its occupying forces, must of course be addressed; but I question 
Louis A. Pérez, Jr.’s assumption that Cuban boxing is derivative of U.S. boxing because of 
the role that soldiers and expatriates had in first developing the sport. He quotes Cuban 
sportswriter (and later national boxing commissioner) Jess Losada’s contention that boxing 
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did not take root on the island independently of the Americans because of “the Cuban 
sensitivity – ‘a purely colonial characteristic’ – that ‘if you touch my face I’ll kill you.’”22 In 
the nineteenth century, Cuba did boast a small number of practitioners of the sport, though 
little is known about them, and their impact was limited. Yet one may acknowledge the 
importance of U.S. intervention in the development of boxing in Cuba – as in other locales 
under its jurisdiction, notably the Philippines – while also taking into account the ways in 
which the sport grew along national lines. 
At the turn of the twentieth century, boxing was an integral weapon in the United 
States “athletic crusade.” A term coined by Gerald Gems and explored in his writings as well 
as those of Louis A. Pérez, Jr. and Linda España-Maram, this “athletic crusade” sought to 
acculturate far-flung, polyglot dominions into a larger imperialist project, one that relied less 
on force, ideally, than on the creation of cultural affinities as well as economic ties.23 Gems 
notes that scholars of U.S. imperialism have long neglected the history of sport in American 
dominions, while sports historians have avoided the impact of U.S. imperialism upon foreign 
sporting cultures.24 He posits that, in Cuba, U.S. military representatives, Protestant 
missionaries, and other middle-class white expatriates were intent on teaching “morality” to 
the natives via instruction in sport, albeit filtered through the prism of anti-Catholicism and 
racism. Although baseball was initially the primary athletic vehicle for disseminating virtue, 
                                                
     22 Pérez, Jr., On Becoming Cuban, p. 175. The quote is from Jess Losada, “30 años de deporte profesional,” 
Carteles, 24 May 1936, pp. 117, 129. 
     23 Gerald R. Gems, The Athletic Crusade: Sport and American Cultural Imperialism (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2006); Pérez, Jr., “Between Baseball and Bullfighting”; España-Maram, Creating Masculinity in 
Los Angeles’s Little Manila, pp. 84-85. 
     24 Gems, The Athletic Crusade, p. 16. For an exploration of sport and masculinity in the context of British 
imperialism, see Patrick F. McDevitt, May the Best Man Win: Sport, Masculinity, and Nationalism in Great Britain and 
the Empire, 1880-1935 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
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basketball, football, track and field, and boxing, among other sports, also served as modes of 
moral transmission.25 
Boxing, in particular, was viewed to be a safe outlet for male aggression, especially 
for “less civilized” nonwhites or for those whose claim to whiteness was troubled by 
extended exposure to the tropics and to nonwhite peoples. While many missionaries loathed 
the environment in which prizefighting took root, amateur boxing was considered to offer 
useful training for the white middle classes, who might otherwise become “effeminate.” 
Even so, many U.S. military representatives and other expatriates eagerly supported the 
development of professional boxing, first in small public spectacles featuring little-known 
American opponents, but by the 1910s including a growing corpus of Cubans as well as a 
string of high-profile foreign fighters. Many early-twentieth century U.S. boxing boosters 
maintained that the sport was critical in advancing Cuban civilization because it could further 
“whiten” the white race. (Afro-Cuban and Asian Cuban boxers were of course excluded 
from this formulation.) 
This rhetoric was repeated by some middle-class Cubans who supported the new 
republic’s dependency on its more powerful northern neighbor. In 1915, one Cuban official 
stated that the public’s excitement over the Jack Johnson-Jess Willard heavyweight bout held 
in Havana “causes Cuban boys and even men to yearn for skill in the manly art of defending 
themselves with their fists instead of with knives and pistols.”26 The positioning of boxing as 
a refined means of settling conflicts and expressing natural male aggression is reminiscent of 
the nineteenth-century debate in Cuba over the civilizing mission of baseball versus 
                                                
     25 Gems, The Athletic Crusade, pp. 82-98. 
     26 “Willard Victor; Johnson Retires from Prize Ring,” New York Times, 6 April 1915, p. 8. 
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bullfighting, considered by some to be the “most ferocious and cruel of amusements.”27 Not 
all agreed that traditional Spanish forms of recreation were dangerous to the new nation, 
however. In response to lobbying by U.S. reform organizations such as the American Society 
for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the U.S. military government under the leadership 
of General Leonard Wood banned cockfighting and bullfighting in 1899. Yet local protests 
against the cockfighting ban were forceful enough that the national government reinstated 
the activity following the 1902 U.S. troop withdrawal.28 It is telling that some of its 
supporters viewed cockfighting as morally preferable to both pugilism and bullfighting; a 
petition to re-establish cockfighting stated in its defense, “It is not the spectacle of a bloody 
fight between a powerful wild beast and man, peon or cabelloro [sic]; nor is it the brutal 
contest between two athletes who undertake to conquer each other by blows with no other 
end than that of gaining money.”29 While bullfighting did not receive the same level of public 
support, there were periodic efforts to revive this form of public spectacle in the decades 
since its ban.30 
Although studies on the U.S. athletic crusade offer a valuable critique of the 
ideological underpinnings of the growth of boxing and other sports in U.S.-controlled 
outposts – based in then-current notions of muscular Protestantism as well American 
exceptionalism – they at times fail to take into account the ways in which these sports and 
their accompanying ideology were received by native peoples.31 By turning to non-U.S. 
                                                
     27 Pérez, “Between Baseball and Bullfighting,” p. 506. 
     28 Gems, The Athletic Crusade, p. 87. 
     29 “Island Press: On the Demand of the Cockfighters,” Havana Post, 13 September 1902, p. 2. 
     30 For example, see “Bullfight Petition Is Handed to the Senate,” Havana Post, 8 April 1915, p. 2. See also 
Pettavino and Pye, Sport in Cuba, p. 50, which notes that another attempt to reintroduce bullfighting in the 
1930s also ended in failure. 
     31 For a discussion of Muscular Christianity as expressed in early twentieth-century Cuba, see Chapter 1. 
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sources where available and looking beyond questions of theory to those of reception and 
implementation, we may invert U.S.-centered interpretations on the growth of sport and 
recreation in areas under its political and economic control to examine how peripheries (in 
this case, Cuba) responded to the U.S. effort to strengthen its hegemonic ties via sport and 
culture. This project, then, at its root attempts to describe the other side of the athletic 
crusade – how boxing in Cuba became “Cuban.” In the same vein, it seeks to complicate the 
historiography of U.S.-Cuban relations by exploring how ideas and practices disseminated by 
American actors were received and reacted upon by the Cuban masses as well as 
representatives of the nation-state. 
 My third intervention is in the realm of sports historiography. Despite efforts by U.S. 
and Cuban promoters, sponsors, and boosters to build up the sport as both respectable form 
of mass entertainment and as moral alternative to knife fighting and other types of colonial-
era combat, boxing never quite became integrated into the Cuban national project. Here it is 
instructive to note the distinctions between boxing and baseball in pre-revolutionary Cuba. 
If, as Pérez states, “baseball has long served to give expression to Cuban nationality, both as 
a means to nationhood and as a metaphor for nation,” then boxing’s ties to the nation have 
been somewhat more complex.32 
Pérez posits that nineteenth-century Cubans, attempting to throw off the yoke of 
Spanish colonization, “celebrated the modernity and progress implied in baseball, associated 
with the United States, and denounced the inhumanity and backwardness suggested by 
bullfighting, associated with Spain.” The inclusion of middle-class women at early baseball 
games was an indicator of “the gentility and refinement of baseball,” while “the blurring of 
                                                
     
32
 Pérez, Jr., “Between Baseball and Bullfighting,” p. 494. 
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class lines” meant that baseball offered “a usable paradigm of social order.” The sport 
offered “both local attachments and national allegiance,” giving audience members the 
opportunity to cheer on their hometown or neighborhood teams in domestic competition 
and to express their nationhood in competitions against the U.S. Finally, he argues, baseball 
evoked the strivings of Cubans for national independence because “defeat was temporary 
and victory a function of preparation (practice) and unity (teamwork).”33 
 All of these characteristics, with the possible exception of the last, were evident in 
boxing. Although it took several decades longer for boxing to emerge as a Cuban pastime – 
thus, the national debate over boxing did not coincide with the independence struggle from 
Spain – by the early 1920s the arguments that it represented a “manly” sport better fitted to 
the new nation than knife fighting or other types of individual combat had helped to achieve 
the sport’s legalization and regulation. Middle-class women were, from at least the second 
decade of the twentieth century, an important (if minority) element of the audience base for 
boxing, and by the early 1950s, they would constitute a portion of its television viewers. 
While class lines remained evident at the fights in many ways – the location and quality of 
one’s seating, one’s dress and comportment – boxing also represented the “blurring of class 
lines,” as the sport developed a passionate following among middle- as well as working-class 
whites and Afro-Cubans. Fighters were closely identified with their provinces, cities, and 
towns, often taking their ring monikers from the geographic region in which they were born 
or bred. Still, foreign competitors were visible enough, particularly beginning in the 1920s, 
that there were sufficient opportunities for audience members, at least in Havana, to express 
nationalist sentiments via opposition to the outsider. (As can be seen in the Lorenzo Safora-
                                                
     33 Ibid., pp. 493-517 (quotes on pp. 505, 507, 508, 509, and 508 respectively). 
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Small Montana example referenced at length above, however, the individual nature of 
boxing allowed even partisan audiences to shift loyalties when they felt that the local fighter 
was not performing well enough or that an injustice had been done in the scoring.) 
Lastly, and where boxing departs most significantly from baseball, the teamwork 
needed to ensure victory or stave off harrowing defeat was primarily carried on behind the 
scenes, during workouts and sparring sessions that had taken place weeks and even months 
beforehand. Such teamwork was most often visible to observers during the one-minute rest 
periods when the boxer’s cornermen, or seconds, could work their magic – ironing out 
swelling, staunching blood flows, massaging muscles, hydrating, pestering, imploring, or, 
when the situation was dire enough, stopping the fight altogether. Nor, as in baseball, was 
defeat always temporary; ring deaths, permanent injuries, and other damage could work their 
toll. A dominant fighter – heavier, stronger, more powerful – was too often said to have 
“ruined” an outmatched opponent, as former world welterweight champion Benny “Kid” 
Paret, of Santa Clara, Cuba, was ruined by Gene Fullmer in December 1961. The vicious 
tenth-round knockout administered by Fullmer rendered Paret vulnerable to the kind of 
beating he received from his next opponent, Emile Griffith, in March 1962 – one that left 
him in a coma from which he never awoke.34 
Given Pérez’s explanation for why baseball came to be identified with the nation, we 
must ask why boxing – despite attempts by the republic-era state to co-opt boxing for its 
                                                
     34 The story of Paret’s death is told in Chapter 6. Although safety precautions have been put in place to 
prevent this type of one-sided beating, which often leads to brain injury or death should the vanquished 
opponent continue fighting, there have of late been a number of mismatches that ruined a prizefighter’s career, 
or health, or took his (or, more rarely but more controversially, her) life. Each has led to a call for greater 
boxing safety and at times effected minimal changes, but the financial incentive remains high for damaged 
boxers to return to the ring. For an instance in which a “ruined” fighter chose to retire rather than risk greater 
trauma, see “Gamache, 33, Gets Advice, Then Retires,” New York Times, 11 March 2000. 
 21 
own purposes – did not coexist with it as easily. As established as boxing became – and mid-
century Saturday night shows in Havana were testimony to the sport’s popularity among the 
people and acceptance by the state – its relationship to nationalism was always somewhat 
strained. There are several explanations as to why. One, the sport’s inherent connection to 
destructive violence – of violence as not only its means, but its end – visibly contradicted the 
notion that its practice was civilized, an ideal way to shape young manhood and to prepare 
the nation for actual warfare. Two, the reliance upon judges and referees to determine 
decisions meant that there was the potential for fraud or, simply, bad decision-making to 
affect a contest’s outcome. The impact of gambling, later tied to organized crime, increased 
the likelihood that the results of bouts might be tarnished – making safeguards by the state 
(including the ability to overturn results) a necessity. Third, the individual nature of the sport 
made it easier to distinguish between athlete and nation; not all fighters were well-liked or 
respected by knowledgeable audiences. Fourth, the prevalence of Afro-Cubans in the ring 
may have led to a further disjunction between (white) observers and (black) competitors. 
Unlike baseball, which in its infancy remained racially segregated, the color line in early 
prizefights was rarely enforced. Despite fears that interracial bouts would increase division 
between the races (or even lead to riots), it was impractical to keep the races apart in the 
boxing ring – and doing so violated many Cubans’ sense of fair play. Fifth, by the late 1930s, 
the close relationship that developed between amateur and professional boxing – with the 
former becoming a feeder system for the latter – meant that regional and international 
amateur tournaments, which might have brought prestige to the nation, were not a high 
priority in republic-era Cuba. Rather, boxing in its professional variant was viewed almost 
from the beginning as a money-making vehicle for the state. From the 1915 tourist bonanza 
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of the Jack Johnson-Jess Willard bout to the young Castro regime’s seemingly incongruous 
attempt to align prizefighting with its socialist agenda, boxing was often as much about 
attracting foreign revenue as it was about building a domestic audience base. 
 As described by anthropologist Heather Levi in her study of lucha libre (Mexican 
professional wrestling), the tragic figure of the boxer as written into Mexican popular culture 
contributed to his marginalization from the nation: “The boxer was a figure of national 
pride. But the boxer also came to symbolize instability and the failure of social reproduction 
in the urban setting.” She notes that “the narrative of the boxer – the meteoric rise, the 
personal turmoil, the crushing setbacks, and sudden fall from grace” contrasted with that of 
the luchador, which “promised a vision of stability, an incorruptible hero immune to the 
ravages of time.”35 In Cuba, the inability of once successful boxers, such as national 
champions Baby Coullimber (who murdered his manager) and Joe Legón (who was himself 
murdered), to overcome the poverty, uncertainty, and criminality of their youth contributed 
to the sense that prizefighting destroyed not only its journeymen, but its champions as well. 
The brevity of an average boxer’s career – until recently, most were considered “washed up” 
by their early 30s, and many long before that – further emphasized the fragility of a career in 
the ring and the risks that were involved in embarking upon one. Although I do not here 
systematically attempt to link popular culture portrayals of boxers in Cuba to their actual 
trajectories in and out of the ring, this disjuncture between image and reality (particularly in 
representations of transnational Cuban citizens who spent the most critical years of their 
careers in the United States) are suggestive of the ways in which other cultural forms – art, 
                                                
     35 Heather Levi, The World of Lucha Libre: Secrets, Revelations, and Mexican National Identity (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2008), pp. 189-190. Although Levi is describing the Mexican context, the narrative of the 
tragic boxer is one that has wide applicability – most notably, perhaps, in U.S. popular culture. 
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literature, drama, music, and film, to name a few – are influenced by, and impose their own 
influences upon, the world of sport.36 
 
 Finally, it may help readers to have a clear outline of what this project proposes to 
do. The central time period under discussion is from 1898 to 1962, i.e., from the U.S. 
military intervention in the Cuban War of Independence (1895-1898) to the year in which 
the regime of Fidel Castro prohibited professional sports, including boxing, in Cuba. 
Chapters are organized chronologically, with sections divided thematically. 
Chapter 1 begins with a description of Muscular Christianity, a movement that began 
in Great Britain and carried over to the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century. It sought to counter what its advocates feared was the growing effeminacy of 
Protestant, middle-class, white males through the embrace of “manly” sports and other 
activities, including entry into the Cuban and Philippine independence struggles. The chapter 
then moves to a discussion of Cuban amateur and professional boxing from the late 
nineteenth century to the early 1910s. Though heavily influenced by U.S. and other 
expatriates, the sport developed in fits and starts due in part to government resistance. 
One ambitious if ill-fated foreign intervention was the effort by the Young Men’s 
Christian Association (YMCA) to establish a foothold in Cuba. Amateur boxing was an 
important part of its mission, influenced by the Muscular Christianity movement, to boost 
the virility and self-esteem of white middle-class youth. In its efforts to propagate the sport 
in Cuba, however, the YMCA reinforced the color line that was already in place at elite 
                                                
     36 For U.S. (and, to a lesser extent, European) cultural representations of prizefighting, particularly its 
heavyweight division, see Kasia Boddy, Boxing: A Cultural History (London: Reaktion Books, 2008). 
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Cuban social clubs and, in so doing, limited the effectiveness of its outreach. Having sent its 
first secretary to Havana in 1904, the YMCA finally ceased operations there in 1932 and was 
never active on the island again. 
Chapter 2 is a departure from the remainder of this project in that it focuses on a 
single prizefight involving non-Cuban actors: the April 5, 1915, title fight between Jack 
Johnson and Jess Willard. It begins with background on Johnson’s early years and personal 
life, including his rise through the heavyweight ranks, assumption of the world 
championship, unconventional relationships with women, and battles with a racist U.S. 
government, which prosecuted him on Mann Act violations and forced him into exile in 
1913. From there, I describe the processes that took Johnson to Cuba and how the 
promoter of his fight with Jess Willard, future wrestling impresario Jack Curley, was 
persuaded to stage it in Havana. 
I admittedly say little about the mechanics of the bout, which lasted for twenty-six of 
forty-five scheduled rounds and which ended in what was not then, but would become, a 
controversial knockout. This is not because the fight does not have a place among the most 
important of the century – many boxing commentators would agree with me that it does – 
but because I wish to maintain a focus upon the reactions of the Cuban press, politicians, 
promoters, and public to the presence of the fighters (especially Johnson) and to the 
aftermath of the fight. I argue that, while the bout itself was a high water mark in the 
development of Cuba’s early tourist industry, it did not in itself kick off the country’s 
prizefighting culture, as Louis A. Pérez, Jr., seems to imply.37 Rather, U.S. promoters had 
already seized upon Havana as the site for potential championship events between foreign 
                                                
     37 See Pérez, Jr., On Becoming Cuban, pp. 175-177. 
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fighters, as well as undercards involving up-and-coming or veteran Cuban pros. Yet a 
backlash against interracial bouts, resentment over how little the bout actually benefited its 
local boosters, and the Cuban government’s and elites’ indecision over what to do with 
boxing – legalize and regulate it, ban it entirely, or allow it to remain in quasi-legal limbo 
without official state support or funding – helped to kill much of the initial momentum 
generated by the Johnson-Willard fight. With attempts to stamp out boxing in Havana, the 
sport was further diffused into the interior, where tolerance for it was greater and pugilistic 
contests tended to be local affairs generating little outside publicity. 
 The remaining chapters broaden the focus well beyond a single fight or set of 
fighters, and also beyond Havana, although it remains at the center of this work for logistical 
as well as substantial reasons. It is true that most of the important Cuban prizefights – ones 
that contested national and world championships, for instance – took place in Havana rings. 
Yet with notable exceptions (such as Kid Chocolate, who grew up in the Havana barrio of 
Cerro), the best fighters tended to emerge from the interior, recruited to the capital as boys 
or young men once their talents were discovered. Without the widespread development of 
boxing in the provinces, Cuba could never have sustained its levels of international success. 
Nonetheless, most of the primary and secondary material I have consulted (sport and general 
interest periodicals, newspapers, memoirs, government documents, scholarly works on sport 
and culture in Cuba, and non-scholarly articles, web sites, and books on Cuban boxing more 
specifically) does little to flesh out the processes by which boxing first spread to, and then 
flourished in, provinces such as Camagüey, Oriente, and Matanzas. Whenever possible, I 
address these and other areas, although with the realization that much more needs to be 
done to bring them more fully into the story of boxing in Cuba. 
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 Chapter 3 looks at the twenty or so years of Cuban pugilism following the Johnson-
Willard bout. It details why and how, by 1921, the Cuban state had created a national boxing 
commission to legalize and regulate the amateur and professional variants of the sport. With 
previous bans – including one that lasted from March 1919 to December 1920 – proving 
unable to stamp out the sport, which counted among its enthusiasts many men of social 
prominence, the state at first tried a policy of noninterference in the staging of boxing events 
before moving to regulate and license them. The pent-up public demand for fight cards, 
particularly in the capital, led to an explosion of public spectacles beginning in 1921 which 
the state sought to oversee in order to ensure athletes’ safety and to obtain revenues from 
licensing fees. By 1922, the Unión Atlética Amateur de Cuba (Amateur Athletic Union of 
Cuba, UAAC) offered its first boxing tournament for white athletes, members of the YMCA 
or exclusive social clubs, to compete against one another. Although prizefighting had long 
been integrated, the UAAC would continue to exclude Afro-Cubans from its tournaments 
for several years, forcing them to compete within their own amateur associations or at 
racially integrated tournaments, or to forgo the amateur ranks altogether to become semi-
professionals. 
Additionally, this chapter explores how the boxing explosion of the early-to-mid 
1920s led to the rise of Kid Chocolate, who won the first world boxing title on behalf of his 
country in 1931 and elevated foreign perceptions of Cuban boxing. Chocolate, who fought 
most of his important fights in the United States, went on to become a two-time world 
champion and idol to millions of Cubans. While his many years of obscurity during the first 
three decades of the Revolution may have dulled his legacy, he is still admired among many 
Cubans today for his athletic achievements and the pride that he brought to the island. 
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 Chapter 4 analyzes the role of various state institutions, particularly the national 
sports headquarters, the Dirección Nacional General de Deportes (later renamed the 
Dirección General de Deportes, or DGD, as I refer to it throughout) and the Comisión 
Nacional de Boxeo y Luchas (National Commission of Boxing and Wrestling), in furthering 
the institutionalization of boxing in the late 1930s and 1940s. By the late 1930s, Cuba led the 
way in developing a constant pipeline of talented youths from the amateur and semi-
professional ranks into the top levels of national and international prizefighting. Two key 
elements of this approach were the adoption of a Cuban Golden Gloves amateur 
tournament, modeled on but not initially a part of the U.S. organization of the same name, 
and the regularization of a semi-professional system that offered pittances to those too poor 
to compete strictly as amateurs yet seeking an entrée into the professional game. Another 
was the formation of a national boxing academy in Havana intended to aid talented but 
impoverished youngsters from the interior. Students were provided room, board, health 
care, and tutoring in the fundamentals of boxing by the likes of Kid Chocolate and other top 
former prizefighters. 
Some U.S. observers, such as The Ring editor Nat Fleischer, saw much to admire in 
this system, which – though reflecting the state’s disinterest in sending the best young men 
into international amateur competition – created a self-renewing prizefighting industry. On 
one level, it was a rudimentary version of what Castro’s regime would later accomplish with 
the production of amateur athletes, and one that was also, in many ways, as color-blind. 
Unlike its amateur variant, talent, not race, was the key to success in the Cuban prizefighting 
arena. Yet the system’s efficacy was limited by extreme corruption from DGD Director 
Jaime Mariné on down and by the lack of political stability in the neocolonial regime. With 
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the departure of President Batista from the Presidency in 1944 and the ouster of Mariné, the 
subsequent Ramón Grau (1944-1948) and Carlos Prío Socarrás (1948-1952) administrations 
ushered in a deepening of political corruption and the increasing movement of Cuban 
boxers abroad, driven to a peripatetic existence by lack of opportunities at home. 
 Chapter 5 explores how the state’s increased focus on fostering tourism, both before 
and during the 1952-1958 Batista dictatorship, helped to fuel the outflow of prizefighters 
abroad. Later in the decade, the Batista regime attempted to marshal revenues for its new 
sports commission by staging major athletic events, such as automobile races and world 
championship prizefights, that could attract national prestige as well as foreign tourists. Yet 
its efforts to make Cuba an international destination for sports aficionados were hampered 
by graft, inefficiency, and the intensification of the rebel movement. 
This chapter also examines how television changed the audience for and reception of 
professional boxing in Cuba and the United States from the late 1940s to mid-1950s. In each 
nation, TV became an important element in the spread of boxing, as it introduced previously 
unfamiliar audiences – women, children, and residents of outlying areas – to the sport. In the 
United States, this medium was especially threatening to those who made their living from 
live boxing shows, particularly at smaller arenas. The “TV debate” there foreshadowed many 
of the changes that would occur as boxing became big business, including the closure of 
local clubs, the creation of made-for-TV pugilists, and the de-emphasis on subtle, defensive 
tactics in favor of a more aggressive style of fighting that played well on television. In Cuba, 
televised fights tended to focus on major bouts in the capital and did not have the same 
impact upon the boxing culture, probably because television was introduced there later and 
because so many of the best Cuban fighters were already living abroad. 
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 Coinciding with the growth of televised prizefighting in both countries, and seeming 
to embody the TV era, was the rise of Cuba’s second world champion, Kid Gavilán. A 
determined fighter who fought best at welterweight but faced some tough middleweight 
competition late in his career, he was a veteran of nearly 150 prizefights who was never 
knocked out and rarely knocked down. Still, Gavilán was renowned less for his grittiness 
than his flashiness, particularly his innovative use of the bolo punch. His talents went well 
beyond  a single punch, as his long career demonstrated; indeed, he was the cream of the 
crop of young Cuban boxers in the 1940s and 1950s who gained valuable experience in that 
country’s emerging amateur and semi-pro system. Their success was mirrored by that of 
Cuba’s musicians in the 1950s, who, as Robin D. Moore demonstrates, created forms of 
cultural production that were consumed alike by tourists and locals in Cuba and by the U.S. 
market. The top Cuban artists and athletes in the decade or so prior to the Revolution – 
none more so than Gavilán – could thus inhabit a transnational space that allowed them to 
operate almost as citizens of two countries.38 
 Chapter 6 reflects upon the decline of Cuban prizefighting in the revolutionary years 
of 1959 to 1962. In one sense, the traditional idea – adhered to by proponents as well as 
opponents of the sweeping changes brought on by the Revolution – that 1962 marked a 
turning point in the island’s boxing and baseball industries is correct. For, in that year, the 
Castro regime banned professional sports as being incompatible with the socialist project, 
forcing active athletes into exile or retirement. In another sense, however, this demarcation 
of a “before” and “after” in modern Cuban sports history neglects the revolutionary state’s 
                                                
     38 See Moore, Music and Revolution, particularly Chapter 1, “Revelry and Revolution: The Paradox of the 
1950s,” pp. 26-55. 
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early attempts to maintain its foreign tourist base, of which professional boxing was a critical 
component, while attempting to reform the worst excesses of the sport from within. This 
chapter examines the gradual transformation of state attitudes towards sport in general and 
boxing in particular, and the ways in which athletes, trainers, and others intricately linked 
with professional boxing responded when they were forced to choose between country and 
career. It also analyzes the use of boxers for propagandistic purposes by revolutionaries and 
counter-revolutionaries before and after 1959. 
Fidel Castro and his associates initially sought to maintain professional boxing and 
baseball in Cuba while mitigating what was felt to be their exploitative aspects. Yet the 
growing standoff between the U.S. and Cuba, and the latter’s move toward the Soviet camp, 
helped to jettison the tourist market that sustained these industries and the desire of the state 
to maintain them. In accordance with socialist ideals, the only true sporting agenda was 
reconceived to be one that involved the masses as participants as well as spectators and that 
resulted in the glory of individual athletes being mobilized for national prestige rather than 
individual wealth. 
 The Conclusion reviews the success that Cuba’s national boxing team has sustained 
on the international amateur stage since 1962 and the perils that it faces as it is increasingly 
racked by defections among its ranks. It is possible only to speculate how a prospective 
thawing of the U.S.-Cuba relationship, and democratic and economic reforms in Cuba itself, 
may affect the likelihood that professional boxing will flourish there again anytime soon. 
What is likely, given how lucrative pay-per-view revenues have made big-time boxing in the 
United States and how much Major League Baseball depends upon prospective Latin 
American stars, is that – with a loosening of travel restrictions on both the Cuban and U.S. 
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sides – the island’s top tier of boxers, baseball players, and other athletes may someday relive 
the experiences of their predecessors in the 1940s and 1950s and be able to function as 
transnational citizens, remaining closely affined with their native country while living and 
working in another. 
 A few linguistic addenda are in order. I have used Spanish orthography throughout 
except in quoting original English-language source material. Although most Cuban boxers 
active in the U.S. found the spelling (and, at times, pronunciation) of their names simplified 
for English usage, this distinction is most noticeable in the case of Gavilán, whose name was 
almost never written in the U.S. press with the diacritic. As a result, the pronunciation of his 
ring name in the United States tended to favor the first syllable – i.e., Kid GAV-i-lan – rather 
than the last syllable, as in Spanish. Similarly, Kid Chocolate was generally known as Kid 
CHOC-late in the United States but as Kid Cho-co-LA-te in Spanish-speaking countries. 
Cuban heavyweight champion and world contender Geraldo Ramos Ponciano Valdés, a.k.a. 
“El Niño” (pronounced NEEN-yo) Valdés, was similarly transformed into Nino Valdes in 
the United States. There are numerous other instances where the spelling and pronunciation 
of pugilists’ names varied across national and perhaps regional lines, but I use these as 
examples because, during their peak years, they were some of the most visible Cuban faces in 
the United States. In contrast to scholars who use the adjective and noun “North American” 
as a synonym for “U.S.,” I have opted to use the term “American” to describe people, 
customs, and institutions from or of the United States. I do this for the sake of clarity, as 
Canadians were (albeit to a much smaller extent than their neighbors to the south) active in 
twentieth-century fistic circles – including Jack Johnson’s predecessor as heavyweight 
champion, Tommy Burns. When invoking the Americas more broadly, I make that 
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distinction clear. Finally, I have capitalized the Cuban Revolution (or, simplified, the 
Revolution) as a proper noun when discussing the political movement that overthrew the 
Batista regime and which to this day has maintained a firm grip upon the Cuban populace.39 
 This project attempts to cast light on a subject that has remained for too long the 
purview of journalists, amateur historians, and propagandists on both the pro- and anti-
Castro sides. By incorporating academic insights with little-known primary and secondary 
source material, not all of it in the realm of traditional scholarship, I hope that I have 
succeeded at least in part in providing a glimpse into the processes by which boxing became 
such an integral part of Cuban cultural identity from the end of the independence struggle to 
the beginning of the revolutionary regime.
                                                
     39 For an accessible introduction to the history and impact of the Revolution, which lies largely beyond the 
scope of this work, see Marifeli Pérez-Stable, The Cuban Revolution: Origins, Course, and Legacy, 2nd ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 
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Chapter 1: The Rise of Cuban Boxing, 1898-1915 
 
Muscular Christianity in the Cuban Context 
The process by which boxing entered Cuban society predated, but certainly 
accelerated with, the onset of U.S. occupation in the wake of the national independence 
struggle. By the end of the nineteenth century, public spectacles featuring U.S. as well as 
native pugilists could be found in various parts of the island; by the early 1910s, prizefighting 
had begun to take hold among native Cubans as well as foreigners. Shortly after the 
republic’s founding, moreover, the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) had 
initiated amateur boxing classes and exhibitions at its new Havana branch. While the latter’s 
impact upon the shape of Cuban boxing was limited by that organization’s relatively brief 
existence in Havana and its embrace of racial segregation, it nonetheless offered a space in 
which boys and young men from “good” families became exposed to the sport. 
The advent of Muscular Christianity preceded by some decades the onset of the 
Spanish-Cuban-American War, but it helped to construct ideas of manhood that would fuel 
the movement to involve the U.S. in that late nineteenth-century conflict – and, eventually, 
to accelerate and intensify the development of amateur and professional boxing in Cuba. 
Defined as “a Christian commitment to health and manliness,” the ideology of Muscular 
Christianity can be traced back to the New Testament, but did not become a clearly 
demarcated philosophy until the second half of the nineteenth century. English writers 
Charles Kingsley and Thomas Hughes are credited with first developing this philosophy in 
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their 1850s novels.1 Their ideas “fused a hardy physical manliness with ideals of Christian 
service” and were soon advocated in the U.S. by Thomas Wentworth Higginson in the pages 
of Atlantic Monthly. Higginson and other advocates of this new way of thinking felt that it 
was necessary “to revirilize the image of Jesus [Christ] and thus remasculinize the Church.”2 
They lamented the “feminine” ways in which Jesus had been traditionally depicted, the 
“womanly” bodies and attire of Christian ministers, and the artificial separation of physicality 
from spirituality. Muscular Christianity played into contemporary fears of the growing 
influence of women in boys’ and men’s lives – including a notable sex imbalance (skewed 
toward women) among schoolteachers and missionaries. By leading a “strenuous” as well as 
upstanding life, its advocates claimed, boys and men could rescue Christianity (read as 
middle-class, white, Protestantism) as well as their own manliness. 
In the late nineteenth century, notions of Muscular Christianity took hold in various 
realms of U.S. life, from the churches to the White House. Theodore Roosevelt was perhaps 
its most influential advocate, choosing to embrace a physically challenging lifestyle despite 
his patrician background. Although not all supporters of Muscular Christianity supported 
U.S. military intervention in foreign wars, there was quite a bit of verbal slippage between 
Muscular Christianity and calls for building an American empire in other lands. 
In her provocative thesis on the Spanish-Cuban-American War and its counterpart in 
the Philippines, Kristin L. Hoganson argues that “gender beliefs contributed to the jingoist 
clamor for war.” By examining the ways in which males and females were gendered in late 
                                                
     1 For ideological background of the movement as it was conceived in Great Britain, see Clifford Putney, 
Muscular Christianity: Manhood and Sports in Protestant America, 1880-1920 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
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     2 Michael S. Kimmel, Manhood in America: A Cultural History, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
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nineteenth-century U.S. life, Hoganson links anxieties over gender to the processes by which 
a political case was made for military intervention in Cuba and the Philippines. In the 1890s, 
American jingoes (whom she defines as a diverse group of men united by their common 
desire for war) feared that women’s increased levels of activism, including involvement in 
domestic and international affairs, would undermine the “manly basis of politics, if not 
manhood itself.” Advocates such as Theodore Roosevelt and Alfred Thayer Mahan based 
their jingoist sentiments upon the idea that only military service could ensure the manliness 
of American men and provide a secure basis for democracy. During the last years of the 
Cuban independence struggle, jingoes sought to defend the “honor” of white Cuban women 
against the villainous Spanish colonizers and adroitly manipulated the February 1898 sinking 
of the U.S. battleship Maine in Havana harbor (which was attributed as an attack by Spain, 
although this was never proved) as an affront to American manhood. Indeed, Hoganson 
notes, the honor of Cuban women took a back seat to that of American men following the 
sinking of the Maine. Jingoes effectively depicted those who were reluctant to enter the 
Cuban war with Spain as effeminate cowards, equating them with women if they failed to 
support a military intervention. Even President McKinley was not exempt from public 
snickers about his manhood. Although it seems he had reservations about entering the 
Spanish-Cuban conflict, he undoubtedly felt pressure from journalists, congressmen, and 
military leaders who were clamoring for blood. Ultimately, Hoganson writes, “McKinley 
reached the logical conclusion that war was politically imperative.”3 
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Building upon Hoganson’s work, Paul Kramer reminds us that “imperial race-
making was a fundamentally gendered process” that allowed “imperial nationalists” to find 
manly qualities lacking in both domestic critics of imperialism and in the colonized other.4 A 
strong patriarchal strain was clearly evident in the U.S. imperialist projects in the Philippines, 
Cuba, Puerto Rico, and other territories at the turn of the twentieth century. American 
ideologies emasculated native men politically as being incapable of self-government. In the 
case of the Philippines, as in Cuba, these views – that the weakness and cowardliness of its 
native men contributed to its being a colony – were completely at odds with their actual 
contributions to the anti-Spanish war effort and with the ways in which their martial 
traditions reflected a continuing resistance to outside control. Why, for instance, did boxing 
become so much more a part of Filipino cultural life than baseball despite extensive efforts 
by U.S. colonial administrators to foster the latter’s development? A deeper analysis of 
boxing’s rise in the Philippines in the early twentieth century would need to include an 
understanding of pre-Spanish Filipino martial arts, such as Kali, which had their origin in 
India and were used, with European adaptations, against both Spanish and U.S. colonizers as 
a form of community self-defense.5 
The popularity of Muscular Christianity in the fin-de-siècle United States led to an 
enthusiastic embrace of sports and recreation, both as means (a mode for moral education) 
and end (to build hardy bodies that could work for Christian salvation). Although Linda 
España-Maram’s assertion that – following the incorporation of the Philippines into the U.S. 
                                                
     4 Paul A. Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race Empire, the United States, and the Philippines (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2006), p. 23. 
     5 I am grateful to my husband, Billy Geoghegan, a practitioner of Kali-based Filipino martial arts, for first 
introducing me to this topic. This point is also made in The Great Pinoy Boxing Era, 1994, which notes that early 
twentieth-century Filipino boxers introduced a “crouching” style into modern boxing that was based upon their 
training in Filipino martial arts. 
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empire – “[i]nstruction in American sports, including boxing and baseball, became part of 
the indoctrination of Filipinos into ‘good’ colonials” is a bit overstated, it is true that U.S. 
military, civil, and religious leaders viewed instruction in such sports as critical to the 
development of modern colonial and neocolonial subjects.6 In the Philippine context, the 
fact that these subjects were nonwhite bodies who had already amply demonstrated their 
martial spirit through years of armed resistance to U.S. intervention complicated the ways in 
which these athletic traditions were conveyed. Gerald Gems posits that, in the Philippines, 
Americans’ advocacy of sport was an effort to “redirect” native nationalist sentiment.7 In the 
Cuban context, as we explore in the next two sections, sport was not so much intended to 
redirect nationalism as it was to co-opt white, Catholic, middle- and upper-class men into the 
neocolonial project, one that sought to rigidify race and class divides and to strengthen the 
existing U.S. hegemony. 
Yet there was no consensus as to how best to achieve the growth of U.S.-favored 
sports within the new empire. Nowhere was this more evident than with boxing in Cuba. 
While YMCA leaders and other evangelical missionaries generally disavowed the pursuit of 
prizefighting for its associations with the lower classes, gambling, and interracial 
competition, other U.S. expatriates supported the commercial possibilities that prizefighting 
afforded and avidly sought out boxing spectacles as entertainment. Among these boosters, 
however, were disagreements as to whether interracial competition was problematic or not – 
                                                
     6 España-Maram, Creating Masculinity in Los Angeles’s Little Manila, p. 75. Modern boxing, of course, was not 
an American invention but was developed in Great Britain. 
     7 For background on U.S. efforts to “redirect” Filipino nationalism through sport, see Gerald R. Gems, 
“Anthropology Days, the Construction of Whiteness, and American Imperialism in the Philippines,” in The 
1904 Anthropology Days and Olympic Games: Sport, Race, and American Imperialism, ed. Susan Brownell (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2008), pp. 189-216, and Gems, The Athletic Crusade, Chapter 4: “Sport and 
Colonialism in the Philippines,” pp. 45-66. 
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an issue that came to the fore as a substantial number of nonwhite foreign competitors, 
particularly African Americans, were recruited to display their skills in Havana rings. 
The first section below explores the growth of early forms of Cuban boxing, 
especially prizefighting, in the late colonial and early republic periods. The second section 
analyzes the role of the Havana YMCA in offering an outlet for white boys and men who 
wished to learn how to box. What follows last is an exploration of the growth of athletic 
infrastructure in Havana, which played a critical role in the city’s landing the most important 
prizefight in the world at that time – the April 1915 world heavyweight title contest between 
champion Jack Johnson and challenger Jess Willard. The story of their bout is told in the 
next chapter. 
 
Cuban Boxing in the Colonial and Early Republic Periods 
In Cuba, although public boxing spectacles first appeared with regularity only during 
the first U.S. military occupation (1898-1902), earlier martial traditions held sway, particularly 
among the upper classes. Fencing was a popular pastime inherited from the Spanish, and 
French-style kickboxing (savate) as well as English-style boxing may have existed as far back 
as the mid-1800s. Using newspapers from the mid-to-late nineteenth century, Cuban sports 
historian Carlos Reig Romero has documented accounts of boxing classes on the island as 
early as 1843, presumably in Santiago de Cuba; the presence in 1886 of a North American 
boxing instructor at the Club Gimnástico, located on Havana’s Prado Street; and the first-
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known English-style boxing match held in Cuba, an exhibition staged by two visiting 
baseball players from the United States, in December 1892.8 
Late colonial Cuba was also floated as the possible host of a high-profile 
heavyweight title fight. In January 1894, James J. “Gentleman Jim” Corbett – who had got 
his start during the bare-knuckle days and had recently defeated John L. Sullivan in 1892 in 
the first world heavyweight boxing championship bout to use gloves – was rumored to be 
fighting Charley Mitchell in Cuba (presumably Havana) after the Duval Athletic Club of 
Jacksonville, Florida, fell behind in constructing an arena for their bout. The opposition to 
holding the event there by Florida’s governor, Henry L. Mitchell (no relation to Corbett’s 
opponent), was a primary stumbling block despite his state’s prior legalization of “scientific 
boxing exhibitions” and the Jacksonville City Council’s approval of gloved contests. Despite 
the logistical delays, threats of intervention, and staunch political opposition, the bout was 
held on January 25 in Jacksonville, with Corbett easily winning by third-round knockout.9 
While these glimpses of early boxing culture in Cuba are tantalizing, much more 
work remains to be done on the origins of boxing in the Spanish colonial period and the 
ways in which both U.S. and European norms may have influenced them. For instance, Reig 
Romero has unearthed evidence that savate was practiced in some mid-nineteenth century 
                                                
     8  Carlos E. Reig Romero, YMCA de la Habana: Memorias deportivas 1905-1910 (Quito, Ecuador: Imprenta 
Hojas y Signos Vasco de Contreras, 2003), pp. 137-138. Reig Romero identifies the ballplayers as “Earle” and 
“York.” 
     9 Whether or not the fight would be held was closely scrutinized in the New York Times for several months. 
See, for instance, “To Fight at Jacksonville,” New York Times, 16 November 1893, p. 2; “Gov. Mitchell 
Thwarted,” New York Times, 6 December 1893, p. 2; “Will Try to Stop the Fight,” New York Times, 23 
December 1893, p. 2; “Sure of Stopping the Fight,” New York Times, 30 December 1893, p. 6; “Fighters Are 
Discouraged,” New York Times, 7 January 1894, p. 3; and “Corbett Wins the Fight,” New York Times, 26 January 
1894, p. 6. 
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social clubs, as gentlemen of the era were expected to engage in strength training techniques 
and strategies of self-defense, such as fencing.10 
From the beginning of the first U.S. military occupation to the end of the second 
(1906-1909), boxing spectacles began to be seen on the island with more regularity. On 
March 18, 1899, in the city of Matanzas, six U.S. soldiers from the 12th Regiment of 
Volunteers took part in what may have been the first fight card staged in Cuba. Three ten-
minute bouts were held there at the Teatro Sausto. It is likely that more bouts took place 
that year. By September, the Secretary of State and Government recommended that the civil 
and provincial governors not grant permission to hold boxing shows and to punish those 
who did. This ban was ineffective at preventing underground boxing, as other, later 
prohibitions would be. In January 1902, for instance, a fight card was held at the Teatro de 
Marianao at which over 500 people attended.11 
In February 1902, the New York Sun reported that, contrary to reports of a ban on 
the island, boxing was not illegal there and that, “An attempt will shortly be made to 
introduce boxing in Cuba.” It stated that Alvie King, a representative of former heavyweight 
contender Tom Sharkey, and Fred Block, a former trainer of ex-heavyweight champion 
James J. Corbett, were planning to go to Havana “within a week to have a talk with a well-
known Cuban capitalist who is to furnish the backing for the venture.” Block described their 
plans thusly: 
 
We have been given to understand that boxing is not illegal in Cuba 
and if everything pans out a clubhouse on similar lines to the New York A. 
C. [Athletic Club] and the Knickerbocker A. C. in this city will be built. Our 
                                                
     10 Personal communication with Carlos E. Reig Romero, April 1, 2006, Havana, Cuba. 
     11 Reig Romero, YMCA de la Habana, pp. 138-139. 
 41 
idea is to further athletics of all kinds, with boxing, of course, the feature. 
Several shrewd and well-versed lawyers have assured us that there is no law 
against pugilism in Cuba. When our club is launched we intend to arrange 
several important fistic events between the best pugilists obtainable. 
 
King had even secured a commitment from “Gentleman Jim” to come down to Cuba “to 
box there in the near future.” He was to be the first of many “heavyweights and champions” 
to be invited to fight there.12 This ambitious plan appears to have come to naught, for 
nothing else about it appears in the pages of the Sun or the New York Times, and Corbett 
retired from the ring following his August 1903 technical knockout loss to then-heavyweight 
champion James J. Jeffries. Nonetheless, the second U.S. occupation and the years after it 
witnessed the increasing frequency of public boxing events, often driven by or involving U.S. 
or other foreign actors. 
One of these was John Budinich Taborga, a Chilean born circa 1881, who had begun 
boxing in amateur smokers in Valparaiso at the turn of the nineteenth century. The ex-naval 
cadet opened his own boxing academy in Santiago, Chile, in 1902 and participated in what 
boxing historian Enrique Encinosa calls the first professional boxing card in Chile in 1903. 
After attending Columbia University in New York and living for a time in Panama, where he 
also engaged in prizefighting, Budinich moved to Cuba in 1910.13 There, he became one of 
two well-known boxing instructors in the capital, even teaching the son of President José 
Miguel Gómez how to box. The other instructor was Jack Connell, boxing and jiu-jitsu 
professor at the Cuban Athletic Club. In 1910, Secretary of the Government Gerardo 
Machado issued a decree banning public boxing spectacles in Havana because the garments 
                                                
     12 “Boxing in Cuba,” New York Sun, 9 February 1902. 
     13 Enrique Encinosa, “The Life and Times of a Boxing Pioneer,” Wail! The CBZ Journal, July 2007. 
http://www.cyberboxingzone.com/boxing/w0707-encinosa.htm (accessed June 5, 2008). 
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worn by competitors were “sicalípticos” (pornographic). At least one commentator 
wondered why, if the athletes’ dress was too outrageous for “nuestras damas”(our ladies), 
the state didn’t authorize boxing “in places where it can be seen by the strong sex,” i.e., 
men.14 The notion of banning boxing due to its competitors’ skimpy attire seemed ironic at 
best, given that Havana had “seven theaters, and three of them dedicated exclusively to 
pornography.” And since boxers dressed similarly to circus artists, another argument went, 
why forbid the former from performing while entire families could watch the latter? 
Budinich requested President Gómez’s intervention to secure a repeal of the decree, but the 
matter was tabled for a time.15 
Although that ban appears to have been lifted, the state once against instituted a ban 
on prizefighting spectacles, but permitting the exhibition of fight films, under Secretary of 
the Government Francisco López Leyva, and signed by President Gómez, in November 
1911.16 This was well before the so-called “race war,” when the Partido Independiente de 
Color (Independent Party of Color), led by Afro-Cuban leaders Evaristo Estenoz and Pedro 
Ivonnet, launched an armed protest to attempt to persuade the president and Congress to 
legalize their party once more and allow it to take part in the upcoming November election. 
Although their aims were moderate and their protest was limited to Oriente province, as 
Aline Helg explains in her groundbreaking work on this topic, the use of arms en masse by 
                                                
     14 “Crónica Teatral,” El Atlético 1:1 (December 4, 1910), p. 11; R. de Nello, “Algo sobre boxeo,” El Atlético 
1:2 (December 11, 1910), pp. 6-7 (quote on p. 6). The original phrase is “en lugares donde pueda ser visto por 
el sexo fuerte.” 
     15 “En Pro del Boxeo,” El Atlético 2:5 (January 8, 1911), p. 9. The original phrase is “siete teatros y tres de 
ellos dedicados exclusivamente á la sicalípsis.” 
     16 “Decreto Nº 1067 de 25 de noviembre de 1911,” Gaceta oficial de la República de Cuba, Habana (November 
30, 1911), C.L. Tomo 34, p. 342. 
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Afro-Cubans “prompted an outburst of racism that swept the entire country… white 
repression was nationwide, indiscriminate, and almost unopposed.”17 
 The ramifications of the race war went well beyond sports, of course, leading to 
delayed political, economic, and social equality for Afro-Cubans at least (and then not in full 
measure) until the Cuban Revolution. Yet for decades, the notion that the 1911 boxing ban 
was tied to the Oriente rebellion and its repression has been repeated in Cuban histories on 
boxing. In the first such work, co-written with Vicente Cubillas, El arte de los puños (The Art 
of the Fists, 1922), Bernardino San Martín stated that the ban was actually issued in 1912 in 
response to the government’s fear that the race war and its aftermath would lead to public 
disorder should bouts be held between white and black men. As someone who felt the color 
line had no place in boxing, San Martín attributed the decree to ignorance on the part of the 
elderly men running the government, for with the passing of the “guerra racista” (racist war), 
as he called it, none of them seemed interested in its repeal.18 Drawing from San Martín’s 
and Cubillas’s work, many other secondary materials have repeated the myth that the boxing 
prohibition was tied to the race war.19 Since the date of the ban clearly precedes the onset of 
the Oriente repression, however, it can easily be disproved. In that case, we may ask what 
purpose this myth may have served the Cuban state and the U.S. neocolonial administration 
in the years following the quashing of the Partido Independiente de Color. As the U.S. 
collaborated in the party’s repression and advocated for and perpetuated a much harsher 
                                                
     17 Aline Helg, Our Rightful Share: The Afro-Cuban Struggle for Equality, 1886-1912 (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1995), p. 194. For a detailed treatment of the “race war,” see Chapter 7: “The Racist 
Massacre of 1912,” pp. 193-226. 
     18 Bernardino San Martín and Vicente Cubillas, El arte de los puños: Historia del boxeo en Cuba (Habana: Impr. 
La Prueba, 1922), p. 30. 
     19 See, for example, Peter, “Casi cincuenta años de boxeo en Cuba,” Diario de la Marina, Siglo y Cuarto: 
número extraordinario (September 15, 1957), pp. 211-212, 214, and Alfonso, Puños dorados, p. 20. 
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color line than had been customary in Cuba, the role of U.S. elites in sending the message 
that interracial bouts would foment political and social unrest – as was the conventional 
wisdom among whites in most parts of the U.S. where legal boxing events were then 
permitted – needs to be assessed.20 
Despite its presidential signature, the 1911 ban – as was its earlier incarnation – was 
ineffective, as “fiestas de boxeo” continued with regularity and enforcement was sporadic. 
As journalists were invited to attend, the results of these events were reported in the press. 
While the decree was in place, San Martín notes, bouts had to be held behind closed doors, 
“hidden from the authorities, as if we were committing some sin.” Officially, the ban was 
observed until the building of George Bradt’s Great Havana Stadium at the entrance to the 
Vedado neighborhood. Opening in 1915, the Stadium showcased foreign boxers in Havana 
and offered preliminary bouts to the small cadre of Cuban boxers who, along with 
sportswriters, trainers, managers, and promoters, as San Martín pointed out, had made 
“tantos sacrificios” (so many sacrifices) to keep boxing alive in their country.21 
Amidst the Cubans making sacrifices were foreigners like American Frank Fowler, a 
YMCA boxing instructor who, as discussed below, spent over twenty years of his life 
promoting Havana’s boxing culture, and Chilean-born Budinich, who left the country by 
World War I but had an outsized impact early on. In Havana, as he had in Chile, Budinich 
                                                
     20 Helg reprints a fascinating yet repugnant cartoon from the June 8, 1912, issue of La Discusión, captioned 
“Deporte de Actualidad” (Sport in Fashion), which shows a Cuban soldier and U.S. marine kicking back and 
forth the “footballs” of Evaristo Estenoz’s and Pedro Ivonnet’s severed heads. Both men were shot and killed 
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influenced racist ideas permeated early twentieth-century sport in Cuba. Helg, Our Rightful Share, pp. 224, 233. 
     21 San Martín and Cubillas, El arte de los puños, pp. 31-32. The original phrase is “escondida de las 
autoridades, como si comitiéramos algún delito.” As is discussed in the next chapter, a 1915 challenge to 
boxing’s legality following the Johnson-Willard bout was rebuffed by the Cuban Supreme Court, yet the sport 
was periodically repressed until March 1922. 
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became a gym proprietor, where he taught “longshoremen, construction workers, 
blacksmiths and a considerable group of well-bred university students” how to box. He also 
joined the prestigious Vedado Tennis Club as its boxing instructor. Although Budinich’s 
own pro career in Havana was short-lived, he became well known as a promoter, initially 
holding small amateur shows in private homes, dance halls, and theaters before moving on 
to larger professional cards. He proved successful in training native and transplanted 
fighters, among them Anastasio Peñalver, who was named the first heavyweight champion 
of Cuba.22 Another top pupil of his was Mexican-born Miguel (“Mike”) Febles, who became 
a noted local boxer and jiu-jitsu practitioner before moving back to Mexico, where he 
became the lead instructor of the national army’s boxing team. Bernardino San Martín was 
another member of Budinich’s academy, although he admits that the Chilean took him in 
out of generosity. Despite his ardent desire to box – he devoted three years of his life to its 
practice – San Martín lacked both the disposition and the physique to succeed at it. 
Nevertheless, he was named flyweight champion of Cuba from 1911 to 1913, an indicator of 
the sparse competition he must have faced (San Martín claimed not to be able to recall how 
many fights he had), before losing the title by knockout to Víctor Achán at the American 
Club. After retiring briefly and then attempting a comeback to regain his title, San Martín 
was quickly shown up by then-champion Oscar García, “who gave me the most tremendous 
knockout that I have received in my life.”23 
 Professional boxing, as limited as it was, was not the only variant of the sport that 
took hold in the republic’s first two decades. Amateur boxing also took its first tentative 
                                                
     22 Encinosa, “The Life and Times of a Boxing Pioneer.” 
     23 San Martín and Cubillas, El arte de los puños, pp. 27-28 (quote on p. 28). The original phrase is “quien me 
dío el knock out más tremendo que he recibido en mi vida.” 
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steps under the auspices of the YMCA and other organizations. We turn next to an 
investigation of the YMCA’s origins in Cuba and the ways in which its physical education 
programs there sought to introduce and propagate amateur boxing among its members. 
 
The YMCA in Havana 
 The YMCA was a pervasive presence in U.S. life in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries and a guiding force behind the emerging Muscular Christianity 
movement. Founded in England in 1844 as a means of bringing young men into the 
evangelical Protestant fold, the YMCA’s first branch in the U.S. was established in Boston in 
1851. Within a decade, 205 chapters had opened throughout the country. By 1912, with a 
membership comprised primarily of middle-class men under age forty, an astonishing 1 in 
181 Americans had joined. Distinct membership levels indicated whether one had accepted 
the YMCA’s Christian teachings (active members) or had merely been considered to be of 
“good character” (associate members).24 
Although athletics were not initially a focus of the organization, by 1869 the New 
York City branch had hit upon the use of gym equipment as a way of attracting young men 
to join. By the end of the nineteenth century, athletics had become a far more critical part of 
the YMCA mission. Initially, its swimming pools, gyms, and athletic clubs were viewed as a 
means of keeping “de-natured” city men away from the “conscienceless” masses who 
predominated at other sports facilities. Within a few years, however, the YMCA was at the 
                                                
     24 Putney, Muscular Christianity, pp. 64-66 (quote on p. 66). Putney notes on p. 153 that he Young Women’s 
Christian Association (YWCA), the YMCA’s sister organization, was founded in England in 1855, began its 
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forefront of a worldwide movement to better men’s souls by improving their bodies – the 
Muscular Christian movement. In 1887, the YMCA’s training school in Springfield, 
Massachusetts – soon renamed Springfield College – recruited Luther H. Gulick to direct its 
physical education staff. Under Gulick’s aegis, the YMCA not only oversaw the creation of 
the sports of basketball (1891) and volleyball (1896), but also embraced as its logo an 
inverted red triangle developed by him to represent the unity of body, mind, and spirit.25 
Boxing was one of many sports that the YMCA initially embraced. Advocates such 
as Theodore Roosevelt (who himself had been taught to fight by a former prizefighter) 
maintained that the sport offered its practitioners a means to engage in the “strenuous life” 
necessary to produce a “manly race.”26 While Roosevelt and others felt that boxing, among 
other athletic endeavors, could help to mold a race of men suited for actual combat, 
disillusion with both the Spanish-Cuban-American War and World War I led to very 
different notions of boxing among pacifist ministers and theorists. Rather than serve as 
preparation for war, the latter maintained, the sport might better serve as a “moral equivalent 
of war” which – in place of battlefield experience – might best transform effeminate boys 
into men.27 Whether pursued as preparation for or in place of war, however, an important 
point needs to be made about the YMCA’s institutionalization of boxing. As conducted by 
the YMCA and other athletic associations at the turn of the nineteenth century, the amateur 
                                                
     25 Putney, Muscular Christianity, pp. 68-70 (quotes on p. 68). According to Putney (p. 70), Gulick’s coinage of 
the phrase, “body, mind, spirit,” was inspired by Deuteronomy 6:5: “And thou shalt love the LORD thy God 
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     26 Among other “manly” sports approved by Roosevelt were wrestling, football, rowing, baseball, and 
shooting. See Kimmel, Manhood in America, 2nd ed., p. 123. 
     27 Putney, Muscular Christianity, pp. 163, 170 (quote on p. 163). 
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variant of the sport was pursued by middle- and upper-class boys and men as a form of 
recreation and self-betterment. Few who engaged in bag punching, boxing calisthenics, and 
sparring had any intention of joining the ranks of the bare-knuckle fighters, who, as Michael 
T. Isenberg writes, represented “the dregs of sporting society, a cut below baseball players 
and completely out of the class of horse-racing fanciers.” In addition to strict penalties 
against fighting for pay as public entertainment – which in Massachusetts, at that time, 
ostensibly included death – most “respectable” Americans viewed prizefighting as a morally 
degenerate activity. As Isenberg concludes, “A friendly bout between gentlemen was one 
thing; the degrading spectacle of two brawny hoodlums mauling each other for a purse, quite 
another.”28 
The YMCA’s efforts to embrace men of character, regardless of religion, class, and 
citizenship status, did not prevent the organization from discriminating against potential 
members on racial lines. African American members were subsumed into their own chapters 
under the aegis of the Colored Men’s Association. By the end of World War II, however, 
there was a growing unease within the organization about keeping the races apart. While 
some northern branches voluntarily opted to desegregate earlier, not until 1946 did the 
National Council of YMCAs and YWCAs insist upon desegregation among all of its 
affiliates. The process of implementation took several years to achieve – not surprisingly, 
Southern branches were especially resistant – but represented the YMCA/YWCA’s 
disavowal of the principle of separation of the races at a time when the U.S. government 
continued to advocate it. As Nina Mjagkij, who documents the history of African American 
                                                
     28 Michael T. Isenberg, John L. Sullivan and His America (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), pp. 32, 
58, 60-61 (quotes on pp. 58 and 61, respectively). 
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YMCAs prior to desegregation, notes, the 1946 national YMCA/YWCA resolution on race 
discrimination anticipated the desegregation of the U.S. Army (1948) and the Supreme 
Court’s Brown v. Board of Education ruling (1954).29 
In early republic Cuba, where color lines held tightly in many social settings but were 
not as rigidly drawn as in the United States, the YMCA also insisted upon limiting the 
membership of its Havana branch to white men – although religion and class restrictions 
were not imposed. Indeed, in both the U.S. and Cuba, a shortage of “respectable” men who 
could convey the secrets of the manly art led to the hiring of former prizefighters to lead 
their boxing programs.30 
The YMCA’s New York-based International Committee oversaw the establishment 
of foreign branches beginning in 1889, a process that accelerated in the first decades of the 
twentieth century. In her history of the YMCA in China, Kimberly A. Riserdorph points out 
that, despite the “full scale bureaucracy” necessary to conduct such worldwide operations, 
the organization as a whole “stressed local autonomy”; foreign branches needed to secure 
their own local base of support and, critically, funding, in order to survive.31 While this 
endeavor may have seemed far easier to accomplish in a Havana teeming with U.S. 
expatriates in the aftermath of the Spanish-Cuban-American War than in far-flung locales 
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     31 Kimberly A. Riserdorph, “Reformers, Athletes and Students: The YMCA in China, 1895-1935” (Ph.D. 
diss., Washington University, 1994), p. 3. 
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such as Japan (where the organization is still active today), the Cuban experiment would 
ultimately result in failure.32 
From 1904 to 1931, the YMCA embarked upon an ambitious attempt to build its 
Havana branch. The organization’s leaders felt that the city could benefit from its 
recreational, educational, and – to a lesser extent, given the long-term hold of Catholicism 
on the nation – evangelical religious programs. In this last regard, the YMCA was hardly 
alone in viewing Cuba as ripe for its Protestant reforms. As Louis A. Pérez, Jr., has 
demonstrated, missionaries were active throughout the island from 1898, “initially in 
scattered numbers and subsequently in successive waves…. They staked out spheres of 
influence in all provinces and in almost all municipios.” Within a few years, the competing 
presence of large numbers of missionaries – representing the Episcopalian, Methodist, 
Northern and Southern Baptist, Quaker, and several other denominations – led to an 
agreement among them to divide up the new republic into spheres of influence. In addition 
to church efforts to conduct relief work, establish schools, and address other community 
concerns in the wake of the Spanish-Cuban-American War, many U.S.-based, Protestant-
influenced charities, fraternal groups, and other organizations soon initiated cultural as well 
as social reform activities in Cuba. One of the first to do so was the YMCA.33 
 In November 1904, the YMCA sent Lyman L. Pierce, the general secretary of its 
Washington, D.C. headquarters, to Havana. There he met with J.E. Hubbard, a young 
Harvard man and prospective local secretary already in the city, who had spent the past 
several months laying the groundwork for the establishment of a YMCA branch in the 
                                                
     32 For a description of the YMCA’s early efforts in Japan, see Jon Thares Davidann, A World of Crisis and 
Progress: The American YMCA in Japan, 1890-1930 (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1998). 
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Cuban capital. As in the U.S., where separate (if unequal) YMCA branches existed for 
“colored” peoples, the goal was to establish an institution for middle-class white Cuban and 
American expatriate families while addressing the needs of Afro-Cubans at some future date. 
Shortly after Pierce’s arrival, the two men met with American and English-speaking Cuban 
business elites to talk up the new branch. In doing so, they hoped to build upon the YMCA’s 
smashing international success; not only did it have a million U.S. members and successful 
branches in Mexico (700 members) and Buenos Aires (800 members), but it had expanded 
beyond Europe and North America to Japan, China, Korea, India, and Ceylon.34 The men’s 
arrival was greeted enthusiastically by Cuban politicians, journalists, and businessmen, from 
President Tomás Estrada Palma to Havana Mayor Juan O’Farrill on down, as well as by 
many U.S. entrepreneurs and ministers resident in the city. At a November 15 dinner at 
“Paris” restaurant honoring Pierce and Hubbard, President Estrada Palma gave a speech in 
Spanish and English in which he thanked the men for offering to oversee “the establishment 
among us of the association which will afford to the youth of Havana varied means of 
intellectual, moral and physical diversion.”35 Postmaster General Fernando Figueredo used 
the occasion to reminisce in English on his own experiences with the YMCA while a student 
in Troy, New York, and pledged his support to the new branch. Pierce read a personal letter 
of support from U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt and asked the men present to assist 
Hubbard in his work, since “[i]n his work in Havana he will be, in a measure, alone.” Despite 
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a lack of manpower, he predicted that the new branch’s success was, “to use a Presbyterian 
expression… foreordained to succeed.”36 In this Pierce would be proven wrong, but the 
YMCA’s experiment in Havana lasted for a time and helped, in a small way, to promote 
boxing in the capital and among U.S. military men stationed there. 
 The following night, at a meeting at the Hotel Telégrafo focused on enrolling the 
city’s young men, the YMCA succeeded in securing eighty applicants. The number grew to 
three hundred by week’s end and ultimately exceeded five hundred before the branch was 
finally opened. The annual inscription was eight pesos per year for charter members but was 
slated to increase for those who joined later. Membership fees were anticipated to cover one-
third of the branch’s expenditures, with the remainder coming from local merchants and the 
central YMCA office in the U.S.37 Despite the auspicious start, the new branch was facing 
several major hurdles, among them the lack of a brick-and-mortar establishment. The budget 
to construct a new facility was 300,000 pesos. In the meantime, for athletic activities, the 
association borrowed the basement of the Club Ateneo. The offices were temporarily 
located at the Colonial Loan and Deposit Co. at Prado and Neptuno, where Hubbard was 
available for 90 minutes each morning. Mr. Pierce did not stay long in Havana but departed 
on November 18 for Tampa, leaving the day-to-day work in Hubbard’s able hands.38 
Although the latter had only recently graduated university, the D.C. headquarters had sent 
him to Cuba in January 1904 to begin mastering Spanish with the intention of naming him 
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the founding secretary of a Havana branch. Given the large membership pool, Hubbard 
found it necessary to rent a sizeable building on Prado formerly known as Belot Baths; as a 
year’s rent – $6,000 – was due in advance, the local branch’s board of directors, led by 
president T.H. Harris, stepped in to secure it.39 
 In an interview with La Discusión shortly after his arrival in Havana, Price emphasized 
that, despite the Protestant origins of the international YMCA, the local branch would not 
ascribe to a particular religious creed or religious sect but would be welcoming to Roman 
Catholics, which most Cubans, despite disenchantment with some aspects of prior Church 
rule, were. The organization would be neither Roman Catholic, nor Episcopal, nor 
Methodist, the newspaper assured its readers, but Christian. As all good Christians “aspired 
to their own perfection, or that of their children,” the Havana branch would truly be “by all 
and for all.” That boxing was a central part of the YMCA mission in Havana was evident 
from the outset, as the plans for the new facility included a dedicated boxing room, as well as 
a weapons room (presumably for fencing) and spaces for calisthenics and other physical 
exercise.40 
 Shortly after its opening, the Havana YMCA offered boxing classes three days a 
week, on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays from 5:15 to 9:30 p.m. By 1909, boxing was 
offered every day at 5:15 p.m. and four nights a week – Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays, and 
Fridays – at 8 p.m. The director of boxing instruction was Frank A. Fowler, who was 
advertised as having had many years of boxing experience. Classes cost a small fee, in 
                                                
     39 C.A. Nichols, “The First Y. M. C. A. in Cuba,” The National Magazine of Cuba, September 1905, pp. 10-13. 
A Spanish translation of this article appears in the same publication as “La Primera A. de J. C. en Cuba,” pp. 
24, 26-27. In “Articles n.d. and 1904-1922” file in C-PM/CIE box, KFA, UMN. 
     40 “Los Jóvenes Cristianos,” La Discusión, n.d. (probably November 1904), in “Articles n.d. and 1904-1922” 
file in C-PM/CIE box, KFA, UMN. The original Spanish phrases read, “asipran á su perfeccionamiento, ó el 
de sus hijos” and “por todos y para todos,” respectively. 
 54 
addition to the basic membership. The YMCA also offered regular instruction in gymnastics, 
basketball, swimming, and fencing, in addition to anatomy, physiology, and Bible classes.41 
On February 4, 1910, it held a “fiesta atlética” that included a 220-yard dash, round of 
fencing, boys’ hockey game, basketball contest, and a “boxing demonstration”; the entry fee 
was one peseta.42 Several weeks later, an article in the Havana Post recognized Fowler’s 
achievement in stirring up local interest in the sport of boxing.43 In addition to Fowler’s 
work with the boxing team, which may have begun as early as 1908 as he was by then 
affiliated with the Havana branch, he was captain of the baseball team, played basketball and 
volleyball (sports that had been invented less than two decades earlier by YMCA physical 
education professors in Massachusetts), and helped to coach the 1908-1909 college football 
team to an undefeated record.44 
That Fowler continued to be part of the Havana boxing scene for many years 
afterward is evidenced by the fact that, following the establishment of the Cuban National 
Boxing and Wrestling Commission in 1921, he was appointed an official referee at boxing 
events.45 In 1927, Fowler – who had by then trained four Cuban champions as well as 
several up-and-coming fighters such as José “Kid” Sotolongo – was appointed by the boxing 
commissioner as a “professor” to teach youths in Havana to box.46 His “Fowler’s Academy” 
also employed as one of its directors Fernando Rios, a former prizefighter who had become 
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the city’s top boxing referee in the years since the commission’s founding.47 By 1928, Fowler 
was promoting fights in Havana with José Coucé under the aegis of the Latin American 
Sporting Club, which held weekly semi-professional shows at the Miramar Garden.48 
 While advocating recreational and amateur boxing and even employing former 
prizefighters at times, the YMCA, through the influential voice of Hubbard – who led the 
Havana branch until 1918, when he accepted an appointment in Italy – made clear its 
opposition to prizefighting. During the lead-up to the Johnson-Willard bout in April 1915, 
Hubbard was one of a group of ministers who sent a letter to the Havana Post protesting its 
staging, and that of all other professional fights in Cuba. While the Havana YMCA fielded 
entrants in Cuban national amateur tournaments and employed active and former pugilists, 
no prominent Cuban prizefighter appears to have emerged from within its ranks. Instead, it 
mostly catered to middle-class youngsters who went on to more “respectable” careers. 
 For a time, the YMCA had limited success in Havana, though never on the scale its 
founders had hoped in keeping with plans to develop additional branches throughout the 
interior. The Havana branch was hampered in many ways – its own distrust of Catholicism 
and the Catholic Church’s distrust, in turn, of its aims; political instability, infighting, and 
corruption; the U.S. government’s heavy hand toward domestic matters and Cuban 
resentment of it; and Americans’ gambling, whoring, and other illicit activities, which 
inhibited the YMCA’s attempts to put forth a more upstanding image of its expatriate 
brethren. There would also be conflicts between the mostly U.S. leadership and Cuban 
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members who sought a more active role. Most serious of all, particularly after 1920, was the 
constant lack of funds.49 Undeterred by these challenges, in June 1920, the Cuban YMCA 
opened a second location in the capital, on Compostela Street, for U.S. Merchant Marines. 
That establishment housed approximately 1,600 men and was dedicated to assisting “the 
English speaking young men.”50 Around the same time, at the request of Col. Montes, 
supervisor of the Cuban Military School at Morro Castle, two YMCA instructors, known as 
Mr. McDonald and Mr. Thayer, began offering instruction to the school’s students in indoor 
basketball, calisthenics, tumbling, boxing, and other physical activities. Other organizations 
around the island also began seeking out the YMCA for “suggestions relative to Physical 
Education, Welfare and playground work.”51 By 1928, the Havana branch had recruited 
active prizefighter Johnny Cruz – whose first defeat at the hands of then little-known semi-
pro Kid Chocolate in December 1927 had helped propel the latter into a spectacular career – 
to teach boxing to amateurs who wished to compete in the Amateur Athletic Union’s 
tournament that April. Cruz’s program had attracted 26 students and brought in receipts of 
$240.00, which was equal to the boxing program’s disbursements.52 
 Despite this limited success, however, the Havana YMCA was unable to recruit the 
wealthiest Cuban families, which instead opted to join more exclusive social clubs. Its early 
innovations in physical education and infrastructure could not keep pace with what the social 
clubs could offer, a fact that local branch leaders acknowledged but lacked the resources to 
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overcome. Shortly before the closure of the Havana branch, the International Survey of the 
Young Men’s and Young Women’s Christian Associations offered a prescient post-mortem on its 
inability to attract sufficient financial support: 
 
 There is only one Christian Association in Cuba, namely the YMCA 
of Havana, which was founded in 1905. It has developed the regular four-
fold program, with especial emphasis on physical education, and has been in 
the past reasonably successful. At the present time, however, it is in serious 
trouble. While mistakes in management account to some extent for this 
condition, the chief trouble is competition by the big social clubs. The 
building and equipment are not only old-fashioned and in poor repair but 
they suffer very much by comparison with the magnificent clubs that have 
been developed recently in Havana. These undertakings, of which the Club 
Asturias is the most outstanding example, have superb equipment and 
nominal entrance fees. They promote physical and social activities on a 
considerable scale, offering free medical service and health examinations. 
They set material standards with which the YMCA can never hope to 
compete, especially since it has never been able to secure the interest of the 
wealthy Cuban families.53 
 
By December 1931, the International Committee – faced with the Havana branch’s 
insurmountable financial troubles – decided to close it down. The building was shuttered 
that February. An elderly J.E. Hubbard attempted in 1949 to have the organization’s leaders 
reopen a Havana branch, but there was no institutional support for his proposal.54 
In regard to its boxing program, three conclusions are in order. The first is that, 
although the YMCA catered to young, white amateur boxers who most likely would not 
become professionals, it did serve as a steady source of employment and as a means to 
acquire practical experience for white U.S. and Cuban boxers such as Frank Fowler and 
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Johnny Cruz. Fowler went on to be a top trainer and promoter, while Cruz became one of 
the most respected referees in Cuba. Because the YMCA was not racially integrated, 
however, these opportunities were off-limits to Afro-Cuban fighters, who made up a 
significant proportion of Cuba’s boxing population. As a second point, then, we should note 
that the organization helped to exacerbate the class and racial schism – which would grow 
wider as the decades wore on – between middle-class or wealthy white amateurs and poor 
white and black semi-pros and pros. Although the exclusivity and racism of the social clubs 
as well as the segregation of amateur athletic bodies were far more central to this process, 
the YMCA reinforced the existing tendency to push poor whites and blacks into the semi-
pro or pro ranks with little or no prior amateur experience. Third, and more positively, by 
fostering the notion that boxing was a respectable pastime suitable for the children of U.S. 
expatriates and Cuban business and political elites, the YMCA helped to legitimize it as a 
sport and thus indirectly assisted in its ultimate legalization and regulation. 
 
The Growth of Athletic Facilities and Their Impact on Early Prizefighting in Cuba 
While foreigners were certainly critical in the introduction and development of 
Cuban pugilism, their voices tend to predominate in the few works on the subject (popular 
histories written by Cubans or Cuban exiles) in this early period. Similarly, up to now, most 
U.S. historians have examined the Jack Johnson-Jess Willard bout – the subject of the next 
chapter – from a U.S.-centric perspective. Given the influence of the U.S. government in 
driving Johnson to live a transnational life – thus exposing the ideology of American race 
relations to countries that, for the most part, had more fluid hierarchies in place – one must 
understand the U.S. context of the bout before being able to translate its significance to 
 59 
Cuba. Yet these studies have mostly left unanswered the question of the bout’s impact upon, 
and interaction with, the island’s boxing culture, and on society more generally. Using Cuban 
sources, however, particularly the Havana-based English-language press – which, as we shall 
see, had a financial incentive to promote prizefighting on the island – scholars may better 
begin to understand how the U.S. “athletic crusade” (recalling Gems’s terminology) was 
translated on the ground, and with what results. 
Without the establishment of sports facilities for its public consumption, boxing’s 
growth in Cuba would have been severely retarded, relegated to small theaters and private 
homes. Americans were critical in the erection of new public infrastructure after the end of 
the Spanish-Cuban-American War, but the process had begun earlier. The construction of 
athletic facilities had originated in the late nineteenth century with baseball parks, such as 
that in 1890 of a ten-thousand person park for the Habana Baseball Club.55 In republic-era 
Cuba, thoroughbred racetracks were one of the earliest public recreation facilities built. The 
Oriental Park track, where the Johnson-Willard fight took place, was inaugurated in 
Marianao. This municipality, located west of Havana in an area that had been “relatively 
underdeveloped” as late as 1910, was prized for its sea breezes, hot springs, and high 
elevation. In the nineteenth century, it had served as a summer home to wealthy Spanish 
administrators and landowners, who were replaced at the turn of the century by their U.S. 
counterparts. Because of its elevation, Marianao also became the site for U.S. occupation 
headquarters at Camp Columbia. With its population expanding rapidly – including a 
doubling of residents from 18,000 in 1907 to 37,000 in 1919 – it is no surprise that Marianao 
quickly went from being a wealthy suburb of Havana to a site for tourist development. While 
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central Havana experienced a hotel boom in the first two decades of the twentieth century, 
Marianao increasingly became the place where many tourists went to spend their leisure 
time.56 
In that vein, an American entrepreneur, Harry D. “Curly” Brown, opened Oriental 
Park in January 1915 to cater to visiting Americans and elite Cubans with money to spend 
on thoroughbred racing. President Menocal, his cabinet, several prominent senators, and the 
U.S. and British foreign ministers all had designated seats in the boxes near the finish line. 
Nearby, the Cuban-American Jockey Club had a clubhouse for its members and their 
guests.57 Real estate agents Juan Kirksey and Frank K. Harvey, whose firm oversaw the sale 
of lands adjoining the race track, advertised relentlessly to speculators and investors seeking 
to get rich quick: “No man can make a mistake in selecting any of these properties as they 
will more than triple in value within the next twelve months and now is the time to buy as 
we positively will not hold them at their present prices for any specified time.”58 Although 
not constructed with boxing in mind – it was popularly known as the “Hippodrome” – 
Oriental Park’s seating capacity was far larger than that of the Great Havana Stadium, which 
was inaugurated the following month and built specifically for boxing, wrestling, and similar 
spectacles. For the Johnson-Willard fight, for instance, the racetrack’s grandstand alone was 
said to accommodate between 20,000 and 30,000 people.59 
As the finishing touches were being applied to Oriental Park, U.S.-born boxing 
promoters were rushing to obtain contracts to hold bouts in the capital. Billy Gibson of New 
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York secured a concession to hold prizefights in Havana “with only star performers,” since, 
in his hometown, decision bouts were then prohibited (which resulted in the matches being 
decided by sportswriters, leading to the term “newspaper decisions”). In early February 
1915, he even suggested hosting the Johnson-Willard bout should it be moved from Juarez, 
Mexico, where it was originally scheduled to go on the following month.60 Shortly after 
Gibson’s announcement, Havana Post publisher Bradt, who had apparently been granted a 
similar concession several months earlier, applied to construct a temporary 20,000-person 
amphitheater in an abandoned city lot near the Malecón called Maceo Park. On January 11, 
1915, the Havana city council had granted him the concession to build the amphitheater and 
to hold athletic events there up to June 1. On January 19, fight promoters Richard Klegin 
and George Lawrence, who had recently come to Havana and were working in concert with 
Bradt, left together for New York City to sign contracts with U.S. and foreign boxers – 
among them, leading African American heavyweights Sam Langford, Sam McVea, Joe 
Jeanette, and Battling Jim Johnson, as well as top-notched smaller men such as lightweight 
champion Freddie Welsh of England – to appear at the Maceo Park facility. The following 
day, however, President Menocal cancelled Bradt’s concession at the request of the House of 
Representatives and the Interior Department. It turned out that the land belonged to the 
national government, not the city of Havana, and that even should the former allow the 
concession, the amphitheater could interfere with a new statue of General Antonio Maceo 
that would soon be erected. To conciliate Bradt, the following week the Cuban government, 
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with President Menocal’s approval, granted him use of government land on the Malecón 
extension near the Santa Clara Battery, where he soon began building a permanent facility.61 
Before the new Havana Stadium went up, boxing shows were staged at irregular 
intervals in various theaters and private clubs around town, catering primarily to locals and, 
in the case of clubs, to members and guests. On January 23, for instance, the American Club 
held a “smoker” that featured three bouts with some of the best local fighters, including 
national flyweight champion Oscar García.62 The event was so successful that it held another 
smoker on March 5 featuring an exhibition by famed Danish ex-champion boxer “Battling” 
Nelson.63 Yet Bradt made no secret of his intention to turn his establishment into a regular 
venue for prizefighting (and, to a lesser extent, wrestling) that attracted tourists as well as 
locals. In that vein, the Havana Post both cultivated new audiences for prizefighting among 
women, expatriate and visiting Americans, and bilingual Cuban elites through continuous 
reporting on and advertising of the Stadium, and thrived off the advertising revenue brought 
in by other businesses – such as hotels, restaurants, rail and steamship companies, and 
souvenir establishments – hoping to cash in on the tourist boom. 
Not all were pleased by the plan. Some objected to Bradt’s decision to publicize the 
Stadium’s location – near the monument to the USS Maine – as “Maine Park.” “[T]he use of 
the name in connection with the opening of prizefighting on or about the anniversary of the 
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sinking of the Maine was distinctly bad taste,” fumed The Times of Cuba.64 Not surprisingly, 
there was opposition to prizefighting from certain Protestant circles, although they did not 
make their voices widely heard until shortly before the Johnson-Willard bout. And at the 
January 23 American Club smoker, Theodore Terry sang E.F. O’Brien’s lyrics lampooning 
the new Stadium: 
 
My friend George Bradt has got a scheme 
 To bring folks here in flocks; 
He’s going to lure them down to see 
 Some “culled pussons” box. 
And Mayor Fairy Ann agrees 
 It’s going to be a lark! 
(In fact he has agreed that George 
 May use a city park.)65 
 
 Despite the criticism, the Stadium went up in an astonishing ten days. Far from the 
20,000 seats that Bradt had planned for his Maceo Park amphitheater, the Stadium was 
limited to 12,000 bleacher seats, plus an additional 1,600 cushioned seats at ringside and in 
boxes. Prices ranged from $2 to $5 in the grandstand and from $10 to $25 for ringside and 
box viewing. The arena’s smaller size was marketed as an advantage, since “there is not a seat 
in it that does not give as good a view of the ring side as the seat farthest away.” The 
inaugural event, on February 13, featured Young Ahearn, the middleweight champion of 
Europe, and Willie Lewis, from New York City; Ahearn won by knockout. Featured on the 
semi-final bout were Frankie Howard and Young Donahoe, lightweights from the U.S. 
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South. The undercard events were Frank (Kid) Howard vs. Kid Santello and Walter Cousins, 
the U.S.-born lightweight champion of Cuba, vs. native Cuban A. Arango. The Cousins-
Arango bout proved to be the most disappointing, as referee Sam Lewis tossed both fighters 
out for stalling. Only 2,500 people attended the inaugural events, later prompting the 
Stadium to reduce its prices.66 The low turnout was despite the offer by railway companies to 
offer discounted fares to out-of-town visitors coming into Havana for the fights.67 
 Nevertheless, the Stadium continued to attract foreign boxers, even though veteran 
fight observers were skeptical of some of the heavily hyped match-ups. The Brooklyn Eagle 
and other U.S. newspapers, for instance, scorned Willie Lewis as a “has-been.”68 In the 
Stadium’s second boxing card, held on February 20, an all-African American feature bout – 
Sam McVea versus Battling Jim Johnson – was contracted to last up to twenty rounds. As 
Bradt did not favor mixed-race bouts except, apparently, when a title might be changing 
hands, both fighters were touted as “smoky giants,” one of whom – either McVea, “the cool, 
calculating, clever boxer,” or Johnson, with his “giant strength” – would not likely last the 
duration. But they did last twenty rounds, and when referee Sam Lewis called their fight a 
draw and demanded that they box five more rounds so that he could make a decision, 
Johnson balked, claiming he was only paid for twenty. Amidst a “shower of cushions and [a] 
jeering audience,” Lewis gave the victory to McVea by disqualification.69 Moreover, the 
                                                
     66 “Young Ahearn vs. Willie Lewis at Havana Stadium Feb. 13th,” Havana Post, 6 February 1915, p. 1; 
“Noted Boxers Arrive for Match Saturday,” Havana Post, 10 February 1915, p. 2; “Stadium Is Real Marvel,” 
Havana Post, 13 February 1915, p. 1; “Young Ahearn Scores Clean K. O. over Lewis,” Havana Post, 14 February 
1915, p. 1. 
     67 “Reduced Week-end Rate Issued by Railroads,” Havana Post, 10 February 1915, p. 6. 
     68 “They Say,” The Times of Cuba 3:3 (March 1915), pp. 50-54.  
     69 “McVea and Jim Johnson to Clash on Saturday,” Havana Post, 16 February 1915, p. 2; “M’Vea Wins over 
Jim Johnson in 20 Rounds,” Havana Post, 21 February 1915, pp. 1-2; “Cuban News Review Day by Day,” The 
Times of Cuba 3:3 (March 1915), pp. 18-22. Not surprisingly, the Havana Post left out the crowd reaction to Jim 
 65 
Stadium at times promised more than it could deliver. Disregarding Jack Curley’s contract 
for the Johnson-Willard bout and the fact that the promoter had not yet given his blessing to 
relocating it from Juarez to Havana, the Stadium announced that the winner of the McVea-
Jim Johnson bout would face Jack Johnson for his heavyweight title. An advertisement to 
that effect ran in the Havana Post the morning of the McVea-Jim Johnson fight. It featured a 
stunningly racist illustration of “The Four Black Gladiators,” four bald, vaguely ape-like, 
ebony-skinned boxers with huge white lips and eyes standing close together. Representing 
Jim Johnson, Sam McVea, Joe Jeanette, and Jack Johnson – whose caricatured figure held a 
certificate that read “Champion Del Mundo” –, the ad touted, “Winner to Fight Jack 
Johnson.”70 It thus came as something of a shock to Bradt and the Stadium management 
when Curley ultimately selected the Oriental Park racetrack over the Stadium for staging the 
Johnson-Willard affair. 
While not all bouts at the Stadium, then, were close or even well-matched affairs, 
three points should be made. First, although foreigners tended to receive the most publicity, 
the undercards offered opportunities for young, inexperienced Cuban fighters to appear in 
front of much larger audiences than they might otherwise have done. Although Cubans 
initially were featured as preliminaristas, within a few months, as the tourist season wound 
down and the Stadium began offering twice-weekly shows, a few local pugilists as Mike 
Febles and Anastasio Peñalver were elevated to main-event status. Yet the promoters 
focused far less upon developing local boxing talent – which would have built up audience 
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loyalty and developed Cuba’s nascent prizefighting industry – than upon bringing in foreign 
boxers who were well-known abroad but had little connection to Cuba. As a result, when the 
government later instituted bans on boxing in the capital, Cuban boxers, trainers, referees, 
and judges were forced to maintain their beloved sport underground – while foreign boxers 
simply competed elsewhere. 
Second, without advertising the bouts in this manner, the Stadium hued closely to 
the rigid color lines fixed in most U.S. boxing circles at that time. White American, 
European, and Cuban boxers were matched against one another, while Afro-Cuban and 
African-Americans were similarly matched. This rigidity undoubtedly affected the caliber of 
the matches, as it was more important, at least initially, for fighters to be of the same weight 
class and skin hue than for them to complement each other’s ring experience, abilities, and 
shortcomings. Moreover, the Stadium management’s support of American-style white 
supremacy in a Cuban setting influenced its decision to introduce one of the most 
notoriously racist elements of the boxing game: the battle royal. 
A form of mass boxing show that featured nonwhite (usually black) boys or men 
who often possessed only the most rudimentary of boxing skills – and a rite of initiation for 
many top African American boxers of the early-to-mid-twentieth century – the battle royal 
had begun primarily as a Southern U.S. phenomenon attended by moneyed white spectators. 
That it soon spread to Cuba encouraged by U.S. promoters was not surprising, as they did 
little to hide their desire to replicate patterns of their own nation’s white supremacy on a 
Cuban stage (particularly the rigid demarcation of color lines in athletic and social events). 
The sight of five, six, or as many as a dozen young men going at one another violently within 
the confines of the ring – usually as the preliminary event on a boxing card – was amusing 
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for whites in attendance. The youths’ degradation – in addition to the beatings received by 
their peers, they were subject to all manner of racial epithet – was intended to uphold the 
tenets of white supremacy. Yet as Andrew Kaye points out, black audiences at times found 
pleasure in attending battles royal (segregated or not) because they could appreciate their 
slapstick quality without accepting their racist overtones. To add to the intended hilarity, 
promoters would sometimes hire one-legged boys, require participants to fight naked (thus 
invoking erotic notions of African American male genitalia), or hamstring them in other 
ways, such as tying one hand behind their backs. Miniscule purses often went to the 
“winner,” which was whoever appeared to be the least battered – or the last man standing. 
In other instances, participants would scramble to collect the small change tossed by 
spectators into the ring. While fighters at times colluded with one another to “fake” a 
spectacle, or paired up with one another to gang up on a particular opponent, there were 
African American boxers – including, notably, three-time world champion Henry Armstrong 
– who refused to engage in such bouts out of pride. Many more, however, did take part, 
particularly in the South. In addition to Jack Johnson, who engaged in battles royal prior to 
(as well as after) establishing himself as a young prizefighter in Chicago, Beau Jack 
(lightweight champion of the early 1940s) got his start by taking part in such engagements in 
his native Augusta, Georgia.71 
The Havana Stadium held its first battle royal on March 24, 1915, involving “eight 
husky colored fighters.” Although Theresa Runstedtler states that “the promotion of black-
                                                
     71 Andrew M. Kaye, “‘Battle Blind’: Atlanta’s Taste for Black Boxing in the Early Twentieth Century,” 
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style influenced Cuban world champion Kid Chocolate, see Chapter 3. 
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on-black matches and battle royals [sic] certainly suggest that an element of white racial 
voyeurism was at work in the Cuban boxing scene,” it is important to differentiate between 
the two types of pugilistic affairs in their purposes as well as methods. The battle royal was 
not intended to display genuine boxing skills; rather, it was viewed as a social Darwinian 
battle of the fittest, one that ideally left several victims in its wake and at least one survivor. 
As G.W. Krick, the Stadium publicity agent and Havana Post contributor, promised for the 
March 24 battle royal, “negroes will be the victims and some hot stuff is assured. 
Ambulances have been engaged to carry away the victims after the bout.”72 Black-on-black 
boxing matches, on the other hand, while evoking whites’ racialist fantasies – as can be seen 
in the advertisement for the McVea-Jim Johnson bout, which depicted the participants as 
more primate than human – nonetheless drew fans who viewed the participants as 
individuals, with specific ring talents and limitations. No matter how poorly a black boxer 
might perform in a fight or exhibition against either a black or white opponent, he was not, 
at least, an undistinguishable being, as often hapless participants in battles royal were 
depicted. As just one indicator of their lack of individuality, battle royal contestants were not 
advertised by name, only by number and body type – e.g., “eight husky colored fighters.” 
Yet because battles royal proved so popular among Stadium fans, many of whom were 
presumably from the U.S., the management continued to include them among its preliminary 
programs at many semi-weekly boxing events. That securing the correct race of “victims” 
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was more important than nationality is evident from the March 27, 1915, fight card, which 
included “[f]our American and four Cuban colored glove-wielders” in its battle royal.73 
Third, the Stadium bouts and the Havana Post’s relentless promotion of them offered 
Cuban and American fans – including many women – an introduction to the culture of 
prizefighting, however vicarious. (As Louis A. Pérez, Jr., notes, Cuban women had similarly 
begun flocking to baseball games two decades earlier, thereby helping to legitimize the new 
sport as one of “gentility and refinement.”74) In March and April 1915, the Havana Post hired 
a visiting English vaudeville actress, Cecilia Wright, to write columns deciphering the rules 
and idiosyncrasies of prizefighting for a female audience. Despite being billed as a “boxing 
expert,” her credentials as boxing reporter were lean; prior to her writing assignment, her 
main experience with boxing had been attending two world championship bouts, including 
the Jack Johnson-Frank Moran bout in Paris the year before, “and a number of minor 
matches.” Nonetheless, she sought to increase the “red-blooded” (i.e., elite white) female 
presence at prizefights by assuring her peers that boxing was not nearly as violent as other 
sports, such as football, and that lady fans would be treated with the utmost gentility (that is, 
so long as they purchased seats at ringside and in boxes.)75 Furthermore, instead of toiling 
away in anonymity in gyms, out-of-town boxers held daily public workouts at the Stadium, 
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which gave women leery of attending evening prizefights the opportunity to observe fighters 
(and their physiques) in more controlled settings – as they went a few rounds with a sparring 
partner, performed calisthenics, or hit punching bags. If there were bad blood between the 
fighters or between their respective management and retinues, one would train at the 
Stadium and the other at an alternate facility. 
That was the arrangement made when Sam McVea fought Battling Jim Johnson in 
February 1915, when training facilities were improvised for the latter at Marianao.76 And a 
similar arrangement would be made when Jess Willard finally arrived in Havana in March 
1915 to challenge Jack Johnson for his heavyweight throne. After weeks of uncertainty over 
the status, date, and location of the fight, the “Pottawatomie Giant” (so-named for the 
Kansas county of his birth) was finally summoned to Cuba by Jack Curley, who – shortly 
after arriving on the island himself – had reached the same conclusion as had Jack Johnson: 
that the championship bout would have to take place there. How and why it came to Cuba is 
the story we turn to next. 
 
By 1915, boxing was neither widely embraced in Cuban society nor considered a 
respectable career path for young native males. Yet, in the capital, at least, it had developed 
into a form of public entertainment suitable for the gente decente (“decent people,” i.e., middle 
classes) – and at which they became increasingly visible as the 1910s wore on. The inclusion 
of middle-class women as spectators contradicted the beliefs held by prominent clergymen 
and government officials that the sport (at least in its professional variant) was unabashedly 
brutal and unworthy of state sanction. Moreover, its semi-tolerated status in Cuba and the 
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U.S. (where it remained illegal in many states) ensured boxing’s ongoing liminal condition. It 
was in these circumstances that the Johnson-Willard bout came, quite unexpectedly, to 
Havana – raising the city’s pugilistic profile at a time when the few Cuban males actively 
partaking in the sport were doing so largely in anonymity. 
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Chapter 2: The Johnson-Willard Fight and Its Aftermath, 1915 
 
Filtering an American Bout Through a Cuban Prism 
 The most famous boxing match in Cuban history occurred in Havana on April 5, 
1915, at the dawn of the island’s love affair with the sport, and involved two American 
boxers. Much has been written about the world heavyweight title bout between champion 
Jack Johnson and challenger Jess Willard – deservedly so, for this meeting of the world’s first 
black heavyweight king and the little-known “white hope” who would ultimately take his title 
was notable on a number of levels far beyond boxing or sports history. The bout 
represented the culmination of a racist campaign against Johnson, a flamboyant but gifted 
pugilist from Galveston, Texas, who was hated and feared for his ability to toy with white 
opponents in the ring and his unapologetic desire for white women (and theirs for him) 
outside of it. Fleeing prosecution from the United States, where he was convicted of 
violating the Mann Act, and forced into exile in Europe, Johnson’s Havana sojourn came at 
the end of his seven-year title reign but would remain central to his athletic saga ever after. 
In this chapter, I filter the bout through a Cuban prism. Prior commentators have 
perceived its Havana locale to be little more than a colorful, exotic backdrop to one of the 
most important – and, given the racial anxieties that served as its impetus, most American – 
boxing matches of the twentieth century. In doing so, I will analyze the impact that this 
event had upon the development of boxing on the island in the short- and medium-term. In 
particular, I wish to shed light on the processes by which the U.S. government and elites 
attempted to foster an “athletic crusade” (using Gerald Gems’s terminology) to pursue 
political aims through the advocacy of pugilism and other “manly” sports. The previous 
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chapter considered how, in the two decades before the fight, recreational boxing and 
prizefighting had both gained a foothold in Cuba. In this chapter, I examine how the intense 
and prolonged worldwide scrutiny fostered by the Johnson-Willard fight, combined with the 
influx of visitors and press men (and a few women) to Havana to witness it, increased 
Cuba’s status as a site for major boxing events. Yet a variety of factors – a backlash against 
Johnson-Willard promoter Jack Curley for leaving behind him a slew of unpaid debts; a 
growing unease among U.S. promoters about staging interracial bouts; and the government’s 
vacillating approaches as to whether, and how, to regulate prizefighting – led to an inability 
to sustain the bout’s momentum. 
The celebrated bout of April 5, 1915, that took place at Oriental Park was more 
anomaly than foundational moment for boxing in Cuba. This is in contrast to the picture 
drawn by Louis A. Pérez, Jr., in his wide-ranging cultural history of pre-Castro Cuba, On 
Becoming Cuban. In his brief summary of early Cuban boxing, Pérez argues that its practice 
was limited primarily to Americans, particularly soldiers of the 1898-1902 and 1906-1909 
occupations. While noting that boxing spectacles featuring foreign (mostly U.S.) pugilists 
became more frequent in Havana beginning in 1914, he seems to imply that the sport 
became popular among native Cubans only in the years following the Johnson-Willard fight.1 
This chapter and the previous one demonstrate, rather, that – while Johnson’s personal 
notoriety and the hype surrounding the bout no doubt helped to fuel local interest in 
prizefighting, there was already a developing audience for prizefighting in the capital city 
(and to a lesser extent in the interior), as well as a growing pool of young native pugilists 
who were seeking to develop their craft. 
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This chapter opens with a discussion of the personal history and pugilistic career of 
Jack Johnson. This is because his singular story – perhaps no other sports figure before or 
since has been the subject of such intense public scrutiny, disdain, and hope – is critical to 
telling the story of the bout itself. There were no doubt racial elements of the struggle 
between the black champion and “white hope” that resonated as much, perhaps, in 1915 
Havana as they did in 1915 Chicago. Nonetheless, Johnson’s popularity on the island and the 
growing presence of a multiracial, multinational body of prizefighters mitigated some of that 
racism and allowed Johnson to go about his daily business in Havana with a degree of racial 
equality that was not then available in his own country, or to most Afro-Cubans. His 
celebrity status in Havana – even President Menocal expressed his admiration for Johnson 
and was rumored to have wagered on him to defeat Willard – helped to pave the way for 
Afro-Cuban athletic and artistic visionaries in the next two decades. Moreover, despite his 
lack of training and the fact that some of his fistic skills were by then in decline, Johnson was 
widely respected for his boxing talents and undoubtedly served to inspire many of the young 
men who were at the time coming up in Cuban rings. 
Thus, in order to understand the context by which the bout came to Havana and the 
heightened racial environment in which it took place, it is necessary to review some of the 
salient details about Johnson’s life and boxing career, in particular his long pursuit and 
tenacious hold of the world heavyweight championship; his controversial relationships with 
white women as they impacted his reception by white and black American audiences; the 
U.S. government’s campaign to prosecute him for violating the Mann Act, which prohibited 
the interstate and international transportation of females for “immoral” purposes; and the 
peripatetic exile that led him to Cuba. The chapter then turns to an exploration of the 
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processes by which the fight came to Havana and the particularities of Johnson’s sojourn 
there – including his broader impact upon local society. Finally, it analyzes how Cuba’s 
serving as host nation for this bout impacted the development of prizefighting there. 
For many of his critics, though they often claimed to admire his courage, talent, and 
sportsmanship, Johnson’s comeuppance on a hot Havana day had been too long in the 
making. Yet once he lost what made him so feared – the heavyweight championship of the 
world – he appeared to become almost an avuncular figure in Cuban life, one whose name 
was frequently floated as potential citizen, gymnasium owner, and politician. By the time he 
departed for Spain fifteen days after his defeat at Oriental Park, Johnson had succeeded in 
shifting the meanings of “white” and “black” among at least a segment of Havana society, 
even as his powerful example appeared to have little sway over how most whites viewed 
their Afro-Cuban counterparts. As in the United States, Johnson’s singularity did little to 
alter the nature of race relations between whites and blacks on the Ever Faithful Isle. 
 
The Making of a Champion and the Road to Exile 
Jack Johnson remains the most reviled heavyweight professional boxing champion in 
history. Even the travails of Muhammad Ali, formerly Cassius Clay (who was stripped of his 
title for objecting on religious and moral grounds to military service in Vietnam), or Mike 
Tyson (still the youngest heavyweight champion at age twenty, who was convicted on rape 
charges after losing his title and arrested several times since) cannot compare to the fervent 
desire felt by countless whites of his era that Johnson be dethroned by one of their own, a 
“white hope” who could return this coveted mantle to the race. Johnson’s rise and fall in the 
first two decades of the twentieth century coincided with the worst period for race relations 
 76 
in the United States since the end of the Civil War. Having broken the infamous color line 
that had pervaded prizefighting (particularly in the heavyweight division) since the end of its 
bare-knuckle days, Johnson steadfastly refused to allow race prejudice to impact the other 
facets of his life. He dressed elegantly, even ostentatiously; was married three times to white 
women and publicly associated with many more, including prostitutes; drove expensive cars 
recklessly and rapidly; owned a black-and-tan joint in Chicago called the Café de Champion; 
and made no attempt to hide his desire for fame, or notoriety, as well as wealth. His was a 
truly international celebrity, one that resonated as much in Latin America or the Caribbean 
as it did in Europe or the United States. To call him a larger-than-life figure is a vast 
understatement; in the modern era, no other sports figure before or since has conveyed such 
disregard for the norms of his times, with such disastrous results to himself and others (race 
riots, censorship, his own conviction and imprisonment), and yet been so favorably 
reclaimed by history. 
Since his death in 1946, Johnson’s influence in sports and African American history 
has been writ large. Because his story is now so familiar to modern fans and scholars – in 
addition to the champion’s own voluminous works, a corpus of scholarship has developed 
around him that includes film documentaries directed by Jim Jacobs and Ken Burns and 
biographies by Randy Roberts, Al-Tony Gilmore, and Geoffrey C. Ward – I will provide a 
very brief description here.2 Although Johnson often changed the facts of his biography to 
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suit his storytelling purposes, a good deal is known about his early life. Born in Galveston on 
March 31, 1878, Arthur John Johnson was the third of nine children, six of whom survived 
infancy, of illiterate former slaves Henry and Tina (“Tiny”) Johnson. His close-knit family 
life and attachment to his mother – after her death, he eulogized her by celebrating the idea 
she implanted in him as a youngster that “there is nothing you can’t accomplish” – and 
upbringing in racially mixed Galveston – though schools were segregated, neighborhoods 
were not – were formative in his early refusal to accept an innate racial inferiority or to bend 
to white demands that he display it. Yet despite the voluminous amount of research devoted 
to Johnson, his seeming lack of concern with the racial norms of his time remains, as his 
biographer Ward puts it, “the essential mystery of his life,” one that “[n]o amount of 
sleuthing will ever fully solve.”3 
 Johnson’s exploits (however exaggerated) as detailed in his memoirs and interviews 
detail a man who, from a very early age, learned to fend for himself – running away from 
home, stowing aboard ships, and taking on all manner of dangerous, low-paid, manual work. 
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As an adolescent, he began practicing fisticuffs as a means of self-defense, turning to the 
sport of boxing around age fifteen when apprenticing in Dallas with the owner of a carriage 
painting shop named Walter Lewis. Under the supervision of Lewis, “an amateur boxer of 
local prominence,” Johnson began to think seriously of entering the ring professionally. He 
returned to Galveston, where he had his first pro bout in 1895 with John Lee, a dockworker. 
He won that bout, earning a net purse of a dollar twenty-five cents, and continued to fight 
for pittances in Galveston rings until 1899, when he decided to look for more promising 
venues to display his pugilistic skills.4 This was the start of his nomadic ring career, which 
eventually took him across the U.S. and to Australia, Europe, and Latin America. 
Not long after departing Galveston, after jumping trains to Springfield, Illinois, 
Johnson – over six feet tall and an imposing physical presence, despite being malnourished – 
was invited to take part in a five-man battle royal. When his opponents, apparently as part of 
a prearranged plan to knock him out and fake the rest of the performance so they could 
choose a winner amongst themselves, rushed at him, Johnson knocked out three of the men 
and dropped the fourth with a body blow. His stunning performance resulted in an 
invitation for Johnson (“the big coon with the great left hand,” as referee George Siler called 
him) to fight on a P.J. “Paddy” Carroll-promoted card in Chicago, where he met a young 
Jack Curley, then Carroll’s assistant.5 Curley would become famous in the first decades of the 
next century for popularizing professional wrestling. He would also try his hand at 
promoting boxing shows, including the Johnson-Willard title fight in Havana sixteen years 
later. That Johnson was able to make such an impression on big-city fight watchers in the 
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chaotic circumstances of a battle royal speaks highly of his early defensive as well as 
offensive skills. 
 The association Johnson formed with Curley at his Chicago debut in May 1899 – 
when, on an empty stomach, he knocked out an up-and-coming black heavyweight who 
went by the name Klondike – became an important one throughout his fistic career. After 
leaving Carroll’s employment, Curley continued to promote fighters on his own, at times 
matching them with Johnson – as he did with George Gardner in November 1902 and 
Fireman Jim Flynn in September 1907, both in San Francisco. While most black 
prizefighters of the early twentieth century labored under white managers – who tightly 
controlled the purse strings, hired the seconds, handled matchmaking, and (should it be 
necessary) fixed fights – Johnson continued to serve as his own man, using whatever agents 
and seconds he felt advantageous to him and making his own decisions inside as well as 
outside the ring.6 His ability to frazzle opponents through taunts, smiles, and a demonstrated 
mastery of boxing skill as well as power soon attracted the attention of sportswriters and the 
boxing public. Although his rise was not unmarred by poor performance or defeat, he 
accomplished some notable victories on his way to the world title. On May 1902, Johnson 
knocked out Jack Jeffries, brother of then-heavyweight champion Jim Jeffries, in five rounds. 
The following February, he earned the “colored heavyweight championship of the world” by 
decisioning Denver Ed Martin. As Jim Jeffries continued to enforce the color line that had 
been put in place by the first American world heavyweight champion, John L. Sullivan, and 
maintained by his successors, the colored title was as high an honor as most black 
heavyweights could then achieve. (Once Johnson became undisputed world champion, the 
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colored title, ironically, was replaced by the establishment of a “white heavyweight 
championship” belt devoted to the creation of white hopes.) Johnson would defend the 
colored title thirteen times. 
Following his defeat of respected white boxer Fireman Jim Flynn in 1907 on a 
Curley-promoted card, Johnson set his sights on the new world champion, Tommy Burns. 
The title had already changed hands twice in two years, and Burns – at five foot seven – did 
not seem physically imposing enough to break that pattern. His elevation was preceded by 
the retirement in May 1905 of Jim Jeffries, then undefeated and at the peak of his powers. 
Jeffries’s decision caught many people off guard; never before had a heavyweight champion 
voluntarily stepped away from his title. With the sport still illegal in most U.S. states, there 
were no boxing commissions to guide the ranking or succession process; hence, there was 
no path in place to replace Jeffries. The next champion was thus decided through an 
elimination bout in Reno, Nevada, between two white heavyweights – Jack Root and Marvin 
Hart. Refereeing the bout was Jim Jeffries himself. Hart’s substantial weight advantage – he 
outweighed his opponent by forty pounds – resulted in his twelfth-round knockout victory 
and assumption of the title. His reign was short and uninspired; the following year, he lost 
his first title defense to the much smaller Burns, a Canadian, who inherited the heavyweight 
crown when public opinion of its value was at its nadir.7 
Unlike his predecessors, Burns was more concerned about gaining what he could 
financially from the title than about maintaining a rigid color line. Consequently, he declared 
that – for the right price – he would fight Jack Johnson, who was increasingly being viewed 
by fight fans and journalists, regardless of race politics, as the best man left to beat. Some 
                                                
     7 Roberts, Papa Jack, pp. 38, 42, 47. 
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white sportswriters openly called for Johnson to have a chance at the title in the interests of 
“fair play.” When Burns left the U.S. seeking a larger pool of white opponents in England, 
Johnson followed, hoping to be able to fight him there. The failure of promoters to establish 
terms to each man’s liking (Burns demanded a $30,000 guarantee) caused Burns to depart for 
Australia in the summer of 1908, invited by Australian promoter Hugh D. McIntosh. To 
accommodate fans – including sailors from the Great White Fleet of the United States, then 
anchored in Australia –, McIntosh hurriedly built an open-air stadium at Rushcutters Bay, 
near Sydney, and another in Melbourne, where Burns defeated two local challengers for over 
$20,000 per fight. By the time Johnson arrived in Australia that October, McIntosh had 
already reached terms with Burns to accept him as his next title challenger. Burns’ purse was 
to be $30,000, as he had all along been seeking; Johnson would receive just $5,000. The fight 
was to be held on Boxing Day, December 26, 1908, at Rushcutters Bay.8 
 Johnson’s methodical, humiliating demolition of Burns – the bout was stopped by 
police in the fourteenth round rather than have the audience witness the white man being 
counted out – fueled disappointment and even outrage in Australia, the United States, and 
much of the white world. Interestingly, too, it fueled a worldwide rise in the prestige and 
visibility of prizefighting, which had reached a low since Jim Jeffries’s retirement in 1905. As 
new champion Johnson defeated a string of white challengers in exhibition and title defenses 
– most notably Stanley Ketchel, the great middleweight, who put Johnson on the canvas in 
the twelfth round of their October 1909 bout, only to be knocked out decisively moments 
later – pressure was mounting in the English-speaking press for Jim Jeffries to emerge from 
retirement and save the “white race” from the horror of a black heavyweight champion. 
                                                
     8 Johnson, The Autobiography of Jack Johnson, pp. 56-58; Roberts, Papa Jack, pp. 50-56, 67. 
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 Gail Bederman attempts to answer the question – which seems incomprehensible to 
most people now, accustomed to a world in which nonwhite athletes excel in all variety of 
sports – of why a black man’s possessing the world heavyweight title (versus that of a lighter 
weight class, for instance) was so objectionable to so many in the first two decades of the 
twentieth century. She argues that, “Jack Johnson’s racial and sexual challenge so upset the 
ideology of middle-class manhood that both the white press and the United States 
government were willing to take extraordinary measures in order to completely and utterly 
annihilate him.” At the turn of the nineteenth century, middle-class white men felt that their 
dominance was being actively challenged by immigrant men, men of color, and middle-class 
women. To reclaim what they believed to be their rightful place in American society, she 
maintains, the white male bourgeoisie turned away from gendered formulations of 
masculinity toward ones predicated upon race.9 Although Bederman accurately uses the 
word “hysteria” to describe hegemonic responses to Johnson, she does not sufficiently 
analyze why he possessed such outsized influence – and ignominy – as the face of a sport 
that was, after all, illegal in much of the country during the years he held the heavyweight 
title. One may arrive at a clearer understanding of the furious anti-Johnson sentiment by 
examining Michael S. Kimmel’s comments on boxing in the U.S. at century’s end: 
 
As were other sports, boxing was defended as a counter to the “mere 
womanishness” of modern, overcivilized society. But boxing was more than 
mere manhood; it heralded the triumphant return of the Heroic Artisan as 
mythic hero. No sooner had he virtually disappeared into enormous, 
impersonal factories than he staged his triumphant return in the boxing ring. 
If the workaday world undermined working-class manhood – requiring 
obedience to rules and docility toward managers – then boxing celebrated his 
traditional virtues: toughness, prowess, ferocity. If men could not make 
                                                
     9 Bederman, Manliness and Civilization, pp. 5, 13-14, 20 (quote on p. 5). 
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things with the skill of their hands, they could at least destroy things, or 
others, with them.10 
 
Thus, although Johnson’s success represented the culmination of white fears about the 
impending racial domination of blacks – who, after all, were considered to be inherently 
inferior – it was significant that it occurred in the boxing ring, an arena that should have 
been the purview of formerly independent, working-class whites: a profane site used for a 
sacred purpose, the reclamation of manhood. If blacks had any place there, it was fighting 
one another as a type of blood sport for whites’ pleasure (as seen most brazenly in the 
staging of battles royal); notions of “fair play” were put aside in the interests of the white 
race, which had developed a set of eugenic theories around why its dominance was essential 
for the continued progression of world civilization.11 
 White fears of black domination as symbolized by their success in the boxing ring do 
explain much of the vitriolic white response to Johnson’s winning of the heavyweight title, 
but so does his complicated relationship with the wider African American community. It has 
been argued, for instance, that Johnson’s decision to forgo respectable black women as 
companions in favor of white women, usually of ill repute, cost him the sympathies of many 
                                                
     10 Kimmel, Manhood in America, pp. 93-94. 
     11 Eugenics comprised quasi-scientific notions of anthropomorphic difference and better breeding practices. 
Although pioneered in Europe and most damagingly applied in the Nazi Germany of the 1930s and 1940s, 
eugenics became increasingly influential in public policy and educational institutions in early twentieth-century 
racially mixed societies, particularly the U.S. as well as Latin American countries such as Brazil, Peru, and 
Mexico. In addition to campaigns against drinking, venereal disease, squalid living conditions, and other banes 
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eugenicists upheld notions of Muscular Christianity that had been popularized by the YMCA and other 
reformist organizations since the late nineteenth century. For a discussion of Muscular Christianity, see Chapter 
1. On white notions of black inferiority inside and outside the boxing ring during Johnson’s career, see Denise 
C. Morgan, “Jack Johnson Versus the American Racial Hierarchy,” in Race on Trial: Law and Justice in American 
History, ed. Annette Gordon-Reed (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 77-102. On the eugenics 
movement in Latin America, see Nancy Leys Stepan, “The Hour of Eugenics”: Race, Gender, and Nation in Latin 
America (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
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African Americans as well as whites and further entrenched racist notions that upheld white 
females as the ultimate symbol of male desire.12 There is no doubt that certain middle-class 
black leaders such as Ida B. Wells and Booker T. Washington found much to which to 
object in Johnson’s choice of mates. Yet in his study of Chicago’s black culture in the early 
twentieth century, Davarian Baldwin notes that “discussions about Johnson’s controversies 
and their violent aftermath focus primarily on what his ascendancy meant for white anxieties 
about race, manhood, and civilization in the ‘Progressive Era’,” but that “[w]e rarely invert 
the lens” to inquire about his status among African Americans.13 
In that context, Johnson’s “appropriation” of desirable white females – along with all 
of the material trappings usually accorded to the world heavyweight champion – was met 
with varied responses by middle- and working-class blacks. While some were embarrassed by 
his public liaisons with white women even before he was brought up on Mann Act charges, 
others viewed him as a folk hero for his steadfast refusal to be pigeonholed as a black man 
rather than recognized as an individual.14 Johnson further inflamed middle-class black 
opinion by flouting notions of how best to use his wealth and celebrity for the black 
                                                
     12 Morgan, “Race on Trial,” pp. 84-87. 
     13 Baldwin, Chicago’s New Negroes, p. 4. 
     14 Ibid., p. 111. Johnson himself attributed his supposed “forswearing” of black women to having his heart 
broken by two of them, Mary Austin and Clara Kerr (Johnson, The Autobiography of Jack Johnson, p. 76) and 
maintained that white women treated him better, since “I never had a colored girl that didn’t two-time me” 
(John Lardner, “The Passing of the White Hopes,” Negro Digest (October 1949), pp. 20-31; quote on pp. 28-29). 
Randy Roberts argues that a preference for white women was part of Johnson’s intrinsic rebellion against racist 
norms, and that his favoring of white women went hand-in-hand with his rise to prominence and was similar to 
other black leaders’ preference for light-skinned African American wives (Roberts, Papa Jack, pp. 46-47). 
Geoffrey Ward, on the contrary, maintains that Johnson “forswore nobody” and “would pursue black as well 
as white women all his life,” but that he simply chose to travel with white ones (Ward, Unforgivable Blackness, p. 
99). As the singer Ethel Waters – who rebuffed one of Johnson’s advances – quoted him saying, “I like colored 
women, I could love a colored women…. But they never give me anything. Colored women just won’t play up 
to a man the way the white girls do… No matter how colored women feel toward a man, they don’t spoil him 
and pamper him and build up his ego.” (Ethel Waters with Charles Samuels, His Eye Is on the Sparrow (Garden 
City: Doubleday, 1951), quoted in Hietala, The Fight of the Century, p. 52.) 
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community’s benefit. Wells, for instance, urged Johnson to use his winnings to open a gym 
on the South Side of Chicago for poor black youth; instead, he founded a black-and-tan 
joint, the Café de Champion, in the same neighborhood.15 It is thus fair to ask whether this 
lack of racial solidarity that coalesced around Johnson, his very unwillingness to follow the 
rigid racial norms to which most blacks of the time were forced to adhere, made him more 
vulnerable to white persecution. At the same time, the shame which some African 
Americans felt upon learning of the fighter’s exploits was not always shared by African 
diaspora peoples elsewhere; upon arriving in Cuba, for instance, Johnson’s name was floated 
along with those of renowned Afro-Cuban politicians as a potential leader for Cuba’s blacks. 
On July 4, 1910, Johnson cemented his position as a target for race hatred when he 
dismantled the most illustrious white hope to get into the ring with him, former undefeated 
champion Jim Jeffries. Many of his critics refused to accept Johnson as the “true” champion, 
since the succession path from Jeffries to Hart, and by extension from Hart to Burns and 
Burns to Johnson, was predicated upon Jeffries’s retirement rather than defeat. While Hart 
and Burns inspired only apathy, the elevation of a black man – particularly this black man – 
to the most coveted position in sports led many racists to declare that he could only become 
champion by beating Jeffries. As champion, Jeffries had famously refused to defend his title 
against a black opponent. Now that Johnson held the title, Jeffries initially displayed little 
interest in returning to the ring. Months of flattering entreaties in the white press – which 
hyped him as the savior of the white race, the one true champion who would wipe the 
trademark smile off Johnson’s face – helped to coax him out of retirement from his alfalfa 
farm, now thirty-five years of age and over a hundred pounds heavier than his fighting 
                                                
     15 Boddy, Boxing: A Cultural History, p. 186. 
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prime. Under Tex Rickard’s promotion, which emphasized the nature of the bout as nothing 
short of a race war, Jeffries and Johnson signed their fight articles in October 1909. They 
agreed to engage in a 45-round bout the following July in Reno. Rickard himself would 
referee, and the fighters would receive a total purse of $101,000. Although initially planned 
as a winner-take-all bout, the split turned out to be fairly even, with 60 percent going to the 
winner and 40 percent to the loser.16 
From a pugilistic perspective, the “Fight of the Century” was a terrible mismatch, 
one that proved the old adage that the toughest opponent a great boxer ever has to face is 
the passage of time. The training of the past several months, which had returned Jeffries to 
something resembling his old physique; the encouragement of prior champions Jim Corbett 
and John L. Sullivan; and the near-unanimous support of the crowd were unable to provide 
Jeffries with any real chance against the champion at the peak of his abilities. To avoid the 
unthinkable – Jeffries being counted out – the battering stopped at the end of the fifteenth 
round with Jeffries’s corner throwing in the towel. As the Associated Press reported, 
 
The great Jeffries was like a log. The reviled Johnson was like a black 
panther, beautiful in his alertness and defensive tactics. 
Jeffries fought by instinct, it seemed, showing his gameness and his 
great fighting heart in every round, but he was only a shell of his old self. The 
old power to take a terrible beating and bore in until he landed the knockout 
blow was gone.17 
 
Jeffries, who had expressed dislike for Johnson and blacks in general prior to the fight, was 
more gracious in defeat. The day after the fight, he said, “I guess it’s all my own fault… I 
                                                
     16 Ward, Unforgivable Blackness, pp. 44, 46, 166-168. Johnson, The Autobiography of Jack Johnson, p. 61, gives the 
signing date as February 1910. 
     17 “Sad Crowd at Ringside,” New York Times, 5 July 1910, p. 2. 
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was getting along nicely and peacefully on my alfalfa farm, but when they started calling for 
me, and mentioning me as the white man’s hope, I guess my pride got the better of my good 
judgment.” Though some asserted he could have defeated Johnson had he, too, been at his 
prime, Jeffries shook his head and remarked, “I don’t think I could have beaten Jack 
Johnson at my best. I don’t think I could have beaten him in a thousand years.”18 
 Sadly for Johnson and his supporters, the win over Jeffries would prove to be both 
the high point of his prizefighting career and the beginning of his very public downfall. The 
scandals began shortly after the suicide of his first wife, Etta Terry Duryea. Johnson met 
Duryea, a Long Island “sporting lady” who was separated from her East coast gambler 
husband, in 1910. After her divorce went through, they wed in Pittsburgh in January 1911, 
an event that went largely unnoticed by the public. The marriage was short-lived and tragic. 
Rejected by both the white and black communities in Chicago and by her family, Etta 
frequently fell victim to depression. In September 1912, not long after her husband had 
opened the Café de Champion, where she lived with him in an upstairs apartment, Etta shot 
herself with his revolver. Johnson was fortunate not to have been present in the building at 
the time; if he had, he might have been charged with murder. A coroner’s inquest ruled the 
death a suicide, but this did not serve to end the speculation. Although there was no 
evidence that Johnson had been involved in her death in any way, and some mainstream 
news outlets – including the New York Times – even applauded Johnson for his display of 
                                                
     18 Graeme Kent, The Great White Hopes: The Quest to Defeat Jack Johnson (Stroud, U.K.: Sutton Publishing, 
2005), p. 86. 
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what appeared to be genuine grief, many in the white press argued that her death was the 
only foreseeable result of her interracial marriage.19 
 Thomas Hietala argues that “[t]his white obsession with mixed marriages might have 
ebbed had Johnson acted discreetly after his wife’s death.” Indeed, a case can be made that 
Johnson’s refusal to play the role of grieving widower, or at least to maintain an interracial 
love life outside of the public eye, inadvertently fueled the rise of anti-miscegenation 
hysteria. Just a few weeks after Etta’s death, Johnson once more became the subject of 
scandal with his open relationship with eighteen-year-old Lucille Cameron. When her 
outraged mother, Mrs. Cameron-Falconet, traveled to Chicago to “rescue” her daughter, an 
unrepentant Lucille was incarcerated; her mother even tried to have her declared insane. An 
incendiary press campaign instigated by Cameron-Falconet’s attorney soon led to an arrest 
warrant for Johnson on the charge of abduction. His arrest in October 1912, for which he 
promptly paid bond, did not satisfy the many whites who, infuriated by his “insult” to 
Cameron (and, by extension, the deceased Etta), called for his lynching. While Johnson 
sought Lucille’s freedom, the authorities attempted to use her testimony to build a Mann Act 
case against him. Yet Lucille revealed that she had come to Chicago on her own volition and 
had been there prior to meeting him. The case collapsed. In retribution, the mayor of 
Chicago ordered a cessation of entertainment at Johnson’s café, which also lost its liquor 
license. On November 1, the police nailed the doors and windows shut.20 
                                                
     19 There are many accounts of Etta Johnson’s suicide, but one of the more detailed is in Ward, Unforgivable 
Blackness, pp. 289-295. 
     20 Ibid., pp. 299-311; Hietala, The Fight of the Century, pp. 60-62 (quote on p. 60); Morgan, “Jack Johnson 
Versus the American Racial Hierarchy,” p. 88. 
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 That month, while the city of Chicago continued to harass Johnson, the federal 
government unleashed a far more powerful weapon by reviving the Mann Act charges to 
bring him to heel. Sponsored by U.S. Representative James Mann of Illinois, the United 
States White Slave Traffic Act of 1910 – better known by its namesake nickname – had its 
roots in the decision by the Theodore Roosevelt administration to sign a 1908 international 
treaty to end “white slavery,” the trafficking of white women as prostitutes and sex slaves. 
The act’s vague wording – it prohibited the transportation of females across state or national 
borders “for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose” 
– allowed a wide scope of enforcement far beyond prostitution, abduction, and teenage sex. 
It had become a felony to cross state lines for any reason that might be perceived immoral 
by arbiters of the period, i.e., federal agents and courts. Particularly vulnerable were 
consenting, heterosexual unmarried or adulterous adult couples traveling together or 
separately with the intended aim of pursuing their physical relationship in another state. 
(Until 1932, women were subject to arrest under the Mann Act for acquiescing in their own 
corruption.)21 
 Jack Johnson eluded Mann Act prosecution in the case of Lucille Cameron, but he 
could not evade it on another count – having violated the law in respect to a white prostitute 
named Belle Schreiber. His romantic involvement with her mostly pre-dated the June 1910 
passage of the Mann Act. Yet the critical component to the Mann Act – that interstate 
transportation as well as “debauchery” or prostitution be involved – was the fact that 
                                                
     21 David J. Langum, Crossing over the Line: Legislating Morality and the Mann Act (Chicago: University of Chicago 
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Johnson had paid Schreiber’s Pittsburgh-to-Chicago rail fare in late 1910 and had 
subsequently set her up as a madam. Johnson was immediately arrested and indicted on 
seven counts of encouraging prostitution.22 Following Lucille’s release from custody and 
Johnson’s release on bail, the two married on December 3 at his mother’s Chicago home. 
Lucille had apparently requested the marriage because her mother’s campaign to remove her 
from Johnson’s influence had instead “ruined [her] in the eyes of the world.”23 In acceding 
to her request, however, Johnson only made his legal and personal situation worse. Coming 
as it did so closely after Etta’s suicide, Lucille’s incarceration, and repeated federal attempts 
to indict him on Mann Act violations, his union with Lucille caused shock and revulsion 
among much of white society, as well as dismay and anger among many in the black 
community. His impassioned defense of his right to pursue love outside of his own race, 
given at a middle-class black club when he was facing allegations of abducting Lucille, did 
little to improve his situation: 
 
I do want to say that I am not a slave and that I have the right to choose who 
my mate shall be without the dictation of any man. I have eyes and I have a 
heart and when they fail to tell me who I shall have as mine I want to be put 
away in a lunatic asylum. 
So long as I do not interfere with any other man’s wife, I shall claim 
the right to select the woman of my own choice. Nobody else can do that for 
me. That is where the trouble lies.24 
 
 The “trouble” with his former companion, Schreiber, did not end with a slap on the 
wrist, as Johnson had expected it to. As his lawyers fought those charges on the basis that 
                                                
     22 Roberts, Papa Jack, pp. 150-154, 161. As noted below, Johnson was later indicted on four additional 
counts of “crimes against nature.” 
     23 Ward, Unforgivable Blackness, pp. 312-320 (quote on p. 319). 
     24 Chicago Defender, 26 October 1912, quoted in Ibid., p. 310. 
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the Mann Act was unconstitutional, the champion and his new wife had to contend with 
numerous other challenges. In addition to losing the Café de Champion, Johnson learned 
that his two upcoming Australian bouts with Sam Langford and Sam McVea were canceled. 
The promoter, Hugh D. McIntosh – who had staged the lucrative show four years earlier at 
which Johnson had won his world title –, was forced to scratch the bouts after local white 
sentiment against Johnson had grown too strong. When the Supreme Court refused to hear 
his case, Johnson’s trial went ahead, after several delays – and with four additional 
indictments for “crimes against nature” (defined as “unnatural and perverted practices”) – 
on May 5, 1913. At the end of the trial, the defense motion to toss out the four “crimes 
against nature” indictments was accepted, but the all-male, all-white jury quickly reached 
agreement on the remaining seven counts: guilty. The sentence, declared on June 4, was for 
Johnson to pay a $1,000 fine and to serve a year and a day in federal prison. Before the 
month was out, however, Johnson, Lucille, and his nephew, Gus Rhodes, had fled to 
Canada, from where they were soon en route to Europe.25 
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The Prelude to the Fight 
 Johnson’s years in exile abroad, from 1913 to 1920, remain some of the least studied 
of his much-documented life.26 In the past decade or so, a growing corpus of scholarship has 
sought to right this imbalance. Christopher Rivers has edited and translated Johnson’s 
French autobiographical writings into English; Richard V. McGehee and Gerald Horne have 
shed light on his time in Mexico; and Theresa E. Runstedtler has explored Johnson and 
other black boxers of the era as transnational figures.27 While this chapter cannot do justice 
to his global peregrinations, which prior to his arrival in Cuba included sojourns in France, 
Great Britain, Hungary, Russia, Argentina, Barbados, and other far-flung locales, it aims to 
shed light on the weeks leading up to his arrival in Havana and the nearly two months he 
resided there. Although the capital was already developing a nascent prizefight industry, the 
tremendous amount of publicity surrounding the Johnson-Willard fight unquestionably, if 
briefly, put it at “the center of the pugilistic map.”28 Yet the bout’s heightened racial 
atmosphere, which fueled so much excitement among the American journalists and tourists 
who made the trek to Havana, differentiated it from previous or subsequent prizefights there 
and did little to promote boxing’s long-term health on the island. Indeed, the reverberations 
from the bout were in many ways negative for local fight boosters, leading to efforts to 
stamp out boxing spectacles, prevent interracial matches, and discourage foreign promoters 
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(who, like Curley, might abscond without paying their debts) from staging such major 
attractions. 
 That the fight took place in Havana at all was quite by accident. In late 1914, after 
two successful title defenses against fellow Americans in Paris – the first a ten-round draw in 
December 1913 against Battling Jim Johnson in what was the first heavyweight title fight 
featuring two black opponents,29 the second a twenty-round decision win in June 1914 
against white hope Frank Moran, “The Pittsburgh Dentist” – Jack Johnson and his retinue 
moved frantically around Europe searching for somewhere to avoid the impending war. As 
he made plans to move to Buenos Aires, the fighter received a telegram from old friend Jack 
Curley, proposing to see him in person. With fearful American expatriates sailing back home 
across the Atlantic, Curley sailed the opposite way, toward England, meeting the champion 
in his Paddington flat. There they began to work out the details for Johnson’s next title 
defense, which would be against a giant but little-known Kansas heavyweight named Jess 
Willard. 
“Giant” was a word often tossed around in the early twentieth century to describe 
heavyweights, the one boxing division that lacked a maximum weight requirement; it was 
frequently used to characterize men who today might compete in the cruiserweight or even 
light heavyweight category. But the nickname was accurate in Willard’s case. He stood about 
six foot six-and-a-half inches in stature, trimmed down to a fight weight of roughly 230 to 
240 pounds, and had an 84-inch reach, which in boxing is measured from fingertip to 
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fingertip in a straight line across the breast with arms outstretched. Curley – backed 
financially by theater magnate Harry Frazee (who would become notorious, at least in New 
England, as the Boston Red Sox owner who sold Babe Ruth’s contract to the New York 
Yankees in 1919) – had already worked out the details with Willard and his manager, Tom 
Jones. For an agreed sum of $30,000 and training expenses, Johnson agreed to a 45-round 
bout against Willard to be held in northern Mexico near the U.S. border to provide ease of 
access for U.S. tourists, whom Curley anticipated would make up a majority of the audience. 
Later, he and Curley would offer vastly contrasting accounts as to whether the substantial 
purse – which equaled that offered to Tommy Burns for having given Johnson a title shot – 
was only the first of many inducements to Johnson to “lay down” to Willard.30 
Eventually, the bout was scheduled to occur in Juarez, across the U.S.-Mexico border 
from El Paso, Texas, on March 6, 1915. That it was shifted to Havana the following month 
owed to a confluence of several near-simultaneous events: the violence, upheaval, and 
factionalism of the Mexican Revolution which led to specific threats on Johnson’s personal 
safety and liberty; the determination by some U.S. government officials to extradite him 
from Mexico; Johnson’s continued physical rootlessness, which made the decision to settle 
temporarily in Cuba an easier one; his determination to fulfill the terms of his contract with 
Jack Curley without undue delay; the long tourist season in Cuba which attracted thousands 
of wealthy Americans each winter; and the capital’s recent surge in the construction of sports 
facilities and the staging of boxing shows, which made the possibility of relocating a title 
fight there a more realistic one. 
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In early 1915, Johnson and his stalwarts left Europe for Buenos Aires, from where 
they planned to reach Tampico, Mexico, via Barbados and Cuba. As they made their way 
closer to Mexico, that country’s revolutionary ferment reached a high pitch. By the fall of 
1914, following their successful ouster of dictatorial President Victoriano Huerta, the anti-
Huerta factions led by Generals Francisco “Pancho” Villa and Emiliano Zapata declared 
their split from their former allies, Generals Venustiano Carranza and Álvaro Obregón, in 
the Convention of Aguascaliente. While Carranza, supported by Obregón, declared himself 
President (and was recognized in that role by the Wilson Administration in 1916), Villa and 
Zapata carried on their rebellion. After briefly holding the capital, Mexico City, Villa’s Army 
of the North and Zapata’s Army of the South retreated to their respective regions to foment 
local unrest. By 1920, a level of political stability had returned to Mexico, but at great cost to 
the country and its former leaders; Carranza and Zapata had been murdered, Villa had 
retired from revolution (only to be assassinated himself in 1923), and Obregón had become 
president.31 
Prior to Johnson’s arrival in Cuba, Curley had greased the way for the fight to occur 
in Mexico by securing Carranza’s cooperation in allowing the champion to land at the port 
of Veracruz (which was controlled by Carranza’s Constitutionalists) and Villa’s in staging it 
in Juarez (under the Conventionist aegis) in return for a portion of the receipts. Yet as 
Johnson made his way to Havana, Carranza’s attitude toward the bout – and toward the 
exiled fighter himself – visibly changed. The president’s about-face appears to have been 
based at least in part upon considerations of continued Wilson Administration support 
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against Villa and Zapata. The U.S. Bureau of Investigation, hoping to secure Johnson’s 
deportation from Mexico as an “undesirable citizen,” offered a financial reward to those 
assisting with his expulsion.32 As early as mid-January, Carranza contacted the 
Constitutionalist consul in El Paso, Texas, asking for details of the upcoming Johnson-
Willard bout and stating that, should the champion attempt to travel there, “he will be 
arrested for aiding the convention cause, as it is thought that Villa will make his own profit 
out of any event that comes off at Juarez.”33 
 In early February, rumors had it that Carranza’s men had arrested Johnson in 
Veracruz “on the ground that he was a friend or ally of Villa, and also because the first chief 
does not intend to allow the projected prize fight at Juarez take place if he can prevent it.”34 
Although Johnson had not yet departed Barbados and was nowhere near Veracruz, the 
rumor was accurate about Carranza’s intentions. By February 10, Johnson sailed from 
Barbados on a schooner for Cienfuegos, Cuba, “apparently unaware that Carran[z]a has 
announced that he will arrest him on sight as a friend of Pancho Villa.”35 He reached Havana 
by train on February 22, accompanied by his wife, nephew, and three others.36 
Once in the capital, Johnson quickly learned of Carranza’s plans to arrest and deport 
him. He still wished to depart for Mexico the following day, but he was forced to modify his 
original plans, which had been to take the Morro Castle steamer to Veracruz on the 
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afternoon of Tuesday, February 23. He approached the Ward Line about taking him directly 
to Tampico in return for naming “their own price,” but the steamer turned down the offer 
as “impracticable.” The only option was to charter a steamer, but most were already engaged 
in exporting sugar. Finally, Johnson arranged for a tramp steamer to take him and his party 
to Tampico – but when approached by the Havana Stadium management to appear in a 
boxing exhibition there on Wednesday night, February 24, he agreed to move his departure 
date to February 25.37 Curley, in El Paso, continued to hold out hope that the fight would be 
held in Juarez, but acknowledged that, given the delay in getting Johnson there, the March 6 
date would need to be pushed back.38 By the following day, however, Johnson – who was 
attracting large crowds throughout Havana – was refusing to leave for Mexico at all. New 
information about Carranza’s betrayal and the extent of his reach in Mexico appear to have 
been the motivating factors; the Havana Post reported that, “Persons who are well acquainted 
with conditions as they are now in Mexico showed the champion beyond any question that 
he would be running a grave risk to take any chances with Carranza.” Whether these 
“persons” were the same ones who hoped to benefit by Johnson’s continued association 
with the Stadium – its matchmaker and manager, B.F. Farris, who had been recruited from 
the Seminole Athletic Club of Jacksonville, Florida, shortly after the Stadium’s opening, and 
owner, George M. Bradt – who, not coincidentally, also owned the Havana Post, the English-
language daily newspaper written for and by the U.S. expatriate community – is not known. 
As word reached Curley – who had been secretly, if unsuccessfully, negotiating with federal 
officials in Chicago to try to secure Johnson’s return to the States after the bout – of 
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Johnson’s refusal to leave Cuba, he twice cabled the champion urging him “to charter a 
steamer for Tampico and assuring him that everything was all right.” Johnson, eager to meet 
his contract obligations, responded that he would still battle Willard for the championship –
 but in Havana, not Juarez. Havana, he told Curley, was an “ideal spot for it.”39 
That night, as Johnson fought two short exhibition bouts at the Stadium against his 
nephew and another sparring partner, Frank Hagney of Australia, Curley made immediate 
plans to depart for Havana. In the meantime, Johnson – ensconced with Lucille at a 
“Spanish” establishment, the Hotel Estrella (which had not drawn the color line against 
them, unlike many other hotels in the capital) – appeared to be enjoying his Havana sojourn, 
apparently finding that city “the nearest to Paris of any that he has visited yet.” The idea was 
even floated for him to remain in Havana, become a Cuban citizen, and run for political 
office; as a naturalized citizen, he “would be eligible to any office in Cuba except that of 
senator or president and his popularity would be such that he could command the entire 
colored vote in any part of Cuba and would soon put such colored leaders as Congressman 
[Generoso] Campos Marquetti and [Manuel] Escoto Carrion into the shade.”40 When in early 
March Johnson purchased from famed Obispo Street tailor Larry Spero “ten suits varying 
from a pair of the whitest linen to match his eyeballs to the blackest full dress to match his 
complexion,” as the Havana Post crudely noted, the crowds were so great that police were 
called in to facilitate traffic. Apparently, local politicians viewed this latest Johnson 
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development with interest, as such an exorbitant purchase seemed to indicate that he was 
contemplating remaining in Havana, pursuing Cuban citizenship, and “entering the arena to 
wrest leadership honors from Campos Marquetti, [Juan Felipe] Risquet and Juan Gualberto 
Gomez.”41 
Despite the welcoming attitude of many, the Johnsons’ stay in Havana was not 
unmarred by vicious racism – as when, in late March, a white manicurist refused to serve 
Lucille because she “had married a negro,” and then got into a physical altercation with her. 
Although the proprietor apologized to Johnson, the manicurist refused to do so, insulting 
the champion and throwing a wet towel in her (presumably former) boss’s face as she 
stormed out.42 Moreover, not all Americans welcomed the possibility of such a high-profile 
mixed-race bout, especially one that appeared to be a lock for Johnson. Captain Cushman A. 
Rice declared that he and his fellow ranch owners were “unalterably opposed to having 
[Johnson] beat up a white man,” fearing the “inter-racial feeling” that would be stirred up.43 
The editors of the Times of Cuba, a monthly English-language expatriate publication, split the 
difference. While arguing against the principle of mixed bouts of minor significance, due to 
the “very well defined color line here” and the violent suppression of the Partido 
Independiente de Color partisans in Oriente in 1912, one that left 5,000 Afro-Cubans dead, 
it called the Johnson-Willard bout “the exception that proves the rule”: 
 
For this battle is not between Cubans (Johnson hasn’t declared his 
citizenship intentions as yet), and it is an event in the sporting world. It is 
doubtful if the contest, no matter how it results, will have the slightest 
political effect in Cuba. On the other hand, it should have a stimulating effect 
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on the business interests of the city and especially the hotels and 
transportation lines, as it should bring several thousand visitors here and will 
place considerable money in circulation. The contest for the heavyweight 
championship of the world is exceptional per se.44 
  
Thus, while some observers initially found the likelihood of a Johnson-Willard bout 
in Havana to be undesirable or unlikely – even Stadium publicity agent and prizefighting 
booster G.W. Krick, in his daily column for the Havana Post, held it to be a “ten-to-one 
shot… that Curley will be the dictator and Johnson will do what he says,” i.e., travel to 
Juarez – others understood the benefits of wooing the champion.45 The American expatriate 
community in Havana, particularly, saw endless financial possibilities in boosting nearly year-
round U.S. tourism with Europe and nearby Mexico at war, and the bout fit perfectly into 
that agenda. Even before Johnson’s arrival on the island, the Havana Post featured screaming 
headlines attesting to the bloodshed occurring in Mexico, particularly at the hands of Pancho 
Villa and his associates, and to the political, economic, and social instability that led to 
protracted civil war.46 With World War I raging in Europe and debates over what the U.S. 
should do with the Philippines after years of fighting insurgents there, it is no wonder that 
the Cuban-based U.S. community, which was closely tied to native government and business 
elites, chose to emphasize the island’s relative peace and stability, its open access to U.S. 
investors, and its willingness to hue to American foreign policy imperatives. Any hint that 
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Cuba – and particularly Havana – was more quasi-colonial backwater than comfortable U.S. 
enclave was fiercely rebuffed, as when an editorial in the Minneapolis Journal argued against 
Philippine independence on the grounds that, “We have learned our lesson in Cuba, where, 
since self-government was granted, two interventions have been necessary to preserve peace 
and order.” As the editors of the Havana Post corrected, 
 
If The Journal will brush up a little on its history it will learn that 
there has only been one intervention in Cuba since the Cubans were declared 
free and independent. If it will investigate a little further it will also find that 
it drew a very poor comparison when it mentioned Cuba and the Cubans in 
the same connection with the Philippines and the Filipinos. Cuba is not a 
model of self-government just as Minneapolis is not a model of city 
government. But there is no similarity with conditions here and those 
obtaining in the Philippines, and Cuba, considering that the United States left 
the island sooner than it should have done, with the exception of the little 
trouble in August, 1906, has done quite as well as big countries many times 
older, and has given the United States practically no trouble.47 
 
Having already been exploited by U.S. concerns for its agricultural crops, Cuba now 
beckoned to ambitious Americans as a burgeoning tourist haven. As Rosalie Schwartz notes 
in her work on the history of tourism on the island, “Cuba carved its tourist niche according 
to the appeals that Cuban entrepreneurs, foreign investors, and its tourist commission 
thought the U.S. market would buy.”48 While Schwartz and other cultural historians of pre-
1959 Cuba have focused primarily on the growth of travel options (steamship, ferry, 
airplanes), luxury hotels, casinos, music and dance venues, movie theaters, and the sex trade, 
less commented upon has been the boom in the construction of athletic facilities in Havana 
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and smaller municipalities. Coming as it did – along with the island’s tourist boom more 
generally – with the disruption of travel to Europe and the rapid development of southern 
Florida at the onset of World War I, the building of arenas, gymnasiums, and racetracks also 
coincided with the worldwide rise of pugilism in areas under heavy British or U.S. influence: 
notably, Australia, the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rico, and Cuba. 
Prizefighting thus had its earliest heyday in Cuba at a time when it was first being marketed 
to North Americans as a tourist haven. And the biggest tourist event of Cuba’s first two 
decades would coincide with the potential for a return to white supremacy at the highest 
pinnacle of sports achievement for that age: the heavyweight championship of the world. 
 
The World Comes to Havana 
 While Jack Curley had initially hoped to talk Jack Johnson into going to Juarez, it 
quickly became apparent that there was no safe way for the champion to get there. 
Carranza’s control of the main Gulf of Mexico ports and Mexico City made it impossible to 
enter via the Caribbean or overland through Central America. There was no way to enter 
Juarez overland from across the U.S. border, since officials there were waiting to arrest 
Johnson for Mann Act violations. The only two possible means of entry were impracticable 
and expensive – chartering an airplane, or sailing via Cape Horn and around Mexico’s 
Atlantic coastline.49 In late February, although he issued statements from El Paso that, 
“There will be no fight unless it is held in Juarez,” Curley seemed more concerned about 
competing Havana promoters who might attempt to “steal” his fight. He ordered his 
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secretary, Bill Frawley, to pack up his office equipment for shipment abroad.50 In particular, 
he was determined to stop Johnson’s ongoing negotiations with the Stadium’s promoters to 
hold the bout there, wiring him to cease such efforts until Curley landed in Havana.51 Curley 
arrived in the capital on March 2, visiting both Oriental Park and the Havana Stadium on his 
first day there. His initial feeling was that the Stadium – with its 12,000-person seating 
capacity – was too small for a world championship fight of such significance, but that the 
Hippodrome might work.52 At the same time, he cabled the treasurer of the Johnson-Willard 
syndicate, one A. Weil, in El Paso that Johnson was being “misled” by local promoters, and 
optimistically concluded, “Everything favorable for Juarez.”53 
 Privately, however, Curley confided to friends that he despaired of persuading 
Johnson to accept the original fight terms, as “the sporting men in Havana had filled the 
black man full of lies about his treatment if he went to Mexico, how negroes were especially 
hated there and how unsafe it would be for him to undertake the trip.” Adding to Curley’s 
woes, Tex Rickard – who had promoted the famous Johnson-Jeffries bout on July 4, 1910, 
and had since retired to Buenos Aires – was exploring the possibility of staging the bout in 
Argentina. With Rickard proposing to match Curley’s guarantee and Havana promoters 
seemingly conspiring to steal the championship bout from under his nose, Curley was forced 
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to act quickly to maintain control of both the fighters and the fight.54 By March 7, Curley 
confirmed that the Johnson-Willard bout would indeed take place in Havana, during the first 
week of April. The next day, as Willard cabled his acceptance of the terms, Curley firmed up 
plans to hold the event at the Marianao racetrack – no doubt a bitter disappointment to 
George Bradt, who disputed Curley’s story to the local newspaper, La Noche, that Bradt had 
sought $7,500 for renting the Stadium on the day of the bout only.55 Willard – having 
recently broken training camp against the advice of his manager, Tom Jones, in frustration 
over the delays keeping Johnson from landing in Juarez –, after further negotiations with 
Curley over travel and other costs, departed for Cuba via New Orleans and Key West on 
March 11, accompanied by Jones and Weil. The trio arrived in Havana five days later, to a 
raucous local welcome from about 7,000 onlookers.56 
 With their match-up scheduled for Sunday, April 4, the government quickly acted to 
demonstrate its support for serving as host to the most important athletic event ever held in 
Cuba. On March 15, President Menocal and his two sons – as well as Secretary of the 
Government Hevia, Postmaster General Hernández, Governor Rodríguez, and two aides – 
arrived at Jack Johnson’s public workout to express his administration’s support for the title 
fight. Hevia, impressed by Johnson, offered to wager $100 on him – a bet that the president 
was said to have matched, although he later vociferously denied it, even threatening to end 
future boxing contests in Cuba should such rumors persist. At the Johnson workout, 
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Menocal told Curley that his visit was aimed, in part, to assure the public that, despite 
rumors to the contrary, he was in favor of holding the bout in Havana. Two weeks later, 
Menocal visited Willard’s camp in Miramar.57 
 Once all of the principals – Johnson, Willard, and Curley – were in the capital, local 
fight fever grew more heated. Johnson made frequent appearances at the Hippodrome races, 
while Willard was invited to various social functions around the city. Each fighter had daily 
scheduled workouts open to the public for a small fee – Johnson at the Stadium, Willard at 
Miramar Garden.58 These offered many Havana denizens and tourists the opportunity to 
view the fighters in person for the first time. The fight not only drew boatloads of new 
tourists to Havana, particularly from the U.S., but it also served to extend the current season, 
which normally would have ended by late March or early April due to encroaching heat. 
 With the fight scheduled to go 45 rounds – by 1915, an increasingly rare occurrence 
even in championship disputes – the conditioning of both fighters, but particularly Johnson 
at 37 years of age, was of the utmost importance in determining who might be able to last 
the distance. Johnson himself later claimed, “Preceding the fight with Willard, I did no 
serious training. I engaged in a few boxing exhibitions and did a few ‘strong man’ stunts, 
such as pulling against horses and permitting a horse to stand on my stomach. This was 
about the extent of my training.” This claim was critical to establishing, as his autobiography 
and numerous post-fight interviews sought to do, that he and Curley had agreed during the 
initial planning in London that Johnson would “lay down” to Willard in return for financial 
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remuneration and so that Curley could expedite Johnson’s return to the United States to see 
his ailing mother. As Johnson recalled, his indifference to training raised alarm bells among 
“Mrs. Johnson, my nephew Gus, my sparring partners and friends,” but that he was able to 
fool more experienced observers: “I boxed occasionally with Bob Armstrong, Sam McVey 
and some other American boxers whom I had previously fought in America, but as I always 
had been able to box rings around all of them, they never knew whether or not I was in 
shape.”59 
 Although most contemporary and later commentators have discounted Johnson’s 
claims of throwing the fight, as will be discussed below, some Havana observers 
corroborated that he did not train as might be expected of an aging world champion facing a 
slightly younger, taller, heavier opponent who – albeit far less skilled – possessed dangerous 
punching power and “the steam of a locomotive.”60 As his biographers demonstrate, 
Johnson had a long tradition of slacking in training, instead relying on natural defensive 
instincts and ability to evade the rushes and haymakers of less able opponents, and on a 
willingness to fight in the clinches when fatigue overtook him. On several occasions, 
audiences had jeered him for “carrying” fighters the distance rather than knock them out 
early, as he clearly might have done. Yet whether he underestimated Willard, who, in greener 
days, had once hidden behind a referee to avoid taking a beating; whether his stamina or 
desire to train, or even to retain the championship, had deserted him after two years in exile; 
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whether he feared overworking himself in the hot Havana climate; or whether, as he claimed 
throughout the last decades of his life, he simply chose not to train for a fixed fight are 
questions that cannot definitively be answered.61 Nonetheless, G.W. Krick noted ominously 
of the champion’s training regimen two weeks before the bout, “Johnson has failed to show 
his old time steam and appears to be taking things easily. A great question now in the minds 
of the critics is whether or not the champion can go the route.”62 
 Willard, on the contrary, was gaining admirers – quite a few who were willing, 
literally, to bet on his victory. Not only was he a gigantic, fit specimen of “white hope,” but 
he also showed marked improvement in his public workouts, including a surprising addition 
to his arsenal: clever footwork.63 His left jab was coming along, and he had a strong chin. 
While his supporters admitted he was “far from a finished boxer,” Willard appeared to be a 
quick study. He was, of course, the sentimental favorite owing to his position as potential 
savior of the white race; even those white men who liked or sympathized with Johnson (as 
many claimed to do after his loss) showed little compunction in rooting for their race ally. 
Interestingly, a significant number of “Cowboy” Jess’s fans were women; at a workout he 
held in late March at Miramar Garden, about a third of the 500 spectators were female. 
While American betting began in favor of Johnson, 11 to 5, the Havana Post early on placed a 
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$500 bet on Willard “against the Johnson money offering the best odds.”64 Within a few 
days, the betting odds had dropped to between 2 and 2 ! to 1 in favor of Johnson.65 
 Just over a week before the fight, a controversy involving U.S. government officials 
and religious ministers briefly threatened to overtake the entire event. William E. Gonzales, 
the U.S. Minister to Cuba, sent a letter to Havana Post publisher Bradt on March 26 
protesting to the fight’s scheduled date of April 4 – which he had recently discovered was 
Easter Sunday. Gonzales felt that, should the event be held on that sacred day, second in 
importance only to Christmas in the Christian tradition, “it will inevitably produce a storm of 
protests from the United States against this country.” Although he left the matter up to the 
promoters, he closed by warning, “I feel that these millions [in the U.S.] will resent this 
contest being held on Easter Sunday and their resentment will fall not upon the participators 
in the contest but upon the country in which it is held. I think that this would not only be an 
injustice but very unfortunate for Cuba.” Bradt supported changing the date but claimed that 
his paper had not publicly commented upon the issue because of what might be perceived as 
sour grapes over the Stadium’s losing the bout to Oriental Park.66 The Secretary of the 
Government, under Menocal’s authorization, quickly moved to alter the date. In addition to 
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pressure from the U.S. Minister, the Cuban president had received about 600 telegrams and 
cable dispatches opposing the Easter date. Even the fighters claimed to support the change. 
Willard said he did not wish to box on a Sunday at all, and both men had received letters 
from fight fans asking them to refuse to box on Easter. Despite grumblings from merchants 
who feared a weekday bout would hurt sales, Curley quickly gave into these entreaties and 
moved it to the afternoon of Monday, April 5. Ticket holders were informed that their 
Sunday passes would be valid for the following day.67 
The Cuban government reciprocated the gesture by naming the hours of April 5 
after 10 a.m. a national holiday, which enabled all government employees who had 
purchased tickets for Sunday to be able to attend the 12:30 p.m. bout. After initially opting 
to close its session early, the Cuban Congress declared it would not convene at all on April 5, 
saving both its members and Menocal the trouble of attending his scheduled address. At 
least twenty large private businesses followed the government’s lead by shutting their doors 
at 10 a.m. the day of the fight.68 One sector that did not receive the day off was the police 
force; a double force was slated to line the racetrack, the ring, and parts of the electric car 
line between Havana and Marianao. Military forces were also kept in reserve.69 
While the postponement satisfied the U.S. and Cuban governments, and the national 
holiday was welcome news to many ordinary Cubans, a binational group of ministers used 
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the Johnson-Willard fight to call for a complete ban on prizefighting on the island. They 
addressed their call to President Menocal, Governor Bustillo, and Havana mayor Acosta.70 
Eleven U.S. ministers and one bishop resident in Havana, among them J.E. Hubbard, 
General Secretary of the local Young Men Christian’s Association branch, echoed their 
sentiment in the following letter to the Havana Post only days before the fight: 
 
To the American Residents or Sojourning in Cuba: 
 
 The Cuban Ministry, representing the various Evangelical Missions centered 
in Havana, have presented to the President, the Governor of the Province of Havana 
and the Alcalde of Marianao a protest against the prize fight, advertised to take place 
in the Oriental Park on Monday, April 5th. 
 We, the undersigned, citizens of the United States, ministers of the Gospel, 
residing in Cuba, while not joining directly in said protest because we have no desire 
to complain of the action of the authorities of the Republic of Cuba nor to interfere 
in the internal affairs of the Island, desire nevertheless to call the attention of the 
Cuban Government to the fact that prize fighting is prohibited by the laws of the 
United States; that it is favored only by the baser elements of the population and that 
if it is permitted in Cuba, it will have the effect to draw hither those who desire to 
gratify their lower instincts in ways prohibited by the laws of their country.71 
 
Rather than engaging the religious leaders on the issue of whether prizefighting in Cuba 
should be banned, the Post’s editorial writers initiated a battle of semantics, noting that, 
“there is no United States’ law against” the sport and that many states did allow it in some 
form, albeit usually with restrictions. Nor did the implication that only “baser elements” 
favored professional boxing appear to impact ticket sales, local fascination with the fighters 
(Willard was by then attracting 5,000 paid visitors to his training camp, Johnson over 3,000), 
or the determination of most Cuban and American elites in Havana to be in attendance. As 
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if to emphasize how out of touch the ministers were with local public and political 
sentiment, the promoters had arranged for President Menocal, his cabinet members and 
friends, the provincial governor, the Havana mayor, the army’s commanding general, and the 
American minister to be present in special ringside seats. In the end, the Christian ministers’ 
protest had little or no effect upon the U.S. government’s tacit support, and the Cuban 
government and public’s overt support, of the bout. With the Easter issue satisfactorily 
resolved and without further U.S. intervention in Cuban affairs forthcoming, the debate over 
prizefighting on the island had died for the time being. Moreover, the futility of the 
ministers’ gesture reflected the limited impact of the evangelical Christian church on Cuban 
society – which would be demonstrated by the YMCA’s failure to gain more than a marginal 
foothold in Havana during its brief tenure there.72 
 Johnson-Willard ticket sales continued to be brisk as the fight drew closer. Exclusive 
athletic clubs and social organizations snapped up the best seats: eight boxes costing $2,000 
to the Cuban-American Jockey Club; $3,700 worth of seats to the Vedado Tennis Club; 
$2,500 to the Union Club. Relatives of prominent politicians also sought to make their 
presence known; the brothers of current President Menocal and of former President Tomás 
Estrada Palma each bought two boxes, as did Postmaster General Hernández. Large parties 
from the U.S. – including a group of 85 people from New Orleans – made reservations from 
abroad. And once again demonstrating the interest of women in this fight, and in 
prizefighting in Havana more generally, several Cuban society women purchased seats at 
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ringside – presumably, close enough to hear and feel the exertions of the fighters. One 
wonders whether the high-status women and men who occupied those seats realized ahead 
of time that the transfer of sweat, saliva, and blood was a hazard of sitting at ringside.73 
While the New York Times reported that most women in attendance at the Johnson-Willard 
fight were American, “many other women, members of Cuba’s aristocracy, from the 
seclusion of the racetrack clubhouse trained their glasses on the battling gladiators.”74 
 To accommodate the large numbers of people who were expected to see the fight, 
the Marianao Railway added additional electric rail cars to its regular Havana-Marianao 
service. Since it was anticipated that most in attendance would be traveling from Havana, the 
railway was prepared to handle the transport of as many as 25,000 people on a direct route 
from central Havana to the Hippodrome, about twelve miles away. After 8 a.m. on the 
morning of the fight, it scheduled electric cars to run every few minutes for a fare of five 
cents.75 In the days leading up to the fight, rail service from the interior of the country to 
Havana was similarly in demand. In addition, increased bookings of passage to Havana on 
steamers from Key West, Florida, were causing a “big jam in that American city, hundreds 
being unable to get to Cuba.” San Francisco-based Jack Welch, who had previously worked 
as third man during Johnson’s bouts with Sandy Ferguson and Stanley Ketchel and was 
selected to referee in Havana after negotiations among the boxers and their managers had 
eliminated all other possibilities, had been unable to make it to Cuba on a regular Key West 
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steamer, and instead had to charter his own. He finally landed in Havana late on April 2.76 
That Cubans would make up such a large portion of the fight goers appeared to surprise 
many late American arrivals; those showing up at the ticket booth a day or two beforehand 
without reservations were disappointed to learn that most of the best seats were already 
taken.77 Yet the bout was far from sold out; the fight would ultimately attract 16,000 ticket 
holders (plus as many as 5,000 who watched for free on the hills behind the racetrack), a 
respectable number considering the relative newness of big-time prizefighting to Havana, 
but far less than had been anticipated.78 
 Although they had lost their chance to host the world heavyweight championship to 
Oriental Park, the promoters of the Great Havana Stadium were banking that the excitement 
over that event might spill over into a desire by the public to see many lesser bouts as well. 
The Havana Post therefore sponsored a “fistic carnival” to take place in the evenings leading 
up to April 5, as well as the night of the fight itself.79 While the main events were to be 
“name” fighters, most from abroad, Cuban fighters were invited to try out for some of the 
undercard spots. As the carnival got underway, an Associated Press reporter described a 
changed environment in which prizefighting had, at least temporarily, become a sport of all 
classes and races in Havana: 
 
 Havana is fight mad. Nothing else but pugilism is being discussed in 
clubs, hotels, and homes by the men and women of the city. The American 
pigilists [sic] here are treated as popular heroes, and all the bouts that are held 
are being well attended. The only thing that the Cuban fails to grasp in the 
fight game is the clinching. 
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 The task of educating the Cuban people to an understanding of 
boxing is now under full headway. Boxers are gathering here from all parts of 
the United States, and bouts are scheduled for every night of this week. 
Windows and billboards are filled with cards and posters announcing the 
fights. Pugilists of all classes are in training here, and as they parade the 
streets, clad in flannels or linens, they are followed, like popular heroes, by 
crowds of boys and men. About the training camp groups of negro youths 
spend all day at sparring, many of them cleverly.80 
 
While U.S. outsiders may have viewed Cubans as a passive but “educable” part of 
the imperial project to promote American values, Cubans were developing their own unique 
relationship to the sport and its practitioners. True, most were unfamiliar with Marquis of 
Queensberry boxing rules – which had first been adopted in England in 1866 and marked 
the emergence of gloved, timed prizefights over bare-knuckle brawls – but so were most of 
their American peers; after all, the sport remained illegal in most U.S. states.81 Because there 
had been no tradition of bare knuckle boxing in Cuba, the gloved variant could enter the 
Havana sporting arena as a “respectable” sport, more akin to baseball than to the frequent 
street brawling that was reported in the city’s press, and thus one that attracted the presence 
of women from the start. Yet by the very selection of Havana as the world capital of 
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pugilism, at least for one day, habaneros responded with pride as well as curiosity about this 
new sport and came out in force to experience it. Cuban newspapers and periodicals sought 
to educate their readers about the nuances of prizefighting, publishing numerous articles on 
the history of the sport and its peculiar customs. Shortly before the Johnson-Willard fight, 
for instance, the Havana daily newspaper El Mundo ran articles summarizing the Marquis of 
Queensberry rules and a list of some of the more notable bouts – the latter including figures 
on how much revenue each one garnered, no doubt of interest to those hoping to benefit 
first-hand from the Johnson-Willard tourist boom.82 
Although Jack Johnson had been driven out of the United States for sordid reasons, 
and although U.S. and Cuban officials insisted that Johnson-Willard was the interracial bout 
that would prove the exception rather than the rule, in Havana Johnson cut a dashing figure 
and was indeed something of a folk hero. Outside of training camp, he attracted bigger 
crowds than Willard, was exceedingly well dressed, and flaunted his wealth by driving 
luxurious cars through town and reportedly buying a $5,000 diamond in a Havana shop. 
Despite the fact that sportswriters interpreted Willard’s chances more favorably as the fight 
grew near, local betting remained partial to Johnson; for many, his loss to the little-known 
Kansan seemed a long shot at best. Retirement seemed likelier; Sam McVey hoped that, 
following his victory over Willard, Johnson would move to Paris, retire, and pass the title to 
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him, as Jim Jeffries had done (indirectly) for Marvin Hart.83 Sam Langford had bolder hopes; 
on April 3, he sent a cablegram to the editors of El Mundo offering challenges to Willard and 
Johnson that the victor should meet Langford in his next defense “in accordance with [the] 
American public[’]s demand.” When reporters of the paper brought the cable to Willard’s 
attention at the Hotel Plaza, his somewhat bewildered response was, “It is foolish; it has no 
importance.” Willard’s manager, Tom Jones, replied more diplomatically that his man would 
fight whoever was put in front of him; no mention was apparently made of drawing the race 
line, though both would have known that Langford was African American. At the Johnson 
residence, an intermediary informed the reporters in response to the cable that the champion 
would take on any challenger to his title for a purse of $30,000, but that Johnson felt 
Langford was “soft meat for him.”84 
 Johnson was apparently not aware of it at the time, but the U.S. District Attorney in 
Chicago, Charles F. Cline, claimed to have assigned U.S. Secret Service agents to watch the 
Havana bout from ringside in order to observe “every move Johnson makes.” It was said 
that they would attempt to arrest him after the fight, although the Cuban government stated 
that it had not received an extradition request. If these agents were indeed present, no such 
arrest was forthcoming.85 To ensure that race riots or other breaches of the peace did not 
occur, the Cuban government stationed both infantry and cavalry on the scene. Despite the 
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electric railway’s plans to ease the crush of people heading to Oriental Park, the cars were 
unable to handle the traffic, and some fight-goers had to walk the entire twelve miles from 
central Havana to Marianao. Some men had spent all night waiting in line to purchase the 
$3.00 general admission seats, which were not sold in advance.86 
Although scheduled to begin at 12:30 p.m., Johnson and Willard did not enter the 
ring until 1:15 p.m. and 1:20 p.m., respectively. The first round began shortly afterward.87 A 
couple of hours later, despite McVea’s hopes of succession, there would be a new world 
heavyweight champion, one who was initially greeted by most of the white world with 
tremendous enthusiasm and gratitude. As quite a few sportswriters had predicted, if Johnson 
could not win by knockout in the early rounds, he would lose to one in the later rounds. Had 
there been a twenty-round limit, Johnson would have retained his title by decision, as he 
clearly outperformed his opponent for the first seventeen rounds. But Willard, though 
outboxed, did not drop. Although it was later said that Johnson had broken Willard’s jaw 
and ribs, the Kansan’s corner urged him to conserve his energy for the stretch. The tide 
began to turn in Willard’s favor by the start of the eighteenth, although Johnson was still 
inflicting punishment into the twenty-first. After that, Willard’s punches came quicker, and 
Johnson’s fatigue became worse. By the twenty-fifth, legs tiring, Johnson took a hard hit to 
the abdomen but did not fall down. According to Curley, Johnson sent word to him to usher 
Lucille Johnson, who was sitting ringside, out of the stadium rather than see her husband be 
knocked out. In the twenty-sixth, Willard, having weakened his opponent, came at him more 
forcefully, knocking him into the ropes before ultimately dropping him with an overhand 
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right. As Johnson slowly fell, grabbing hold of Willard, the big man tried to push him away. 
Johnson hit the canvas and rolled partway onto his back, with his feet pointed toward a 
corner post and his head slightly under the ropes. With Johnson’s eyes staring straight into 
the hot afternoon sun, he pulled his right arm, still gloved, in front of his face, presumably to 
shield them. He remained that way as Curley called out the full ten seconds, while a United 
Press International (UPI) photographer snapped one of the most famous poses in boxing 
history – one that, as Al-Tony Gilmore noted, would be “a standard wall decoration in 
saloon and speakeasies” for years afterward.88 
 The image became proof of one of two things, depending on one’s perspective: that 
a white man had bested the world’s first black heavyweight champion, or that Johnson had 
thrown the fight. Although at first gracious in defeat, acknowledging in an official statement 
shortly after the fight that Willard had been the better man that day, within a few months the 
former champion claimed to have been a willing participant in a fix. On June 1, the Havana 
Post reported that, “A London despatch to a New York newspaper quotes Jack Johnson as 
saying that the fight in Havana with Willard was faked. We are disposed to believe that the 
despatch was faked but not the fight.”89 The following year, Johnson sent a lengthy 
“Confession” to his friend Nat Fleischer explaining the arrangement. According to this 
statement, which he reiterated ten years later in his autobiography, Johnson had worked out 
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a deal with Curley and Frazee: He would allow Willard to win by knockout in return for a 
large monetary payment and amnesty for his Mann Act prosecution, thereby allowing him to 
return to the United States (and to see his sick mother) without having to serve a prison 
sentence. He insisted that he had not shared the plot with anyone else until the morning of 
the fight, when he informed his wife so that she could assist in its implementation. She was 
escorted out of Oriental Park only after she had flashed him a signal to indicate that she had 
received payment in $500 bills of the agreed-upon amount, which had been delayed by the 
counting of gate receipts; shortly afterward, he took a dive. According to Johnson 
biographer Gilmore, this alternate version of events at Oriental Park was “one that most 
blacks [of the era] chose to believe.”90 
 Undoubtedly, because of the popularity of gambling on prizefights, and later, the 
involvement of organized crime, outright fixes and other fraudulent practices were common 
to the sport for much of the twentieth century (and, some would have it, continue on a more 
subtle but insidious level today, now that pay-per-view revenues have made it more lucrative 
to create “bankable” fighters). Even when boxers were not asked to take a fall, they at times 
had to prop up their opponents and win (or lose) by decision; this was particularly true of 
black heavyweight prizefighters prior to the rise of Joe Louis, when their road to achieving a 
world title was almost completely blocked. 
Yet there is little reason to believe Johnson’s story. His lack of training, surplus 
weight, advanced boxing age, dissolution, size disadvantage, and other consequences of two 
strenuous years in exile were insurmountable odds in a 45-round fight against an opponent 
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of Willard’s caliber at his peak, particularly in an unforgiving climate where endurance 
counted as much, if not more, than ability. Nor can one discount the effort that Johnson 
showed until he finally hit the canvas. Unlike other suspected fixes, such as Sonny Liston’s 
shocking losses in February 1964 and May 1965 to Cassius Clay/Muhammad Ali, Johnson’s 
and Willard’s bodies both bore signs of a long and arduous battle.91 As Nat Fleischer, who 
covered Johnson in Reno and Havana and considered him to be the best heavyweight in 
boxing history, noted years after receiving his “Confession”: “When a fight is ‘arranged,’ the 
man who is taking the dive doesn’t fight for twenty-six rounds and break his rival’s ribs and 
jaw in the bargain, as Johnson had done to Willard!”92 
 Johnson’s efforts to shape his legacy aside – and to justify the rematch he requested 
with Willard but was never granted –, his loss after six and a half years as heavyweight 
champion was celebrated as a race victory by whites in Cuba as well as the United States. 
Newspapers in both Cuba and the U.S. emphasized the jubilation of those in attendance. 
They had waved white flags (in honor of the white race), shouted epithets such as “Kill the 
black bear” to Johnson, and otherwise made their partisanship for Willard quite obvious. For 
instance, women who had “groaned” as Willard was being beaten in the first half of the bout 
“grew wildly excited” as his performance improved, “and [they] vied with the men in striving 
to make their shouts of cheer reach the man who was battling for the pugilistic supremacy of 
their race.” Following the bout, several thousand people blocked the Plaza Hotel, where 
Willard was staying, forcing police to have to clear passage to the entrance to allow the new 
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champion through. White Cubans celebrated into the night.93 Although there are fewer 
testimonies as to reactions by Afro-Cubans, a group of black children met Johnson after the 
fight by waving black flags – an incident which a contemporary Associated Press reporter 
considered to be due to ignorance as to the fight result, but which Theresa Runstedtler 
convincingly argues was more likely an expression of black pride in Johnson and defiance of 
white Cubans’ unapologetic racism.94 
Yet by the next day, the tenor of whites’ celebration was somewhat muted. While 
Willard was praised in all corners for bringing “the supremacy back to the white race,” 
Johnson was likewise honored for his good sportsmanship in the wake of defeat. The 
evening after the fight, a group of Havana residents – presumably including many Americans 
– hosted a reception in Willard’s honor at the Stadium. Johnson, also in attendance, easily 
upstaged the new champion as the most charismatic figure at the banquet. He and Willard, 
as well as Curley, were presented with gold watches and were invited to give remarks to the 
crowd. With “notable” speechmaking ability and to much applause, Johnson used his time to 
congratulate Willard – to whom he said he had lost honorably – and to express gratitude to 
the Cuban people for their warm hospitality. He also announced plans to sail soon for 
Europe. Willard’s training camp in turn presented the former champion with “a beautiful 
silver loving cup.” Following the presentations, the honorees and guests were treated to an 
eight-man battle royal (presumably featuring nonwhite participants) and a ten-round bout 
between Eddie Hanlon and Kid Alberts, of Atlanta and New York, respectively.95 
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 Some Havana residents would have occasion to regret the gold watch given to 
Curley, who – with his publicity agent, expatriate American John R. Robinson, and Jack 
Johnson himself – had been arrested and detained by police the morning after the reception 
for failure to pay debts related to staging the bout.96 Curley apparently had not yet paid the 
many laborers who had constructed the seats at Oriental Park, nor had he reimbursed the 
driver that Robinson had hired under Curley’s authorization for a forty-day period. Three 
men – two chauffeurs and a man who had helped to build the ring – had made the initial 
complaint to police, but some sixty others were owed unpaid wages. In his defense, the 
promoter claimed that gate receipts had been far less than anticipated – $60,000 versus 
$110,000 – and that, as a result, there was no money remaining to pay them. (Jack Johnson 
had wisely collected the remaining $29,000 balance of his $30,000 purse the morning of the 
fight, while Willard ultimately received $13,000 as a percentage of fight receipts.) After 
making bail, Curley managed to outwit his many creditors – and a hapless Robinson, left 
with many “IOUs” with his signature on them – by sailing immediately for the United 
States.97 Willard, too, made a quick getaway from the island, departing two days after the 
fight. Unlike Curley’s, his departure was met with a crowd of well-wishers at the wharf, 
including Jack Johnson, who “told Willard that he wished him all the luck in the world, and 
also advised him to save his money.” Jackson’s equanimity is noteworthy considering that 
Curley had already predicted (correctly, as it turned out) that the new champion would “draw 
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the color line tightly.”98 No black aspirants for the heavyweight crown, including Sam 
Langford, need apply. 
Johnson took a few more days to bid farewell to Havana, caught up in legal and 
diplomatic matters. His films of the fight – which he had anticipated bringing him an 
additional source of income – had been pirated, and he was seeking a judge’s injunction 
against various Havana theaters’ display of them. The fighter estimated that, as part of a 
foreign syndicate owning the moving picture rights to his bout with Willard, he would lose 
half a million dollars in royalties should the pirated films be allowed to continue showing in 
Havana. Frustrated by the judge’s delay in issuing the injunction, Johnson ultimately sold the 
Cuban and Puerto Rican film rights to Captain Walter Fletcher Smith, owner of Havana’s 
Plaza Hotel, for a sum of several thousand dollars. The negatives were expected to be in 
Havana by early May.99 
In addition, although Johnson was initially granted a U.S. passport by Ambassador 
Page in London, he found himself at the center of a diplomatic storm when he attempted to 
obtain another one after the Willard fight. When the secretary of the U.S. legation in Havana 
approved his new passport request, William Gonzales – the U.S. Minister to Cuba who had 
earlier protested the initial Easter date of the his bout with Willard – intervened, bringing the 
matter to the attention of U.S. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan. Bryan held that 
Johnson, as a fugitive from American law, should not be granted a passport. The legation 
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contacted the Johnson residence in Havana to notify the couple that their passports were 
invalid and needed to be returned. Over the protests of his wife Lucille, Johnson reluctantly 
returned his passport to the Cuban legation. It was reported that the incident had 
encouraged Johnson to consider taking up Cuban citizenship, “if for no other reason, so that 
he can get something like a passport.” With Cuban papers, it was said, Johnson could travel 
back to Paris, where he had kept a chicken farm.100 
While waiting for his fortunes to change, Johnson agreed to referee a twenty-round 
light heavyweight bout at the Stadium between Steamboat Bill Scott, who had recently 
completed a tour of Panama, and Fred Ellis of Milwaukee. Scheduled for Sunday, April 18, 
the fight card included an eight-round preliminary bout featuring Cuba’s Young Gavilán as 
well as a battle royal with six black participants. Ladies with escorts would not be charged 
admission.101 The event was called off when, in a separate prizefight the night before the 
fight, John Lester Johnson, an African American, was alleged to have fouled Scott, a white 
man, in the second round. When Scott complained of the illegal hit, the referee, John R. 
Robinson (who had been involved in the Johnson-Willard fight promotion) called in the 
ringside physician to substantiate it. Despite many witnesses claiming not to have seen the 
foul – one commentator later stated that “Scott… was just saying good night when Johnson 
accidentally hit him below the belt as he was going down” – the doctor agreed that Scott was 
injured. Consequently, the fight was stopped and John Lester Johnson disqualified. The 
sudden end to the bout caused a “near riot,” with enraged Cubans attempting to storm the 
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ring. As the police moved to protect Johnson, some in the audience demanded that “Mr. 
Robinson be taken to the precinct too on the unheard of charge of failure to stop the match 
when he saw the negro outclassed the white man.” At the precinct, Congressman Pepe 
Estrampes – apparently a defender both of mixed-race fights and the manly art itself – “gave 
an eloquent discourse on the ethics of boxing” and testified that, “if anybody had made 
trouble it was the men who had charged the ring and had done so much yelling.” As a result, 
Robinson was released as a witness, while others present (presumably the Cubans involved 
in the fracas) were charged with “escándalo.” The boxers were sent to the hospital, where 
neither one was shown to have any serious injuries.102 
Less than two weeks removed from the Jack Johnson-Jess Willard bout, a seeming 
triumph for white supremacy, this incident would appear to indicate that a segment of 
Cuban society did not feel interracial bouts were a wise idea given the damage that could be 
done to the white opponent, and, by extension, to the pride of white spectators. Although 
some influential promoters and others in the boxing business in Cuba raised their voices 
against “mixed” bouts, they were unable to enforce a rigid color line. Fred Ellis, left waiting 
in Havana for two weeks after his bout with Scott was canceled, wrote in desperation that he 
would be willing to take on the “Jap wrestler” (Taro Miyake) who had arrived in the city that 
May, “winner taking all except expenses.”103 Ellis instead secured a bout at the Stadium with 
John Lester Johnson as part of Cuba’s Independence Day festivities on May 20 – an 
interracial match-up that Stadium owner (and Havana Post publisher) Bradt, upon returning 
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from a family trip to the U.S. and possibly learning of it for the first time, disavowed for its 
having violated his racial norms.104 
Despite the personal setbacks that kept him in the city longer than he might have 
wished, Johnson remained a popular figure among many habaneros. The rumor of his 
becoming a Cuban citizen was frequently reported in the local press; it was further stated 
that he would open a gymnasium in the capital.105 Shortly after the departures of Willard and 
Curley, the Havana Post ran a short article commending Johnson (in pointed contrast to the 
white men involved in promoting the bout) for the way he had carried himself in the days 
since losing his title: 
 
 A sermon in black and white exists in the comparison of the 
difference in the way in which Jack Johnson, the former champion of the 
world, is leaving Havana, and the way some of his white colleagues left, who 
came here in the same connection. With the white men, or better stated, with 
the men with white skins, creditors had to rush down to the dock and with 
policemen to get their bills paid. The ones who got there late were left in the 
cold. Jack Johnson, on the other hand, has stayed behind and paid every bill 
that he owed and also out of his own private funds he has liquidated the bills 
of men who were left stranded because of the double dealing of others. 
Every obligation he contracted has been settled and when he leaves next 
week for Europe there will not be any one who can say that he ran away 
without paying his debts or that he ever tried in any way to obtain wrongfully 
the possession of another. There is some contrast!106 
 
That he had finally approached “white” status in some men’s minds only by conceding a 
white man’s victory over him is an irony that the Galveston Giant must have well 
appreciated. He may have further cemented his popularity in Havana with a gracious 
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“farewell” that was published in the Havana Post two days before his departure, in which he 
gave credence to the rumors about his plans to make Cuba his home. Addressed “To the 
people of the City of Havana and Cuba,” it stated: 
 
I want to thank each and every one for the kindness they have shown and 
the splendid manner in which they have received me in every way. The 
Cubans have won my heart. Cuba is blessed by two great things, a great 
climate and splendid people. I have been to every civilized country in the 
world, but never have I been in a country that I love so well as this one, 
Cuba. I have never met such polite people as the people in this country. 
When I first came to Cuba a few months ago, I liked it very well, but today I 
love it. 
 I am sailing for Europe on Tuesday the 20th, and if it wasn’t for 
business of importance Jack Johnson would never leave the beautiful Isle of 
Cuba. My stay in Europe will be very short. I will return here again in June of 
this year and I then expect to open a gymnasium to teach boxing and other 
athletics. I have been studying for the past three years the nature of insomnia, 
and I really believe that I have an absolute cure for it, and in my gymnasium I 
expect to build up men who are a nervous wreck and have broken down 
constitutions. 
 I hope that I have proven to the Cubans and foreigners that I am not 
the Jack Johnson that they have read so much about in some of the 
American newspapers and I hope on my return in June that I will find my 
Cuban friends with the same warm feeling they have for me now. 
 Thanking you once and again, I am, sincerely, 
   JACK JOHNSON.107 
 
 As promised, Johnson finally left Cuba on April 20, departing with his wife for Spain 
on “the most luxurious suite aboard the steamer” Reina Maria Cristina.108 The following 
month, he informed the press that, “I have been invited to be athletic director for a 
gentleman’s club in Havana. I might go there and open a cafe as a side line. It certainly is one 
of the last good towns.” How seriously Johnson considered this offer is questionable given 
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that he told the same interviewer that he was also contemplating going to Spain to become a 
bullfighter.109 
While Johnson never got a chance to reclaim his world title, he was no longer viewed 
as a threat to white supremacy, either in Cuba or in the United States. Upon his long-delayed 
return to his home country in 1920, he served his full prison term of a year and a day, then 
continued his prizefighting career upon his release. While he never honored his plans to 
move to Havana to open a gymnasium, he did return there for bouts against Farmer Lodge 
and Jack Thompson in May 1923. He remained active, fighting in exhibitions and prizefights 
well past the normal age of retirement. It is said that he fought for the last time in 1938, at 
the age of sixty; at the time, the world heavyweight champion was a young Joe Louis, the 
second African American to earn that distinction, who had rebuffed Johnson’s presence in 
his training camp in an effort to disassociate himself from the controversial ex-champion. In 
1946, Johnson died as he lived, crashing his automobile after driving too fast. He left a 
widow, his third white wife, Irene Pineau Johnson, although by then his romantic foibles had 
ceased to be shocking. 
 Willard fought infrequently after Havana, defending his championship only twice in 
four years, and strictly upholding the color line, as he had promised. It was little secret that 
he preferred working the vaudeville circuit to boxing, for it allowed him an easier means to 
profit off his brief but extraordinary popularity in the U.S. after the Johnson bout. His first 
and only successful defense was in March 1916 against Frank Moran, who had 
unsuccessfully challenged Johnson for the championship two years earlier; Willard won the 
ten-round bout by newspaper decision, since it was held in New York. Then, at the end of 
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World War I, Willard faced Jack Dempsey in a scheduled twenty-round title fight. Dempsey, 
outweighed by nearly 60 pounds, managed to knock Willard down seven times in the first 
round and finally succeeded in knocking him out in the third. The Kansan mounted a 
comeback, but by 1923, after losing by knockout to Argentina’s “Wild Bull of the Pampas,” 
Luis Ángel Firpo, he finally quit fighting. He later became a businessman and boxing referee, 
passing away in 1968. 
 As for Jack Curley, with Tex Rickard’s re-emergence after years in Argentina, he 
soon moved away from prizefighting and into the field for which he became truly renowned: 
wrestling. The Johnson-Willard bout – what Curley had once called “the greatest and the 
happiest day of my life” – was his crowning achievement in boxing, particularly since it had 
brought the result he had desired: the return of the heavyweight crown to the white race.110 
“For sportswriters who derided his favorite sport,” noted his obituary in Time magazine, 
“Promoter Curley… had an unvarying answer: ‘I have never promoted a wrestling match 
that was not absolutely honest’.” Curley died in 1937 of a heart attack at the age of 61.111 
 
The Aftermath of the Fight 
 The short-term impact of the Johnson-Willard fight in Cuba was somewhat mixed. 
Although there was pride in having hosted the most important boxing event since the 1910 
Johnson-Jeffries bout – and, more explicitly, for being the site where white supremacy in the 
sporting world was regained – there were also grumblings over whether prizefighting really 
fit into the culture of the new nation. Those who rejected any form of professional boxing 
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spectacle, such as the ministers who had expressed their opposition to the Johnson-Willard 
bout, were likely buoyed by an official attempt to eradicate the practice. The day after the 
fight, Senator Erasmo Regüieferos proposed a bill in the Cuban Senate calling for “the 
suppression of boxing” on the island – specifically, “the holding of any boxing contest at 
which admission money is charged.” He asserted that there was “nothing as inhumane and 
cruel as the poorly named sport of boxing,” and, as evidence, argued that it had been 
repudiated by a majority of the U.S. public. The senator railed against allowing boxers to 
injure or kill one another with impunity, charged that the sport accustomed the public to 
blood spectacles, and disdained the prevalence of gambling at prizefights. Accordingly, he 
proposed that promoters and pugilists found guilty of violating the proposed law be subject 
to jail time, as well as fines; the former would receive up to one year in prison and a fine of 
$5,000, the latter a 15 day-sentence and a fine of $500. Moreover, any public official 
attending such an event would be subject to a fine of $500 and the loss of his office for one 
year. The bill passed in the Senate on April 10 and was moved to the lower house for 
consideration.112 
 Not everyone agreed with the reasons for ending prizefighting just as it seemed to be 
flourishing in Cuba. Over the next few weeks, a debate ensued in the pages of the Havana 
Post regarding the merits of the Senate’s measure. In a series of vehement editorials, the 
editors lambasted the congressman for wasting time on a matter of such inconsequence 
when so many other important matters – the elimination of obsolete legislation, excess 
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budgetary spending, even prostitution and pornographic shows – cried out for attention. 
Not only was the practice of boxing liable to produce healthy young men rather than 
“mollycoddles,” but it would lead to a reduction in knife violence should young men learn 
less destructive techniques of self-defense. While the proposed bill did not abolish amateur 
boxing, the editors felt that the two variants of the sport went hand in hand: “Amateur 
boxing needs the display of science and skill of the game which can only be developed 
professionally.”113 To those who protested that prizefighting attracted “undesirable” 
elements, the editors extolled the fitness and virtue of most boxers, who avoided alcohol, 
tobacco, and other temptations, and noted the high status of those who attended the 
Johnson-Willard bout: 
 
From Cuba the match attracted red-blooded men from the president of the 
republic down. Opponents to the boxing game are said to have tried to 
induce President Menocal to refrain from attending the match. He is said to 
have answered frankly that he was not a hypocrite and he would go in the 
same way as if he were a private individual to see the display of skill and 
strength on exhibition there.114 
 
Other opponents of the bill noted that the congress should be more concerned with the 
risks that prostitutes and other dangerous women posed to the virtuous people of the city, as 
well as the rampant cruelty to animals (through abuse of horses, cockfighting, and other 
practices) that was visible in Cuban society. Regarding the latter, one R. Koerner, dismissing 
the need to protect two big, strong, pugilists from one another, wrote, “When will this 
‘civilized’ country start to protect the dumb animals? The prizefighter can take care of 
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himself.”115 Perhaps the most eloquent testimony to boxing’s growing popularity in Havana 
was the fact that, when two underage youths, José Unanuno y Alfonso and Lutgardo Benítez 
Barranco, were pulled into a local police precinct for fighting days after the Johnson-Willard 
bout, they stated that they had no quarrel with one another but were simply practicing 
boxing; the policeman had surprised them during the first “round.” Apparently, they did not 
have access to an actual gymnasium but were forced to use the corner of Consulado and 
Colón streets for their exercises. The would-be pugilists were treated for injuries at a first aid 
station.116 
One month later, on May 12, the debate was rendered temporarily moot when the 
Cuban Supreme Court ruled that boxing was indeed legal. The case, which the court 
dismissed, concerned whether provincial governor Bustillo had violated the law by attending 
the Johnson-Willard bout in person. The complainant, Dr. Horacio Martínez, had 
denounced the governor “because he [Bustillo] had seen Jess Willard hit Jack Johnson a 
blow so hard that it deprived the said Johnson temporarily of consciousness.” The court’s 
ruling conceded that, while Decree 1067 of November 1911 – which had banned live boxing 
spectacles but permitted the showing of fight films – would appear to have made the 
Johnson-Willard bout an illegal activity, “it is a fact that neither before nor after the said 
decree has there been any legal action to sustain such prohibition or that would cause the 
provincial government to be obliged to impede the holding of such an exhibition.”117 
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 Although Curley had burned many bridges in fleeing the country without paying all 
of his debts, U.S. promoters, trainers, managers, and boxers continued to operate on the 
island for some months afterward. Their Cuban counterparts quickly began to replace them, 
however, once the new Havana alcalde (mayor), Manuel Varona Suárez, clamped down on 
boxing in the capital in 1919, forcing it to go underground. Not for many more years would 
Havana become the “the center of the pugilistic map,” but if its next decades lacked another 
blockbuster event like the Johnson-Willard affair, it would, beginning in the early 1920s, 
serve as host to a number of important national, regional, and world title prizefights, as well 
as amateur contests of some renown. As discussed in the next chapter, the creation of a 
national boxing commission, the promulgation of new rules and standards, and the 
dissemination of the sport into the interior helped to forge a genuine boxing culture on the 
island that was less predicated upon U.S. norms and values than upon Cuban ones. 
The Johnson-Willard fight arrived at a propitious moment for the government, press, 
and businesspeople of Cuba. On the one hand, it raised the young country’s profile at a 
moment when domestic tourism remained a nascent industry, one that was monopolized by 
a small subset of North Americans seeking warm-weather entertainment. On the other, its 
advancement was tied to a spectacle that many people viewed as dangerous, primitive, and – 
given the interracial nature of the competition – downright immoral. Moreover, although 
Willard – who was little more than a cipher before he was tapped to fight Johnson – was 
depicted in the U.S. and Cuban press prior to and just after the fight as the consummate 
family man, modest and humble, most people were only too aware of the sources of 
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Johnson’s notoriety. After all, only two years previously he had been convicted of violating 
the Mann Act and had fled the U.S. before he could serve out the resulting prison sentence. 
Yet not only did the Johnson-Willard fight win the approval of the national and provincial 
governments in Cuba, but it also emerged as a moment of perceived national unity, when the 
entire country, and particularly the residents of Havana, could unite around its celebration. 
This moment did not result in the widespread embrace of either prizefighting or mixed-race 
bouts; nor did it translate into greater social freedoms for the vast majority of Afro-Cubans. 
For what unified most of the country, both before and after the fight, was a celebration of 
the defeat of a notorious, larger-than-life black man and the reimposition of white 
supremacy in the sporting world. 
 
In his brief stay on the island, Johnson’s transformation into a popular figure who 
might someday become appropriated into the rhetoric of the Cuban nation (even if that 
moment never came) was the completion of the circle that began on December 26, 1908, 
when he wrested the world heavyweight title from a beleaguered Tommy Burns. His 
presence on the island could not change the fortunes of Afro-Cubans battling with 
discrimination and poverty, though they likely found him to be an inspirational figure who 
had attained heights previously inconceivable to them. Nor could his bout with Willard, 
storied as it was, sustain the fragile culture of prizefighting that had emerged on the island in 
the wake of the Spanish-American-Cuban War. Indeed, a few years after Johnson’s departure 
from Havana, the sport – driven underground by unsympathetic officials, fear of interracial 
conflict, and general public apathy – appeared to have reached its nadir. 
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Within two decades of the Johnson-Willard bout, however, the situation was 
markedly different. While still influenced by U.S. cultural practices, in boxing as in so many 
other facets of everyday life, Cuba was instituting its own methods for developing successful 
pugilists – and would continue to eschew the drawing of the color line in its prize rings. As 
the state moved in the late 1910s and early 1920s from a position of alternately tolerating 
and suppressing boxing to legalizing and regulating it, a new national system emerged that 
sought to increase the sport’s reach into the interior and to build up a cadre of professionals 
who performed in weekly shows for the pleasure of locals. By the early 1930s, it had already 
nurtured one world champion – the incomparable Kid Chocolate – and seemed to have 
several more in the pipeline. How this rapid transition came to pass is the focus of our next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3: The Legalization and Regulation of Boxing and 
the Era of Kid Chocolate, 1916-1930s 
 
Between Illegality and Respectability 
 The Cuban Supreme Court’s May 1915 ruling, following the Johnson-Willard bout, 
that boxing spectacles were indeed legal on the island did not come close to resolving the 
ongoing dispute over the sport’s role in a civilized society. Without the excitement of a 
history-making bout to sustain it, public interest in boxing inevitably waned somewhat in the 
second half of the 1910s. At the same time, a growing corpus of young Cuban fighters, most 
of them little known outside of their own small circles, began to hone their skills at 
gymnasiums, parks, athletic clubs, and private homes. But it was the institution of a nearly 
two-year ban on boxing exhibitions in the capital that forced aficionados, practitioners, and 
correspondents, many of them middle-class whites from “good” Cuban families, to navigate 
the spaces between illegality and respectability – and to find effective ways to make public 
their plea for the relevance of pugilism to a modern nation. 
 By the early 1920s, with the state’s decision to legalize boxing once and for all, a new 
set of challenges arose as to how best to regulate it. The Cuban government went farther 
than most countries at the time, and much farther than the United States, in establishing a 
system of rules that applied to fighters, seconds, managers, promoters, referees, timekeepers, 
and judges. Although some influential promoters (mainly hailing from the U.S.) disdained 
interracial bouts, there was little effort to keep the races apart in the prize ring. Nor were 
fights restricted in practice to impoverished, mostly Afro-Cuban young men; in these early 
years, middle-class whites figured predominantly among the growing pool of professionals, 
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as did foreign-born men such as Mexico’s Miguel (“Mike”) Febles. While the newly 
established boxing commission sought to develop a system by which to select national 
champions and recognize up-and-comers, the dearth of solid competition in the early 1920s 
meant that most Cuban competitors were easily disposed of when they met with serious 
foreign competition. Only with the success of a few top contenders, such as Kid Charol and 
Black Bill, did Cuban boxing begin to win respectability abroad. And only with the meteoric 
rise of a charismatic young star known as Kid Chocolate (Eligio Sardiñas Montalvo) would 
Cuban boxing definitively become a force to be reckoned with on the world stage. 
More than any other fighter in Cuban history, Chocolate was able to translate his 
personal glory into a source of national and even transnational pride, one that transcended 
racial barriers and undoubtedly inspired a generation of young athletes in the U.S. as well as 
Cuba. His ring style, itself influenced by pioneering African American fighters as well as his 
stable mate, Black Bill, would become associated with Cuban boxing for years to come, even 
if few of his peers could match it. Embodying hand speed and lightness on one’s feet as well 
as a sly, methodical defense, Chocolate and those who emulated him might look as pretty 
after a bout as they had before it. For a time, at least, no one was as pretty as Kid Chocolate. 
This chapter explores the transition of boxing in Cuba from its tenuous position in 
the months and years after the Johnson-Willard bout to its triumphant explosion upon the 
world stage, culminating with the achievements of Chocolate. While societal and official 
acceptance of the sport proceeded in fits and starts, the state finally embraced its legalization 
in the early 1920s and moved rapidly to regulate its practice. Government intervention 
would hereafter remain a hallmark of Cuban prizefighting (and, by the late 1930s, of amateur 
boxing), although private promoters remained critical in staging events and bringing in 
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outside talent when necessary. The newly formed boxing commission acted both as 
government regulator and sanctioning body – naming divisional champions (and stripping 
them, if need be), licensing participants, and monitoring the safety and fairness of the 
proceedings. This degree of control, unusual for its time, mitigated some of the more 
exploitative aspects of prizefighting in this era. Though few boxers became rich off their 
endeavors, the best of them found regular employment in Havana or provincial rings. And 
as native trainers and managers emerged to develop the country’s pool of talent, local fight 
cards no longer featured Cubans mainly in preliminary bouts but on bona fide main events. 
 
The Legalization and Regulation of Boxing 
 The years immediately after the Willard-Johnson bouts were mostly bleak ones for 
Cuban boxing. With the Stadium having gone bankrupt not long after its opening due to 
mismanagement by Leo Farris, there was a clamor among boxing enthusiasts to find new 
places to participate in and watch their beloved sport. In 1918, a group of boxers, trainers, 
sportswriters, and would-be promoters – including Bernardino San Martín and Vicente 
Cubillas – formed the “Ring del ‘Cuba’,” named after the newspaper at which many of them 
worked. The honorable president was Don José María Villaverde, a prominent member of 
the “Spanish colony” in the capital. The organization held weekly Sunday shows.1 
 Shortly afterward, however, the capital had experienced yet another ban on the sport. 
In March 1919, the boxing-related death of lightweight José “Soldado” Marroquín after his 
bout with Alex Publes at the “Recreo de Belascoaín” led municipal alcalde Manuel Varona 
Suárez to suspend licenses for further bouts in the capital. As documented by San Martín 
                                                
     1 San Martín and Cubillas, El arte de los puños, pp. 27, 39-41. 
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and Cubillas, authors of the first full-length book published on Cuban boxing, the alcalde 
believed boxing to be “salvaje” (savage) and “bárbaro” (barbarous) and refused to sanction 
any bouts involving Cuban fighters while he remained in that office. In his statement, 
Varona Suárez noted that boxing “is good for foreigners, for the Americans who are ‘made’ 
for that” – indicating that it was hardly suitable for Cubans.2 
As a result, many boxers moved into the interior of the island, where, San Martín 
and Cubillas ironically noted, the alcaldes were not so “religious” as in the capital. The 
authors, who had met while working for Cuba newspaper and had been involved in running 
the Cuba ring, appealed to Varona Suárez that Marroquín’s death was not caused by blows 
received from Publes “sino a causas completamente ajenas” (but to completely distinct 
causes) – namely, having eaten shortly before the bout. Yet Varona Suárez remained 
adamant that no (legal) boxing take place under his purview. When his term ended, the 
Cubillas y San Martín promotional group formed by the authors openly held a boxing event 
featuring the brothers Clodomiro and Mike Castro at Santos y Artigas park on December 19, 
1920. Afterward, the men lobbied the Secretary of the Government, Colonel Charles 
Hernández, to overturn Varona Suárez’s ban. Hernández obliged, instructing the new 
alcalde, José Castillo, to end the prohibition. In his statement to Castillo, Hernández 
reiterated that the Cuban Supreme Court had already ruled on the sport’s legality following 
the Johnson-Willard bout, and that there was no law that prohibited the celebration of 
                                                
     2 Ibid., pp. 56, 58-59, 60. The original phrase was “está bueno para los extranjeros, para los norteamericanos 
que son ‘hechos’ para eso.” 
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boxing matches in the republic.3 With his signature, the suspension was lifted, after more 
than 21 months. 
 In 1920, as well, a three-promoter organization named the Havana Boxing 
Committee was founded to promote major bouts in the capital, including those that were to 
settle the dispensation of national titles.4 Yet government officials were coming around to 
the idea that the best approach to the sport was regulation rather than noninterference – 
particularly as Havana was once again becoming relevant to followers of pugilism worldwide. 
On October 10, 1921, the biggest prizefight on the island since Johnson-Willard, and 
likewise an interracial bout, took place between two U.S. heavyweights: Harry Wills, the 
“Black Panther,” and “Gunner” Gunboat Smith. Ten thousand people flooded the new 
Stadium on Carlos III to watch the bout, leaving five hundred people outside without 
tickets. There were three preliminary bouts featuring some of Cuba’s best young boxers, 
including Black Bill (who won a six-round decision over Modesto Morales) and Mike Castro 
(who defeated Aguedo Herrera in fifteen). The rapidity with which the main event occurred 
– Wills knocked out Smith in the first round with a kidney punch – must have been 
disappointing to many in the audience who anticipated a more competitive fight, as Wills 
himself acknowledged. Still, the Black Panther was gracious in victory, and, most likely, 
sensitive to the local racial implications of defeating his white opponent so expeditiously. In 
an interview with the sportswriter for Cuba’s weekly Bohemia an hour after the fight, Wills 
stated that he had received two forceful blows from Smith, one to the face and the other to 
                                                
     3 Ibid., pp. 56, 61, 63-66. San Martín’s and Cubillas account, while extremely informative, is also quite self-
serving, so it is difficult to determine how central they were to the overturning of this ban. Yet they were 
central figures in Cuban boxing during this early period, so it is reasonable to assume they played a large role. 
     4 Hugh Shannon, “Heard in Buffalo,” The Ring 1:8 (September 1922), pp. 30-31. The three promoters were 
“Antoñico” Ruíz, Rafael Posso, and Dr. Rubén López Miranda. See San Martín and Cubillas, El arte de los puños, 
p. 83. 
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the stomach, which had persuaded him to move the knockout along in order to prevent 
absorbing future punishment.5 
On December 13, 1921, the Secretary of the Government signed a decree forming a 
new agency, the Comisión Nacional de Boxeo y Luchas (National Boxing and Wrestling 
Commission), to regulate boxing, Greco-Roman wrestling, and similar forms of public 
spectacles on the island. The first commission members were Colonel Rosendo Collazo, 
president; Dr. Juan O’Naghten, vice president; and Augusto York, Ramón Fonts, and Mario 
Mendoza as members. The new commission and the Secretary of the Government 
apparently did not notice that alcalde Marcelino Díaz de Villegas, characterizing pugilism as a 
brutal sport, shortly afterward issued a prohibitive decree banning boxing in the municipality 
of Havana. An editorial campaign by brothers José “Pepe” and Rafael Conte, sportswriters 
for La Prensa, helped to persuade the commission members to visit with Díaz de Villegas and 
to revoke his decree. This would be the last ban on boxing to be instituted in Cuba; the sport 
resumed in Havana in late March after three months of inactivity.6 
 The commission took the regulation process seriously. In July 1922, it issued a new 
boxing law containing 26 sections. As Pepe Conte reported in La Prensa, “the boxing game 
and all those actively engaged in it… are regulated to a queen’s taste.” Several of the rules 
were designed to protect competitors; others sought to encourage legitimate bouts; still 
others sought to eliminate the influence of gamblers. For instance, no return bouts (i.e., 
rematches) were permitted before sixty days had passed since the original match-up. The 
                                                
     5 Guillermo Pi, “Tratemos de Sports….,” Bohemia, 9 October 1921, pp. 14-15; Guillermo Pi, “Tratemos de 
Sports….”, Bohemia, 16 October 1921, pp. 12-13, 18. As Pi had asked Wills to write down his statement, he 
includes a copy of this (translated into Spanish) in his October 16, 1921, column. 
     6 San Martín and Cubillas, El arte de los puños, pp. 85-88. 
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minimum age for boxers was eighteen, and gambling was “discouraged as much as possible.” 
Conte stated that, since gambling had been prohibited in boxing clubs, several promoters 
had stopped holding cards. Boxers, trainers, managers, promoters, referees, timekeepers, and 
judges had to purchase identification cards displaying their fingerprints and other personal 
information. Fees for the cards varied from $10 for boxers to $300 for promoters. All 
officials and promoters also needed to put up bond amounts, which were highest ($5,000) 
for promoters. The commission also sought to create reciprocal relationships with U.S. state 
commissions to ensure that their blacklisted fighters, managers, promoters, and officials 
would not be able to operate in Cuba, and vice versa.7 Battling Siki, the Senegalese light 
heavyweight who had stunned Georges Carpentier with a six-round knockout in September 
1922, discovered first-hand how seriously the commission took its licensing requirements 
when he attempted to serve as cornerman to a preliminary fighter during his 1924 stay in 
Havana. He was unceremoniously yanked from the ring.8 
 Boxing in Cuba began to flourish shortly after the commission was established, and 
interest in the sport seemed to soar overnight. The Ring reported in its September 1922 issue 
that the New York-based publication, which had only begun publishing that February, was 
now being sold in Havana – as well as Paris, London, Canada, and Mexico.9 Though boxing 
arenas were now viewed as suitable spaces for adults, the state sought to ensure that minors 
aged fifteen and under did not attend or participate in prizefights, out of concern that they 
                                                
     7 Pepe Conte, “Fingerprints Required by Cuban Boxing Commission,” The Ring 1:8 (September 1922), pp. 
16, 22. 
     8 Peter Benson, Battling Siki: A Tale of Ring Fixes, Race, and Murder in the 1920s (Fayetteville: The University of 
Arkansas Press, 2006), p. 179. One wonders whether the commission held strictly to licensing requirements for 
the safety of the competitors or whether it was done out of concern for acquiring licensing fees. 
     9 “Important Notice to Readers of The Ring,” The Ring 1:8 (September 1922), p. 7; “National Advertisers, 
Attention. This Will Interest You,” The Ring 1:8 (September 1922), p. 22. 
 143 
might unconsciously mirror the vices that they witnessed there; it passed a resolution to that 
effect in June 1923.10 All of these regulations could not immediately improve the level of 
local competition, however. Hugh Shannon, a Ring correspondent in Buffalo, New York, 
described the avidity with which Cuban fans embraced the sport and their surprise at 
realizing that, compared with American boxers, “their vaunted champions were rank 
amateurs”: 
 
 Although one can travel from New York to Cuba in four days, it is a 
fact that until a year ago the Pearl of the Antilles might as well have been on 
the other side of the globe so far as its being up to date on boxing matters 
was concerned. It seems hardly believable that Cuban sporting fans could 
have held the antiquated ideas regarding boxing that they did until hardly 
more than twelve months past. 
 
A year earlier, Shannon had witnessed a bout in Havana between Cuba’s light heavyweight 
champion, Santiago “El Cabo” (Corporal) Esparraguera, and Bronx, New York, 
welterweight Jimmy Kelly. Despite outweighing his opponent by more than 35 pounds, 
Esparraguera was knocked out in the fourth, “causing much consternation and a good deal 
of profit to the American tourists who had bet on the American,” he wrote.11 
  Despite prior lackluster performances by Cuba’s national champions, by late 1923 
boxing judge Fernando Gil felt that matters had improved sufficiently enough to encourage 
U.S. promoters to come to Havana to stage shows with native fighters. He noted that Cuba 
had declared champions in each division “by the process of elimination” and, with a little 
time and additional experience, they would grow “more seasoned” and worthy of top 
                                                
     10 “Resolución de 22 de junio de 1923,” Gaceta oficial de la República de Cuba (25 de junio de 1923), p. 13997. 
     11 Hugh Shannon, “Heard in Buffalo,” The Ring 1:8 (September 1922), pp. 30-31. This bout was held on 
September 17, 1921. 
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American opponents. Gil claimed that, since the commission’s founding, support for boxing 
on the island had grown to such an extent that “a number of divorce cases have come up 
before the courts” where the neglectful husband was spending his time at the fights, or 
watching boxers train. This increased demand was able to sustain weekly Saturday night 
cards at central Havana’s Stadium Marina, as well as occasional Sunday shows and events at 
the Arena Colón. Although his article was written to publicize the island to U.S. promoters 
and others interested in the fight game, Gil reported that the Cuban commission had already 
licensed eight promoters, the best known of them being Santos y Artigas (which had been a 
promoter of the circus), Sam Tolón, Santiago Fernández, and Luis F. “Pincho” Gutiérrez, 
the future manager of Kid Chocolate.12 Many of the promoters were successful business 
impresarios. For instance, the Parga and Caicoya group owned the Casa Tarin sporting 
goods shop on Calle O’Reilly.13 The “Parga” of the pair was Luis F. Parga, who would later 
go on to become boxing commissioner. Although all of these promoters were Cuban, they 
looked to U.S. boxers for competition against their top local athletes. Santiago Fernández, 
for instance, employed an American matchmaker named Jimmy Lake, who was using his 
connections to import U.S. fighters. He secured top lightweight contender Rocky Kansas 
and lightweight world champion Benny Leonard to appear in Havana in September and 
November 1923, respectively, although neither fight was carried off.14 In August 1925, the 
United Promoters Corp., which billed itself as “the largest organization of its kind in Cuba” 
and was represented by one J. de Tabibe out of Woodridge, New Jersey, placed an 
                                                
     12 Fernando Gil, “Cuba and Its Athletes,” The Ring 2:11 (December 1923), pp. 8-9; Milton Baron, “Boxing in 
Havana, Cuba,” The Ring 5:3 (April 1926), p. 32. The others were Clodomiro Castro Romay, Francisco Navas 
Márquez, José M. Caicoya y Díaz (as part of Parga y Caicoya), and Miguel A. Sordo. 
     13 Charles Pujol, “Hooks and Jabs from Cuba,” The Ring 3:8 (September 1924), p. 40. 
     14 Harold Walsh, “Boxing in Havana,” The Ring 2:8 (September 1923), p. 36. Kansas eventually became 
world lightweight champion after Leonard retired from the ring in 1924. 
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advertisement in The Ring which promised boxers seeking work, “Fight in Havana – Earn 
Good Money.” The group held shows every Saturday night at the Arena Colón.15 
 Although the early 1920s saw a dramatic increase in fight cards in the capital and in 
the larger provincial cities, many fighters had to travel to the southern United States for 
experience against higher quality opponents. Tampa was a logical first stop, especially since a 
large Cuban American population there ensured Cuban boxers would earn a solid turnout. 
Throughout the early to mid-1920s, Aramis del Pino – who had been amateur lightweight 
champion of Cuba before earning the same distinction in the professional ranks – fought 
repeatedly in Tampa and Saint Petersburg in between his frequent Havana appearances.16 
 By 1925, approximately fifty Cuban prizefighters sought to unionize “to assure 
themselves of a ‘comfortable old age after fighting days are over’.” A proclamation they 
signed in support of the union effort declared that promoters held all of the power in their 
relationships with fighters: “Pugilists are at the mercy of their cruel masters. No provision is 
made for a lay-off on account of serious injury such as a broken arm or leg, and in case of 
such injury the friendless boxer is thrown on a cold and unsympathetic world.” The Ring 
editor Nat Fleischer, who repeated much of the proclamation in his monthly column, 
averred that a boxing commission would serve Cuba’s boxers better than a union – not 
realizing, apparently, that Cuba (unlike the United States, which to this day does not have a 
                                                
     15 “Fight in Havana – Earn Good Money,” The Ring 4:7 (August 1925), p. 39. The group’s members were 
Luis F. Parga, José Coucé, and Luis Ferrer, who initially served as its manager. See Milton Baron, “Boxing in 
Havana,” The Ring 5:1 (February 1926), p. 32; Milton Baron, “Boxing in Havana,” The Ring 5:2 (March 1926), p. 
30; and Milton Baron, “Boxing in Havana, Cuba,” The Ring 5:3 (April 1926), p. 32. 
     16 See, for instance, Duke Barry, “Florida State Notes,” The Ring 5:1 (February 1926), p. 36, and Milton 
Baron, “Boxing in Havana,” The Ring 5:2 (March 1926), p. 30. 
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national boxing commission) had had such an institution in place for nearly four years.17 
Nothing appears to have come of this union, although the government would attempt to 
institute additional protections for boxers by the late 1930s. The commission did widen 
opportunities for poor amateur youths, however, by sanctioning semi-professional bouts in 
Havana and its suburbs of Marianao, Regla, and Guanabacoa beginning in 1927. The bouts 
paid competitors a dollar per round in preliminary fights and three dollars per round in “star 
bouts.” Champions in each weight class would also receive belts.18 
 The Secretary of the Government found it necessary to reiterate in a February 1932 
resolution that only boxers, promoters, referees, judges, timekeepers, and announcers 
possessing an identification card provided by the national commission would be eligible to 
take part in boxing or wrestling matches or exhibitions, which could only be held with 
commission approval. At every sanctioned event, the commission would also station a 
delegate to ensure that it held to legal standards. Local alcaldes and military delegates were 
asked to inform the commission president of any anomalies taking place in such spectacles. 
Those violating these rules were subject to legal penalties. As the resolution’s wording 
indicated, the government acknowledged that it was having difficulty enforcing its rules in 
the interior of the island and sought to engage local officials in their enforcement.19 
 As visiting fighters often discovered, Cuban fans were enthusiastic about viewing 
foreign competition, which included by the mid-1920s more boxers from throughout Latin 
America, such as Chile’s Estanislau Loyaza, and the Philippines, including “Filipino Flash” 
                                                
     17 Nat Fleischer, “As We See It: Crisp Comment on Current Ring Problems,” The Ring 4:8 (September 
1925), pp. 23, 25. 
     18 Milton Baron, “Boxing in Cuba,” The Ring 6:7 (August 1927), p. 33. 
     19 “Resolución de 6 de febrero de 1932,” Gaceta oficial de la República de Cuba, Habana, Año XXX, Núm. 35, 
Tomo II (February 12, 1932), pp. 2309-2310. 
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Pedro Campo.20 Nor were they always partisan to the local man. In February 1924, when 
southern U.S. champion Jimmy Finley defeated Kid Charol (Estebán Gallard) in Havana on 
a fifteen-round decision, the American feared “that the fans intended doing him bodily 
harm.” Instead, the Louisville native found himself “mobbed by thousands of Cubans and 
carried through the streets of Havana on the shoulders of the fans.” Upon his return to the 
States, Finley claimed Charol’s Cuban middleweight title, as well as Enrique Ponce de León’s 
Cuban welterweight title, since he had knocked out the latter in Havana in January 1924. 
Added to his southern U.S. title, these would certainly have upped Finley’s promotional ante. 
In Cuba, however, the commission did not recognize him as the holder of two of its national 
titles, as he was ineligible for them as a foreign boxer.21 
  Spaniards were particularly in evidence in Havana rings in the 1920s and 1930s. 
Some of the more celebrated included bantamweight “Fillo” Julián Echevarría; lightweight 
Hilario Martínez; Julian (“Jim”) Moran, who held the Spanish welterweight title; 
welterweight Justo Vidal; middleweight Ignácio Ara; and Basque heavyweight Isidoro 
Gastanaga. Spanish fighters were often welcomed into exclusive social clubs as members or 
visitors, and many of them remained in Cuba for decades. Echevarría, for instance, did not 
leave Cuba until the onset of the Revolution; he then moved to Miami, where he spent the 
remainder of his life. 
Yet perhaps no foreign boxer since Jack Johnson was greeted with as much curiosity 
as was Battling Siki, the “Singular Senegalese.” Havana crowds had awaited Siki’s steamer 
                                                
     20 Milton Baron, “Heard in Cuba,” The Ring 4:12 (January 1926), p. 40; Milton Baron, “Boxing in Havana,” 
The Ring 5:1 (February 1926), pp. 32-33; Milton Baron, “Boxing in Havana,” The Ring 5:1 (February 1926), p. 
37. 
     21 “Notes from Florida and Other Points,” The Ring 3:3 (April 1924), pp. 29-30 (quotes on p. 30). 
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from Key West for days before it arrived on February 21, 1924. He was scheduled to fight 
the winner of the February 23 Santiago Esparraguera-Sergeant Ray Thompson bout, which 
ended up being a first-round KO for the Corporal. But as it got closer to Siki’s March 8 date 
with Esparraguera, the Senegalese heavyweight found himself too sick with pneumonia to be 
able to fight. When he recovered sufficiently, he earned money by hosting workouts and 
sparring exhibitions at the Stadium Marina and Cuban Lawn Tennis Club, for which 
audiences paid small admission fees. For forty centavos, curious habaneros got to witness him 
spar a six-round session against flyweight Black Bill. Siki left Havana in late April, without 
having had a single official bout in Cuba.22 
 By the mid-1920s, Cuba could boast of at least two potential world championship 
contenders: Kid Charol at middleweight and Black Bill at flyweight. Both had left the island 
for promising careers abroad – Charol in South America and Bill in New York, under the 
aegis of Luis “Pincho” Gutiérrez. Charol, the longtime Cuban middleweight champion, 
never did win a world title. Black Bill came close – he was the first Cuban to compete for a 
world title when he lost a fifteen-round decision to Midget Wolgast in March 1930 – but his 
career was ultimately derailed after he contracted syphilis, which, untreated, led to blindness, 
fueled his desperation, and drove him to suicide in New York in 1933. Thus, it was not until 
the rise of Kid Chocolate, who invaded New York in 1928 as Pincho’s latest discovery, that 
a Cuban boxer would fulfill the promise that had been invested in him by the thousands of 
fans who were weekly attending shows on the island, particularly Havana. In Cuba and New 
York, Chocolate had become a superstar long before he became a world champion. 
 
                                                
     22 Benson, Battling Siki, pp.175-180. 
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The Era of Kid Chocolate 
 For almost six years, Kid Chocolate was among the top competitors in the lighter 
weight classes in the world. Starting his career as a bantamweight, he moved up to 
featherweight and junior lightweight. He was the first Cuban to be internationally ranked 
among the top fighters of his division, and the first, more importantly, to win a world title – 
in his case, two. He was also the first international Cuban superstar, a larger-than-life figure 
in his prime who was as renowned for his enormous wardrobe as he was for his numerous 
ring tricks. Well after he had fought his best fights, Chocolate remained a magnetic figure in 
both New York and Havana, attracting spectators who hoped to see some of his old flash. 
When he finally retired, in December 1938, he had amassed an undefeated amateur record as 
well as 131 professional wins, 50 by knockout; nine losses, including two by knockout; and 
six draws.23 
Born into a poor Afro-Cuban family in Cerro, Havana, in 1910, the year that Jack 
Johnson demolished his old nemesis Jim Jeffries in Reno, Eligio Sardiñas Montalvo 
embarked upon an extensive amateur career at a young age.24 After losing his father at age 
five, young Eligio had little opportunity for schooling, instead working various manual labor 
jobs, including shoe shining and working as a “voceador” (newspaper boy). Having become 
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a fan of the boxing through the shows held in the capital, he enrolled in an amateur boxing 
tournament for newsboys sponsored by the daily La Noche in 1921, when he was ten or 
eleven and weighed just 52 pounds. One story has it that he was persuaded to enter the 
tournament by Luis “Pincho” Gutiérrez, the paper’s young sports editor, who had witnessed 
the newsboy fend off an older, stronger bully in a street scrap. Despite being smaller and 
younger than the other competitors, little “Yiyi” – as Eligio was known in childhood – came 
away with the victory. The nickname he went by, Kid Chocolate, was borrowed from his 
older brother, Domingo, who had previously tried his hand at boxing.25 
 After winning the La Noche tournament, Chocolate hooked up with Gutiérrez, who 
agreed to be his future manager. Together, Pincho (as he came to be best known in the 
boxing world) – himself a novice to the sport – and Chocolate learned the fundamentals of 
technique by studying old boxing films in Havana cinemas and trying to emulate some of the 
sport’s greats. The fabled lightweight Joe Gans, known as the “Old Master,” was one of the 
Cuban fighter’s heroes, and he sought to emulate the former’s clean ring style. (Unlike the 
brawlers of his day who resorted to “dirty tricks” such as hitting low and relied upon broad 
swipes and rushing tactics to overwhelm their opponents, Gans – the first African American 
champion in any weight class – used miniscule defensive movements to avoid unnecessary 
punishment and targeted his punches precisely and legitimately to areas that could do the 
most damage.) Chocolate’s manager, meanwhile, early on avoided matching his charge with 
heavier opponents and prevented him from fighting too frequently – which might have 
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earned both men short-term financial gain but would almost certainly have shortchanged 
Chocolate’s potential.26 
Boxing was undergoing great changes in Cuba around the time that Chocolate first 
took up boxing, as the first commission regulating the sport was formed in late 1921. As 
more men applied to become promoters, including Gutiérrez, there would soon be an 
explosion of fight cards in Havana and increasingly, throughout the interior. It is thus 
surprising, especially given Pincho’s cautious approach to his protégé, how quickly 
Chocolate traveled from semi-professional obscurity to international renown at a time when 
many other young men were seeking to make their mark in the capital’s rings. 
 The Havana correspondent for The Ring, Milton Baron, who reported monthly on all 
of the island’s pugilistic activity, first mentioned Chocolate in print in late 1927 when the 
Kid earned an unexpected decision over Johnny Cruz, a Cuban who had returned from New 
York after winning the 1926 metropolitan amateur bantamweight title there. Chocolate, then 
still a semi-pro, was a last-minute replacement after Cuba’s amateur bantamweight 
champion, Eugenio Molinos, had dropped out. After nearly being knocked out, the Kid 
rallied to knock down Cruz and pull out a six-round decision.27 When Cruz demanded a 
rematch, Chocolate obliged – and this time knocked out the former amateur champ in five. 
A month later, in March 1928, Chocolate had his official pro debut, against Frank Fowler’s 
protégé, Kid Sotolongo. This time Chocolate knocked his opponent out in the first round. 
He dispatched his next five Cuban opponents, all by knockout. 
                                                
     26 Nannes, “Will Kid Chocolate Ever Equal Little Chocolate,” The Arena 3:6 (March 1931), p. 9; Winters, 
“Eligio Sardiñas,” Contemporary Hispanic Biography, p. 203; “Joe Gans: The Old Master,” in Roberts and Skutt, 
The Boxing Register, 4th ed., pp. 124-125. Gans was born Joseph Gaines in Baltimore in 1874 and passed away 
from tuberculosis in 1910. He held the lightweight crown from 1902 to 1908, when he lost it to Battling 
Nelson. 
     27 Milton Baron, “Boxing in Cuba,” The Ring 6:11 (December 1927), p. 28. 
 152 
Though his fighter was still very young in both years and professional experience, 
Pincho Gutiérrez felt Chocolate was ready to conquer American fighters. He brought his 
charge with him to New York in July 1928. Shortly after Chocolate began an undefeated 
streak in Mineola and Brooklyn, he graduated to more important cards at St. Nicholas Arena 
in Manhattan. There, he caught the attention of Nat Fleischer and other important boxing 
commentators. Legend had it that, in Cuba, Chocolate had had exactly one hundred amateur 
bouts, all of which he won – 86 by knockout and 14 by decision.28 It seemed as though he 
would be unstoppable in the professional arena, a well. Fleischer raved: 
 
 New York fandom is going wild over a little Cuban negro whose 
sensational ring work has earned for him thousands of admirers and who at 
this writing is recognized as one of the leading attractions among the smaller 
boys in the East. His name is Kid Chocolate and his weight is 122 pounds. 
He calls himself the bantam champion of Cuba and there is no doubt he is at 
his best around the bantam limit. 
 Kid Chocolate is one of the greatest showmen New York has seen in 
the last decade among the boys below the welter division. He is a little 
human buzz-saw who possesses everything a good fighter should have. He is 
shiny black, his skin presenting an appearance of a shined piece of black 
leather.29 
 
Chocolate’s skin color and texture – reinforced by his self-referential nickname, 
which evoked a satiny, warm brown – was a frequent point of commentary by white U.S. 
journalists. Additionally, the U.S. press characterized Chocolate, for all of his talents, as more 
child than man – someone who delighted in his newfound fame but who needed to be 
                                                
     28 Although the web site boxrec.com’s Cuban boxing historian, Enrique Encinosa, utilizing original Cuban 
newspapers, has argued that Chocolate’s amateur record was likely a more down-to-earth string of 21 victories, 
zero defeats, and that the 100-0 legend was invented by Pincho to promote his boxer abroad. Whatever the 
truth, the legend persists to this day. See Navarro, Biografía de Kid Chocolate, p. 11, and Winters, “Eligio 
Sardiñas,” Contemporary Hispanic Biography, p. 203. For Encinosa’s data, see http://www.boxrec.com/media/ 
index.php?title=Human:9006 (accessed April 27, 2009). 
     29 Nat Fleischer, “Nat Fleischer Says: New Boxing Federation in Sight; A Warning to Play Producers; 
Stribling Heads Towards Title,” The Ring 7:11 (December 1928), pp. 10-11 (quote on p. 11). 
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“handled properly.” In fairness, many white boxers were similarly characterized as being 
pleasant and family-oriented yet simple-minded, unable to function without a wise, older 
(white) manager. Yet the comparison of boxers with children was often more explicit when 
discussing young black men. As Caspar Nannes wrote in mid-1929 for The Arena, a monthly 
boxing glossy published in Philadelphia, “[t]hrough all this acclaim and adulation, the kid still 
remained the same likable, child-like, good natured youngster he had always been.”30 
Whether Chocolate claimed his country’s bantamweight crown or not, he certainly 
had proven by 1929 that he deserved it – something on which all but the Cuban commission 
members seemed to agree. This fact brought the body up for ridicule among many observers 
in both Cuba and the United States. Despite the fact that Genaro Pino was still a preliminary 
fighter in the U.S. while Chocolate was packing them in at St. Nick’s Arena, and that the 
former had a record “so full of defeats that it resembles a piece of shrapnel-torn Swiss 
cheese,” as one Philadelphia newspaperman wrote, Pino remained bantam titlist of Cuba. 
Cubans were also incensed by the commission’s refusal to strip Pedro Canales of his 
featherweight crown (with its 126-pound limit), despite the fact that he then weighed 143 
pounds and was regularly meeting welterweights rather than offering defenses of his title.31 
The late 1920s was truly a “golden age” of bantamweight prizefighters, when there 
was a plethora of young men from far-flung areas of the world who seemed capable of 
winning the title, Chocolate foremost among them. The rise of small men in the ring may 
have had to do with the fact that many impoverished ethnic Americans, who had grown up 
poorly nourished in urban slums, as well as boxers from throughout Asia and Latin America, 
                                                
     30 Caspar Nannes, “‘Kid Chocolate’,” The Arena 1:7 (June 10, 1929), pp. 20-21, 35-37 (quote on p. 35). 
     31 Leonard Joseph, “Short Jabs,” The Arena 1:9 (July 10, 1929), pp. 26-27, 38-39 (quote on p. 26). 
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were then active in the U.S.32 This period also coincided with the heyday of Jewish American 
fighters, particularly in New York, who tended to be most successful at the lighter weights.33 
Despite the plethora of bantams, it had been more than two years since champion Charley 
Phil Rosenberg was stripped of his title, fined, and suspended for a year for coming in 
significantly over weight for his February 1927 defense with Bushy Graham, yet there still 
had not been crowned a replacement. In May 1929, the New York State Athletic 
Commission (NYSAC) refused to sanction a bantamweight championship match between 
Kid Chocolate and 1924 flyweight Olympic champion Fidel La Barba, who had abandoned 
his professional flyweight title to study at Stanford University. NYSAC reduced the bout’s 
scheduled fifteen rounds (which, in New York, was then the limit for championship affairs) 
to ten, but indicated that, “if the competitive calibre of the contest warranted, and the public 
and press agreed, the winner would merit recognition as champion.” That was assuming, of 
course, that both fighters reached the maximum weight limit of 118 pounds at 2 p.m. on the 
day of the fight, May 22, which was to be held at the New York Coliseum in the Bronx.34 
Yet neither one made weight – Chocolate came in at 121, LaBarba at 120 ! –, thus 
obliterating their chances at the bantamweight title. Chocolate defeated LaBarba by majority 
                                                
     32 A few of the many names put forth as potential champions were Bushy Graham (Angelo Geraci), an 
Italian American from Utica, New York; Italian American Fidel La Barba of Los Angeles; Spain’s Vidal 
Gregorio; “Panama” Al Brown of the Canal Zone; “Spider” Pladner of France, New York’s Joey Scalfaro; and 
Norwegian Pete Sanstol. Of these, Brown would prove himself to be the greatest of the era’s bantams, winning 
the vacant New York State Athletic Commission title in June 1929 by defeating Vidal and subsequently 
receiving recognition by the National Boxing Association later that year. Brown – the first Latin American to 
win a professional world boxing title – held several versions of the crown until 1935. He was soon afterward 
replaced by Sixto Escobar, the Puerto Rican hero, who became the second Latin American world 
bantamweight champion and whose rise signaled the future dominance by men from that region (and the 
Philippines) in this and other smaller weight classes. 
     33 As Allen Bodner notes, “Jews entered the ranks of American boxing in large numbers and by 1928, were 
the dominant nationality in professional prizefighting, followed by the Italians and the Irish.” See Bodner, When 
Boxing Was a Jewish Sport (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1997), p. 1. 
     34 James P. Dawson, “LaBarba to Meet Chocolate Tonight,” New York Times, 22 May 1929, p. 23. 
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decision (one judge ruled the bout a draw, while the other judge and the referee scored it for 
Chocolate), but the result was irrelevant. This was the second time Chocolate had failed to 
reach the 118-pound limit, and, as The Arena boxing magazine noted, “despite the 
persistence of the Candy Kid and his manager that the Cuban Negro still is a bantam… we 
do not think he ever could do it without cutting off either a foot or an arm.”35 
Unfortunately for Chocolate, who never again fought as a bantam, this would derail 
his championship ambitions for a year and a half, when – as a full-fledged featherweight – he 
faced Battling Battalino in December 1930 at Madison Square Garden. The referee and two 
judges ruled it a unanimous victory for Battalino, although many in the crowd disagreed, 
booing and littering the arena with torn newspapers and fight programs. James P. Dawson, 
sportswriter for the New York Times, scored the bout as Chocolate’s, nine rounds to six, but 
noted that the judges rewarded the Hartford fighter for his aggression.36 This loss was 
particularly disappointing for Chocolate. The year had been a difficult one for his career. In 
May, he was injured in a car accident and had to spend several weeks convalescing, forcing 
him to postpone a May 28 rematch with LaBarba. When he returned to the ring in July 1930, 
he won his next three bouts before losing three fights to top competition in a four-month 
period. The first, at the New York Polo Grounds on August 7, 1930, was a split-decision win 
by Jack “Kid” Berg of Great Britain (with Berg, a lightweight, outweighing Chocolate by 
                                                
     35 “Critic,” “Bantam Muddle Still Muddled Up,” The Arena 1:10 (July 25, 1910), pp. 20-21, 35 (quote on p. 
20). 
     36 James P. Dawson, “18,000 See Battalino Beat Chocolate and Retain World’s Featherweight Title,” New 
York Times, 13 December 1930, p. 26. 
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nearly ten pounds) that Chocolate and many observers felt had rightly been his. The second 
was a ten-round, clear-cut unanimous decision victory by LaBarba in November 1930.37 
On the day of the Battalino fight, a New York Times sportswriter noted, “There has 
been a quite a bit of conversation… about Chocolate being through.” He noted that the 
“good-natured Cuban boy” was “paying the price of perfection”: “He was too good at the 
outset. It is puzzling and disturbing to think that about a year ago he was considered as 
certain a thing as Man O’War.”38 If the buzz prior to the Battalino fight was that Chocolate’s 
career had fizzled, it became stronger after it. As many had predicted, Chocolate was not as 
invincible at featherweight as he had been at bantam.39 
Despite the naysayers, in 1931, Chocolate rebounded well from these losses, putting 
together four straight victories before meeting Benny Bass on July 15 at the Philadelphia 
National League Ballpark in front of 15,000 people. The third time was the charm for 
Chocolate, who was given his third chance at a title – in his third weight division. Bass’s 
world junior-lightweight title, which he had won a year and a half earlier from Seattle’s Tod 
Morgan, would be on the line. Bass, who went into the bout aware that his younger sister 
Anna was dying from spinal meningitis, was outclassed early and often. The referee stopped 
                                                
     37 “Kid Chocolate in Crash,” New York Times, 19 May 1930, p. 16; James P. Dawson, “Chocolate Forced to 
Postpone Bout,” New York Times, 20 May 1930, p. 42; James P. Dawson, “Berg Gets Verdict over Kid 
Chocolate,” 8 August 1930, p. 20; James P. Dawson, “La Barba Triumphs in Chocolate Bout,” New York Times, 
4 November 1930, p. 38. 
     38 Robert F. Kelley, “Sports of the Times: The Kid Grows Older,” New York Times, 12 December 1930, p. 
35. 
     39 See, for instance, “Critic,” “Bantam Muddle Still Muddled Up,” The Arena 1:10 (July 25, 1929), p. 20: 
“Chocolate will not find it so easy to get to the top of the 126-pound boys as he did in the lighter class. There 
is no questioning the fact that the ebony boxer is a great little fighter, but we do not believe that he is any 
greater than a number of other 126-pounders – including LaBarba – and we say this despite the fact that 
Chocolate is credited with a victory over the fighting student of the West.” 
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the one-sided affair in the seventh, after Bass had been physically battered. Chocolate 
appeared to have been unscathed.40 
The Cuban public was jubilant at having one of their own finally earn a professional 
world boxing championship. Upon his return to the island, the boxing commission hosted 
an event in Chocolate’s honor on July 23.41 Shortly afterward, however, the champion found 
himself in trouble with the Cuban authorities on the charges that he had the committed 
statutory rape of a 17-year-old girl, Rosario (Rosa) Mora Martínez, in Havana. Her father, 
Pablo Mora Nieto, pressed charges for an offense that was said to have occurred that 
February.42 According to the girl and her father, Chocolate had promised to marry her but 
had then deserted her. Following a first-round knockout over Max Lanier at St. Nicholas 
Arena on November 30, 1931, in a benefit show for Black Bill – who by then, ravaged by 
syphilis, had lost his sight – Chocolate was arrested by the office of U.S. Commissioner 
Cotter, who held him at a federal penitentiary pending the outcome of an extradition request 
by Cuban Consul General Augusto Merchán. Facing a one-year prison sentence should he 
be extradited and convicted, Chocolate stated that he thought he had married Rosario “by 
proxy.”43 His attorney sought bail for Chocolate to fight Al Singer on a milk fund benefit 
show December 11, but the request was denied. Instead, his recent opponent, Battling 
Battalino, was recruited to fill Chocolate’s shoes on the card.44 Upon the State Department’s 
formal receipt of Cuba’s extradition request, Chocolate agreed to waive proceedings and be 
                                                
     40 “Chocolate Victor by Knockout in 7th,” New York Times, 16 July 1931, 26; “Benny Bass’s Sister Dies,” 
New York Times, 18 July 1931, p. 7. 
     41 Peter, “Casi Cincuenta Años de Boxeo en Cuba,” Diario de la Marina, Siglo y Cuarto: número 
extraordinario (September 15, 1957), p. 214. 
     42 “Cuba Boxer Held on Girl’s Charge,” Los Angeles Times, 28 July 1931, p. 5. 
     43 “Kid Chocolate Is Jailed,” New York Times, 2 December 1931, p. 19. 
     44 “Boxer to Be Extradited,” New York Times, 4 December 1931, p. 18; “Battalino to Box Singer,” New York 
Times, 4 December 1931, p. 33; “Battalino Bout Approved,” New York Times, 5 December 1931, p. 24. 
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taken directly to Cuba. After two weeks in U.S. federal lockup, he was wed by proxy to Mora 
Martínez on December 16 – with Pincho Gutiérrez standing in for him at the ceremony (at 
which the bride and her father were also in attendance) as Chocolate traveled by steamer to 
Havana. With the wedding having occurred before he touched Cuban soil, the Cuban 
authorities allowed Chocolate to disembark without further detention.45 
Now that this trouble was behind him, the newlywed Kid enjoyed his popularity at 
home and abroad and took advantage of opportunities to augment it. He posed for the 
Compañía Lechera de Cuba in a light-colored suit and floral tie, holding up a glass of the 
company’s pasteurized milk, with a caption indicating that it was his favorite drink.46 He 
posed completely nude (with his private parts coyly hidden from view) for photographers 
who reproduced his image in magazines, newspapers, and postcards. Nocaut Internacional ran a 
photo of Chocolate in profile, right bicep curled, with the caption, “The ebony Apollo, 
considered by critics worldwide to be the most perfect boxer of the era.”47 Naked or clothed, 
the Kid was always beautiful to look at, almost godlike, like Apollo. The point was made by 
Carteles when, in August 1931, it ran two very contrasting photos of the new world 
champion. The first was the same image that later ran in Nocaut Internacional, with the caption 
– “El ‘Beau Brummel’ de ebano” (the ebony Beau Brummel).48 In the second, the boxer 
stood squarely at the camera, impeccably adorned in a suit – “Bronce viviente” (living 
                                                
     45 “Would Extradite Fighter,” New York Times, 9 December 1931, p. 23; “Pugilist Wed by Proxy,” New York 
Times, 17 December 1931, p. 21. 
     46 For instance, see “Tome Solamente Leche Pasteurizada,” Nocaut 2:6 (March 1932), p. 3. 
     47 Jess Losada, “Peleará Chocolate con Venezuela?” Nocaut Internacional 3:1 (February 1933), p. 31. The 
original text read, “El Apolo de ébono, considerado por la crítica mundial como el más perfecto púgil de la 
época.” 
     48 George Bryan “Beau” Brummell was a wealthy young man in turn-of-the-18th century England who was 
renowned for his extreme fastidiousness in matters of personal fashion. His name became a synonym for 
“dandy.” 
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bronze). The text listed Chocolate’s current weight (134 pounds), height (5 foot 7 inches), 
age (20 years old), and details about his amateur and professional career, as well as the details 
that probably interested its readership the most: that Chocolate had personal, tax-free 
earnings of $100,000, and that his future wealth was valued at a quarter-million dollars.49 
In October 1932, Chocolate added another title to his résumé: the world 
featherweight championship, which he won from Lew Feldman at Madison Square Garden. 
But his hold on that started to waver at Madison Square Garden in November 1933, when 
Tony Canzoneri knocked him out in the second of ten nontitle rounds. Two fights later, on 
Christmas Day 1933, Chocolate was stopped again – by Frankie Klick in Philadelphia during 
the seventh of fifteen rounds. Klick won recognition in Pennsylvania as the holder of 
Chocolate’s junior lightweight title.50 When Klick challenged Chocolate to a featherweight 
title fight the following year, the Cuban Bon Bon, citing weight issues – he felt he could no 
longer get below 130 pounds –, refused to meet him. NYSAC thus stripped Chocolate of his 
featherweight title on February 19, 1934.51 
His decline was slow but obvious. In 1935 and 1936, Chocolate’s fight pace slowed 
considerably, with bouts every other month or so. With the exception of a jaunt to 
Venezuela, where he lost a decision to national hero Simón Chávez, he satisfied himself with 
bouts against top U.S. opposition in Havana. He went back to New York in late 1936 with 
the aim of trying to make a comeback. Although he lost his first attempt back against Phil 
                                                
     49 “Galería deportiva No. 1,” Carteles, 23 August 1931. That his age at the time is listed at 20 years gives 
further credence to Menéndez’s and Ortega’s claim that the Kid’s birthday was in October 1910, not January 
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     50 “Canzoneri Victor by Knockout in 2d,” New York Times, 25 November 1933, p. 20; “Klick Wins Title; 
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     51 “Chocolate to Yield Title,” New York Times, 18 February 1934, p. S7; James P. Dawson, “Chocolate Title 
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Baker in December 1936, he won or drew against the remainder of his opponents over the 
next two years. But his skills had slipped, and, after exerting himself to manage a draw 
against Nicky Jerome in Havana on December 18, 1938, Chocolate decided to cancel an 
impending South American tour and instead finally called it quits from ring competition. 
Much later, Chocolate claimed that it was Pincho Gutiérrez who insisted upon it: “After my 
bout with Jerome in December 1938, he called me and made me retire. He spoke with truth: 
I was not the same boxer, fighting was affecting my health and my morale.” When he finally 
stepped away from the ring, Chocolate was not yet 29 years old.52 
Why his career was over so quickly remains a subject of debate, but most experts 
agree that lack of training and personal dissolution – the bane of many a boxer – had much 
to do with it. Never all that disciplined in his training, Chocolate also enjoyed a life of 
women, nightlife, and rum. It was speculated that, like his friend Black Bill, he had 
contracted syphilis and was never the same.53 The Kid himself unapologetically 
acknowledged how distracting his women-chasing had been to his prizefighting career; in old 
age, he told his Cuban interviewers: 
 
…I also wanted to be a champ in bed. Imagine, when I made my debut in 
New York, they had to drag me off between the legs of a dancer, a 
tremendous woman I liked a lot. If I had taken the sacred code of boxing 
literally, I would have lasted longer, nevertheless… I would have little to say 
except to talk about punches and defense, and perhaps bore you.54 
 
                                                
     52 “Kid Chocolate Retires,” New York Times, 20 December 1938, p. 34; Menéndez and Ortega, “The Last 
Great Interview with Kid Chocolate,” 4 July 2006. 
     53 See, for example, Jonathan Rendall, This Bloody Mary Is the Last Thing I Own: A Journey to the End of Boxing 
(Hopewell, NJ: The Ecco Press, 1997), p. 38, which claims that Chocolate’s supposed troubles with weight 
after 1933 were merely a cover-up for dealing with the ravages of syphilis. 
     54 Menéndez and Ortega, “The Last Great Interview with Kid Chocolate,” 4 July 2006. 
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For the next fifty or so years after retiring from professional boxing, Chocolate 
remained in Havana, where he raised a family and worked, during the republic years, as a 
boxing instructor on behalf of the government. As discussed in the next chapter, he was a 
critical part of the boxing academy founded by the state in the late 1930s to develop young 
amateur boxers from the interior into first semi-pros and then accomplished professionals. 
He died in poverty and obscurity on August 8, 1988, in a state-owned house in Havana, the 
barest details of his death announced on Cuban radio.55 The revolutionary regime has 
maintained his Kid Chocolate Gym in Cerro, and his name is frequently evoked in 
aficionados’ discussions of the greatest Cuban boxers of all time – usually at the top of their 
lists. But his legacy remains clouded by the sad unraveling of his later years. To the 
revolutionary government, he quickly became a relic – a living symbol of his own, and an 
earlier era’s, excesses – rather than someone who could speak to the future ahead. He was 
not involved in any significant way in running the Castro regime’s amateur boxing program, 
perhaps due to his own ambivalence regarding the ban on professional sports. It is true that 
his health had been failing for some time; according to Nat Fleischer, who had seen him in 
Havana circa 1959, Chocolate (presumably not yet fifty years old) was already “bent over” 
and relied on a cane, noting, “It’s like he disappeared when Castro came.”56 Yet Chocolate’s 
lack of involvement in the Revolution’s amateur program, even on a symbolic level, might 
also have belied an ambivalence toward it. In 1979, though he called Cuba’s program 
“[w]ithin the limits of amateur boxing, the best in the world,” he added, 
 
                                                
     55 “Kid Chocolate, 78, Ex-Boxing Champion,” New York Times, 9 August 1988. 
     56 Ira Berkow, “Sports of the Times: The Riddle of Kid Chocolate,” New York Times, 21 August 1988. 
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…I, who fought 10 and 15 rounds, get bored [with amateur boxing] at 
certain moments. I understand that amateur boxing is more humane, cleaner, 
and takes better care of the boxer. They are two different sports. Even 
though it is always tough: in professional boxing the punches are not given 
with meringue.57 
 
 Regardless of his feelings toward the Revolution, Chocolate remains a salient 
icon in Cuba today. By this I mean the Chocolate of 1931 through 1933, the world 
champion who posed so confidently, and brazenly, for nude photographs and who 
represented the supreme victory of Cuba – an island that chafed under its obvious 
neocolonial status and the second-class citizenship of most of its citizenry. As British 
sociologist John Sugden opined during his ethnographic fieldwork in Cuba in 1990-
1991, much of it spent around the small Arena Trejo boxing gym in Old Havana 
which remains a training ground for future world champions, “The glory days of Kid 
Chocolate and his contemporaries are retained in the collective folk memory of 
places like Old Havana and this helps to sustain a subculture which encourages 
young Cubans to dedicate themselves to the ring.”58 
 
Reading the First Decades of Boxing in the Republic 
 The first three-and-a-half decades of boxing in the Cuban republic testify 
that the sport was growing – unsteadily, and not always progressively – along several 
different tracks and in very different venues: the elite social and recreational clubs of 
Havana; private homes and out-of-the-way theaters where local amateurs, semi-pros, 
                                                
     57 Menéndez and Ortega, “The Last Great Interview with Kid Chocolate,” 4 July 2006. 
     58 John Sugden, Boxing and Society: An International Analysis (Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 
1996), p. 169. Sugden refers throughout his text to the Arena Trojo gym, but it is the Arena Trejo. 
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and pros could perform for a close-knit group of aficionados; and grand arenas 
where renowned foreign prizefighters performed for the pleasure of women as well 
as men. Poor Afro-Cuban newsboys, like young Kid Chocolate, and middle-class 
white Cuban and U.S. youngsters could find spaces in which to hone their craft. The 
state vacillated between tolerating boxing and repressing it, between embracing it as a 
progressive means by which to build a generation of virile young men and 
repudiating it as a barbaric relic suited for Americans, perhaps, but not Cubans. The 
1921 formation of the national boxing commission and the subsequent 
establishment of opportunities for professional as well as amateur advancement 
undoubtedly accelerated the processes by which Cuban fighters found their niches 
not only at home but also abroad, particularly in the United States. But not until the 
rise of Kid Chocolate did a native pugilist achieve the type of transcendent fame that 
would inspire (and continue to inspire) generations of young boxers on the island. 
 
In my first two chapters, I have attempted to indicate the fragmented nature 
of boxing’s growth in the first few decades of the twentieth century. Until 1921, state 
intervention was used primarily to suppress boxing. After 1921, the state turned to 
regulation with an eye toward developing yet another arm of Cuba’s nascent tourist 
industry, a goal that would become more important in the next three decades. 
Looking ahead to the late 1930s, the role of the state in overseeing the sport became 
far more proactive – leading to a self-sustaining domestic prizefighting industry as 
well as a constant supply of boxers for export abroad. The Cuban boxing program of 
the late 1930s and 1940s was far more ambitious than that in practice in most U.S. 
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states at that time, but its effectiveness was limited by ongoing graft, corruption, and 
political turmoil that served the latter aim – export of boxers – but not always the 
former – increasing sports tourism at home. It is this largely forgotten era of Cuban 
sports and politics to which we now turn. 
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Chapter 4: The Conflicting Role of the State in Building a 
National Boxing Program, 1930s-1940s 
 
The Neocolonial State and the Cubanization of Boxing 
The late 1930s through late 1940s witnessed a phenomenal growth in amateur, semi-
professional, and professional boxing in Cuba. The institutionalization of the sport in 
various departmental organizations, the construction of new facilities, and the growth of fan 
bases through the development of local idols and the distribution of sports and physical 
culture publications were all critical to the effort of building the nation’s pugilistic program. 
Perhaps most salient, however, is that this expansion of boxing was concurrent with the 
increasingly transnational nature of the sport. Prizefighters had always been wanderers, 
particularly those in search of elusive titles. Yet the immediate pre- and post-World War II 
periods were remarkable for how quickly Cuba became both a regional center for boxers 
seeking work – one that embraced young men from the Caribbean, Latin America, and the 
Philippines as well as the United States – and a powerhouse in producing them. 
The neocolonial state was responsible for much of this growth, as it worked to 
develop a self-sustaining tourist industry that employed surplus adults (prizefighters, trainers, 
seconds, referees, doctors) at home while providing a venue of employment abroad for 
boxers – as well as baseball players, musicians, dancers, and others whose work was central 
to the tourist machine. Robin D. Moore seeks to answer in his monograph on music in 
Cuban life since the 1950s “how a country with many social problems, and one eventually in 
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a state of civil war, could have simultaneously been the site of amazingly vibrant musical 
development.”1 These next two chapters ask a similar question, with boxing as their focus. 
Yet the world of music varied significantly from that of athletics, particularly 
prizefighting, where age and experience were more liability than advantage. Through the 
1950s, and in some countries into the 1980s, prizefighters fought often. “Ham-and-eggers,” 
those with little to no chance of reaching the top of the sport, might fight once every two 
weeks, more often if they were desperate; top contenders and champions could take on 
opponents once a month (albeit not always for title defenses).2 To have amassed over one 
hundred professional fights – an astonishing feat today – was nothing special in U.S. and 
Cuban rings at the time. With every fighter only too aware that his time in the ring was 
limited (many, like Kid Chocolate, retired before age thirty), the Cuban system could only 
have offered him long-term employment if it established a system by which, after his fighting 
years were over, he could be adapted to work for which he was already suited. Within limits 
– for the numbers of ex-prizefighters far outnumbered the potential need for new boxing 
support staff – the state attempted to do just that. Thus, former boxers were recruited to be 
boxing instructors at the national academy or at social clubs; managers and trainers who 
traveled with their charges; referees who might become as well known in Cuba as the boxers 
themselves; or, for the rare man among them (usually, but not always, from a white middle-
class background), sportswriters or government officials. 
                                                
     1 Moore, Music and Revolution, p. 27. 
     2 Boxing has long used several colorful, if derogatory, phrases to describe competitors who are viewed as 
being mediocre at best, talentless at worse; they include “ham and egg” and “meat and potato” fighters 
(presumably because their ring wages are sufficient only to pay for a basic livelihood), “tomato cans” (because 
they are easily knocked down), and “palookas.” 
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The period described in this chapter reflects a great deal of variety in the methods 
and approaches to the sport as it was practiced, advocated, and regulated in Cuba during the 
1930s and 1940s. It treats semi-professional boxing, the amateur Golden Gloves 
tournament, the ways that the World War II-era physical culture movement helped to 
popularize boxing among the middle classes, and prizefighting in both the capital and 
interior of the island. One of the most obvious ways the sport changed in this period was the 
institutionalization of semi-professionalism, which, at a time when the social clubs remained 
segregated by race and class and UAAC tournaments were off-limits to them, gave poor 
white and Afro-Cuban boys a venue by which to learn how to become fighters without 
having to face more experienced opponents. 
In this era, moreover, the state supervised – although it did not quite control – the 
growing Cubanization of boxing. Although genuine sports fans such as DGD director Jaime 
Mariné oversaw boxing’s expansion domestically, the pursuit of tourist and other revenue 
was an underlying motive in fostering a self-sustaining prizefighting culture. That the state 
took the institutionalization of boxing seriously is evidenced by the increase in the number 
of promoters, managers, and trainers it sanctioned as well as by the growth of professional, 
semi-professional, and amateur boxers. Indeed, the state’s reach went far beyond the capital 
and even beyond the interior. The creation of a regional network of prizefight centers, 
stretching from the Southern U.S. to South America, helped to ensure that Havana would 
not only attract the best foreign competition to its rings, but also that its top native fighters 
could secure steady work abroad. 
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The Institutionalization of Semi-Professional Boxing 
 Instituted in 1927 as a venue by which underprivileged boys and young men could 
obtain develop pugilistic skills for lower pay – and against less experienced opposition – than 
in regular prizefights, semi-professionalism filled a space between amateurism and 
professionalism but was closer to the latter. In the Cuba, it must be noted, amateurism was 
not truly amateurism, as became clear as the period wore on. Youngsters and college 
students were accustomed to receiving pittances after each bout, and sometimes more 
substantial aid from benefactors and fans. Thus, rather than existing in separate spheres, 
amateur, semi-professional, and professional boxing fit together along a spectrum – one that 
displayed obvious differences in pay scale, length of bouts, quality and age of opponents, 
prestige, and national exposure. 
 The last weeks of 1939 brought with them a new government policy toward semi-
professional boxing. Under the leadership of Colonel Jaime Mariné, the Dirección Nacional 
General de Deportes (DGD) inaugurated a semi-professional boxing championship 
tournament in early 1940. By recognizing this variant of the sport with titles and other 
honors, the DGD hoped to ensure a safe path to the pro ranks for impoverished young men 
who could not afford to spend any length of time in the amateurs. It declared that semi-pros 
would receive the same per-round rate of pay, but that they would be limited to fighting no 
more than six three-minute rounds per bout. The minimum age requirement for semi-pros 
was fifteen, versus eighteen for pros. The new regulations further stated that semi-pros were 
not allowed to tape their hands, as did their professional counterparts, and would use slightly 
larger gloves – six and three-quarters versus five ounces for pros. Amateurs generally fought 
for three or five rounds of three minutes duration, were similarly prevented from taping 
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their hands, and used eight-ounce gloves. As then-Commissioner of Boxing, Luis “Pincho” 
Gutierrez, former manager of Kid Chocolate and a strong advocate of semi-professionalism, 
noted, “This is the first time in [Cuban] boxing, under commission rules, that boys use 
gloves for regulation contests that are bigger than those required for professional fights and 
smaller than those used in our amateur contests.” While these distinctions among amateurs, 
semi-pros, and pros may seem incrementally small, the Commission was striving to 
differentiate between those who needed more time in the amateurs and those who “are 
ready to graduate into the tougher group.” As such, only those with at least twelve amateur 
bouts could pass into the semi-pro ranks.3 
 Gutierrez – who had been named to his position by DGD Director Mariné – 
proudly boasted of using an “iron hand” as Boxing Commissioner as a means of preventing 
“set-ups,” or pre-arranged mismatches, and, more broadly, to ensure the health and safety of 
Cuba’s boys. All registered boxers received free medical and dental treatment so long as their 
membership card remained active and they attended regular training sessions. Of 2,758 
registered boxers – amateurs, semi-pros, and pros – he estimated that some 200 were “highly 
experienced professional fighters.” Yet unlike in the United States and other countries, 
where “the professional promoter rules the sport of boxing, in Cuba every branch of sport is 
part of a national program under the direct supervision of members of the Athletic 
Commission.” He elaborated as to how such a system worked to ensure the constant influx 
of new boxers into the semi-pro and pro ranks: 
                                                
     3 Luis Gutierrez, “Cuba’s Boxing Progress,” The Ring 19:1 (February 1940), p. 25. To put the glove weights 
in contemporary perspective, though this was an improvement in cushioning for the time, today no recognized 
professional sanctioning body (or national amateur association regulating adult competitors) uses gloves of less 
than eight ounces in competition; heavier weight classes use ten-ounce gloves. At present, only young children 
in amateur competition use gloves of less than eight ounces. 
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 Nowhere in the boxing world are the boxers ruled with such an iron 
hand and yet most kindly by a boxing commission. I use the term “iron 
hand” because we absolutely forbid any matches here under our control, in 
the amateur and semi-professional field, in which there are any set-ups. The 
boys are required to fight an opponent selected for them by me. I make the 
choice, based wholly on the ability of the rivals, the number of hours they 
have spent under our jurisdiction in the gymnasium and the period of their 
activity in other fights. 
 When I feel that they are ready to become professionals, if they so 
desire it, then through our boxing commission, we assign a professional 
manager to handle the boy. Such managers are not permitted to obtain a 
license from us unless they are men of high character who not only know the 
sport but upon whom we can depend for proper guidance of the boys 
released to them.4 
 
In short, the boys and young men who formed the corpus of Cuba’s amateur boxers 
– should they be so gifted – now had financial incentives to enter the semi-pro ranks. This 
middle level of competition not only served as training ground for future professionals – 
possible national champions as well as “meat and potato” club fighters – but offered those 
who could expect little success in the pro ranks a means of supplemental income. Men could 
stay semi-pro for a number of years, augmenting day wages with irregular evening or 
weekend earnings that brought intangible benefits, such as local recognition and a sense of 
personal achievement, while requiring far less training time. Moreover, paid forms of 
pugilism – whether pro or semi-pro – were quite often a necessary side occupation for boys 
and men who could not earn sufficient wages by other means. Since ring fees varied 
dramatically by region, the line between semi-pro and pro fights was not always clear-cut. 
The majority of Cuba’s registered boxers, after all, labored in obscurity for months or years, 
gaining recognition only at the local or possibly provincial level. One such fighter who 
                                                
     4 Ibid., p. 25. 
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earned far more attention in death than in life was Kid Chicle, a.k.a. Lino Rodríguez Grenot, 
whom we discuss below. 
Another, if unspoken, argument for semi-professionalism concerned the segregation 
of amateur facilities in Cuba. The exclusive social clubs were for well-heeled white members, 
and their athletic competitions – whether internal, such as exhibitions, or external, with other 
clubs – denied opportunities to people of color and poor whites. While professional boxing 
in Cuba was not racially segregated as in much of the United States, amateur bouts were a 
different matter. The Unión Atlética Amateur de Cuba (Amateur Athletic Union of Cuba, 
UAAC), which encompassed athletes from the University of Havana, discriminated against 
Afro-Cubans for years after its establishment. Nonwhites were able to participate in boxing 
and other sports in an integrated association founded in 1931, the Organizacíon Deportiva 
Amateur de Cuba (Amateur Sport Association of Cuba, ODAC).5 
In addition to ODAC, there were individual participants from the black social clubs, 
which had their own sporting calendar separate from the UAAC. White athletes who were 
not from exclusive families competed for separate clubs that were set up for the white petit-
bourgeoisie. Finally, there were “atletas libres” (free athletes) who were not associated with 
asociaciones deportivos, or who were from small black clubs. These free athletes almost 
always participated in track and field or preliminary boxing events (eliminatorios), although 
track and field usually recruited directly from the colleges. Members of non-UAAC leagues 
and free athletes were allowed to participate in the Cuban Olympic Committee’s public 
eliminatorios. This is why Afro-Cubans did take part in the 1935 Central American and 
                                                
     5 Alejandro de la Fuente, A Nation for All: Race, Inequality, and Politics in Twentieth-Century Cuba (Chapel Hill: 
The University of North Carolina Press, 2001), p. 164. 
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Caribbean Games in events where they might be more heavily represented, such as boxing, 
baseball, and athleticism (track and field). Of course, outside of the UAAC and the exclusive 
social clubs, it was difficult if not impossible for athletes to secure access to good trainers, 
adequate and healthy nutrition, and equipment and facilities – thus giving the UAAC 
members a tangible if not insurmountable advantage in winning the eliminatory events.6 
Because of the segregated and uneven nature of amateur competition – outside of 
the Golden Gloves, which did bring together white and black competitors – it was by no 
means assured that a talented youth could make his way successfully to the professional 
ranks by amateur experience alone. Semi-professionalism addressed these structural 
inequalities in amateur sport by offering an alternate path to prizefighting. Yet it is important 
to note that semi-professionalism could be as exploitative as prizefighting itself; there were 
few safeguards in place to ensure the continued long-term health of participants, and 
paydays were by nature smaller than what might be had in the professional rings. 
Although fight cards varied by promoter, city, and venue, the typical arrangement 
followed closely upon that which was, and still is, common in the United States. This was to 
open the card with the preliminary bouts (usually four or six rounds in duration), which were 
followed by one or two “semi-final” events, normally eight rounds apiece, and culminated in 
a “star-bout” of ten or more rounds. (In the U.S. South, as in Cuba, battles royal were also a 
popular way to open a fight card in the early twentieth century.) Cuban promoters regularly 
integrated amateur and semi-professional bouts into the preliminary portion of the card – 
for instance, opening with one or two amateur bouts, moving to a semi-pro bout, and then 
                                                
     6 Conversation with Carols Reig Romero [scholar on the early YMCA in Havana], 1 April 2006, Havana, 
Cuba.  
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introducing some (often quite green) professionals. The status of the boxers was usually 
indicated in some form – either explicitly in the programs that were published beforehand in 
the press, or implicitly based on number of rounds or other details. For instance, two 
fighters in a preliminary bout of three rounds would most likely be amateurs. 
The term “star-bout” brings up the matter of the use of English in postwar Cuban 
boxing circles. In Havana periodicals of that period, this term was rarely translated into 
Spanish (“pelea estrellar”), reflecting the desire of Cuban elites to align themselves culturally 
as well as politically with the United States. As Louis A. Pérez, Jr., has compellingly 
demonstrated, English in the mid-to-late 1940s and 1950s was “Havana’s unofficial second 
language,” one that surpassed Spanish in countless ways small and large. Indeed, as he notes, 
“the vogue of things North American had passed directly into forms of self-representation.” 
English words were used to sell consumer goods, such as kitchen and household appliances 
and cars. Children and pets were given American, and even Hollywood-inspired, names. 
While it is important to qualify that these affectations did not reflect a saturation of 
American culture among the lower classes or even among provincial elites, they did allow 
habaneros of means to differentiate themselves from their less educated, less wealthy, and 
nonwhite peers. These linguistic shifts were demonstrative of significant lifestyle changes, as 
U.S. middle-class norms were imbibed by Cuban (and particularly Havana) elites who sought 
to eat, dress, and associate with each other along American lines.7 
Mirroring the influence of English in Cuban literature, film, and music, much of the 
sporting vocabulary of the time was borrowed directly from English, albeit with sometimes 
modified orthography. Boxing was certainly no exception. “Rounds” were at times spelled 
                                                
     7 Pérez, Jr., On Becoming Cuban, pp. 354-444 (quotes on pp. 384 and 385). 
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“raunds” and were used interchangeably with the Spanish terms “cantos” or “asaltos.” There 
seemed no need to translate “knockout,” abbreviated “K.O.,” but a technical knockout was 
called a “knockout tecnicál.” Participants were “boxers” more often than they were 
“boxeadores,” and the same was true for trainers and managers, whose English terms were 
far more common than “entrenadores” and “dueños.” The “ring” was still a “ring”; the term 
“cuadrilátero” referred to a baseball diamond, not the squared circle. Moreover, although the 
practice began to decline by the late 1940s, boxers continued to use Americanized 
nicknames, most notably those that suggested youth, such as “Baby,” “Kid,” and “Young.” 
Perhaps in no other sport of the period in Cuba – with the possible exception of baseball – 
did English so completely rule the terminology of the game. 
Despite the seeming advantages of the semi-pro system for boxers who could not or 
would not devote themselves to the professional arena, it was dismantled in 1947 by new 
DGD director Manolo Castro. The decision was part of the Grau administration’s post-
Mariné restructuring of the DGD; the reason given for semi-professionalism’s end was 
because of “no haber cumplido el fin para que fue creado” (not having achieved the end for 
which it was created). Pincho Gutiérrez – who remained an influential manager and 
commentator after leaving the Boxing Commission – took strong umbrage at this decision, 
stating that the loss of semi-professionalism was a “crime” that would destroy the progress 
that Cuban boxing had achieved (under his tenure, it was implied). He argued that the loss of 
semi-pro bouts would destroy Cuba’s rising stars before they could be properly introduced 
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to the pro ranks. Moreover, the amateur game in Cuba was now a “filfa” (fib), and he had no 
option left except to take his boxers abroad to find suitable competition.8 
“Todos, todos, todos, absolutamente todos los llamados amateurs” (All, all, all, 
absolutely all of the so-called amateurs) – declared another commentator – received a 
pittance per bout. In order to increase participation in amateur events, this money often 
came directly from the Boxing Commission, no less, which had recipients sign receipts of 
payment. Regardless of whether they earned one, two, three, or a hundred pesos, he 
concluded, paid boxers were professionals, not amateurs. He pointed out that the main 
reason given for creating the semi-pro system – that poor youths could not afford to spend 
any amount of time in the amateurs – was illogical given the age-old practice of paying 
amateurs as well. By the late 1940s, its amateur system was so notorious that, when Cuba 
sent boxers to the United States to take part in its national Golden Gloves championship – 
for which Cuba was then considered part of its Southern contingent – they were not allowed 
to compete until they could show proof of amateur status from the local Florida amateur 
association; UAAC documentation was not sufficient.9 These payments were clearly in 
violation of the 1932 amateur boxing regulations promulgated by the Comisión Nacional de 
Boxeo y Luchas, which restricted winners of amateur championships (whether interclub, 
local provincial, national, or international) to medals, certificates, and items that could be 
used for boxing practice or competition, such as gloves or apparel.10 While professional 
boxers, on the contrary, were guaranteed at least 25 pesos per fight, Cuba Deportiva columnist 
                                                
     8 Pincho Gutiérrez, “¡Qué reorganización! Acabarán con el boxeo,” Cuba Deportiva 9:156 (January 5, 1948), 
pp. 1, 6; “En este mundo traidor nada es verdad ni mentira,” Sábado Deportivo 1:8 (June 22, 1947), p. 8. 
     9 “El problema de los pseudo-amateurs y los EE. UU.,” Cuba Deportiva 9:157 (January 12, 1948), p. 5. 
     10 Comisión Nacional de Boxeo y Luchas, República de Cuba, Reglamento del Boxeo Amateur (Marianao: Imp. 
Marianao Alegre, 1932), pp. 3-4, 6-7. 
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Don Pito felt that many preliminary fighters after the DGD restructuring were actually semi-
pros “disguised” as pros. At one state-run card, he witnessed Commission staffers paying 
preliminary boxers only four pesos apiece and concluded sarcastically that the law requiring a 
minimum ring fee must only apply to promoters.11 
 
The Flourishing of the Cuban Golden Gloves 
Perhaps in no other decade until the late 1960s would amateur boxing in Cuba offer 
as many avenues for personal advancement as in the 1940s. Established in 1937 with the 
backing of Jaime Mariné and Pincho Gutiérrez, the first Cuban Golden Gloves competition 
took place at the Arena Cerveza Cristal in 1938. By the following year, it had taken on an 
international flavor when Nat Fleischer, editor of The Ring, the “Bible of Boxing,” came to 
Havana to referee the final bouts.12 The Golden Gloves tournament lasted for several 
months, typically beginning in the late summer or fall and concluding with a series of final 
bouts in the winter. Organized into eight weight classes from flyweight (up to 112 lbs./51 
kg) to heavyweight, elimination bouts began at the provincial level and progressed gradually 
to the national one. Gold and silver medalists were named per weight class each year (no 
bronze medals were given), but earning the title of Golden Gloves champion was a 
tremendous boost to a would-be pro. For one, it gave a fighter the opportunity to compete 
abroad, thus creating a unique transnational space where the winners could expect to receive 
both class and geographical mobility. The 1937 winners, for instance, were the de facto team 
chosen to take part in the 1938 Pan American Games. For another, the top Golden Gloves 
                                                
     11 Don Pito, “Chiflidos,” Cuba Deportiva 9:159 (January 26, 1948), p. 5. 
     12 Milt Baron, “Boxing in Cuba,” The Ring 19:2 (March 1940), p. 53. 
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boxers were able to bypass the semi-pro system and go directly into the pro ranks, since 
through their amateur engagements they had become familiar with promoters and managers 
who could help to direct their careers. (A frequent qualifier used to describe an experienced 
amateur turning pro was that he would do well “if properly handled.”) 
By the early 1940s, the best Golden Gloves boxers in Havana became familiar names 
and faces to fight fans, earning frequent press coverage, opportunities to showcase their 
skills at the Palacio de los Deportes (Sports Palace), usually as part of the preliminary 
showcase on a professional card, or smaller venues, including all-amateur shows. It also gave 
them, should they so choose, the opportunity to take on ring names of their own, emulating 
their heroes in the pro game. At the Arena Cerveza Cristal in June 1941, Baby Pancho – 
welterweight champion of the previous year – competed against Emilio Silveira in one of 
four main Golden Gloves bouts as the tournament wound its way to the finals. (Amateur 
“star-bouts” were usually five rounds apiece, versus three for preliminary bouts.) Their 
match-up was considered to be one of the best of the night, since “debe ser a sangre y fuego 
desde el primer instante” (it should be fire and blood from the first instant). As was 
customary for amateur shows, admission was priced low enough to allow entry to most who 
wanted in: thirty centavos for ringside, twenty for preferred seats, and ten for bleachers.13 
The Cuban Golden Gloves had formed independently of – albeit heavily inspired by 
– the Chicago and New York tournaments of the same name, which originated in 1927. Nat 
Fleischer’s involvement in the Cuban tournament, moreover, ensured that there was an 
ongoing link, at least in the early years, between the Cuban and New York versions. The 
                                                
     13 “Cuatro star bouts en el programa de amateurs, mañana,” Diario de la Marina 119:143 (June 17, 1941), p. 
15; “Once peleas entre amateurs ofrecen hoy en la Cristal,” Diario de la Marina 119:144 (June 18, 1941), p. 14. 
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Golden Gloves had been the brainchild of New York Daily News sports editor Paul Gallico, 
who sought to combine his passion for amateur boxing with a way to advertise his paper. 
The name appears to have been a play on the Silver Skates Derby, a speed skating contest 
that the Daily News had sponsored annually since 1922. The tournament included a series of 
eliminations across New York City, culminating in the championship bouts at Madison 
Square Garden in March 1927. Champions earned a “diamond-studded gold replica of a pair 
of boxing gloves” – for which Gallico received a waiver from Amateur Athletic Union 
(AAU) officials for exceeding that amateur organization’s $35 prize limit. Heavily promoted 
by the newspaper, the Gloves became a huge success. Later that year, following the removal 
of a ban on boxing (amateur or professional) in the state of Illinois, the Chicago Tribune 
followed suit with its own amateur boxing competition, which also became known as the 
Golden Gloves. Most commentators, however, argue that Chicago was the original site of 
the tournament, since in 1923 Tribune sportswriter Arch Ward had organized an amateur 
tournament to challenge the fight ban; winners received a golden glove. The tournament did 
not take place again until 1927. These two cities would continue to be – and arguably still are 
– the main sources of top U.S. amateur boxers, but they soon faced competition from other 
cities. The Golden Gloves movement, spurred on by the rise of boxing’s popularity during 
the Great Depression, grew quickly. In 1936, the Daily News sponsored a “Tournament of 
Champions” that brought 8,200 boxers to New York from dozens of U.S. cities and Puerto 
Rico.14 Out of the national network of Golden Gloves emerged some of the best 
prizefighters in the world, among them Joe Louis (1934 Tournament of Champions light 
                                                
     14 Bill Farrell, Cradle of Champions: 80 Years of the New York Daily News Golden Gloves (Champaign, IL: Sports 
Publishing LLC, 2007), pp. 1-4, 14-15 (quote on p. 2). 
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heavyweight champion) and Sugar Ray Robinson (1939 featherweight and 1940 lightweight 
New York Golden Gloves champion). 
In the 1950s, the Cuban Golden Gloves finalists were included in the U.S. network 
as part of the Southern division for eligibility to compete in the U.S. national tournament. 
For Afro-Cuban boxers who traveled to the U.S. for the first time as part of the 
competition, it was often humiliating to endure racial segregation and other forms of 
discrimination. These experiences offer a glimpse into how exposure to U.S. racism would 
affect perspectives of the Revolution and is a subject we return to in the next chapter. 
 
World War II and the Growth of the Physical Culture Movement in Cuba 
In his 1940 defense of the need for a regulated system of amateur and semi-pro 
boxing, Gutierrez reflected the contemporary anxiety over crime’s hold on idle youth: “Our 
system has done away to a great extent with juvenile delinquency because a boy knows that if 
he misbehaves, if he is a street loafer, his chances of joining any of the athletic activities are 
few. Under our supervision, boys who heretofore were general nuisances to police officials 
are now being built by proper physical development, good nourishment and fine medical 
attention to healthy men.”15 This call for the improvement of Cuban bodies took on greater 
urgency with the December 1941 U.S. entry into World War II, which prompted Latin 
American and Caribbean nations to follow suit. Even before the onset of war in the western 
hemisphere, however, there had been a growing movement within Cuban elite circles to 
ensure a greater physical stamina among girls and women – the current and future mothers 
of the white race – and the boys and men they cared for. In July 1943, the first issue of 
                                                
     15 Gutierrez, “Cuba’s Boxing Progress,” The Ring 19:1 (February 1940), p. 25. 
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Gimnasia y Deportes, a monthly magazine devoted to the pursuit of a physically rigorous life, 
ran an editorial titled, “Decadencia Física de la Raza Cubana” (Physical Decadence of the 
Cuban Race). In this article, the editors – brothers José (Joe) and Gilberto Becerra, 
promoters of wrestling shows at Havana’s Palacio de los Deportes – appealed to their 
countrymen “to collaborate in the enormous enterprise of giving to Cuba more physically fit 
and capable sons.” A shortage of sturdy workers to exploit the magnificent natural richness 
of Cuba – its beaches, countryside, seas, and climate – would create “una raza débil” (a weak 
race). The Becerras blamed both the government and the citizenry for allowing such a 
situation to come to pass. Rather than solely privileging the intellectual education of their 
sons, they argued, Cuban (elite) parents needed to foster their physical stamina as well; doing 
otherwise would create a generation of men with “sórdidos cerebros” (sordid brains) bred 
solely to exploit the less fortunate.16 The journal continued to harp on the theme of 
impending race decline throughout the war.17 
Through articles on gymnastics, weight lifting, wrestling, boxing, and nutrition, the 
magazine turned typically spectator sports into do-it-yourself fitness manuals. Readers were 
instructed in the art of wrestling for self-defense, the types of foods that benefited their 
dispositions, exercises to improve strength and flexibility, and similar types of self-
improvement advice.18 Women, in particular, were singled out for advancement via a regular 
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column authored by Jennie Liederman entitled, “Perfección Física” (Physical Perfection). 
Liederman’s first such column debated the meaning of physical perfection, noting that 
Cuban women tended to be curvier than their North American counterparts, but that the 
former also possessed “una légitima femenina” (a legitimate femininity) which, along with 
her heart and soul, made up for her “pequeños defectos” (small defects). Nonetheless, 
Professor Liederman devoted her subsequent columns to attempting to reduce those 
defects, particularly those – such as poor posture, weak core muscles, and lack of flexibility – 
caused by years of childbirth and childrearing. All of the women depicting Liederman’s 
exercises were white, usually fair-haired, as were the male models in accompanying articles.19 
While prizefighters were far less central than weightlifters and wrestlers to the 
physical culture movement then thriving in Cuba, their ostentatious displays of strong, sleek 
physiques – unlike fully clothed baseball players, boxers worn only trunks and shoes, 
sometimes socks, during competition – frequently adorned the sports pages of newspapers 
and magazines of that era and served as a visual reminder to nonathletes of the benefits of 
remaining physically fit. As with Kid Chocolate of the early 1930s, the beauty of young, fit, 
Afro-Cuban male bodies became a central motif around which the Cuban press focused its 
commentary on the sport of boxing. Unlike in the United States, however, where amateur or 
recreational boxing in the early-to-mid 1940s was viewed as a critical training component for 
future and current soldiers, some commentators in Cuba advocated boxing-as-self-defense as 
a means to ensure respect and peace for the island. Rather than spending thousands of pesos 
on armaments, argued “Peter,” a writer for the weekly Sábado Deportivo, Cuba could cheaply 
train its young men to box. He lauded the postwar efforts of DGD Director Manolo Castro 
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and Boxing Commissioner Ernesto Azúa to popularize boxing “in secondary schools, in 
neighborhoods, in towns in the interior of the Republic, in the police force, in the army, and 
in the Marines.” Making good boxers thus became a means of making good citizens. By 
recognizing and rewarding the best amateurs in Cuba, the Golden Gloves were an integral 
part of this strategy to forge a stronger motherland.20 
Despite such rhetoric, however, both during and after wartime, Cuban boxing 
continued to maintain a strong class division between, on the one hand, the impoverished 
and lower middle classes, who entered the amateur, semi-pro, and professional ranks, and, 
on the other, those privileged few who engaged in it recreationally within athletic clubs and 
to a lesser extent in amateur competition. The social clubs did embrace visiting Spanish 
boxers, however, even hosting exhibitions at times. In 1947, the popular referee Johnny 
Cruz, by now an instructor at the National Boxing Academy and a member of the Havana 
Yacht Club, officiated a rare exhibition at the club between visiting pugilists Raúl Luengo 
and José García Alvarez, Spanish welterweight champion. In addition to Cruz, former 
boxers Hilario Martínez and Higinio Ruiz – the latter a well-respected trainer – were in 
attendance.21 
 
The “Dictator of Sports”: Jaime Mariné and the Creation of the DGD 
 Since its inception in 1938 to 1948, the directorship of the Dirección Nacional 
General de Deportes had been the purview of military men, each of them inextricably tied to 
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the events of September 1933, and each of them engaged in extra-legal maneuvers whether 
on behalf of or against the state. Once in office, each also used the sports department as a 
means to enrich himself and his cronies, often in crude and obvious ways. Thousands of 
pesos regularly disappeared from DGD accounts with no explanation; huge paydays for star 
athletes coexisted with huge debts; large sums were paid to foreign promoters, particularly 
from the U.S., to hold public events that did little or nothing to develop Cuba’s athletes. 
Most of all, the DGD often appeared to be inseparable from the man who was then running 
it; praise and criticism of the organization was focused upon the director, despite the 
enormous staffs that served him in the Palacio de los Deportes, because it was viewed as his 
personal fiefdom. No one more embodied the personalization of this organization than its 
first and most influential leader; as one commentator noted years after his departure from 
the office, “La Dirección de Deportes era Jaime Mariné” (The Sports Headquarters was 
Jaime Mariné).22 
 Colonel Jaime Mariné had been a close associate of Fulgencio Batista since they had 
taken part together in the September 1933 Sergeants’ Revolt. As Batista’s chief of staff in the 
1930s, he became legendary as “the bottleneck through which all individuals desiring to see 
Colonel Batista must pass.”23 Born in Mungia, Spain, in 1904, he came to Cuba as a child but 
left no doubts as to where his national sentiments lay. In 1946, while living in self-imposed 
exile in Fort Lauderdale, Mariné responded to a reporter’s query as to whether he kept up on 
matters in his adopted homeland: “How do you think Cuban matters are unimportant to me 
when the only thing I lack in terms of feeling as Cuban as anyone else is having been born 
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     23 Frank Argote-Freyre, Batista: From Revolutionary to Strongman (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University 
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there?”24 It was rumored that Mariné, who had become fabulously wealthy through his 
association with Batista – acquiring the famed San Souci casino and nightclub as well as two 
movie theaters – was used “to perform strong-arm tasks that were not of a strictly military 
nature.” These included maintaining dossiers “on the personal lives of prominent politicians 
and journalists, the embarrassing particulars of which could be used against them if they 
proved uncooperative.” If such tactics failed, Mariné and other Batista operatives, including 
Captain Belisario Hernández, might oversee other forms of coercion by their military 
underlings, such as forcing victims to castor oil. Although it may seem to be a fairly 
innocuous form of torture by post-9/11 standards, it was often done – particularly to 
journalists, the usual target – following other forms of physical abuse, such as beatings. 
Moreover, the real damage occurred once the victims were freed. For several days afterward, 
they would suffer from cramps, diarrhea, exhaustion, dehydration, and other ill effects. 
Despite or perhaps because of the regularity with which these tortures occurred, journalists 
from rival as well as sympathetic publications continued to publish detailed accounts of the 
abuse of their colleagues.25 
One of the most notorious incidents of this palmacristi treatment – so-called because 
it was the slang term for castor oil – occurred in Havana on December 12, 1934. Jess Losada 
and five other journalists of the ABC newspaper Acción were kidnapped at gunpoint, driven 
to the Malecón, and forced to drink castor oil before being released. ABC was a middle-class 
secret society formed in 1931 that had initially opposed Machado and then, after September 
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1933, opted to oppose Batista, a former ABC member who had offered its leaders a role in 
the new post-Machado government. Historian Robert Whitney characterizes ABC as “the 
first mass movement in twentieth-century Cuba” because it harnessed popular anti-Machado 
sentiment with a tightly woven organization (the name ABC referred to the group’s cells, 
from A for the top cell on down the alphabet). ABC eschewed the notion of class struggle 
but instead sought to build a mass movement run by elites that used public protest and more 
direct forms of insurrection, such as bombings and targeted assassinations of machadato 
higher-ups and rank-and-files, most notably the Senate president and chief of secret police.26 
Losada, Acción’s sports editor, reflected the young, elite ethos of ABC. Having 
dabbled as a middleweight prizefighter in the early 1920s, his ring career ended in Havana in 
April 1922 with a two-round knockout by Nero Chink, a formidable Puerto Rican 
middleweight of the day.27 Afterward, Losada had become well known in the capital and in 
fistic circles abroad as a sports journalist, editor, and commentator, as well as boxing 
manager and occasional referee. He founded the short-lived sports and culture magazine 
Nocaut (Knockout), in the early 1930s, which helped to popularize prizefighting in the 
capital. Nocaut was loosely based upon The Ring, whose editor, Nat Fleischer, frequently 
lauded Losada’s efforts to drum up the island’s interest in pugilism and collaborated with 
him on staging the finals of the Cuban Golden Gloves in 1941 (Fleischer acted as referee). 
Losada also tried his hand at managing fighters, among them Venezuelan featherweight 
Simon Chávez and Spanish heavyweight Claudio “Pancho” Villar, who had fled his native 
country after being imprisoned by Franco’s forces for fighting on behalf of the loyalists; he 
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spent much of the early 1940s in Havana rings. Losada quickly became as familiar to in-the-
know Cuban boxing fans as the main event prizefighters themselves; when Joe Louis took 
part in an exhibition bout in Havana in 1947, it was Losada who served as third man. By late 
1941, with the former Acción editor’s past political transgressions apparently forgiven, Mariné 
named Losada to be chief of publicity to the DGD.28 He later became Commissioner of 
Boxing in 1940 under Mariné’s successor, Luis Orlando Rodríguez, and Assessor of Boxing 
during the nascent regime of Fidel Castro. 
The Acción incident did not occur in a political vacuum, of course, but was the 
culmination of increasing discord between Batista and his former associates. Six months 
prior to the palmacristi incident in December 1934, Batista’s men violently quashed the ABC’s 
50,000-strong public protest in Havana. Enraged by the deaths of over a dozen people and 
the wounding of dozens more, the ABC’s leader, Martínez Saénz – in exile abroad – urgently 
condemned Batista’s rule and sought U.S. intervention against it. In the intervening months, 
the ABC’s ramped-up anti-Batista rhetoric made it vulnerable to further attacks by the state. 
Mendieta himself seemed powerless, and indifferent, to protecting the newspaper’s staff – in 
part, notes Batista’s biographer, Frank Argote-Freyre, because the government had taken to 
bribing journalists to stem or curtail their open criticism. That December, in addition to 
conducting the palmacristi attacks, the government shut down the paper for several days. The 
U.S. State Department tepidly challenged Batista on his regime’s need to strong-arm its 
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critics using such tactics, but opted for military stability over democratic rule in Cuba in 
order to ensure U.S. long-term interests in the region.29 
Despite Mariné’s unsavory reputation (in addition to serving as one of Batista’s 
enforcers, his appetites for women and wealth were perceived to be extraordinary even given 
the standards of the day30), Batista rewarded his loyalty by naming him, first, president of the 
Boxing Commission in March 1937, and later the first director of sports in Cuba with the 
formation by government decree of the DGD in July 1938.31 In these positions, Mariné 
oversaw a tremendous growth of prizefighting and amateur boxing across the island. The 
colonel was popular in the U.S. sporting press, with his boosters including Nat Fleischer, 
editor-in-chief of The Ring, and its Havana-based correspondent, Milt Baron – for building a 
well-organized, three-tier, amateur, semi-pro, and professional boxing system.32 But his 
tenure – along with Batista’s – was marked by tremendous corruption. Former associate 
Pincho Gutiérrez, who owed his tenure as Assessor General of Boxing to Mariné, noted that 
the colonel was a man who “had chosen sport as a curtain of smoke behind which he could 
conceal all of the shameless acts he committed.” In a sly play on words, Gutiérrez referred to 
Mariné not as “Director de Deportes” but as “Dictador de Deportes” (Dictator of Sports).33 
Pincho himself had been subject to Mariné’s whims; in late 1940, he was removed from his 
position, replaced in that role by promoter and sporting goods store owner Luis F. Parga, 
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and moved to “another important post” at the lottery office, also under the DGD’s 
jurisdiction, where The Ring reported he was “meeting with marvelous success.”34 
The “dictator” analogy had bite not only because Mariné used his position in the 
sports department to augment his influence and wealth but also because he refused to grant 
licenses to would-be promoters, instead opting to give the Boxing Commission the ability to 
make matches and offer boxing cards. Whether this served to develop Cuban boxing, as 
Willy del Pino asserts, or stunted its growth, as many contemporary critics alleged, is a matter 
of debate. During the Auténtico regime of President Grau, many sportswriters recollected 
fondly the Mariné years. In 1947, a writer for Bohemia declared that Mariné had been “casi 
perfecto” as DGD director and did not merit all of the criticism that had been leveled 
against him.35 The fact that many elites tacitly accepted, or even approved of, strong-arm 
policies in the realm of sport indicates a high level of tolerance among everyday Cubans of 
undemocratic practices in the neocolonial state, a point that has been made by many 
previous scholars in analyzing why it took so long for sustained rebellion to occur in the 
republic era (and by political scientists questioning why the Revolution has had so little of it 
in its first fifty years). 
Mariné became the top Boxing Commissioner in 1937 after a prolonged campaign by 
the Cuban press – particularly the sportswriter Pepe Conte – to replace Dr. César Fuentes 
and Juan Campión, president and treasurer, respectively, named to the commission in June 
1936. (The remaining member was Mike Castro, secretary.) By September of that year, the 
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campaign had succeeded in forcing the resignations of Fuentes and Campión, who were 
replaced with José Manuel Quintana and Tomás Gutiérrez, respectively. The following 
March, as discontent in boxing circles widened, the commission was reorganized again, this 
time with Mariné as president, Mike Castro staying on as secretary, and Campión returning 
as treasurer. Dr. César Sánchez was named the commission’s representative to the Secretaría 
de Gobernación. The new commission – working with Jess Losada and Pedrito Martínez 
Bauzá – soon undertook the establishment of Cuba’s first amateur national championships.36 
Up to that point, amateurs had participated in bouts through one of several athletic 
organizations – most prominent among them, the UAAC – that were organized along rigid 
race and class lines. Winners of elimination events were selected to participate on the Cuban 
squad at the III Central American and Caribbean Games held in 1935 in San Salvador, El 
Salvador. At these Games, which were the first to include boxing, Cuba won two gold 
medals (for unopposed entrants in the heavyweight and light heavyweight divisions), three 
silvers, and three bronzes.37 
In July 1937, two UAAC boxers – William Othón and Carlos Herrera, Cuban 
lightweight and bantamweight champions, respectively – traveled to Dallas, Texas, to take 
part in an amateur ring tournament that was being conducted as part of the Pan-American 
Exhibition that August. The Cubans were part of a Latin American contingent that included 
some of the best pugilists from Chile, Uruguay, Argentina, Peru, and Brazil facing off against 
one another and the best U.S. amateurs (as well as a “few chosen Texans”) from August 12-
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14. The visitors were slated to face the Americans in the first round of the tourney to ensure 
that both foreign and domestic fighters would obtain some international ring experience. 
Othón, who worked as a salesman in a brewery, and Herrera, a customs inspector and “Don 
Juan of amateur fight arenas,” who boasted a record of 18-2, arrived several weeks before 
the tournament. They were initially housed and trained at Southern Methodist University but 
later moved their workouts to the Dallas Athletic Club. Spectators were impressed by their 
speed and “knockout punches,” and Herrera in particular was predicted to do well. Including 
the Cubans, thirty-eight boxers from five nations eventually competed in nine weight classes 
at the tournament, which was held at the Pan-American Amphitheater.38 
 Herrera and Othón were some of the more privileged Cuban amateur boxers, as 
evidenced by their UAAC status. They were thus able to achieve opportunities to compete as 
respected athletes in different national spaces, opportunities that were denied to nearly all 
other amateurs and most professionals. While their trip to Dallas added prestige to Cuba’s 
amateur boxing program, more needed to be done to increase the amateur talent pool and 
level the playing field for the most promising youngsters. In 1937, the same year the 
government sent these two young men to Texas, it also established a National Boxing 
Academy. It soon boasted a staff featuring some of the best boxers of Cuba’s recent past. 
Most notable, of course, was Kid Chocolate, the widely adored Cuban Bon Bon, former 
two-time world champion and lead instructor. Also on staff were Aramis Del Pino, two-time 
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Cuban amateur champion and professional lightweight of the 1920s; popular former 
lightweight (and twice opponent of Kid Chocolate) Johnny Cruz, who had become one of 
the most popular referees in Havana; and former lightweight and welterweight champion 
Lalo (Abelardo) Domingúez served as instructors at the DGD’s National Boxing Academy 
in Havana and accompanied the amateur titlists to international bouts.39 By late 1945, Boxing 
Commissioner Pincho Gutiérrez had acquired a space in Cerro that would come to be 
known as Kid Chocolate’s Gym. This became the new site of the National Boxing 
Academy.40 
By early 1947, the academy was so well respected abroad that The Ring’s Nat 
Fleischer was exhorting the U.S. to follow Cuba’s example. His description is worth quoting 
at length for the insight it offers into the daily regimen of the two hundred or so young 
boxers who were able to make the cut: 
 
 A day at the Kid Chocolate gym, a Government-sponsored project, 
makes one from the States feel we have much to learn in our supervision of 
American boxers. At this gym there are paid instructors whose duty it is, 
from noon to 6:00 p.m. daily, to teach the sport to those who have decided 
on a professional boxing career. Chocolate himself is the leading instructor. 
 The gym consists of sleeping quarters, with Navy type cots, double 
deckers, to care for 36 boys. These quarters are given over to lads from 
distant cities who come to Havana and are unable to pay for their board. 
Adjoining the sleeping quarters is a restaurant, where the boys are furnished 
free meals three times daily. They get anything they want, present their 
identification tickets, and the meals are charged to the Department of 
Physical Education. 
 After breakfast, roadwork is followed by a physical examination. The 
unfit are weeded out and sent back home at Government expense. The 
others are drilled until ready to perform as semi-pros. Before he can don the 
gloves, each boy must submit to a clinical examination before a board of 
specialists consisting of a general practitioner, and eye, ear, nose, throat, and 
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heart experts. Then he receives a blood test, skin examination and a 
malnutrition and fluoroscope examination, all free. After this, if passed by 
the board, he receives the green light, and his future in the fight game rests 
on his own shoulders. 
 It is the most complete examination on record among world boxing 
commissions, and speaks highly of the care taken to avoid fatalities. 
  
Nothing of the sort existed in any of the U.S. states, Fleischer hardly needed to tell his 
readers. If a small island that had only been serious about boxing for a few decades could 
achieve so much, what might the U.S. do if it put its mind to it? With World War II only 
recently concluded, many American men of Fleischer’s generation continued to believe that 
boxing training was an essential component in a young man’s physical education, one that 
even had the potential to prevent future world wars. Although the use of atomic weaponry 
in Japan in 1945 might have reduced the optimistic belief that skill in boxing could help to 
enforce peace, the sport remained popular in universities, recreational facilities like the 
YMCA, and other middle-class spaces well into the 1960s. The U.S. therefore owed it to 
itself to follow Cuba’s lead in making boxing such a critical part of its sports program. 
Fleischer concluded his article with words of congratulations as well as warning: “We salute 
Cuba for its efficiency in sports supervision. America, wake up!”41 
 In addition to the National Boxing Academy, one of the earliest projects for which 
Mariné assumed responsibility was the construction of a new Palacio de los Deportes. Upon 
its founding, the DGD had moved its offices into the existing Palacio de los Deportes, 
which was built at the site of the former “Palacio de las Luces,” or Nuevo Frontón (so-called 
to differentiate it from the Old Frontón, the Frontón El Habana-Madrid at Belascoaín and 
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Sitios). Opened in 1921 primarily as a site for the Basque sport of jai alai, then one of the 
most popular spectator sports in Cuba, the Nuevo Frontón was shut down by a players’ 
strike shortly afterward. The mayor of Havana, opposed to the gambling that went on at 
there, sought to keep it closed until betting could be prevented. Though it was opened again 
in 1924, it once again closed after being was seriously damaged in a 1926 cyclone.42 
Upon its reopening, this site was renamed the Palacio de los Deportes (although 
many journalists and amateur sports historians then and now referred to it as the Nuevo 
Frontón). It was in this building that Kid Chocolate would have the final bout of his 
illustrious career, earning a ten-round draw against Brooklyn featherweight Nicky Jerome on 
December 18, 1938. Another Cuban great, the Spanish-born bantamweight Fillo Echevarría, 
also ended his career in this stadium when, in the last of over a hundred pro bouts, he lost 
by four-round TKO to Pedro Pablo Medina on April 1, 1949. 
When the first Palacio was obtained by the Confederación de Trabajadores de Cuba 
(Confederation of Cuban Workers, CTC) as its new headquarters in 1939, it spurred the 
creation of a new state-owned facility for sports and entertainment shows, where the DGD 
offices would be relocated. Ironically, the CTC leaders soon discovered that the building’s 
structure could not support its planned renovations. While occupying that site, it initiated 
construction on a new headquarters at San Carlos and Peñalver. The completion of this 
project was delayed due to lack of funds until March 1945, when the Grau regime granted 
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the CTC $750,000 to complete the space, which became known as, and remains today, the 
Palacio de los Trabajadores (Workers’ Palace).43 
The 1930s had already witnessed a spurt of privately financed sports construction in 
the capital. The Arena Cerveza Polar, built at the site of the famed Arena Colón at Zulueta 
and Dragones, was inaugurated in January 1930. Three years later, in April 1933, the Arena 
Cerveza Cristal at Infanta and San Martín held its first fight. Arena Cristal would continue to 
serve as a site of amateur and professional boxing until late 1943, as Mariné had arranged to 
stage events there with the backing of La Tropical brewery empresario Don Julio Blanco 
Herrera. Because of frequent cancellations due to rain, a hazard of holding outdoor shows in 
a tropical climate, Mariné contracted Celestino Joaristi to put a new roof on the Arena 
Cristal at a cost of 8,059 pesos.44 
The Palacio de los Deportes y Convenciones (Palace of Sports and Conventions) 
was inaugurated on April 10, 1944, shortly before the June elections that ushered in the Grau 
regime. It was located at the intersection of Paseo and Mar streets in the Vedado 
neighborhood of Havana and had cost 300,000 pesos to build – an enormous sum for the 
period. Mariné was forced to inaugurate the facility before construction was fully complete, 
since Batista’s candidate in the upcoming elections, Dr. Carlos Saladrigas, had publicly 
censured Mariné and other high military officials, leading some to tender their resignations. 
Saladrigas had lost to Ramón Grau San Martín, after whose election many of Batista’s men, 
including Mariné, went into exile abroad. The first boxing event that took place at the new 
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Palacio occurred on October 1 of that year, nine days before Grau took office. Headlining 
that card was Kid Gavilán, whose career was on the ascendancy, versus Juan Villalba. 
Gavilán won by nine-round TKO. Over the ensuing decade, the Palacio witnessed some of 
the greatest fights of the period. Despite the enormous cost of construction, the Palacio only 
existed for a little over a decade; it was eventually demolished to make way for the extension 
of the Malecón into Vedado, which was becoming a popular area for hotels, restaurants, 
shops, and upscale homes.45 Completed in the late 1950s, the expansive Ciudad Deportiva 
(Sports City) complex, farther out of the city on Rancho Boyeros Avenue, would replace the 
Palacio as the last major sports construction project of the pre-revolutionary period.46 
During its brief existence, the cost of upkeeping the Palacio on Paseo and Mar, 
including the need to install air-conditioning and proper ventilation, became a constant 
headache to DGD directors.47 By the late 1940s, while the Palacio remained the center of 
Saturday evening boxing in Havana, the most spectacular boxing shows were held at the new 
Havana Ball Park Stadium, the largest in Cuba, which offered lighting for night games, a 
point of pride for habaneros since night games were already common in the U.S. Its president, 
Miguel Suárez, Jr., obtained a license to promote boxing shows.48 
Following the end of Fulgencio Batista’s presidential term in 1944, Mariné found 
himself politically vulnerable without his longtime ally and protector. The new Cuban 
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president, Ramón Grau San Martín, replaced Mariné as DGD Director with Luis Orlando 
Rodríguez, who had been an opponent of Batista’s regime.49 By early 1946, after spending 
time in Caracas, Venezuela, where he had business connections, Mariné and his wife 
relocated to Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Interviewed there by a Bohemia reporter later that year, 
Mariné denied he was a political exile or that he was secretly plotting a revolt against Grau’s 
regime, as some were alleging in Cuba, since he believed all change needed to happen 
through political channels. He said he planned to return to the island following the 
December 1946 Central American and Caribbean Games in Colombia. Dodging political 
questions, he stated that, although he didn’t have much news upon which to base an 
opinion, the DGD seemed to be doing a good job in his absence.50 Although Mariné was 
publicly holding his tongue about Grau and Orlando Rodríguez, his shadow remained writ 
large over Cuban sports, particularly in boxing and baseball, well into the 1940s. For all his 
faults, as Pincho Gutiérrez noted, Mariné was a man who “built sport upon a base of order, 
seriousness, and respect” and “had the tact to surround himself with capable people, gave 
enormous power to the sporting press and never mixed politics with sport.”51 
The legacy of Mariné in Cuban boxing, and sports more generally, remains a touchy 
subject for sports historians depending on political orientation and country of residence. 
Thus, while chronicler Willy del Pino – a former associate of Pincho Gutierrez and a Miami 
exile – viewed Mariné in a mostly positive light, Jorge Alfonso – a writer for Bohemia and 
author of a book-length work on Cuban boxing – saw Mariné’s rule as one of exploitation 
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and greed. The truth of the matter lies somewhere in the middle. Clearly, Mariné was a 
devoted sportsman who did oversee many innovative reforms in Cuban boxing, particularly 
in the amateur sector. Yet his DGD reign gave him the opportunity to entrench himself 
further in the Batista regime and thus to ensure a continued windfall for himself and his 
cronies. Finally, as Pincho Gutiérrez made clear, Mariné continued to permit palmacristi 
attacks on journalists who found themselves in disagreement with Mariné or the regime. His 
personalization of the office of Director of Sports made it difficult for his successors to 
entrench themselves as strongly in the role. For several years after Mariné was stripped of his 
directorship, the turnover rate among DGD Directors and Commissioners of Boxing would 
occur with growing frequency. 
 
The DGD in the Grau and Prío Eras 
Mariné’s replacement, Luis Orlando Rodríguez, brought a colorful past with him. 
His larger-than-life youthful political activities called to mind those of Fidel Castro two 
decades later. A 1930s revolutionary who had survived being shot six times while a member 
of the Bonche Universitario, he had escaped to Florida but returned to Cuba once Grau, his 
ally, had become president.52 The Bonche Universitario – literally, “university bunch” – was 
an anti-Batista organization that “gradually became corrupted and ended in near-
gangsterism.” Its leader, Luis Orlando Rodríguez, had initially been anti-Machado prior to 
the shooting, which took place during an assassination attempt on Havana mayor Arsenio 
Ortiz. The fortunes of the Bonche began to decline after Batista peacefully ceded power to 
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Grau San Martín. In 1944, the new president, himself a former revolutionary, chose his 
associate Rodríguez to become Director of Sports, a position he held until 1947.53 
Rodríguez wasted no time in abolishing most of Mariné’s policies in regard to 
boxing. When Parga resigned as Boxing Commissioner to return to managing his sporting 
goods store on O’Reilly Street, Rodríguez initially disbanded the existing commission and 
created a new one composed of George Foster, Manolo Serrano, and Dr. Sanguily. Shortly 
afterward, he dismantled it and named Pincho Gutiérrez as sole Boxing Commissioner. His 
new role offered Pincho “poderes ilimitados” (unlimited powers), and he used them to carry 
out some ambitious improvements to Cuban boxing. It was during this period that he helped 
to inaugurate the Kid Chocolate Gym in the Cerro neighborhood of Havana, which, as 
discussed above, not only employed the former world champion as lead instructor but also 
provided a government-run boxing academy and dormitory for promising youth from far-
flung parts of the island.54 
 Pincho’s reforms ended with the resignation of Luis Orlando Rodríguez, who was 
replaced in 1947, ironically, with his old rival, Manolo Castro, leader of the struggle against 
the Bonche during their 1930s university days. Like Rodríguez, Castro had a past that 
combined revolutionary activities with violent criminal acts. His path to the Director of 
Sports position took him through varied roles: pro-Grau, anti-Machado student activist in 
1933; police lieutenant and later, university police deputy; engineering student and instructor; 
and, in 1945, President of the Students Union – assigned to that role by his ally, then-
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mirador en el firmamento de los deportes,” Bohemia 39:31 (August 3, 1947), p. 62. 
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President Grau, as a way to maintain university support or, at least, minimize protest. Castro 
was a member of the Movimiento Socialista Revolucionario (MSR), a radical organization 
founded by the former communist Rolando Masferrer. Castro’s criminal history as “the 
attractive gunman” of the MSR, including links to the murder of another student, were no 
bar to his becoming the DGD head in 1947. As the “MSR’s blue-eyed boy,” he supported 
the failed 1947 invasion of the Dominican Republic to overthrow the dictator, General 
Leonidas Trujillo. As well as MSR associates, the would-be filibusters included members of 
rival factions, including – most famously – a young Fidel Castro, then with the Unión 
Insurreccional Revolucionaria (UIR), enemies of the MSR. Tensions were so high among the 
expeditioners that, even before their boat had departed Cayo Confites, a battle occurred in 
which five people were killed, including UIR leader Emilio Tró.55 
 Although he did not live long enough to make substantial changes to Cuban boxing, 
Castro’s youth and enthusiasm were initially assets in invigorating the sport. Under Castro, 
the DGD named its first ring inspector, José Piñeiro Páez.56 Most of his tenure, however, 
was marked with controversy. With Castro taking charge, Pincho Gutiérrez left his position, 
replaced with Luis Parga – his earlier replacement at the Comisión Nacional de Boxeo y 
Luchas. The team of Castro and Parga lifted a month-long suspension on boxing and – in a 
departure from Mariné’s refusal to permit shows by individual promoters – gave promotion 
licenses to three businessmen: Armando Alejandre, Miguel Suárez, and Miguel García. 
Suárez, as mentioned previously, was president of the Havana Ball Park Stadium. Alejandre 
would become the most well known of the bunch, having started as an amateur boxer before 
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becoming a promoter and manager – most notably to Ciro Moracén, Cuban featherweight 
champion over an astounding nine-plus years, from August 1948 to March 1958. In three 
months, the trio scheduled two fight cards at the Palacio de los Deportes, but many of their 
other shows were not successful.57 Their inability to earn big gates caused columnist Don 
Pito to posit, in his predictions for 1948, that both Suárez and García would quit the 
promotion business.58 In addition to allowing free promoting and abolishing semi-
professionalism, Castro sought to increase boxing in the provinces, as is discussed below. 
Manolo Castro’s violent life itself ended violently. His strong association with MSR 
and his stranglehold on the university – through his friendship with the Education Minister 
and continued tie to Auténtico student leaders – made him a target of UIR. On February 22, 
1948, members of UIR shot him and some of his friends down after they left a movie 
theater. At the time, Carlos Prío Socarrás was president; the adopted son of his immediate 
predecessor – a twenty-year-old student named Gustavo Ortiz Faes – was one of the men 
implicated in the murder. (Grau’s intervention earned his son a pardon.) Also implicated was 
Fidel Castro – Manolo’s former friend (no relation) – who was subsequently arrested at the 
Havana airport and had his passport confiscated. Nothing came of the charges against Fidel. 
To this day, his role in the murder remains murky; historian Hugh Thomas concludes, “It 
seems probable that [Fidel] Castro did not participate in the attempt itself nor did he fire a 
shot in the next street to distract attention, as alleged, but that he was present at the meeting 
of the UIR which agreed to undertake the attempt.”59 
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The following year, MSR members revenged the murder by assassinating Justo 
Fuentes, an Afro-Cuban vice-president of the university’s student union, who had led UIR at 
the time of Castro’s death and remained a member of that organization.60 The Fuentes killing 
created even more outrage in the Cuban public than that of Manolo Castro, but in the end 
very little was done by the Prío regime to prevent further revolutionary violence. The late 
1940s in Cuba were thus marked by a combination of state-sanctioned corruption, greed, 
and inefficiency and gangster violence stemming from the revolutionary groups of 1933. The 
early promise of the Grau era, despite strong hopes for democratic change after Batista first 
left office, had quickly faded, and it would not be restored by Prío and his cohorts. As 
Roberto González Echevarría sums up, “Warring groups of former revolutionaries were in a 
feeding frenzy, vying for power and money. Gangsterism was rampant around the university, 
and political infighting deteriorated into full-scale battles, with many atentados (attacks on a 
single individual by gunmen).”61 
After Castro’s assassination, Juan Fresno and then José Adán Rodríguez each briefly 
served as DGD director in the waning months of the Grau regime. Their performances were 
roundly criticized by the Cuban press, leading, the periodical Avance to urge the incoming 
Prío administration to dissolve the DGD. It was not clear how seriously Prío considered the 
proposal, since he was viewed as being sympathetic to the sports world; he had promised to 
address Cuba’s athletic needs in his election platform, and he himself had once been an 
amateur competitor.62 A November 1948 editorial in Cuba Deportiva acknowledged the 
DGD’s problems but stated that it was essential to have a governmental organization to 
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carry out what professional and amateur organizations could not on behalf of Cuba’s youth 
and ordinary (“popular”) athletes. The editorial delineated the unique role of the DGD in 
Cuban society: 
 
Debe convocar a campeonatos de todas clases, auspiciar [sic] 
competencias de circuitos humildes, impulsar la construcción de 
campos deportivos en todos los pueblos y ciudades de la Isla, 
mantener un buro de divulgación deportiva, sostener un cuerpo de 
coaches de todos los deportes que vaya a los placeres de la ciudad y a 
los terrenos del interior para enseñar y mejorar el status de los atletas 
populares.63 
 
It should convene championships of all types, sponsor competitions 
for modest [sports] circuits, impel the construction of sports facilities 
in all of the towns and cities of the Island, maintain a sports 
information bureau, [and] sustain a body of coaches for all sports that 
come to take root in the city and lands of the interior to train and 
improve the status of popular athletes. 
 
In the wake of the chaotic situation facing the DGD, the chief of the Medical 
Department, Dr. José A. de Cardenas, authored a resolution calling for “a meeting of all 
Cuban sportswriters and personalities” to discuss and debate the organization’s 
restructuring. The doctor argued that state-sponsored recreation remained the best way to 
create citizens disposed to serve the country, and that – given the rampant corruption and 
crime of the period – participation in sports was the best way to engage the youth of Cuba in 
the national project, rather than risk losing them to malaise and inactivity, and by extension, 
delinquency.64 In late November, a meeting between several sportswriters and Manuel Sarría, 
then the personal delegate of the Minister Education, did occur in Havana’s Palacio de los 
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Deportes. Sarría was designated to be the next boxing assessor. Sarría was also a promoter of 
boxing shows, which made him familiar with the prizefighting world, but, as Pincho 
Gutiérrez made clear, was a potential conflict of interest; he called upon the new assessor to 
refrain from further promotions. Pincho and other sportswriters wished to separate the fiscal 
oversight of boxing from its promotion, which should be left to individual entrepreneurs.65 
Another familiar face in the Cuban boxing community, the journalist Manolo de la Regüera, 
was hired to be director of the DGD’s publicity department.66 
Along with the speculation over the closing or restructuring of the Department of 
Sports and the staffing of the Boxing Commission came rumors over who, if anyone, Prío 
might announce to the post. Several names were mentioned, including Armando Ruíz; 
promoters expecting his nomination began offering him “hush-hush” bribes so that he 
might intercede on their behalf with the government and to secure business contracts for 
them.67 Ruíz’s chances to attain the directorship were over once it was revealed that he had 
supported discrimination in the UAAC.68 In December 1948, it was announced that Juan A. 
Sosa Zamora would be the new director. Although “Juanito,” as he was commonly known, 
had few ties to the world of sports, it was hoped that his recent experience in national 
politics – originally from Jatibonico, he had moved to the capital in 1940 and served as 
secretary to then-representative Tony Varona, who later became premier – and his 
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“feverentísimo” (extremely fervent) interest in sports would compensate for lack of 
experience.69 
Certainly, the problems facing Sosa Zamora were severe. The Ministry of Education 
was auditing the department in late 1948 for the haphazard ways in which it chose to spend 
money. For instance, Coach Kendrigan – who had raised such an uproar with his negative 
comments about the state of Havana sports in The Saturday Evening Post a few years earlier – 
had a contractually obligated five percent “bonus,” although for what purpose he received 
that on top of his regular salary was not evident.70 That November, rumors were flying that 
the DGD had offered a $50,000 fee to Sugar Ray Robinson, whom it was trying to woo to 
Havana to face Kid Gavilán the following February. Around the same time, the blind former 
heavyweight boxer, Angel Sánchez, reported to the DGD’s offices at the Palacio de los 
Deportes six different times to obtain his usual monthly five-peso allotment; on his sixth 
visit, he was told he would have to wait until after an upcoming prizefight to receive his pay. 
Most scandalous, perhaps, was the fiasco surrounding a planned “Carnival on Ice” event, for 
which the DGD had borrowed five thousand dollars to pay American promoters.71 
 Undoubtedly, the chaos of this period affected the development of boxing in 
Havana, and to a lesser extent in the interior. There were frequent periods in which little or 
no professional boxing occurred in the capital, and the frequent turnover of DGD directors, 
boxing assessors, commissioners, commission members, publicity directors, and other high-
ranking sporting officials had more to do with political maneuvering and financial 
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irresponsibility than with questions of merit. The growth of free promoting in these years – 
when allowed to flourish – provided additional venues for spectators to view boxing and 
more opportunities for pugilists in the interior to showcase their skills in the capital.  
 
The Growth of Provincial Boxing and the Creation of Local Heroes and Martyrs 
The DGD relied upon its provincial delegates to assist with the effort of developing 
boxing and other sports in the interior. In late 1940s Pinar del Río, an alderman of the 
municipality of Mariel, Sergio “Chino” Chan – so-known because of his obvious Chinese 
descent – was the DGD’s point man. Despite his youth, he had a long history of 
involvement in athletic causes. In 1937, Chan had, presumably as a teen, been involved in 
founding the Juventud Deportivo del Mariel (Sporting Youth of Mariel), an organization 
dedicated to promoting sports among their local peers. Chan later played on the basketball 
teams of the Institute of Havana and the University of Havana and worked as a basketball 
instructor at various institutions in the capital. Returning to Mariel, he began working 
independently to raise Pinar del Río’s sporting profile, particularly through the creation of a 
provincial basketball championship. He was ratified as DGD provincial delegate during the 
tenure of Luis Orlando Rodríguez and again during Manolo Castro’s directorship. He and 
Castro made plans to visit all of Pinar del Río’s fifteen municipalities as the first step in 
building athletic facilities and stadiums in each one. Among their top priorities were 
Guanajay, Mariel, Artemisa, Candelaria, Los Palacios, San Cristóbal, and the capital city of 
Pinar del Río. In addition to the construction of pools, stadiums, and baseball fields, Chan 
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and his provincial boosters planned to initiate a “Señorita Deportes de Pinar del Río” beauty 
pageant to embody the new spirit of athleticism in the province.72 
 In other provinces, too, boxing became increasingly popular in the post-World War 
II era. The cities of Camagüey and Santiago de Cuba, Oriente, had long been regional 
centers of prizefighting, but beginning in the mid-1940s regular bouts were often held in 
Matanzas, Ciego de Ávila, and Manzanillo, among other important municipalities. Along 
with the drive to develop provincial boxing was the rise of local ring “ídolos” (idols) who 
toiled in relative obscurity except for in small columns in the sporting press. Sometimes 
these idols made good, moving to the capital and finding success as club fighters or even 
national contenders or titleholders. One of these was the Camagüeyan “guajiro” Rafael 
Legón, a.k.a. Joe Legón. 
 For most of the 1940s, Legón was arguably the most popular boxer in Cuba. He first 
won the national welterweight title in 1938 and held it for much of the next decade (losing 
and winning it two more times) before abandoning it for the middleweight ranks in 1946. 
Legón spawned a number of imitators, some of whom took his name, and was capable of 
drawing large crowds even when fighting poor quality competition. Because of drinking and 
public brawls, Legón was frequently at odds with the DGD; in April 1944, Jaime Mariné 
signed a resolution stripping Legón of his welterweight title “for not carrying himself 
honorably within his private life.”73 
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Legón’s long and impressive career, by then on the decline, ended abruptly on 
August 26, 1947, when he died ten days after being knifed over a dice game dispute in 
Aguacate, Camagüey.74 His last fight was against Lee Sala, a Pennsylvania middleweight, in 
Tampa four months before his death; the Cuban lost in ten rounds. But Sala was a 
gentleman in victory, sending flowers to Legón as he lay dying and, afterward, offering to 
take part in a benefit for his loved ones.75 
Boxers from the interior had both advantages and disadvantages over those in 
Havana. Because they were able to fight often in their local prizefight rings, the best of them 
could quickly develop names and reputations. Many proudly used ring names that displayed 
their geographical affiliations, such as Bulldog Camagüeyano and the Panther of Camajuaní. 
But upon moving to the capital, as Santa Clara native Johnny Sarduy discovered first-hand in 
the 1950s, it was extremely helpful to have the support of family members, friends, or 
patrons. (In Sarduy’s case, the tremendous hospitality he received there would likely have 
been due at least in part to his status as a white fighter.) Although many interior boxers 
relocated to Havana when their professional careers took off and remained there until 
retirement, a few stayed close to their roots while still active in the ring and in so doing 
might have harmed their chances of being able to compete abroad. Still, the DGD sought to 
pave the way for its boxers by providing a letter of introduction to show to prospective 
promoters and managers abroad. Because of the frequency with which Cuban boxers used 
noms de guerre – a trend that was in decline by the 1940s and almost entirely over by the 
late 1950s – the letters used boxers’ real names. Letters given to fighters Rafael Lastre, 
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Orestes Diago, Cheo Morejón, Joe Calixto, and Geraldo “El Niño” Valdés were addressed, 
respectively, to José de Jesús Elías de las Casas, Orestes Mora, José Graciano Rondón, José 
Torres, and Geraldo Ramos Ponciano – names that were unfamiliar within and without 
Cuban fistic circles.76 
While few secondary accounts of boxing in the interior are available outside of 
unpublished papers written by post-1959 students and historians in Cuban institutions, an 
examination of regional newspapers helps to shed light on this little-covered topic.77 For the 
Guantánamo region, historian Jana Lipman’s excellent history of working-class 
guantanameros provides such a glimpse into the life of one boxer who became known not 
for his ring exploits, but for the manner of his death. 
The case of Lino Rodríguez Grenot, a.k.a., Kid Chicle – who was murdered by a U.S. 
navy lieutenant in December 1940 after he had attempted to jump on board the ferry taking 
workers to the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay – remains salient in present-day Cuba 
as an example of the shocking cruelty and exploitation forced upon Cuba by the Yankee 
imperialists. At the time of his death, Kid Chicle was an unemployed, twenty-seven-year-old 
Afro-Cuban boxer from Santiago de Cuba who carried out odd jobs in the city of 
Guantánamo. With the pre-World War II surge in construction at the naval station, known 
by its acronym GTMO, Chicle hoped to obtain a job with the Frederick Snare Company, a 
private contracting firm that was overseeing the expansion. When he was not chosen to 
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accompany the work crew that was departing from the nearby town of Caimanera to GTMO 
via Guantánamo Bay, Chicle jumped onto the boat. In response, the navy lieutenant, 
Kenneth M. West, in charge of the crew assaulted and manhandled the interloper, who 
splashed into the bay, either drowning there or already dead from his wounds. The 
distinction was important, for had he died before entering the water, the cause would have 
been West’s violent beating. That was the conclusion of four local doctors who conducted 
an autopsy. U.S. officials on the ground claimed the death was a drowning due to Chicle’s 
inability to swim. It was critical to know other facts before blame could be assigned: was the 
scene of the crime the boat or the bay? If the former, the U.S. had jurisdiction; if the latter, 
Cuba did. Ultimately, the Cuban Ministry of Justice declared the murder had happened 
aboard ship, thus giving the U.S. sanction to punish the perpetrator. Lt. West was court-
martialed for involuntary manslaughter and found not guilty.78 
Although the regional outcry against the Cuban government and the naval base for 
their refusal to punish Chicle’s killer is beyond the scope of this chapter – and has been ably 
covered in Lipman’s work – there are a few issues that merit attention. One, although Cuba 
had lost dozens of boxers in ring deaths, homicides, and accidents over the past few decades, 
the death of Chicle resonated with locals not for his ring accomplishments but for what he 
represented. While other base workers died in questionable incidents prior to and after 
December 1940, only Chicle’s death fueled an extended protest by ordinary citizens. Lipman 
attributes this to the fact that Chicle “died trying to get a job” rather than while “on the job,” 
and that his death was viewed by dozens of witnesses in a public setting – thus making it 
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harder for the U.S. military to cover up the crime. While there is no doubt much truth to 
that, I would also argue that Chicle’s death impacted the Guantánamo region because he was 
a symbol of a young man who, by his efforts in the ring – however unheralded they might 
have been – was trying to improve his life beyond the drudgery of day labor. It is significant 
that this became known as “the case of Kid Chicle” in the Cuban press and in the memories 
of those who remembered the event; the ring name of this obscure fighter thus became his 
identity even in a context when he was simply another would-be day laborer, another black 
face in a sea of black faces. Indeed, by 1964, the case of the largely forgotten Chicle was 
renovated for revolutionary use as an early example of U.S. exploitation at the naval base. 
Lipman asserts that, in his martyrdom, “Kid Chicle became the archetypal Cuban worker 
struck down by U.S. imperialism.”79 I would argue, on the contrary, that Chicle’s post-
revolutionary identity was based upon his status not so much as worker but as boxer; by the 
mid-1960s, as discussed in the Conclusion, the Cuban state had already begun to single out 
former pugilists of varied athletic ability for their usefulness to the national project of 
creating athlete-citizens. 
Whether Chicle was actually a professional or semi-professional boxer also remains 
murky, since his ring exploits did not merit attention in either the Havana or U.S. press, and 
no record of his fights exists on the thoroughly documented (if not always accurate) web site 
“boxrec.com,” which is maintained by popular sports historians and aficionados. A close 
perusal of the Santiago de Cuba and Guantánamo newspapers would likely be required for 
the particulars of Chicle’s ring feats to be uncovered. While that is beyond the scope of this 
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project, a full reclaiming of Chicle’s story awaits the connection of his sporting life with the 
consequences of his death. 
 
 With the development of the Golden Gloves, the institution of semi-professional 
championships, the rise of the physical culture movement, the increasing movement of 
Cuban boxers abroad, and the political dislocations caused by world war and civil unrest at 
home, the late 1930s and 1940s were something of a transitional period in Cuban boxing 
history, one that is inextricably linked to the machinations of the state. Under Batista’s aegis, 
Jaime Mariné used the DGD both to further reforms in boxing and to enrich himself and his 
cronies. Although the “reformist generation of 1933 had triumphed in Cuba’s 1944 
presidential elections,” in Rosalie Schwartz’s words, the promise of the Grau administration 
was quickly dissipated through graft and corruption.80 The gap that was growing between 
rich and poor, and white and black, in the 1940s laid the groundwork for the accelerated 
exploitation of Cuba’s resources for the pleasure of the wealthy and foreign, especially 
American tourists, that would occur in the following decade and help to spur the onset of 
revolution. It was this decade, the 1950s, which many U.S. boxing commentators consider to 
be the “golden age of Cuban boxing,” witnessing as it did the rise of Kid Gavilán and other 
telegenic Cuban prizefighters. We evaluate how golden it really was in our next two chapters. 
                                                
     80 Schwartz, Pleasure Island, p. 110. 
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Chapter 5: The Golden Age of Boxing? 
Cuba’s Boxers at Home and Abroad in the 1950s 
 
Boxing and the Nation: An Incomplete Integration 
 The year 1950 began inauspiciously for the boxing community in Cuba. It began 
with the death of the “original” Chocolate, Domingo Sardiñas, whose moniker of 
“Knockout Chocolate” had inspired his much famous younger brother, Eligio, to adopt the 
nom de ring of Kid Chocolate. The elder Chocolate had died at age 53 after a period in the 
hospital.1 As January wore on, the lack of boxing events throughout the country, but 
especially in the capital, caused a serious rift between the prizefighting industry and the 
Director of the Dirección General de Deportes (DGD), Juan N. Sosa Zamora, and the sole 
Assessor of the Comisión Nacional de Boxeo y Luchas, Pedro Mendieta. As a result, 
wrestling replaced boxing as the primary athletic spectacle in Havana, and the slow trickle of 
Cuban prizefighters abroad became a stream, as even relative novices sought to find work 
not only in the United States but also in smaller Caribbean islands such as Trinidad and 
Aruba. As the Prío Socarrás government sought to heal this rift by assigning additional 
Assessors to the boxing commission, the news that one of Cuba’s top prizefighters had 
murdered his manager rocked the sporting fraternity and the entire capital. By May 1950, 
with weekly boxing programs returning to the capital and the provinces, the sport appeared 
to be on the mend. 
As the decade wore on, it became increasingly clear that, when it came to boxing, the 
focus of the national government – under the aegis of Prío Socarrás until 1952, and from 
                                                
     1 “Falleció un atleta,” Cuba Deportiva 10:2 (January 9, 1950), p. 8. 
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then until the end of 1958 under Fulgencio Batista – remained on creating a body of 
prizefighters for domestic and foreign consumption, rather than pursuing a nationalistic 
agenda through amateur sport. While the achievements of world-ranked Cuban prizefighters 
(and the occasional champion, particularly Kid Gavilán) brought pride to the nation, they 
were carried out largely out of view of most fans, most often in the United States but 
increasingly in other locales as well. The state mostly ignored opportunities to increase 
national prestige through international amateur events and did not even send boxers to the 
Olympic Games. Indeed, prizefighting in this decade became further entrenched with the 
burgeoning tourist industry, which repackaged the splendors of Cuba, and particularly 
Havana, for American pleasure seekers. As a 1958 official English-language tourist guide for 
U.S. residents described it, Cuba in the 1950s was the “Playland of the Americas,” whose 
natural charms of geography and climate, most notably its beaches, combined with the 
comfort of its luxury hotels, the delights of its restaurants, and the sensuous excitement of 
its nighttime offerings. For these reasons, I contend that Cuban boxing in the 1950s 
remained incompletely integrated into the nation, even as the sport was arguably at its most 
popular. By emphasizing its appeal to foreigners and exporting much of its native talent, and 
belatedly by attempting to create a thriving market for international sports tourism at home, 
the state accelerated the commodification of boxing for short-term financial gain. 
While cabarets and other music venues were undoubtedly the focus of many tourists 
to Havana, prizefighting – along with professional baseball and the still popular jai alai – was 
the athletic engine of the city’s weekend entertainment, spurred on by the growth of 
gambling. Locals and foreigners alike gathered each Saturday night at the Palacio de los 
Deportes (Sports Palace) to see the best Latin American and Caribbean fighters matched 
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with U.S. and European competition. Yet top-notch boxing could also be found outside the 
capital, a fact not evident from the 1958 tour guide. In spotlighting certain Cuban pugilists – 
“the small, lighting-fast boys like world champions Kid Chocolate and Kid Gavilan” as well 
as the occasional “top-flight heavyweight such as Niño Valdes” – the tourist commission 
played into preconceived notions of a “Cuban” style of fighting, one that featured non-stop 
action and a higher level of speed, skill, and offensive and defensive wizardry, particularly in 
the lower weight categories, than might be evinced in U.S. rings. The guide advertised both 
the 6,000-seat Palacio de los Deportes on the Malecón in Vedado and the newly built, 
20,000-seat, Coliseo Nacional de la Ciudad Deportiva (National Coliseum of Sports City) – 
billed as “one of the world’s finest arenas” – on Rancho Boyeros Road, not far from the 
Havana airport, but did not discuss boxing in the provinces at all.2 Nonetheless, the 1950s 
witnessed the sport’s development throughout the country, not simply in Havana. The result 
was the creation of regional boxing “ídolos” (idols) who attracted their countrymen and 
women to regular bouts in cities such as Camagüey, Cienfuegos, Guanabacoa, Guantánamo, 
Matanzas, Pinar del Río, Santiago de Cuba, and Santa Clara, as well as many smaller 
localities. At the same time, the Golden Gloves network – by allowing opportunities for the 
best young boxers to compete against their peers in other provinces and in the capital – 
helped to fuel the exodus of top boxers to the capital, and from there to the outside world. 
While there were opportunities for international amateur competition, such as the Central 
American and Caribbean Games, these were few and far between, and only the cream of the 
young pugilistic crop was given opportunities to showcase their skills abroad. 
                                                
     2 Cuba Magazine: Travel to Cuba, Playland of the Americas (Miami, FL: United Stats Public Relations Office, 
Cuban Tourist Commission, 1958). 
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This chapter examines how the state’s emphasis on developing Cuba’s tourist market 
in the years prior to and during the Batista dictatorship led to the outmigration of its top ring 
talent. As a result, Cuban fighters more than ever before began to saturate the arenas and 
clubs of New York and Florida and to permeate more fully those of Europe and Latin 
America. The widely held notion that the 1950s was thus a “golden age of Cuban boxing” 
must take into account that, if a golden age it was, it was one that certainly did not occur in a 
political vacuum but was intricately tied to domestic political and economic considerations. 
Although the Batista dictatorship did attempt to establish a market for world championship 
boxing bouts in the capital, one that would presumably bring in moneyed tourists and allow 
top Cuban boxers to fight more often on their native ground, it was hampered in its efforts 
by the ongoing political rebellion and its own incompetence and greed. 
This chapter also considers how television, which was already changing the nature of 
prizefighting in the U.S., was beginning to have similar impacts in Cuba. In both countries, 
middle-class and even poor families stretched their budgets to purchase a television set, 
around which families could share cultural experiences while remaining safely at home. As 
critics in the U.S. feared, the promotion of TV boxing not only accelerated the decline of 
small clubs but also fueled the creation of made-for-television stars who were vulnerable to 
mismatches. One Cuban fighter exemplified the trend of TV boxing, at least on the surface: 
Kid Gavilán (Gerardo González). Through the use of his bolo punch – an exaggerated, 
showy uppercut that he claimed to have invented while harvesting sugar cane with a machete 
as a child – this crafty boxer managed to achieve worldwide fame while portraying (or being 
portrayed as) a simple-minded, good natured farmer and family man who was as at home on 
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his family farm as he was in the rings of the big city.3 As did other high-profile Cuban 
prizefighters of this period, such as Niño Valdés, Gavilán’s international success helped to 
market the island as an American vacation spot, one that promised whatever kind of 
amusement tourists wished for. 
 
A Dry Spell for Boxing 
In January 1950, the Association of Managers, Seconds, and Trainers demanded the 
dismissal of DGD director Juan Sosa Zamora, whom it claimed was more concerned with 
bringing in lucrative entertainment events to Havana’s Palacio de los Deportes – such as the 
recently departed Ringling Brothers circus – than with authorizing regular athletic 
competitions there, notably prizefights. Cuba Deportiva, a popular sports weekly, spoke for 
the group when it claimed that, while Sosa Zamora and his collaborators “piensan solo en 
negocios, en recaudaciones” (thought only of business, of gate receipts), his opponents – 
unmotivated by politics or even by personal animosity toward Sosa Zamora – were 
“dedicado a los deportes en varios aspectos” (dedicated to sports in various aspects).4 Yet 
the criticism of Sosa Zamora did extend to politics; it was alleged that he had hired 
communists to assume some of the major responsibilities in the DGD.5 The youth section 
of the Auténticos issued a forceful statement against Sosa Zamora in its publication 
“Realidad.” Although they did not reiterate charges of communist infiltration of the DGD, 
the authors were incensed by the “purely economic” decision by “Sosita” to hand over the 
                                                
     3 For a description of the main punches used in modern boxing, see Introduction, n. 7. Many sources repeat 
the claim that Gavilán invented or “imported” the bolo punch; for one example, see “Kid Gavilan: The Cuban 
Hawk,” in Roberts and Skutt, The Boxing Register, 4th ed., pp. 406-409. 
     4 “La Asociación de Managers y Seconds y [Entrenadores] Demandan la destitución de Sosa Zamora,” Cuba 
Deportiva 10:4 (January 23, 1950), p. 4. 
     5 “La Dirección de Deportes, Sosa Zamora y el P.S.P.,” Cuba Deportiva 10:4 (January 23, 1950), pp. 1, 6. 
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Palacio de Deportes to “[e]l circo norteamericano que ha contribuido a la ruina de todos los 
espectáculos cubanos” (the North American circus that has contributed to the ruin of all 
Cuban public spectacles).6 
 Sosa Zamora was hardly the only Cuban official singled out for invective by the fans, 
participants, and commentators of Havana pugilism. Pedro Mendieta, the sole Assessor of 
the Cuban Boxing Commission, was known to critics as “Kid Promesa” for failing to live up 
to numerous promises to the boxing community. Among his harshest critics was boxing 
manager Juan Oliva, who argued in the pages of Cuba Deportiva that he had achieved his 
position through the influence of his uncle and castigated him for failing to reimburse the 
expenses of hosting a boxing program on October 9, 1949, at the Palacio de los Deportes.7 
 There had not been a major boxing card in Havana since December 17, 1949, when 
Kid Gavilán decisioned Baltimore welterweight Bobby Lee in a ten-round “star bout.” When 
impresario Luis Godoy, a local businessman, had sought to promote a card at Havana’s 
Cancha del Deportivo Asturias (Asturian Sports Field), he approached the DGD to borrow 
its boxing ring. As the ring was not in use – the Ringling Brothers circus was occupying the 
Palacio de los Deportes – it appeared to some commentators a simple matter to lend it to 
Godoy, who – should his new career as a promoter take off – could later purchase his own. 
But Mendieta rebuffed his request, stating that the DGD would be offering amateur bouts in 
the near future. No such event seems to have taken place.8 In December 1949, Luis Felipe 
                                                
     6 “La Juventud Auténtica contra Sosa Zamora,” Cuba Deportiva 10:5 (January 30, 1950), p. 5. 
     7 See “¿Qué hará ahora la DGD?” Cuba Deportiva 10:3 (January 16, 1950), p. 5; “La Asociación de Managers 
y Seconds y [Entrenadores] demandan la destitución de Sosa Zamora,” Cuba Deportiva 10:4 (January 23, 1950), 
p. 4; and “Mendieta dice que la Comisión de Boxeo nada tuvo que hacer en el cartel programa,” Cuba Deportiva 
10:5 (January 30, 1950), p. 9. 
     8 “Luis Godoy quiere comenzar el boxeo: La comisión se lo impide,” Cuba Deportiva 10:2 (January 9, 1950), 
p. 7. 
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“Pincho” Gutiérrez, former manager of Kid Chocolate, briefly returned to Havana from 
New York for the Christmas holidays and had attempted to organize a show featuring U.S. 
versus Cuban pugilists, but received no word from the boxing commissioners because, as he 
said, “estaban ocupados con la compra de heno para los caballos del circo” (they were busy 
buying hay for the circus horses). Whether this anecdote was true or not, the implication was 
– as Gutiérrez concluded – that “los comisionados están mas interesados en los espectáculos 
de circo que en los de boxeo” (the commissioners are more interested in circus spectacles 
than in boxing ones).9 
Very little pugilistic activity was happening in the provinces, either, but there were 
some signs of life. Not all of it was pretty. On January 17, Central Delicias in Oriente 
province held “[l]os más sangrientes peleas ofrecidas hasta ahora” (the bloodiest fights 
offered up to now), including one that resulted in a 137-pound fighter named Cosme Pérez 
being knocked unconscious by his 136-pound opponent, Panterita Holguinera (likely Raul 
Pérez). The ring doctor managed to revive Cosme Pérez, who received a standing ovation 
from the crowd. On February 4, Promoter Rogelio Mestre put on a small card at the baseball 
stadium in Cárdenas, Matanzas. He planned to put on additional cards featuring out-of-work 
Havana boxers, in the hopes of developing the sport in his city.10 
As the first three months of 1950 wore on, fans in Havana had to make do with 
tidbits on U.S. boxing news – such as speculation as to whether former heavyweight 
champion Joe Louis would end his retirement from the sport – and on the exploits of 
                                                
     9 “Dijo Pincho Gutiérrez: ‘Los empresarios están ahora buscando heno para los caballos del Ringling 
Bros’,” Cuba Deportiva 10:2 (January 9, 1950), p. 7. 
     10 “Boxeo en Cárdenas,” Cuba Deportiva 10:4 (January 23, 1950), p. 8; “Boxeo en Oriente,” Cuba Deportiva 
10:5 (January 30, 1950), p. 4. 
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homegrown prizefighters abroad. Most of the news was not good. The career of Gavilán, 
then Cuba’s best prospect, was at a standstill; he had dropped four of seven decisions 
between October 1949 and May 1950 – to Lester Felton, Billy Graham, Robert Villemain, 
and George Costner. Though the losses were controversial, a third welterweight title match-
up with Sugar Ray Robinson seemed out of reach. Meanwhile, Luis “Pincho” Gutiérrez, a 
well-known figure in U.S. fistic circles from his days managing Kid Chocolate and Black Bill, 
was pinning new title hopes on the Costa Rican middleweight, Tuzo Portuguéz, and on 
Cuba’s national bantamweight champion, Luis Galvani, whom he brought with him to New 
York in January 1950. By that March, he and Portuguéz had parted ways after the latter 
stopped training and attempted to secure bouts without his manager’s involvement. By 
April, Gutiérrez had sold his contract with the boxer he called “ingrato” (ungrateful) and 
“indisciplinado” (undisciplined) – and who, under his charge, had gone from $400 to 
$10,000 purses – to New York promoter Allie Zack for a total of $3,600. He continued to 
manage Galvani, who was considered a strong talent but also one with something of a 
discipline problem. Shortly after arriving in New York, the bantamweight was ready to leave; 
he was quoted to have said, “I don’t like this country, I have clothes, but I am always cold… 
I want to return to Cuba.” A January 1950 headline in Cuba Deportiva read, “Galvani puede 
triunfar si se entrena con atención” (Galvani can win if he trains hard). Fight commentators 
of a certain age compared Galvani’s skills to those of Black Bill, the flyweight title contender 
and “maravilloso negrito” (marvelous little black boy) of the 1920s and early 30s who had 
“desgraciadamente desaparecido debido a sus propios errores” (disgracefully passed away 
due to his own mistakes) – a reference to the latter’s having contracted syphilis, turned blind, 
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and ultimately committed suicide in New York.11 Black Bill – like Chocolate – had often 
been referred to in the Cuban press as a “negrito,” a patronizing expression used by whites 
to refer to certain blacks from the fatherland. The term did not merely connote youth and 
blackness but also, as Envir M. Casimir notes, one’s status and class; it was used mainly in 
describing “poor and uneducated blacks who were often seen as obstacles to Cuban 
modernity and development.”12 Yet in the context of invoking successful athletes such as 
Black Bill and Chocolate, it can be argued that this term, however demeaning, was also one 
of ownership and affection, reflecting white pride in the accomplishments of Afro-Cubans 
who had brought prestige to the nation by the showcasing of their skills abroad. 
 Still, the ring exploits of these once-celebrated Cuban fighters were ancient history 
by the start of the 1950s. In addition to Galvani, other young prospects seemed uncertain. In 
March, Yova Kid (Cristóbal Márquez), the national light heavyweight champion – having 
already voyaged to the interior of the country as well as Puerto Rico for bouts – embarked 
for Port-of-Spain, Trinidad, to fight Gentleman Daniel. No one accompanied him, though 
he had arranged to work with a manager in Trinidad, and it was further hoped that José 
“Carón” González, a respected Cuban trainer who had been living in Aruba for several 
years, might be willing to join up with him there. Although his chronicler felt that the 23-
year-old “Yova” was “very young for these adventures on his own,” he argued that, “it is 
                                                
     11 The original quote by Galvani was, “No me gusta este país, tengo ropa, pero siempre tengo frio… Quiero 
irme para Cuba.” “‘Pincho’ Gutiérrez embarca con Luis Galvani a los Estados Unidos,” Cuba Deportiva 10:2 
(January 9, 1950), p. 7; “Galvani puede triunfar si se entrena con atención,” Cuba Deportiva 10:4 (January 23, 
1950), p. 4; “‘Pincho’ rompió con Tuzo: ‘Se le había ido el triunfo a la cabeza’,” Cuba Deportiva 10:13 (March 27, 
1950), p. 4; “Confirma Pincho la ruptura con Portuguéz,” Cuba Deportiva 10:14 (April 3, 1950), p. 4; “$3,600 
recibió ‘Pincho’ Gutiérrez por el contrato de Portuguéz, de Zack,” Cuba Deportiva 10:16 (April 17, 1950), p. 3. 
     12 Envir M. Casimir, “From the Battlefield to the Boxing Ring: Kid Chocolate and the Emergence of 
Athletics as a Site for Afro-Cuban Male Heroism, 1928-1940,” paper presented at the American Historical 
Association Annual Meeting, New York, New York, January 3, 2009. 
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necessary to take risks when there are no fights in our country.”13 Orlando Zulueta, the 
former Cuban lightweight champion, had been fighting in the United States since January 
1949, winning nine bouts in a row. Yet between December of that year – when Sandy 
Saddler defeated him for the vacant world junior lightweight title – and March 1950, he lost 
four of five decisions. Cuban heavyweight champion Omelio Agramonte found himself 
deserted by friends and acquaintances in New York after losing by seventh-round technical 
knockout to Jersey Joe Walcott at Madison Square Garden in March 1950. While holding the 
youth advantage, the 25-year-old Cuban lacked Walcott’s heft and experience. Agramonte 
weighed in nearly fifteen pounds lighter than his 36-year-old rival, the future world 
titleholder, who repeatedly knocked him down before the referee stopped the proceedings. 
Though it was not his first loss in New York, Agramonte complained that those who had 
filled the ring canvas during his earlier victories “shone by their absence… at the moment of 
defeat.” Yet his loss was not surprising to an unnamed Cuban observer, who watched 
Agramonte and Walcott perform an exhibition refereed by José “Carón” González in Aruba. 
Walcott, though wearing the heavier sparring gloves, had knocked Agramonte down in the 
fourth round. So as not to “disillusion” Cuban fans hoping for their hero’s success, the 
observer offered the anecdote after the Agramonte-Walcott bout was over.14 
 While boxing was on hiatus in the capital, seasonal professional wrestling shows 
were a popular alternative for fans. What made them so appealing, beyond the discipline’s 
                                                
     13 “Embarcó Yova Kid Para Port of Spain,” Cuba Deportiva 10:12 (March 20, 1950), p. 9. The original 
phrases, respectively, were “muy nuevo para estas aventuras sólo” and “es necesario arriesgarse, cuando en 
nuestra patria no hay pelea.” 
     14 The original quote was, “brillaron por su ausencia… en la hora de la derrota.” See “Agramonte quejoso 
de falsos amigos,” Cuba Deportiva 10:10 (March 6, 1950), pp. 1, 6 (quote on p. 6); “Joe Walcott impuso su clase 
frente a Onelio [sic],” Cuba Deportiva 10:10 (March 6, 1950), p. 9; “Actividades de boxeadores cubanos en Norte 
América,” Cuba Deportiva 10:10 (March 6, 1950), pp. 9, 6. 
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usual theatrics, was the presence of foreign female wrestlers, such as 21-year-old American 
girl Dot Dotson. An all-around athlete since childhood and former basketball player with the 
Florida State League, Dotson had gravitated to wrestling as her “favorite” sport. The story 
went that Florida promoter Phil Duffy recruited Dotson, then an Orlando taxi driver, to join 
his professional wrestling stable when, as a belligerent rider in her cab, he goaded her into a 
physical confrontation to test her strength. Since then, she had supposedly earned about 
$100,000 in 250 matches. In her first appearance in Havana, it was announced that Dobson 
would be matched against Beverly Lehmer on April 13.15 Fan anticipation was high: 
 
 La lucha entre estas dos chiquillas ha despertado un interés 
extraordinario ya que será la primera vez que se ofrecía en el Palacio de los 
Deportes, un match de luchadores profesional entre mujeres. Las reglas que 
rigen la lucha feminina son idénticas a la lucha masculine y ello debe 
contribuir a que el espectáculo sea más emotivo aún.16 
 
 The match between these two little girls has already awakened an 
extraordinary interest as this will be first time that the Sports Palace offers a 
professional wrestling match between women. The rules that adhere to 
women’s wrestling are identical to men’s wrestling, and that should help to 
make this spectacle even more exciting. 
 
The match was considered to be the first “genuine” women’s wrestling match in Cuba, to 
distinguish it from the forms of female ring competition that had been occurring on the 
island for some time. Yet by grappling forcefully in between screams and groans – which 
were affecting enough that several male audience members called out for them to stop 
hurting one another – and then walking away seemingly unscathed by the blows was enough 
to persuade many spectators that this sport was a scam. Commentator Llillo Jiménez of 
                                                
     15 “Lucha libre,” Cuba Deportiva 10:13 (March 27, 1950), p. 7;  “Dot Dotson a gran encuentro con la Burke,” 
Cuba Deportiva 10:27 (July 10, 1950), p. 5. 
     16 “Será un éxito la temporada de lucha libre,” Cuba Deportiva 10:15 (April 10, 1950), p. 7. 
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Información pointed out that a “standard” woman who attempted such maneuvers, fixed or 
not, would have ended up much differently. Dotson won the bout, and with it, the chance to 
return to Havana to wrestle against Mildred Burke.17 
Burke was the undefeated, female world wrestling champion, a title she had held for 
13 years. Prior to the April meeting of Dotson and Lehmer, Burke cabled promoters 
Gilberto Becerra (brother of the wrestler Joe Becerra) and Oscar Martínez Conill as part of 
ongoing negotiations to bring her to Havana to wrestle the winner. Having earlier demanded 
a minimum of $2,500, beyond the reach of the promoters, she now signaled an agreement to 
accept no less than $1,500.18 Although it is not clear what the final terms were, Conill and 
Becerra personally flew to the United States to persuade Burke and her manager, Billy Wolfe, 
to sign a contract. When Burke later tried to cancel her Havana appearance, citing other 
offers, the promoters used their contacts with U.S. wrestling commissioners to pressure her 
to live up to the contract terms. Ultimately, they were forced to augment her guarantee to 
ensure that she show up. By July 1950, a photo of Burke – wearing a white flowered bikini, 
white open-toed heels, and a smile – appeared on the cover of Cuba Deportiva with an 
announcement that she would be wrestling Dotson the following week – the first time a 
female world wrestling championship match would be held in Cuba.19 In the end, Burke 
retained her title in decisive fashion, but Dotson was rewarded for her showing with another 
                                                
     17 Nick Jerry, “El Gran Espectáculo de Lucha,” Cuba Deportiva 10:15 (April 10, 1950), p. 10; “Lo que opinan 
los colegas: Llillo Jiménez en Información,” Cuba Deportiva 10:16 (April 17, 1950), p. 2. 
     18 “La Campeona Burke actuará en Cuba,” Cuba Deportiva 10:14 (April 3, 1950), p. 4. 
     19 “Mildred Burke, a quien veremos contra la Dobson [sic] el miércoles,” Cuba Deportiva 10:27 (July 10, 
1950), p. 1; “Dot Dotson a gran encuentro con la Burke,” Cuba Deportiva 10:27 (July 10, 1950), p. 5; “Lucha 
Libre,” Cuba Deportiva 10:27 (July 10, 1950), p. 5. The article “Viene T. Galento,” Cuba Deportiva 10:17 (April 24, 
1950), pp. 1, 6 seemed to indicate that Burke would not be competing in Havana that season. 
 224 
turn in front of Havana audiences in October 1950, when she was matched with June 
Byers.20 
In addition to women’s wrestling, what made for novel viewing was the appearance 
in early May 1950 of former boxer “Two Ton” Tony Galento. The New Jersey native was in 
Havana to compete in what was a common fad of the day – the boxer vs. wrestler match-up. 
For decades, boxers had been meeting with martial artists and wrestlers in the ring as a 
means to support their income during their prizefighting career or, more commonly, after it 
was over. Sam McVea, Jack Johnson, Bob Fitzsimmons, Jack Dempsey, Primero Carnera, 
and Joe Louis had all accepted these types of match-ups. They often proved more lucrative 
than purses from prizefights; Carnera, for instance, made far more money as a wrestler than 
he had as a boxer, despite having won the world heavyweight title, and was rumored be 
coming to Havana in 1950 to compete in the Palacio de los Deportes wrestling shows. (Jack 
Dempsey and Max Baer, like Carnera former heavyweight champions seeking lucrative pay 
in the wrestling arena, were supposed to be making the trip to Havana that season to referee 
matches.) In addition to the financial appeal of wrestling was the sense that it was “easy 
money.” Generally speaking, it was not necessary for pugilists to train as strenuously for 
non-boxing events, as opponents had little or no defensive skill as boxers and had to rely 
solely upon wrestling or martial art techniques.21 In his 1978 autobiography, Joe Louis 
recalled getting the offer to wrestle professionally in early 1956, shortly after marrying his 
                                                
     20 “Lucha libre femenina el próximo jueves,” Cuba Deportiva 10:37 (October 2, 1950), p. 3; Asunción M., 
Maria del Carmen, “Tomando el pulso: Lucha libre,” Cuba Deportiva 10:39 (October 16, 1950), p. 6. Asunción 
M. suggested that the Burke-Dotson bout was fixed. 
     21 “Viene T. Galento,” Cuba Deportiva 10:17 (April 24, 1950), p. 1, 6; Maurice Golesworthy, “Wrestler v. 
Boxer,” excerpt in Golesworthy, Encylcopaedia of Boxing, 8th ed. (London: Robert Hale, 1988), p. 277. 
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second wife, Rose, when he was beset by tax problems and without a visible means to 
eliminate them: 
 
So when Ray Tabani, a professional wrestling promoter, came along 
with a $100,000 guarantee for me to wrestle, shoot, I didn’t think twice about 
it. Rose was real upset. She said to me that it was like seeing President 
Eisenhower wash dishes. I told her that it damn sure beat stealing. I honestly 
didn’t feel there was anything dishonorable about it, but then when you’re 
broke who can see straight? 
 
For a time, Louis estimated he earned about $20,000 a year through such exhibitions before 
the liquidation of the International Boxing Club (IBC) ended that lucrative endeavor. He 
continued to find work as, among other things, a referee at wrestling matches.22 Though it is 
not discussed in his autobiography, Louis appears to have continued wrestling into the 1960s 
and as late as 1972. More recently, world boxing champions Muhammad Ali, Joe Frazier, 
Leon Spinks, Mike Tyson, Evander Holyfield, and Floyd Mayweather, Jr., have all 
participated in mixed boxing/wrestling/martial arts exhibitions of one form or another.23 
Galento, Louis’s former opponent, was once a squat, powerful heavyweight 
renowned for his devastating left hook. “Two Ton” Tony had reached the pinnacle of his 
sport by dropping Louis to the canvas in their June 1939 championship bout at Yankee 
Stadium. Louis returned the favor, winning by a TKO in the fourth and retaining the title. 
After retiring from prizefighting in the early 1940s, Galento turned to professional wrestling 
to make a living once his fight career was over. As part of his promotional activities, he once 
posed for photographs wrestling with a bear. At the Palacio de los Deportes, the 40-year-old 
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Galento – using a combination of boxing and wrestling techniques – defeated his opponent, 
Gene Bowman, ten minutes into the match.24 
Most shocking of all during this boxing dry spell in the capital was the murder of 
boxing manager-promoter Juan Oliva at the hands of his protégé, Baby Coullimber (born 
Pablo Roca). Having earlier won the Cuban featherweight and lightweight titles, Coullimber 
had taken the vacant Cuban welterweight title upon the retirement of Joe Legón when he 
knocked out Joe Molina in the fifth round of their December 21, 1946, bout. His father, Jack 
Coullimber (also born Pablo Roca), had been a Cuban featherweight boxing champion in the 
1920s – making them the first father and son pair to hold the same Cuban title. Ironically, 
Oliva himself had been a decorated featherweight in the 1920s, and had taken the senior 
Coullimber’s featherweight title from him in October 1922. Although Coullimber won their 
bout, he forfeited the title for coming in over the weight limit.25 
Despite some impressive wins, the younger Coullimber had had a spotty record of 
late and was considered to be an eccentric personality, owing in part, perhaps, to his 
devotion to Santería. Boxing historian Enrique Encinosa characterizes him thusly: 
 
Baby Coullimber was a good fighter who was petrified by his fear of Santeria 
hexes. Once Coullimber’s opponents realized his fears, they capitalized on 
his weakness. The fighter would arrive at a dressing room in a fight arena to 
find someone had left a dead black rooster or red bandanas tied in knots in 
his dressing room - hexes that preyed on his fragile psyche. Baby Coullimber 
lost fights he should have won because of his fear of the hexes, his 
performances lacking in confidence.26 
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Although it is hard to ascertain to what extent Coullimber was motivated by genuine 
religious belief and to what extent he may have suffered from mental illness, what is known 
is that, in April 1950, after a heated exchange of words, he fired two shots at and killed Oliva 
at Havana’s Gato Gimnasio (Cat Gym). One rumor had it that the argument stemmed from 
a debt he owed to his co-manager. But Manolo Ramirez, a columnist for Cuba Deportiva, 
pointed out that Oliva – himself a well-known writer for that publication – had been 
extremely generous with his fighter, even asking Ramirez to lend Coullimber money. He also 
noted that, shortly before the murder, the boxer had signed a contract with U.S. manager 
Irving Price to fight in Boston. Ramirez was more inclined to view the Cat Gym incident as 
the culmination of a long-standing psychological disorder, informing readers that Coullimber 
had been in trouble with the law before. An altercation at Kid Chocolate’s Gym had resulted 
in the intervention of the local police, who attacked him with tear gas and sent him off to the 
Hospital de Dementes.27 Whether his affliction was “locura” (madness) might be debatable, 
but his complicity in the crime was not; Coullimber did not deny shooting Oliva. It was thus 
necessary for the boxing commission strip him of his welterweight title.28 Ultimately, 
Coullimber was convicted of murder and sent to prison.29 
 The Oliva murder and its immediate aftermath were distractions during an otherwise 
slow time for boxing. Ultimately, however, these could not stem the rise of protests that 
were emanating from Havana newspapers over the lack of regular boxing shows. These were 
finally addressed in March 1950 by the Prío regime. 
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Boxing Returns to the Capital 
 By mid-March 1950, the Prío government finally began to respond to the growing 
chorus of criticism from all sectors of the Cuban boxing world. Although it did not accede 
to demands to fire DGD Director Sosa Zamora and assessor Mendieta, it added two new 
assessors to the Boxing and Wrestling Commission: Captain Enrique Borbonet for amateur 
boxing, and Amor Urquía for professional boxing. The Havana boxing community seemed 
to embrace both selections. In January, Borbonet and Captain Rios Morejón had offered the 
use of a military training facility to the boxing team that went to the Central American and 
Caribbean Games, and he was considered a genuine and gentlemanly supporter of the sport. 
As a young military man, it was unclear what particular qualifications he had for the position. 
Just one year earlier, it seems that Borbonet had been a lieutenant involved in plotting a 
golpe de estado (coup d’état) in August 1949 against President Prío Socarrás. At that time, 
when Prío promoted General Ruperto Cabrera to replace General Pérez Dámara as chief of 
staff, he also promoted Borbonet and his military colleagues. Urquía, on the other hand, had 
served as a publicist, manager, promoter, and boxing critic and was considered eminently 
qualified for his new position. Both men began their positions facing a shortage of facilities 
and equipment for Cuba’s boxers, while Urquía also had to contend with a lack of promoters 
at home and the exodus of top boxers abroad, both of which made it difficult to fill regular 
Havana fight cards.30 
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 To meet the immediate demand for boxing events, Urquía issued a call for those 
seeking to obtain a special promoter’s license in the municipality of Havana to submit an 
application to the Asesoría de Boxeo y Luchas by April 4. Prospective promoters would 
need to provide a $3,000 deposit to the Asesoría; agree to abide by soon-to-be-established 
rules concerning pay scales for boxers, managers, officials, and other employees; and commit 
to offering weekly boxing shows.31 Dr. Emilio San Pedro met these requirements and was 
selected to be a promoter in Havana. He was considered to be a “well intentioned” man with 
“unquestioned enthusiasm,” but he would only succeed if he could obtain decent boxers. By 
July of that year, he had become known as Havana’s “promotor único” (sole promoter), 
showcasing some of the island’s most popular boxers – including Chico Varona, Charolito 
Spirituano, Diego Sosa, and Billy Lima – at the coliseum on Paseo and Mar. The shows ran 
weekly on Saturday nights until, in the fall, baseball fever took over the country and San 
Pedro was forced to hold them on Sunday nights. Yet some accused San Pedro of being too 
fiscally conservative to seek out the best talent; it would be financially risky to hold a genuine 
“star bout” with a weak undercard, since it might alienate fans used to viewing several solid 
fighters who could duke it out. The limits of San Pedro’s approach were made more obvious 
when Camagüeyan official Mochuelo Escalada traveled to the United States during the 
summer of 1950 to recruit foreign boxers to appear in his city.32 
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Shortly after Urquía’s appointment to the body, the Asesoría sent out feelers to the 
provinces indicating that it would begin authorizing boxing and wrestling shows. By April, 
several bouts were already scheduled, including wrestling shows in Matanzas, Ciego de Ávila, 
and Santa Clara and professional boxing cards in Puerto Padre, Caibarién, and Punta 
Alegre.33 In Victoria de las Tunas, regular boxing shows were soon taking place in Kid 
Tunero Stadium. One of that city’s best prospects was Eddy Botello, who was 23-2 and a 
huge local attraction.34 Another heralded prospect was Victor Martínez of Caibarién, who 
had was featured frequently in Havana fight cards beginning in May 1950.35 Camagüey – the 
province that had produced some of Cuba’s greatest fighters, including Kid Gavilán – was 
especially active. Havana promoters Oscar Martínez Conill and Gilberto Becerra, who had 
brought wrestling to the Palacio de los Deportes that spring, was working with Camagüey’s 
Club Gallistico (owned by General Genovevo Pérez Dámara) to host an upcoming boxing 
and wrestling show. That month also brought news that Camagüey would inaugurate a new 
boxing stadium. Built by Pérez Dámara’s son, Genovevo Pérez Valdés, the stadium would 
seat 2,600 persons and cost approximately 300,000 pesos to build. While it was being 
constructed, Pérez Dámara – who was chief of staff for Presidents Grau and Prío Socarrás 
before the latter had dropped him in favor of General Ruperto Cabrera36 – continued to 
promote fights using his 62,000-peso valla (cockpit), which had been rigged with a boxing 
ring. Signed to appear were Bombón Oriental, Diego Sosa, Rafael Lastre, and other well-
known pugilists. By October, however, Pérez Dámara and his son had ended the boxing 
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season at the valla early, in order to begin the cockfighting season. Their plans for the new 
stadium were on hold for at least a few more months.37 
By May 6, Saturday evening boxing shows were back at Havana’s Palacio de los 
Deportes. The headline bout was local favorite Chico Varona versus U.S. boxer Bobby 
Mann. Varona won by technical knockout in the ninth round. The undercard featured Puppy 
Garcia and Pablo Tapia (Garcia won by second-round knockout), Orlando (Zurdo) 
Echevarría and Manuel Perdomo (Echevarría by second-round knockout), Humberto 
Monier and Wilfredo Flores (Flores by decision), and Pedro Pablo Triana and Jesús Vila 
(Triana by decision). At the time, Vila was Cuban middleweight champion, but his title was 
not on the line during his eight-round bout with Triana.38 
One of the lamented effects of the dearth of boxing shows in the capital was the 
inability of up-and-coming fighters to challenge for national titles. (Few title challenges were 
held in the provinces, which was another point of contention.) Following the murder of Juan 
Oliva, when it appeared that the boxing commission would soon strip Baby Coullimber of 
his welterweight crown, the columnist of Cuba Deportiva’s “Del Sector Boxístico” felt it was a 
good time to infuse new blood – particularly young men from the provinces – into the sport. 
As the national champions had not put their titles on the line in months (since most bouts 
they had had were non-title affairs), he argued that Urquía, should require them to defend 
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their titles within 45 days – or else have their titles declared vacant and a new elimination 
process held.39 
The demand for new boxing regulations outpaced actual reforms, but the Asesoría 
was not completely inactive. For instance, Urquía clamped down on trainers and seconds, 
requiring them to follow new rules of dress and comportment. Seconds could no longer 
shout at their fighters from the corners during the three-minute rounds but would instead 
need to convey all instructions during the one-minute rest periods. This rule was announced 
shortly after the New York State Athletic Commission decreed that seconds would need to 
maintain the three-minute silences during all state-sanctioned prizefights. Urquía also 
enforced the new requirement that seconds wear white jerseys while in the corners, which 
were intended to make them look more professional.40 Later that year, the Asesoría declared 
that the DGD’s medical department had reached an agreement with the Association of 
Managers and Seconds that all Association members obtain a card testifying to their good 
health. The card would require a physical exam and would be valid for one year; all trainers 
and seconds were required to obtain one before being able to continue their work.41 
Yet some felt that much more was needed to ensure the safety of boxers and the 
integrity of the sport. Rene Cubas put forth a serious proposal to found an academy for 
referees and judges, to reduce the arbitrary nature of decisions and to prevent unqualified 
people from officiating bouts. He likened such an academy to the courses that were offered 
to trainers, seconds, and masseurs to keep them up-to-date with the latest techniques in their 
                                                
     39 “Del Sector Pugilístico,” Cuba Deportiva 10:17 (April 24, 1950), p. 5. 
     40 “Deberán guardar silencio los managers durantes los duraciones de los rounds,” Cuba Deportiva 10:16 
(April 17, 1950), p. 3; “Harán cumplir a los seconds de boxeo la reglamentación,” Cuba Deportiva 10:19 (May 8, 
1950), p. 8. 
     41 “Notas de la D. G. D.,” Cuba Deportiva 10:31 (August 14, 1950), p. 5. 
 233 
fields. He pointed out that, prior to Sosa Zamora’s tenure of the DGD, the organization had 
launched other athletic-related academies, such as one concerned with nautical sports. Cubas 
called upon the Academía de Oficiales del Ring (Academy of Ring Officials), led by popular 
referee and ex-prizefighter Mike Rojo, to lead the way in demanding that the DGD allocate 
funds for the academy, which would be free for students. By assuring proper training for its 
referees, moreover, Cuba could continue to avoid the “la epidemia de muertes en el ring” 
(the epidemics of ring deaths) that had infected the United States – which the island had 
avoided more through luck than wisdom. Not only would the academy improve the sport 
itself, but it would also provide an employment venue for former boxers and other athletes.42 
 
The 1950 Golden Gloves 
  Under the supervision of amateur boxing assessor Borbonet, the annual Golden 
Gloves championship got underway in the fall of 1950. Nine weight classes, ranging from 
junior flyweight (104 lbs) to heavyweight (+175 lbs), were up for challenge.43 In Havana, 
entrants were asked to go to the national boxing commission office, located at the Palacio de 
los Deportes, to submit the necessary paperwork and undergo an exam by DGD doctors. In 
the provinces, they were to go to the offices of their local boxing delegations and examined 
there. Minors (under age 17) had to bring a parent or guardian along to consent to their 
involvement. All competitors had to be “estrictamente amateurs” (strictly amateurs) – any 
past semi-pro association would cause them to be indefinitely suspended and their results 
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nullified. To ensure the best boxers would participate regardless of income level, the entry 
and medical exam were free for all participants, and those from the provinces who won their 
preliminary bouts would have their travel and lodging costs to Havana paid by the DGD. As 
before, the preliminary bouts were to be three rounds of two minutes each, with a one-
minute rest period. The championship bouts were five two-minute rounds, for a total 
maximum duration of ten minutes each. No bouts could end in a draw, as each bracket 
needed to have one winner to advance to the next level.44 
 Each province held its own series of preliminary bouts. In Havana, he contingents 
came from throughout the capital and were taught by the top trainers of the day, many of 
them former prizefighters. The Gymnasium Cuba y Merced (also known as the Arena Rafael 
Trejo), which was hosting the competition and whose students were instructed by members 
of the Asociación de Managers, had the largest entry pool, fifty boxers. Kid Tunero (Evelio 
Mustelier), the celebrated middleweight of the 1930s and 1940s, brought five students from 
his gym, El Stadium Municipal Rafael Conte. Wee Wee Barton (Gabriel López Nuñez), the 
Panamanian-born featherweight of the 1920s and 1930s, presented fifteen boxers from his 
Centro de Orientación Infantil. Higinio Ruiz, a top trainer and manager who had had a brief 
career as a prizefighter in the 1930s, brought six boxers from his namesake gym. The 
National Army team, under the instruction of Patricio Boada, had fifteen entrants.45 
Candelario Gallardo of Campo Alegre had five aspirants, while Federico Valdés of Club 
Rocafort had six. Assessor Borbonet postponed the tournament for a few more days to 
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enable more boxers to enter. It was postponed once again due to rain. When it began, there 
were a sufficient number of entrants to schedule three televised programs per week.46 
 Although the Golden Gloves was an amateur event that determined the annual 
champions in each weight class – which enabled them to compete internationally, such as at 
the upcoming Pan-American Games in Buenos Aires47 – it was viewed by participants, 
trainers, and officials alike as serving one main purpose: bringing the best prospective young 
prizefighters to the fore. There was a feeling that “the art of the fists,” as boxing was widely 
known in Cuba, had decayed because of government apathy, more lucrative opportunities 
for prizefighters abroad, and the institutional focus on baseball above all other sports. The 
Golden Gloves – with its trophies, belts, and regional and national acclaim – were a way to 
inject enthusiasm into the sport. But this was not intended to be amateur boxing for 
amateurism’s sake. While many Golden Gloves participants never turned pro, the most 
successful ones generally did. Even the style of boxing that was favored by judges was closer 
to what might be seen in professional rings. It was expected that bouts demonstrate both 
“sangre y fuego,” blood and fire, in order to please paying fans. Boxers who ignored this 
edict did so at their peril. During the preliminary bouts in Ciego de Ávila in October 1950, 
two competitors – Severo Álvarez and Raúl Agramonte – were disqualified during the third 
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round of their bout for not hitting one another with forceful enough blows. The referee’s 
decision was met with applause from the audience.48 
 The preliminary Havana bouts of that year’s Golden Gloves – held at the Arena 
Trejo in November 1950 – were the first boxing events to be televised in Cuba. The only 
operational Havana station at that time was Unión Radio TV (Channel 4), which had begun 
broadcasting programs on October 20, 1950, and had Cuban Winter League baseball games 
on by the end of that month. (Its main rival, CMQ-TV, did not being airing programs until 
December.) Each boxing program began at 6:30 p.m. for the convenience of the TV 
viewers. Although it seems unlikely that many Havana residents would have access to TV so 
soon after programming had begun, historian Hugh Thomas notes that the advent of Unión 
Radio TV caused “a rush to buy television sets, [with] dealers buying large stocks on account 
and restaurants, bars and shops beginning to install sets.”49 Indeed, Cuba was one of the first 
nations in the Americas to begin TV broadcasting; although it was a few years behind the 
United States, it was well ahead of its Latin American and Caribbean neighbors in both the 
speed and scope with which it embraced this new technology. 
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Boxing and the Nascent Television Age in Cuba and the United States 
 The rise of television’s influence in U.S. prizefighting began in the late 1940s and 
peaked by the mid-1950s. The first fight shown on U.S. television was the April 1941 Lou 
Nova-Max Baer heavyweight match-up, in which Nova knocked out Baer in eight rounds at 
Madison Square Garden.50 Because of the U.S. intervention in World War II by the end of 
that year, television did not become a major player in the boxing arena until the late 1940s, 
when GIs returned home from the war front and family leisure time became increasingly 
centered in the home. In the 1950s, the number of Americans with discretionary income to 
spend on TVs and other durable goods doubled; by 1960, 87 percent of America’s 44 million 
families owned a television.51 
 The first heavyweight title bout aired on U.S. television was between the champion, 
Joe Louis, and challenger Billy Conn, the “Pittsburgh Kid,” at Yankee Stadium on June 19, 
1946. Louis had already defeated Conn, the former light heavyweight champion, almost 
exactly five years previously, on June 18, 1941, at the New York Polo Grounds. In their first 
bout Conn, who was the smaller but quicker of the two, was leading Louis by a wide margin 
when, instead of running, he decided to try to fight the champion toe-to-toe. Louis ended up 
knocking him out in the 13th round. As Conn recalled decades later, “I couldn’t knock out 
anybody… And I tried to knock out Joe Louis.” Yet Conn had proved to be so elusive that 
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when the rematch was announced, Louis was asked what he would do should Conn run 
from him again. Louis replied, “He can run, but he can’t hide.”52 
The intervening war had caused a substantial layoff for both men, who had enlisted 
in the army, though Conn’s – at four years, four months – was by far the greater. Their 
rematch had been two years in the making. Although Conn was four years younger than the 
champ, he weighed in at twelve pounds heavier than he had in his previous match-up with 
Louis, and his ring rust showed. His poor performance earned the Associated Press’s “Flop 
of the Year” award, but, like no other bout, it ushered in the television age in American 
prizefighting. While most fans heard the fight by radio transmission, others went to friends’ 
homes or to local taverns. As historian Jeffrey Sammons notes, “Tavern owners sensed that 
their customers were among the most rabid and knowledgeable boxing fans and invested 
early in television sets. ‘Fight Nights’ were happenings, and the Louis-Conn rematch 
transcended all others.”53 
In Cuba, too, television soon became a fixture in Cuban taverns and households, 
fostered by business owners’ and the middle and lower classes’ willingness to purchase new 
TV sets and other durable goods on readily available credit. In the early 1950s, graft and 
corruption in the Prío administration was rife, as it was during the previous Grau regime and 
as it would be following Batista’s 1952 coup. Even so, Cuba’s economy was rising. Although 
the Philippines and other sugar-producing areas had recovered from wartime dislocations, 
the outbreak of the Korean War succeeded in keeping sugar prices high (over 5 cents per 
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pound). Since the U.S. remained committed to buying Cuban sugar to assist postwar Europe, 
and since wages were tied to sugar prices, this translated into greater prosperity for the upper 
and middle classes, who displayed their increased wealth through high-status purchases such 
as TVs and cars.54 
Cubans’ desire for access to modern communications led to the importation of 
25,000 TV sets in 1951 and 30,000 more the next year; about 400,000 were in operation by 
1959. The island’s dependence on credit in the immediate post-World War II period – from 
$12.7 million to $30 million between 1946 and 1951 – created the phenomenon of “floating 
televisions,” by which purchases of TVs and other items were made on credit but eventually 
returned for failure to pay. In this way, many families acquired TVs or radio sets for a short 
while before having them taken away, and then saved enough to continue the cycle by 
making another credit arrangement.55 
Prior to the TV invasion in Cuba, fans eagerly awaited the announcement of radio 
transmissions of important fights, particularly those from the United States. For example, 
the likely return of Joe Louis to the prizefight ring had been a main topic of discussion for 
months.56 Louis had retired in March 1949, nearly nine months after his previous bout, a 
knockout of Jersey Joe Walcott. When – to try to unburden himself from a crushing tax debt 
– Louis emerged from retirement to challenge his successor to the heavyweight throne, 
Ezzard Charles, the Cuban newspapers ran photos and articles of Louis for several weeks 
before their September 27 bout in Yankee Stadium. The Gillette Company, the bout’s 
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sponsor, arranged to transmit it to several Latin American countries. From ringside, Cuco 
Conde announced the fight to Cuban audiences on the radio station COCO.57 Unfortunately 
for Louis, his return from retirement ended poorly; he lost a one-sided, unanimous, fifteen-
round decision. Two months later, he continued on his path to reclaim former glory, one 
that brought with it eight straight victories – including one over Omelio Agramonte in May 
1951. By October of that year, he had met with his ultimate, humiliating loss, against Rocky 
Marciano, which drove him into retirement for the last time. Although the Louis-Charles 
bout was televised in the United States, in Cuba the Brown Bomber’s career coincided with 
the heyday of radio; the heavyweights who followed him would become familiar TV faces in 
Cuba in the 1950s and early 1960s. 
As early as 1951, Havana enjoyed three television stations: CMQ-TV (Channel 6), 
Telemundo (Channel 2), and Televisión Nacional (Channel 4), formerly Union Radio 
Televisión. A handful of others – including CMQ-TV’s sister enterprise, CMBF (Channel 7), 
in 1952, and the short-lived, U.S.-backed Televisión del Caribe (Channel 11) in 1953 – soon 
followed. The powerful Mestre brothers – Goar, Abel, and Luis Augusto – had purchased 
half of the CMQ radio station in 1943 and, by 1950, emerged as sole owners of the 
company, which was at the time venturing into television. In a field with few competitors, 
many of them awash in debt, CMQ-TV quickly became the largest and most lucrative 
television station in Havana. In 1957, the Mestres and several partners obtained Televisión 
Nacional and made it the centerpiece for a new national TV network called Cadena 
Nacional, S.A. From the outset, live and rebroadcast sporting events from Cuba and the U.S. 
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– particularly boxing and baseball – were a cornerstone of Cuban television programming. 
Unión Radio TV, the first Cuban station to go on air in October 1950, broadcast Havana 
boxing and baseball along with advertising, improvised skits, and news. The network 
accomplished this feat with three cameras despite being something of “a kitchen operation” 
based out of its owner’s house. In 1954, with the assistance of the U.S. Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC), CMQ-TV carried live broadcasts of Major League 
Baseball World Series games to Cuban audiences by leasing an airplane to circle the Florida 
Keys at 8,500 feet while transmitting signals from a Miami station to Matanzas and from 
there to the capital. By 1957, with the advent of “over-the-horizon” linkages between 
transmitters in Guanabo, Cuba, and Florida City, Cuba, CMQ was able to use microwave 
relays rather than circling airplanes to transmit broadcasts between the U.S. and Cuba.58 
Purchasing exclusive rights to athletic events, though involving high up-front costs, 
was a surefire way to guarantee audience loyalty. The Mestre brothers were at the forefront 
of this effort. In August 1956, their CMQ station purchased five years of exclusive TV and 
radio Cuban Winter League baseball game coverage for $1 million. Days before broadcasting 
its inaugural programs in March 1957, the Cadena Nacional network obtained exclusive TV 
rights to Havana’s Palacio de los Deportes Saturday evening fight cards. Through the new 
over-the-horizon technology linking Cuba and the U.S., which had been developed as a 
means to open telephone communication between the two nations, Cadena Nacional 
broadcast World Series baseball and boxing matches from the United States from 1957 until 
its takeover by the Castro administration in 1960.59 
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As with their U.S. cohorts, Cubans quickly gravitated to TV viewing as a leisure 
activity, one that involved family members, neighbors, and friends. In 1951, on the cusp of 
the TV explosion, a marketing survey estimated that each television set in Cuba was watched 
by close to eight viewers.60 While Mexico and Brazil, respectively, were the first and second 
Latin American nations to broadcast television programming – accomplishing that feat just a 
few weeks before Cuba did in October 1950 – Cuba outpaced its more populous neighbors 
by the rapidity with which it embraced its new technology. By 1954, TV had surpassed radio 
as the nation’s top broadcasting medium. Two years later, Cuba had sixteen operation TV 
stations versus ten in Mexico, nine in Venezuela, and six each in Brazil and Colombia.61 
Advertisers were quick to realize the potential of the growing Cuban TV audience, 
particularly for sports and entertainment programming. The Bacardí Rum Company – which 
since the 1880s had sponsored an employee-based Santiago de Cuba summer baseball team 
that later turned semi-professional – effectively used the new medium to translate its close 
association with that sport via not-so-subtle product placement. When Cuban TV stations 
began to broadcast ball games, Bacardí’s line of Hatuey beer served as the commercial 
sponsor. In addition to huge advertisements for Bacardí rum and Hatuey beer displayed on 
the billboard of the Havana stadium, “[c]utaway shots showed Manolo Ortega, a popular 
newscaster and sports announcer, sitting in a broadcast booth with a big red Hatuey sign 
behind him and a can of Hatuey beer at his elbow.”62 Sports programming was also more 
                                                
     60 Pérez, Jr., On Becoming Cuban, p. 334. 
     61 Salwen, Radio and Television in Cuba, pp. 36-37, 62, 78. 
     62 Tom Gjelten, Bacardi and the Long Fight for Cuba: The Biography of a Cause (New York: Viking, 2008), pp. 
157-158 (quote on p. 158). 
 243 
cost-effective for television stations, since it did not require hiring and outfitting actors and 
musicians and designing sets, as did hosting variety shows and telenovelas (soap operas). 
Similarly, in the United States, boxing was a natural target for television networks 
avidly seeking to reduce costs and increase advertising revenue. The cost of staging the 
average TV prizefight was $5,000 by the mid-1950s – about half of what it cost to host a 
variety show or sitcom (situation comedy). Sponsors such as the Gillette Safety Razor 
Company – which sponsored weekly televised prizefights from Madison Square Garden 
between 1944 and 1964 – enjoyed the connotations of heterosexual masculinity that boxing 
conveyed, thus helping to reach its target male audiences to sell razors, cigarettes, beer, cars, 
and other products. Ratings remained high in the early 1950s – as high as 52% of the public 
watched televised boxing shows in 1952 – before tapering off at the end of the decade, to a 
10.6% audience share in 1959.63 
In the United States as in Cuba, the sudden popularity of television boxing opened 
the sport to new fans while alienating many old ones. A “TV debate” sprung up in pugilistic 
circles over whether the positive ramifications of relinquishing the sport to the new medium 
were worth the price that would be paid. One of the most pointed critics of televised boxing 
was New Yorker essayist A.J. Liebling, who wrote humorous but impassioned defenses of 
what he termed “boxing with the naked eye.” In addition to critiquing the effects of boxing 
on the sport itself – the decline of small clubs, the pressure on young fighters to take on 
major fights before they were ready, the commercialization of sport – Liebling approached 
the pleasures of attending boxing matches from a fan’s point of view: 
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Watching a fight on television has always seemed to me a poor 
substitute for being there. For one thing, you can’t tell the fighters what to 
do. When I watch a fight, I like to study one boxer’s problem, solve it, and 
then communicate my solution vocally. On occasion my advice is 
disregarded, as when I tell a man to stay away from the other fellow’s left and 
he doesn’t, but in such cases I assume that he hasn’t heard my counsel, or 
that has opponent has, and has acted on it…. I get a feeling of participation 
that way that I don’t in front of a television screen. I could yell, of course, 
but I would know that if my suggestion was adopted, it would be by the 
merest coincidence.64 
 
Arthur Daley, a sports columnist for the New York Times, accused TV of making 
“boxing a gigantic give-away program” that was turning off the spigot for new talent: 
 
Amateur boxing was the kindergarten for professional boxing. Then the 
small clubs were the grade school and the high school, graduating only the 
brightest, cleverest, and best-equipped students to college – Madison Square 
Garden, the Boston Garden, the Detroit Olympia, Chicago Stadium, the San 
Francisco Cow Palace and other such show places. 
 
…Television has done a double disservice to boxing. It has helped kill off the 
kindergartens and the secondary schools. So they are uneducated folks who 
suddenly reach the pugilistic college these days. They’ve skipped so many 
grades that they flunk the big test as soon as it comes.65 
 
Even writers for a glossy new monthly publication, TV Boxing (published by Boxing 
and Wrestling magazine) didn’t have uniformly positive responses to the new medium. 
Inaugurated in October 1953, the magazine excoriated the ills of televised boxing while 
helping to promote it by informing audiences of upcoming bouts and reviewing ones that 
had recently occurred. More than serve as a source of criticism, which often spoke at a level 
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which only genuine fight fans might understand, TV Boxing sought to convey the 
complexities of the sport to newcomers. Each month’s issue featured a “Beginners Guide on 
How to Judge a Boxing Contest” on a page that ranked the top five fighters in each division 
and explained the different scoring techniques used in each state. Undoubtedly, the editors 
of the magazine were appealing to female readers as well as to younger males who might not 
yet be initiated into the fight game, since women made up a significant portion of new fans 
enjoying televised boxing from the comfort of their homes. 
Nor did American promoters unanimously embrace the new medium, despite the 
potential for high TV fees. During Kid Gavilán’s July 1952 bout with Philadelphia up-and-
comer Gil Turner, promoter Herman Taylor refused to allow television or radio 
broadcasting to carry the fight. “I realize I can’t halt progress,” Taylor stated. “Television 
and radio are wonderful, but I have the greatest fight of the year, and I am certain it will 
draw a lot more money without television and radio than it would with the added TV and 
radio receipts.” Despite lucrative offers from television networks to black out the fight 
within a 75-mile radius in return for $100,000 and national broadcasting rights, Taylor held 
out for principle and the hope of massive gate receipts. “I think we could return to the 
$1,000,000 gate in boxing if fights were not televised,” he noted.66 The fight did indeed have 
drawing power –39,025 people witnessed Gavilán’s methodical dismantling of the far less 
experienced Turner, who was finally knocked out in the eleventh round – and shattered the 
record for gate receipts for a welterweight championship bout, set at $194,330 in 1934 
during the Barney Ross-Jimmy McLarnin match. Still, the total Gavilán-Turner receipts – 
                                                
     66 “Promoter Snubs $100,000, Won’t Allow Gavilan-Turner,” n.d. (IBHOF file on Kid Gavilán). For more 
on Taylor’s views of televised boxing, see Lanse McCurley, “Why I Am Against TV (Herman Taylor),” TV 
Boxing 1:1 (October 1953): 20-21, 60-61. 
 246 
$269,677 – was a far cry from the million-dollar gate alluded to by Taylor, and the television 
onslaught became more difficult for promoters to withstand.67 
Cuban observers followed the TV debate in the United States, including predictions 
that television would “was the beginning of the end for boxing in the small clubs.”68 One 
commentator took it farther, titling his article, “La televisión ha resultado desastrosa a los 
deportes” (Television has been disastrous to sports). Not only boxing, but also baseball 
would be ruined by it, since people would stop coming to fights and games just to watch 
them at home or in the comfort of their local bar. Only wrestling, he argued, was improved 
by the medium; TV made it “more characteristic of a theatrical spectacle than of a pure but 
violent exercise of strength, agility, and dexterity.”69 
Yet the effects of television on prizefighting in 1950s Cuba were far less invidious on 
the sport than in the United States. For one, the technology of TV came later to Cuba; bouts 
were not televised before the end of 1950. Second, broadcasters favored Havana bouts and 
major U.S. prizefights; rarely did shows from the provinces make the cut. It was in the 
provinces, too, that boxing enthusiasm often ran highest. For instance, while commentators 
in Havana were bemoaning the lack of well-matched bouts at the weekly Palacio de los 
Deportes shows and complaining about the upkeep of the stadium, new boxing venues were 
going up in Camagüey and Morón. The Morón stadium, which was air-conditioned, 
employed a publicist, Rubén Fernández, and, for a time, an active prizefighter from the area 
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– Miguel Mendivil – to oversee matchmaking.70 Although TV offered a way for fight fans to 
witness their favorite national-caliber boxers both at home and abroad, for lesser-known 
pugilists in local bouts, there was no substitute to being there. Those who were unable to do 
so were forced to rely upon daily newspapers, weekly sports publications, radio programs, 
and word of mouth. 
 
Meet the “Keed”: Kid Gavilán and American Audiences 
 In the early 1950s, with the possible exception of Sugar Ray Robinson, no single 
boxer captivated TV viewers in the United States as Kid Gavilán. Certainly the Cuban press 
never tired of writing about him. The welterweight champion from Camagüey, Cuba, may 
have become famous for his “bolo” punch, which he was mistakenly credited as inventing; 
in point of fact, it was first introduced in mainstream prizefighting some years earlier by 
Filipino boxer Ceferino Garcia. Although Gerald Gems calls the bolo “a weapon symbolic 
of his [Garcia’s] Filipino identity,”71 it quickly transcended its nationalist Filipino roots and 
came to be known, in Gavilán’s heyday, as a Cuban innovation, one likened to the repeated 
gesture made with a machete when field hands cut sugarcane. Gavilán’s use of the bolo was 
linked in the mainstream press to the notion that, at least in his prime, he “mambo-stepped” 
his way through the ring, leaving less fleet opponents to flail in the face of his nimbleness. 
The implicit or explicit description of Gavilán as being as much dancer as boxer evoked 
notions of Cubans (particularly Afro-Cubans) as being musically and physically gifted, a 
product perhaps of their “passionate” Latin natures. Such caricatures neglected the obvious 
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facts of Gavilán’s workmanship and endurance, particularly his impressive “chin,” which 
kept him upright in over 140 professional bouts. Even so, Gavilán’s appeal went far beyond 
fancy footwork or one novelty punch, for novelty it was; practically speaking, the bolo, then 
as now, was more about showcasing one’s superiority over an outclassed fighter, 
demolishing him psychologically, than it was about scoring a knockout blow.72 
A beloved celebrity in both the U.S. and Cuba, Gavilán was for several years the 
standard bearer in the welterweight division. Never knocked out and rarely knocked down in 
professional combat, Gavilán – an Afro-Cuban whose command of English was often 
belittled in the U.S. sporting press, where he fought most of his important ring battles – 
gained a rabid following in both his native and adopted countries. His meteoric rise is largely 
coexistent with the rise of television in prizefights. But although Gavilán clearly benefited 
from a wide TV viewership, he was considered by boxing writers of the day to be a genuine 
talent – perhaps one of the best welterweights of all time – rather than a “made-for-TV” 
creation, like several of the fighters he beat in dramatic fashion. 
 Gavilán’s every exploit, in the ring and out, became fodder for the American press. 
At his peak, from about 1951 to 1954 when he held the welterweight crown, his popularity 
extended well beyond the sporting pages. He posed for an endless number of promotional 
photographs with U.S. and particularly Latin American and African American celebrities of 
the day: Desi Arnaz, Jr., Olga Chaviano, famous baseball players and boxers. Gavilán was 
portrayed as an apolitical man, “a friend of Fulgencio Batista” when the dictator ruled the 
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island, a simple farmer from Camagüey, a devout Catholic, and a devoted family man. Even 
his family – beautiful wife Leonora and adorable tots Helen, Gerardo, Jr., and Victoria (who 
was born shortly before his bout with Bobo Olson and whose name was intended to invoke 
Gavilán’s victory) – became part of a promotional effort to make U.S. audiences comfortable 
with him. A cover story on the boxer in the October 1953 issue of Ebony, a monthly 
magazine read primarily by middle-class African Americans, was entitled, “Kid Gavilan: 
Boxing’s Happiest Champ.” Although largely a respectful glimpse of the champion and his 
family on their finca in Camagüey, the Ebony piece could not resist using some of the 
stereotypes common for that day in depicting a happy-go-lucky Afro-Cuban man – many of 
which Gavilán himself had a large part in perpetuating through his and his managers’ PR 
campaign: 
 
 To people who have seen Kid Gavilan only in the ring, the 
welterweight champion is an unsmiling, flat-featured fighting machine whose 
sole aim seems to be the blasting into oblivion of any opponent brash 
enough to climb into the ring with him. 
But outside the ropes, the Kid is such a carefree, fun loving character 
that many of his friends have called him boxing’s happiest champion. Even 
in training for a serious title defense, Gavilan does not seem to worry. While 
getting in shape for his battle with Chuck Davey, the Kid entertained 
gymnasium visitors with rope skipping interspersed with rumba steps and 
lively Cuban songs. Gavilan is an excellent dancer, a good musician (he’s an 
expert on conga and bongo drums), a lover of good food and a night club 
follower. “Someday,” he says, “I might go into show business – like Sugar 
Ray [Robinson].”73 
 
These stereotypes of the pleasant, almost preternaturally gifted, but none-
too-bright black Cuban entertainer were hardly unique to Gavilán. Kid Chocolate, 
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the first “Keed” to take the U.S. by storm, had experienced similar types of publicity 
in the American press of the late 1920s and early 1930s. Moreover, although the 
terminology was more muted, white Cuban fighters such as Luis Galvani were at 
times painted in stereotypical terms in the United States. When Galvani fought 
Rodolfo “Corky” Gonzales in Denver in August 1950, the local press emphasized 
the foreignness of the Cuban in contrast to the native Mexican American boxer, a 
former amateur national champion born and raised in the Mile High City. Not only 
was Galvani ignorant of English, one journalist pointed out, but the promoter, one 
Morris Salzer, had called upon nearby cigar makers to attend the bout at City 
Auditorium in order to give Galvani a share of audience support – and to translate 
for him should the rest of the crowd shout out practical advice to his opponent. His 
lack of English skills and a Denver fan base posed no problem for Galvani, however; 
during the bout, he knocked Gonzales down repeatedly and finally put him away in 
the ninth round, giving the local favorite his first knockout loss.74 
In Cuba as in the U.S., ethnic and racial stereotypes notwithstanding, the charismatic 
Kid Gavilán had a massive following in most stages of his ring career – as a title contender, 
the world champion, and a veteran trying to get back to the top. When he experienced a 
career dip in 1950 after several losses to mediocre-caliber opposition in the U.S., numerous 
articles appeared in the Havana press offering advice and assigning blame for his shift in 
fortunes. It was clear to boxing fans and commentators of the late 1940s and early 1950s 
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that Gavilán was their best shot at winning a world title, which a Cuban had not done since 
Kid Chocolate in 1931. 
 While Gavilán fought all of the best Cubans in his weight class on his rise up the 
professional ranks, most of his important bouts as a welterweight – his natural division – 
occurred in the United States. Fighting as “Gerry Gavilan” in November 1946, he made his 
U.S. debut at Madison Square Garden. Despite being six pounds lighter than his opponent, 
Johnny Ryan, a journeyman from Detroit, Gavilán earned a five-round TKO victory.75 The 
following month, Sugar Ray Robinson became the undisputed welterweight king when he 
decisioned Tommy Bell in Madison Square Garden. It was a title that Robinson was to hold 
until he vacated it to move up to the middleweight division over four years later – including 
an astonishing 91-bout winning streak. 
 That streak included two decision wins over Gavilán – a ten-round nontitle bout in 
September 1948 and a fifteen-round title bout in July 1949. Gavilán lost his chance at a third 
rematch when he was decisioned by Billy Graham in February 1950. When Robinson 
vacated the welterweight crown the following February, there was a scramble to find a 
replacement. Three fighters were invited to compete for Robinson’s crown: Kid Gavilán, 
Johnny Bratton, and Charley Fusari. Bratton decisioned Fusari over fifteen rounds on March 
13, 1951, winning the vacant welterweight title recognized by two U.S. sanctioning bodies, 
the New York State Athletic Commission (NYSAC) and the National Boxing Association 
(NBA). Shortly afterward, on May 18, 1951, Gavilán defeated the durable Bratton – over 
fifteen rounds, Bratton broke both his jaw and his right hand but refused to be knocked out 
– and took the NYSAC/NBA title. Worldwide recognition of Gavilán’s title came once the 
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European welterweight champion, Charles Humez, followed Robinson into the 
middleweight ranks by late 1951 and Gavilán defeated Billy Graham, another top U.S. 
welter, by a questionable split decision on August 29, 1951. 
 In their first of four bouts, Graham had beaten Gavilán at Madison Square Garden 
on February 10, 1950 – in a decision that James P. Dawson of the New York Times called 
“highly complimentary to Graham.” Gavilán had been the clear favorite going in, with some 
odds makers putting him at a 4 to 1 advantage. He was relying on a victory to justify a third 
welterweight title shot at Sugar Ray Robinson, but instead his loss showed “his inadequacy as 
a title challenger.” When the judges split in their verdicts – with Harold Barnes and Arthur 
Aidalla giving close margins to Gavilán and Graham, respectively – referee Ruby Goldstein 
cast the deciding vote for Graham. After the match, Gavilán’s managers, Angel López and 
Fernando Balido, announced their intention to protest the decision to the NYSAC and to 
seek to disqualify Goldstein from refereeing future Gavilán bouts.76 Apparently, neither one 
expressed their discontent in person at the NYSAC offices, causing its President, Eddie 
Eagen, to declare the protest null and to verify the Graham victory.77 The Daily Mirror laid the 
blame not on the referee but on Gavilán’s managers for scheduling the match when they did. 
Their fighter had gotten married on January 27 and had planned to take two months off 
from fighting. When his managers accepted the Graham bout, Gavilán was left without 
sufficient time to train. The New York Post agreed that the Cuban Hawk’s poor conditioning 
was to blame for his loss – an opinion shared by Gavilán himself.78 Noting Gavilán’s lack of 
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a “knock out punch,” Cuba Deportiva called López and Balido’s complaints about the nature 
of the decision “absurd” and mounted a case that both were ill equipped to manage an 
athlete. Columnist Juan Oliva castigated López for being more concerned with collecting the 
fight purse than in conditioning a fighter.79 
Although it was a nontitle affair, Graham would later view his February 1950 defeat 
of Gavilán as his “most important victory” because it led to his being ranked among the top 
welters of the day.80 The euphoria was short-lived. When Gavilán and Graham rematched at 
Madison Square Garden on November 17, 1950, Graham lost a close bout by majority 
decision; the referee called it a draw, while the judges favored Gavilán six rounds to four. 
Once Gavilán became the welter champion, Graham set his sights on a second 
rematch in hopes of claiming the throne for himself. His patience would be rewarded on 
August 29, 1951. This “rubber match” at Madison Square Garden – scored by split decision 
for Gavilán – would become one of the most controversial decisions in prizefighting history. 
Though Gavilán had built up a substantial lead in the early rounds, Graham took hold of the 
fight in the fifth: 
 
After taking a drubbing through the first four rounds, Graham stung Gavilan 
to aimless fury with his clever boxing and sharp hitting through the three 
succeeding rounds. Repeatedly Graham reached the jaw over this span with 
sharp right-hand drives. He made Gavilan miss awkwardly with long lefts 
and rights while getting under the fire with solid rights to the heart or left 
hooks to the head.81 
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 Gavilán came back strong in the eighth, but Graham was not finished. He rallied 
again in the twelfth, and “through the fourteenth and fifteenth rounds Graham, throwing all 
caution to the winds, reached the champion’s jaw repeatedly with grazing rights and left 
hooks.”82 The two judges split in their verdicts: Arthur (Artie) Schwartz called it nine rounds 
for Gavilán to six for Graham, while Frank Forbes had seven rounds for Graham, seven for 
Gavilán, and one even. Since New York State at the time used both a round and point 
system to score professional cards, whenever an equal number of rounds was given to both 
fighters, as in Forbes’s case, the victor was determined by examining the point totals. These 
were assigned on a scale of one to four in each round. Referee Mark Conn proved the 
deciding factor by scoring his card similarly to Forbes – with seven rounds to Gavilán, seven 
to Graham, and one even. But his point totals went in the opposite direction; he gave 
Gavilán ten points to Graham’s seven. The decision was met with hoots of derision. The 
crowd protested angrily for over ten minutes, tossing debris and threatening to storm the 
ring. Referee Conn narrowly avoided being hit with a stool. A near-riot almost broke out 
near the Garden’s 50th Street entrance after police expelled some vehement protesters. 
Conn and Schwartz had to be escorted out of the Garden with police protection. 
Immediately afterward, Graham’s co-manager, Irving Cohen, immediately protested the 
decision to the NYSAC deputy commissioner.83 Although Gavilán was on the winning side 
of a questionable decision this time – one that made him the undisputed world welterweight 
champion – he would later lose his title on another questionable decision, to Johnny Saxton 
in Philadelphia. Gavilán apparently believed that he genuinely won the bout, but that the 
                                                
     82 Dawson, “Gavilan Keeps Welterweight Title,” New York Times, 30 August 1951. 
     83 “Gavilan Barely Outpoints Graham,” n.d. [UP article, probably August 30, 1951], from “Kid Gavilan,” 
Stanley Weston files, The Joyce Sports Research Collection, University of Notre Dame, South Bend, Indiana. 
 255 
protest over the decision stemmed from ethnic tensions. As he told a British interviewer 
four decades afterward: “He [Graham] had the Irish and I had the Spanish rooting for me. 
The crowd noise was so much in his favour that from the very beginning people were going 
to think he won the fight.”84 
 In his popular memoir, Only the Ring Was Square, former Madison Square Garden 
matchmaker Teddy Brenner maintained that, shortly before the August 1951 Gavilán-
Graham bout, Graham’s manager, Irving Cohen, was asked to visit Frankie Carbo. (As 
Brenner noted, “When Carbo called, people answered.”85 At their meeting, according to 
Brenner, Carbo asked for twenty percent of Graham’s purses in order to ensure his victory. 
When Cohen refused, Carbo insisted that he speak to the fighter before giving him an 
answer. Graham apparently also refused the extortion attempt, and Carbo is said to have 
remarked, “Does the kid know he ain’t going to win?”86 Although there is no independent 
confirmation of these events – and despite evoking a colorful era in prizefighting, Brenner’s 
narrative suffers from other inaccuracies, as discussed below – it is possible, given the time 
period and Carbo’s substantial influence at the time, that he or his associates were involved 
in awarding the title to Gavilán. There were business links between Carbo and Gavilán, as 
will be discussed shortly. However, it must be emphasized that no widely accepted 
verification of that allegation has been made, and that given the closely contested nature of 
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the bout – New York Times correspondent James P. Dawson scored the bout nine rounds to 
six for Gavilán, identical to Schwartz87 – Brenner’s claim seems questionable at best. 
 What is known is that, following the announcement of the decision, passion ran high 
on both sides. While Cubans thrilled to Gavilán’s win and his being named the undisputed 
world welterweight champion, Graham, born and raised on Manhattan’s East Side, had 
developed many impassioned supporters – not all of them Irish American, despite Gavilán’s 
impression – who viewed his August 1951 loss as the result of mob fixing. Among Graham’s 
fans, he would forever be known as “the uncrowned welterweight champion.”88 Despite his 
tremendous disappointment – “I was never so confident about winning a fight in my life as I 
was about that third Gavilan match,” he said a few years later – Graham acknowledged the 
impact of his opponent’s punching power, which most boxing critics in the U.S. and Cuba 
downplayed, or even ridiculed. “Gavilan stung me harder than anybody in the title fight in 
New York,” he recollected. “He nailed me with a few good rights in the early rounds. He’s a 
pretty good puncher, better than people think.”89 
 Graham’s persistence in calling out Gavilán after that disappointing loss was 
ultimately rewarded with one last title shot, this time in Havana. Although Graham knew his 
chances were slim going in – New York sources had informed him that, “the only way 
Gavilán would lose in Havana was if they carried him out of the ring on a stretcher” – he 
decided “it was a good payday anyway.” 90 Dr. Lorenzo Nodarse, director of the DGD, 
announced that his department was putting up the $40,000 guarantee. The contract – signed 
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by IBC President James Norris, Jr.; Irving Cohen, Graham’s manager; and Fernando Balido, 
for Gavilán’s management team – called for a rematch within 90 days should Graham win.91 
Although the referee and one of the judges were Cuban, the second judge was Nat Fleischer, 
founder of The Ring. On October 5, 1952, at Stadium Park, Gavilán beat Graham decisively 
by decision. This time, Graham did not protest the result, although he claimed later that he 
had woken up feeling ill that morning and “never would have gone on with the fight if I 
didn’t think the Cuban Government would object.”92 Although widely acknowledged in the 
U.S. boxing press as a clear-cut loss for Graham, at least one prominent observer saw it 
differently; Graham later told an interviewer that, “Ernest Hemingway told him he had 
clearly won but that he was luckier to have lost since most spectators carried guns.”93 The 
loss finally pushed Graham, long one of Gavilán’s most persistent opponents, to move up to 
the middleweight ranks, where he spent the remainder of his career and where Gavilán 
would follow – despite reservations from co-manager Angel López – in 1954. 
 Although Graham and Gavilán never met in the ring again – and Graham never 
received another world title shot in any weight class – their stories would intersect several 
decades later. In April 1985, the New York Times reported that 
 
On April 29, some members of The Players, made up of theatrical and 
newspaper people, will honor Graham, 63 years old, at a dinner at the club 
on Gramercy Park. Having voted themselves a “sanctioning body,” they will 
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proclaim Graham the world welterweight champion for the 13 months 
between the first and second fights94 against Gavilan. 
 “It’s beautiful, I’m so excited,” said Graham, now a liquor salesman 
on Long Island. “At this stage of my life, it’s nice to remembered and to get 
the title I was never able to win. Every kid wants to be champ. I had to wait a 
long time, but I appreciate the recognition.”95 
 
 What might have started as a way to honor Graham during his lifetime for nearly 
winning the world welterweight crown developed into an effort to overturn the original 
decision on the basis of Teddy Brenner’s claim that Arthur Schwartz had confessed to 
judging the bout for Gavilán due to mob pressure. In December 1985, the New York State 
Athletic Commission officially upheld Gavilán’s decision win. Stated NYSAC chairman José 
Torres, “I’m ruling out fraud because the evidence eliminates the issue of the deathbed 
confession.” Multiple sources proved that Schwartz had died of a cardiac arrest in Grand 
Central Terminal – thus making such a hospital bed deathbed confession, as described in the 
Brenner book, impossible.96 
 Although the fame and accomplishment of Gavilán eluded him, Graham’s quest to 
become a world champion, one ultimately proved futile, became immortalized as the story of 
Eddie Brown in W.C. Heinz’s acclaimed novel 1958 The Professional.97 In 1992, the year of his 
death, he was inducted into the International Boxing Hall of Fame – two years after Gavilán 
was similarly honored. 
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 Another of Gavilán’s best-known opponents, Chuck Davey, epitomized the creation 
of pugilistic TV idols in the early 1950s U.S. While in college at Michigan State University, 
Davey began to box seriously. Though he was a quick study – he won four NCAA titles – 
his rapid rise through the professional welterweight ranks had more to do with careful 
matchmaking by his promoters than with his own experience and skill level. In building a 
streak of 39 straight wins, six of them nationally televised, Davey was matched against 
veterans who were no longer at their peak (such as Rocky Graziano and Ike Williams) and 
against perennial contenders who would never become champions (Chico Vejar). 
 On February 11, 1953, Davey met Gavilán at Chicago Stadium to contest the latter’s 
world welterweight title. The event was nationally televised and earned a total gate of just 
under $250,000; $40,000 of that went to Davey.98 There was little doubt among boxing 
journalists that Gavilán would retain his title, despite the massive promotional build-up. A 
news article by Gayle Talbot asked, “Is Tonight’s Bout Big Mismatch?” Talbot feared the 
repercussions of “tossing the boy in there with such a fighter as Gavilan,” noting that, in 
1935, Penn State graduate Steve Hamas had “been beaten into a physical wreck” by former 
world heavyweight champion Max Schmeling, definitely ending Hamas’s ring career.99 A 
cartoon published just before the Gavilán-Davey fight depicted the two men battling it out 
on top of a TV antenna. Gavilán, who was shown trying to throw his famed bolo punch, 
had “105 pro fights” listed beneath his name, while Davey had “30 pro fights” beneath his. 
The text read, 
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We fear Mr. Davey, the southpaw cutie with the reputation that T.V. 
built, is into Channel 2 over his depth tonight! – With all that college 
education and Master’s degree he should oughtta’ know better… After all, 
Gavilan is no washed-up Graziano or Ike Williams!! 
 The Havana Hawk will still be champ tomorrow morning!!100 
 
Davey was more fortunate than Hamas: he was definitively beaten, exposed for the 
made-for-TV creation he was, but he avoided serious harm despite being knocked down 
once in the first round and three times in the ninth. The referee finally stopped the bout in 
the ninth, awarding the TKO victory to Gavilán. The remainder of Davey’s career was 
unspectacular, without any further shots at the title, and he retired in 1955. 
 Gavilán’s career after the Davey bout, on the other hand, featured some of the 
greatest bouts of the mid-1950s. After winning a close decision against Italian Livio Minelli 
in April 1953, Gavilán was upset the following month by Danny “Bang Bang” Womber, a 
former sparring partner of Sugar Ray Robinson. Although Womber’s camp sought to use the 
victory as an incentive to offer Gavilán a rematch – this time with the title on the line – 
Gavilán adamantly refused the offer, claiming the decision had been unfair.101 Gavilán 
emerged with only a split-decision victory in a title defense with Carmen Basilio, a sturdy 
welterweight from Canastota, New York, in September 1951. Basilio managed to knock 
down Gavilán for only the second time in the Hawk’s career (the first had occurred during 
his loss to Ike Williams in February 1948). Gavilán and many ring observers blamed his poor 
showing on a weakened state caused by a struggle to make weight; since the Davey bout, he 
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had been fighting in non-title bouts at several pounds above the welter limit. (While Basilio 
had to shed a pound at the weigh-in to come in at 147 pounds, it didn’t seem to affect his 
performance.) Following this bout, Basilio and his supporters, like those of Billy Graham 
before him, declared that he was the “uncrowned” king of the welters. Gavilán and his 
managers believed that the fighter had no choice but to move up in weight. Before doing so, 
however, he made one more successful title defense against Johnny Bratton, from whom he 
had first gained the NBA world welterweight title back in May 1951. In November 1953, 
Gavilán gave Bratton a serious beating – although he did failed to knock out the durable 
“Honey Boy” in a unanimous fifteen-round decision win.102 
 
Cuban Boxers and Organized Crime in the United States 
 After moving up to the middleweight division, Gavilán challenged Hawaiian Bobo 
Olson for his title on April 2, 1954. Gavilán had not significantly beefed up in the 
intervening months and weighed in with his clothes on. Olson won a close split-decision 
victory on the cards of the two judges and referee, and many ringside commentators 
considered it to be an exciting match, full of activity but without hard blows (other than an 
unintentional head butt by Olson).103 But the Gavilán-Olson bout was remarkable not for 
the result, which was expected, but for the discrepancy between what TV viewers 
experienced and what the conventional boxing wisdom stated. To TV watchers, it was a dull 
fight, due to the limitations of the era’s technology: 
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 Television puts a premium on the street corner brawl, the wild 
slugging that can be seen clearly over a distance. If a boxer is a proficient and 
methodical technician, as the sports writers suggest Olson is, he still can be a 
TV flop. The modern fighter, assuming he wants to share in the television 
gravy, must be a showman as well as a pugilist.104 
 
 Gavilán was both, showman and pugilist, and he realized his best options remained 
in the welterweight division. Following the Olson bout, he set about training for his seventh 
welterweight defense. He and his managers opted to forgo the top five challengers in that 
division, instead opting for 21-year-old Johnny Saxton. Saxton was managed by mobster 
Frank “Blinky” Palermo, a capo in the Frankie Carbo organized crime family. Herman 
Taylor promoted the bout in conjunction with the International Boxing Club of New York 
(IBC), run by James D. Norris, Jr., and Arthur Wirtz. In 1949, the IBC had purchased 
Twentieth Century Boxing Club’s lease of Madison Square Garden. Mike Jacobs, the head of 
Twentieth Century, had been the Garden’s longtime promoter but had recently fallen ill. 
Following the purchase, the IBC of New York quickly established a monopoly over boxing 
title bouts, promoting all but four of them from 1949 to 1955. This and other irregularities 
caused it to be slapped with a federal lawsuit in 1952 for antitrust violations.105 Among other 
charges, the lawsuit alleged that the International Boxing Clubs of New York and Illinois – 
along with their co-defendants, the Madison Square Garden Corporation and IBC heads 
Norris and Wirtz – had “exacted monopolistic control of championship fights as payment 
for its largesse,” principally in the forms of nearly half a million dollars worth of zero-
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interest loans and advances to boxers and managers under its promotion from 1949 to 1953 
as a means of “wedding” them to the corporation, which was colloquially known as the 
“Octopus.” During that period, Kid Gavilán received the second-highest figure of all 
recipients, or $55,830; only Sugar Ray Robinson, with over $65,000 received, was more 
indebted to the IBC. Several other high-profile champions and contenders were implicated 
in the loan scheme, including Johnny Bratton, Joe Louis, and Joey Maxim.106 
At the time of the Saxton bout, some questioned whether Palermo’s involvement 
had influenced Gavilán’s decision to sign for a title match with the sixth-ranked, little-known 
welterweight, particularly in a contract that did not guarantee a return bout should Gavilán 
lose (a common stipulation in title bouts). Pennsylvania State Athletic Commission (PSAC) 
chairman Frank Weiner had insisted upon removal of the clause on the grounds that he did 
not approve of mandatory rematches. López did not push the issue, again for reasons 
unknown. One may only speculate as to the reasons for Weiner’s unusual role in the contract 
negotiations. Certainly, the state athletic commissions were not above mob interference. As 
Sammons notes, “Carbo [and by extension, Palermo] could not have been so effective 
without the acquiescence, and even indirect collusion, of the various state athletic 
commissions.”107 
After two delays – the fight had originally been scheduled for July but was moved to 
September because Gavilán’s physicians in Camagüey disclosed he had a broken right hand; 
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the date was moved again when he came down with the mumps – the Cuban Hawk met his 
latest challenger, Johnny Saxton, on October 20, 1954, at Philadelphia’s Convention Hall. 
Sportswriter Joseph C. Nichols of the New York Times called the fight “one of the poorest, 
dullest title encounters in many years… for the first ten rounds Convention Hall resounded 
with one long jeer as the onlookers expressed their disapproval.” Before the beginning of the 
sixth round, the PSAC chairman Weiner demanded to the referee that he “tell those men to 
do some fighting.” Saxton, an extremely cautious fighter, did not mix it up with Gavilán until 
the last four rounds, frequently resorting to clinching before that point as a means to prevent 
the Cuban’s aggression. In the end, the referee, Peter Panataleo, and both judges, Jim Mina 
and Nate Lopinson, gave the nod to Saxton. The crowd of 7,909 was clearly partisan to 
Saxton and wildly cheered the decision, despite general “disbelief” that he had pulled it out. 
Saxton himself hardly had time to celebrate his victory, for the next day he was due to report 
to New York the following morning to serve a fifteen-day jail sentence for frequent 
violations of that city’s traffic laws. He had already been granted one deferment in order to 
accept the Gavilán bout.108 
 The loss of Gavilán’s title to Johnny Saxton was a shock to nearly everyone who 
witnessed it. No one was more shocked than Gavilán himself. In his dressing room, sobbing, 
he declared that the fight had been “fixed.” Without a knockout, he said, he had no chance 
to win. The AP writer captured Gavilán’s despair in the cadence of his Spanish-inflected 
English: “I don’t want nothing that I don’t deserve, but I win at least nine rounds. I no want 
a return bout. I no want to fight any more.”109 
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 Gavilán and his team were hardly alone in their surprise. A survey of twenty-one U.S. 
boxing writers who were at ringside revealed that nineteen scored the fight for Gavilán; the 
other two (John Webster of the Philadelphia Inquirer and Joe Lee of the Brooklyn Eagle) gave a 
close victory to Saxton.110 Nat Fleischer, founder and editor of The Ring and the godfather of 
U.S. boxing writers, felt that the referee had clearly favored Saxton, frequently warning 
Gavilán for holding despite the fact that Saxton was generally at fault in that regard.111 The 
result gave rise to the term “Philadelphia decision,” referring to an unfair judges’ decision 
that favors the hometown boxer despite the better performance of his out-of-town 
opponent. (Though Saxton was a Newark, New Jersey, native who was said to have learned 
how to box in a Brooklyn orphanage following the deaths of his parents, the comparison 
was close enough.) Philadelphia, in particular, became notorious as a city where fair decisions 
were hard to come by. 
 In Cuba, fans and commentators reacted angrily to the decision. The general 
sentiment was, as Gavilán’s co-manager Angel López put it, “They have stolen the fight.” It 
was widely believed that U.S. gangsters were behind the theft. The sports editor of Alerta, 
Fausto Miranda, wrote a column entitled, “The Gangsters Robbed the Kid.” He railed 
against “the bad faith of the judges” and held that the decision owed to “behind-the-door 
maneuvers of racketeers, the real owners of the pugilistic business in North America.” 
Miranda argued that there was a history of robbing Cuban fighters of well-earned decisions 
in American rings; he stated that another “swindle” had occurred to Kid Chocolate when he 
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fought Jack “Kid” Berg in New York in August 1930, the Cuban Bon Bon’s first loss. In his 
column for Información, sports editor Llillo Jiménez wrote that the Gavilán-Saxton result was 
“the biggest surprise in the last decade in the matter of boxing decisions.”112 
 There is no doubt that Gavilán’s managers – at the time, López and Emile Shade – 
had dealings with Palermo and Carbo, as evinced by the large amount of advance loans and 
advances the fighter received. To what extent Gavilán knew of, and condoned, such mob 
associations remains unclear. But the fall-out within his camp was rapid. Two months after 
the bout, he and López were engaged in a nasty public feud. Gavilán tried to abrogate his 
contract, citing displeasure over his manager’s “overconfidence” and failure to negotiate a 
return clause in his contract with Saxton. López, in turn, blamed Gavilán for his poor 
performance, saying he had fought like an old man, rather than the young man (28 years old) 
he still was. But Gavilán’s contract with López was valid until June 1957, and the latter was 
not inclined to give that away. The bidding for Gavilán’s contract would begin at $50,000. 
López, who was a nightclub owner in Havana, seemed personally insulted by Gavilán’s 
refusal to fight for him any longer. He fumed, “I brought him up from nobody.”113 By 
January 1955, López was gone from Gavilán’s management team, which was now headed by 
Shade.114 That April, Saxton put his welterweight belt on the line against Tony DeMarco, 
who won it by 14th-round TKO – and lost it to Carmen Basilio seven months later.115 
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Two other Cuban boxers, Isaac Logart and especially Orlando Zulueta, would find 
their careers tied even tighter to U.S. organized crime in the 1950s. Logart, the last of sixteen 
children, was, like Gavilán, from Camagüey. In just six years, he had gone from his first 
prizefight in Cuba (prior to which he had just six amateur bouts) to the ninth-ranked 
welterweight in the world. Nearly fifteen months after trying, and failing, to wrest the Cuban 
lightweight title from champion Rafael Lastre, Logart debuted in the United States at the 
Orange Bowl in Miami in January 1954, where he won a points victory over Young Kid 
Chocolate (a fellow Cuban with the name but not the accomplishments of the original 
Chocolate). A year later, under the training of Mundito Medina (Gavilán’s former trainer), 
the 21-year-old had racked up 39 victories and four draws in 48 fights.116 Although some 
considered him likely to become an eventual welterweight champion, the closest he came 
was in 1957, when he, Virgil Akins, and Vince Martinez were selected to take part in a 
NYSAC elimination tournament for Carmen Basilio’s vacant welterweight title after Basilio 
had moved up to middleweight. As Sammons explains, both Akins and Logart were 
managed by Carbo associates (Bernie Glickman and Jimmy White, respectively). Glickman 
wanted Akins to fight Logart first, since he believed the Cuban to be the easier opponent. 
He threatened IBC president Norris with pulling Akins out of the tournament unless he 
matched the two boxers. Norris paid off Carbo, and the bout was on.117 Akins defeated 
Logart by TKO in March 1958, and less than three months later defeated Martinez for the 
vacant welter title. 
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Another Carbo associate – Herman “Hymie the Mink” Wallman (so-known because 
he was a furrier) – owned the contract of lightweight Orlando Zulueta, who had been 
fighting stateside since January 1949. A Cuban lightweight champion who owed that title to 
two questionable decisions, against Kid Bururu in July 1948 and in his defense with Bombón 
Oriental a month later – Zulueta had made a failed bid for the world junior lightweight title 
against Sandy Saddler in December 1949. Since that time, he had fought regularly, but 
without tremendous distinction, throughout the United States, Canada, and Europe, only 
rarely venturing back to Cuba for a bout. In addition to Zulueta and several less-known 
fighters, Wallman controlled Johnny Bratton, who was welterweight champion before 
Gavilán. He apparently bribed officials to ensure his fighters would win and gave Carbo 
betting tips based on that inside information. According to Sammons, in June 1957, when 
Zulueta received a lightweight title shot against champion Joe Brown, “Carbo told Wallman 
that if his man [Zulueta] won the title he had to give a piece of the fighter to Lou Viscusi, 
Brown’s manager (and the former manager of the great Willie Pep), who had been close to 
Carbo for many years. Perhaps fortunately for Wallman, Zulueta lost.”118 
Benny “Kid” Paret, who followed in Gavilán’s footsteps as world welterweight 
champion when he defeated Don Jordan in May 1960, was yet another Cuban fighter tied to 
the Carbo machine. In late 1960, the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, 
known informally as the Kefauver hearings for its chairman, Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, 
unearthed damaging testimony from Truman Gibson, Jr., James Norris’s successor at the by 
then defunct IBC, and other witnesses regarding the extent of organized crime involvement 
in matchmaking and sanctioning fights. Gibson acknowledged that Carbo “controlled” a 
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slew of prizefight promoters and managers, including Gavilán’s helmsmen Emil Shade and 
Angel López, and that Carbo’s wife was put on the IBC payroll for carrying out such minor 
services as phoning from Florida about the condition of Gavilán and other fighters. In 
December 1961, Carbo was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison for attempting to extort 
Jordan out of a share of his fight earnings from his successful welterweight title challenge of 
Virgil Akins in December 1958. Convicted along with Carbo were Palermo, who received 
fifteen years; mob enforcers Joe Sica and Joe Dragna, who received twenty and five years 
each, respectively; and Gibson, who received a suspended five-year sentence and probation. 
In addition, Carbo, Palermo, Sica, and Gibson were fined $10,000 apiece.119 
Although Jordan, like other high-profile boxers called before the Kefauver 
Committee, refused to divulge details about the extortion scheme, he was more open in an 
interview that took place years after Paret’s notorious 1962 ring death. He stated that, in 
their May 1960 meeting, he had deliberately taken a dive against Paret, who won a fifteen-
round unanimous decision: “I was beating him for 13 rounds and slackened off in the last 
two rounds… The deal was in. He had to win, and I didn’t get a rematch because Paret was 
under Frankie Carbo.” Had he not done so, Jordan alleged, “certain people” had threatened 
to take his wife hostage. The judges’ and referees’ fairly one-sided scores, as well as the 
syndicated United Press International synopsis of the fight – which praised Paret for his 
relentless body blows – appear to contradict Jordan’s version of events. In any case, if his 
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charge were true, Jordan received little for his efforts; after his managers took the majority of 
his purse as the price of terminating his contract with them, he was left with just $2,000.120 
 Despite the later revelations of his ties to organized crime, Gavilán’s best career years 
remain a high point in Cuban sports history from the late 1940s to mid-1950s. As with Kid 
Chocolate, however, whose championship years coincided with the last years of the 
machadato and the September 1933 Sergeants’ Revolt, the 1952 coup by Batista 
overshadowed, but could not fully dim, his ring achievements. Gavilán’s success was a 
driving force to those who came after him, an indicator that Chocolate’s achievement had 
been no fluke but that Cuba did indeed produce some of the world’s best prizefighters. His 
appeal to television audiences in the U.S. and Cuba, moreover, foreshadowed an era in 
which boxers, baseball players, and other athletes, were known as much (if not more) for 
their personalities and other exploits than for what they accomplished in the ring, the 
ballpark, or the track. Finally, in an era when race relations was increasingly becoming an 
area of conflict in both the United States and Cuba, his smiling brown face, use of dance 
steps and bolo punches in the ring, and unthreatening personality served to reinforce images 
of blacks, and more particularly, Afro-Cubans, as being happily subservient to elite white 
North American interests as he demolished their fighters on live TV. The rumors that he 
might not have come by all of his victories legitimately, therefore, did not significantly tar his 
personal popularity in the U.S. even as they helped to propagate images of the boxing 
industry as a whole as being corrupt and rife with mafia influence. They may, however, have 
hurt his reputation in Cuban political circles after the onset of the Revolution, when Gavilán 
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found himself ostracized by the Castro regime. After suffering many personal setbacks, an 
impoverished and ill Gavilán was allowed to emigrate to the United States in 1968, where he 
lived for a time on the margins of respectability and died largely in obscurity in 2003. 
 
Havana as Tourist Playground: Gambling, Vice, and International Sport 
 It must be emphasized that – while research on this topic remains sketchy at best – 
the impact of organized crime in sport was hardly limited to the United States. Though the 
mythology of organized crime in late-republic Cuba, thanks to images such as those put 
forth in The Godfather Part II (1974), has largely eclipsed the reality, there were many ways in 
which mid-1950s Havana had indeed become something of a mobsters’ paradise.121 
Nonetheless, the webs connecting professional sport to organized crime and other forms of 
vice in Cuba were never as well elucidated as in the United States. Several recent 
monographs discuss the influence of the U.S.-based mob on the island (including scholarly 
works by Rosalie Schwartz and Eduardo Sáenz Rovner and a well-regarded popular history 
by mafia expert T.J. English), but the intersections among Cuban sport, gambling, and illicit 
industries such as prostitution and drug trafficking are subjects that still demand future 
research.122 
Since the colonial era, gambling had enjoyed a central place in the pursuit of sports 
and recreation. As Sáenz Rovner notes, gambling was a staple of nineteenth-century life, 
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embraced by whites, Afro-Cubans, and Chinese alike and transcending class as well as ethnic 
and racial lines. The activity took on many forms, from lotteries and card games to betting 
on pastimes such as cockfighting. In the republic era, the government instituted a popular 
weekly national lottery, which proved a lucrative source of bribes, graft, and other revenue. 
Furthermore, a culture of vice and corruption had long been the norm; in Schwartz’s words, 
“Cubans did not need foreign gangsters to teach them the intricacies of extortion rackets and 
payoffs from gambling and prostitution.” Nonetheless, the state’s well-known tolerance for 
brothels, sex shows, drugs, alcohol, and casinos – interests that were often openly controlled 
or influenced by the U.S.-based mafia – aided the perception among tourists and other 
foreigners that Havana was an illicit playground for the rich and well-connected.123 
Despite the latter-day portrayal in American popular culture that Cuba emerged as a 
gangsters’ stomping ground only in the 1950s, U.S.-based mobsters had been operating there 
since at least Prohibition days. Alphonse “Al” Capone operated a short-lived Marianao pool 
hall in 1928, probably as a front for bootlegging (Prohibition in the United States remained 
law until 1933). The New York-based Meyer Lansky (born Meyer Suchowljansky) had 
grander ambitions for Cuba; according to T.J. English, Meyer understood that, “With a 
friendly government in Cuba, there was no telling what the Mob could accomplish.” The 
onset of the Great Depression, the political upheaval following Gerardo Machado’s 1933 
coup, and the conviction of Lansky’s partner – notorious gangster Charles “Lucky” Luciano 
(Salvatore Lucania) – in New York on prostitution charges in 1936 prematurely ended the 
mafia’s efforts to “establish the island as their own private fiefdom.”124 In 1938, Lansky – by 
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then running gambling dens in South Florida – was pegged by Fulgencio Batista to lead 
similar operations out of Oriental Park and the Hotel Nacional. In contradiction to the 
seemingly unsavory association of the foreign mob with a military-backed regime, Lansky 
has been credited with running a “clean” game, at least by Cuban standards.125 
In 1946, New York governor Thomas Dewey commuted Luciano’s prison sentence, 
apparently as reward for the gangster’s assistance to the U.S. in its campaigns against Italy 
and Germany during World War II. The government’s gratitude only went so far; the Italian-
born Luciano was promptly deported. Instead of resettling in Italy, as planned, he embarked 
for Cuba that fall and – with the assistance of a Cuban legislator – soon obtained legal 
residence there. In Havana, he hobnobbed with elites and lived splendidly off his numerous 
business interests, which included the Hotel Nacional’s casino and a new airline that 
operated between the capital and Key West. At the same time, U.S. authorities suspected 
him of plotting to turn Havana into a transfer point for the trafficking of Turkish heroin via 
Italy and into their country. Before the U.S. government, using the threat of an embargo on 
medicinal narcotics, forced Cuba to deport the mafia kingpin in March 1947, he and his 
associates, most notably Lansky, had made significant strides in infiltrating Cuban 
government and business circles.126 
Even before the U.S.-based mob gained a foothold in Cuba, betting had riddled 
professional sports, from baseball and boxing to jai alai and (not surprisingly) horse racing. 
In the aftermath of the 1915 Johnson-Willard bout, for instance, Senator Erasmo 
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Regüeiferos specifically referred to boxing’s connection to gambling as one of many reasons 
to ban the sport.127 Nevertheless, the growth of gambling in Cuban professional sports 
accelerated and intensified with the burgeoning tourist industry. Not only did current and 
former athletes, Cuban and foreign, at times actively take part in its development – former 
heavyweight boxing champion Jack Dempsey, for instance, invested fifty thousand dollars in 
Luciano’s Gran Casino Nacional128 – but many government functionaries, from the president 
on down, condoned, colluded with, and personally benefited from the mob’s investment in 
casinos and hotels. 
The influence of the mob in Cuba peaked following the assumption of power by 
Fulgencio Batista after a bloodless coup d’état on March 10, 1952. The influx of prosperous 
North Americans during these postwar years, and the growth of the resort sector throughout 
the Caribbean, provided an incentive for Batista’s government to turn over to foreign 
elements a substantial portion of the tourist market. Moreover, Tennessee Senator Estes 
Kefauver’s televised subcommittee hearings on organized crime had, by the early 1950s, not 
only broadened public awareness of corruption in gambling and other U.S. sectors, but also 
forced many of the top mob families to find new pastures elsewhere. As the Saturday Evening 
Post reported in its notorious March 1953 exposé of organized crime infiltration of the 
Caribbean, mafiosi from New York, New Jersey, Pittsburgh, Detroit, and Chicago soon 
“moved into Havana in such force that the town looked like a haven for the underworld in 
exile.” There they opened gambling houses and casinos, most of them dishonest; naïve 
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tourists were quickly fleeced of their savings in games that were biased toward the house.129 
Outrage over the crooked nature of Havana gambling establishments led Batista to deport 
the more egregious operators and to hire Meyer Lansky (who had run the Hotel Nacional 
and Montmartre Club casinos and whose relationship with Batista went back decades) as his 
“adviser on gambling reform.”130 
Not surprisingly, Batista and his cronies personally benefited from the regime’s close 
association with the mob. Having assumed the presidency in 1952, Batista dismissed the 
DGD director Lorenzo Nodarse and replaced him with the brother of Batista’s much 
younger second wife, Marta Fernández Miranda. In his new position, General Roberto 
Fernández Miranda declared that he was especially interested in developing popular sports, 
such as boxing. With the establishment in May 1953 of the Comisión Nacional de Deportes 
(National Sports Commission, or CND), replacing the DGD, Batista promoted Fernández 
Miranda to head the new body, which oversaw most amateur and professional sports on the 
island. (According to Decree 860, excluded from the CND director’s duties were control 
over the Cuban Olympic Committee, scholastic and university sports, and certain women’s 
sports.)131 Fernández Miranda’s control of the CND also gave him supervision of the 
national lottery, thus offering a means of obtaining many lucrative sources of graft. In March 
1958, Life magazine alleged that he skimmed not only from slot machine revenue, taking a 
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fifty percent cut with the blessings of the mafia, but also from Havana parking meters.132 
There were likely many other ways in which Batista’s brother-in-law used his access to sports 
and other revenue to benefit his political associates and extended family – similar to what 
former DGD director Jaime Mariné had achieved during Batista’s earlier presidency, but this 
time with the active or passive involvement of foreign-based gangsters. 
Beyond augmenting his own personal wealth, however, Fernández Miranda did seek 
to use his tenure at the CND to increase the visibility of international sporting events in 
Cuba. At six feet tall and around 210 pounds, he was himself a career military man and all-
around athlete whose amateur boxing prowess, in particular, was singled out for praise in a 
fawning New York Times article: 
 
Would you like to box? Fernández-Miranda can outstep a 
middleweight, outjab a welterweight and duck and shift in Willie Pep fashion. 
His last three heavyweight “victims,” all sergeants in the Presidential farm 
detachment, asked for transfers to less active posts. 
 
Despite his own enthusiasm for physical recreation, there was a financial rationale behind 
Fernández Miranda’s focus on recruiting sports tourists. The strategy was to attract a handful 
of world-caliber events that, like the Johnson-Willard bout decades previously, could serve as 
a magnet for foreign visitors to stay and spend their money elsewhere – whether that be the 
respectable, risqué, or downright seedy sides of Cuban life. Prizefighting was at the center of 
those plans, but the Batista administration had grander ambitions. Even sports without a 
longtime connection to the island, or that lacked a significant number of native participants, 
were eligible for inclusion. 
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Along those lines, Fernández Miranda supervised the creation of the Gran Premio 
automobile race, which attracted over 150,000 paying viewers during its first year in February 
1957.133 Won by Argentine Juan Manuel Fangio, the race was intended to secure favorable 
publicity for the regime at a time when it was battling Fidel Castro and his rebel forces in 
foreign newspapers as well as the battlefield. Just twelve months later, the Gran Premio 
became a public relations nightmare when, the night before the race, insurgents kidnapped 
Fangio and prevented him from taking part. He was later released unharmed, with positive 
words for his captors. During the race, moreover, a Cuban driver crashed into a grandstand 
full of spectators, killing four and injuring dozens more. Rather than showcase Cuba as the 
site of well-run international athletic events, then, the 1958 Gran Premio did quite the 
opposite.134 
Fernández Miranda also oversaw the development of Ciudad Deportiva (Sports 
City), an eighty-acre complex located between central Havana and the airport. Several years 
in the building, this site included indoor and outdoor facilities for a variety of sports, 
including baseball, swimming, tennis, and track and field. Yet its centerpiece, the Coliseo 
Nacional – which was topped by a large concrete dome – was designed at least in part to 
attract world championship prizefights to Havana. With Cuba’s renowned stable of pugilistic 
contenders and current welterweight champion Kid Gavilán, the state wished to give locals 
as well as visiting tourists the opportunity to view them in action in their own backyard. In 
addition to hosting the CND’s offices, the National Boxing Academy would be based at 
Ciudad Deportiva, and there would be accommodations for visiting athletes. Originally 
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slated to open in October 1954, the complex would take several more years to be completed 
– a delay that was likely due to incompetence and graft.135 Not until 1959, the first year of the 
Revolution, did regular boxing events take place there. 
Ironically, with the eventual repudiation of professional sports by the newly installed 
Castro regime, Ciudad Deportiva became a symbol not of Cuba’s embrace of revenue-
generating international sporting events but of its dedication to socialist ideals of sport. It is 
still in use today, host to important national, regional, and international events, albeit all of 
them in the amateur arena. Cutting-edge for its time, to more recent observers its name (so 
different from the commercially sponsored structures of developed countries) and utilitarian 
architecture evoke Soviet rather than capitalist sensibilities. In his travelogue on Cuba, 
Washington Post editor Eugene Robinson puts his finger on this disconnect for present-day 
U.S. visitors: 
 
The arena itself was like an early prototype of the modern sports 
palace. The size and shape were right, but the materials were all wrong 
(painted concrete instead of glossier surfaces), the portals of ingress and 
egress too few and too narrow to satisfy modern theories of crowd flow, the 
seats too narrow, the pitch of the seating galleries too steep, the spectators 
dangerously close to the action. Instead of being Oz-like and intimidating, 
like every arena in every big American city, the place was almost intimate, 
with the ambiance of a high school gymnasium.136 
 
Most astonishing of all for those inside and outside the Batista administration who 
had championed the development of Ciudad Deportiva as a mark of capitalist progress, its 
coliseum was used briefly in January 1959 as the site of show trials for former Batista military 
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officials. Their convictions brought with them sentences of death by firing squad. Perhaps 
because of the negative international publicity – which likened the stadium crowds crying for 
blood to a “Roman holiday” – the court-martials were relocated to Camp Columbia, once 
the headquarters of the U.S. military occupation on the island. Having learned its lesson, the 
Castro regime allowed access by foreign and domestic journalists to the Camp Columbia 
trials but prohibited television and radio coverage.137 
 
Cubans in International Amateur Boxing Tournaments 
Although virtuosity in international amateur competition was not a hallmark of pre-
revolutionary Cuba, this did not mean that it did not exist. One of the bright spots of the 
island’s boxing program in 1950, at a time when the prizefighting industry was in flux, had 
been the success of its amateurs abroad. Through coverage in daily newspapers and sports 
magazines, Cuba’s “fanáticos” kept up with the exploits of the national contingent to the VI 
Central American and Caribbean Games, held in Guatemala from February 8 to March 12, 
1950. This athletic competition was founded in 1926 and rotated among member states 
every four or so years, depending on the region’s political stability and other factors. After 
Havana hosted the second Games in 1930, the contest migrated to San Salvador, El Salvador 
(1935), the first to include boxing. It was subsequently held in Panama City, Panama (1938) 
and Barranquilla, Colombia (1946). The VI Games were set in Guatemala, which had 
founded the competition along with Mexico and Cuba. In 1950, thirteen delegations that had 
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previously attended the Games were in attendance (in addition to the host country and 
Cuba, these were Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dutch Antilles, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Puerto Rico, and Trinidad and Tobago), while Haiti made its 
first such appearance. Half the delegations fielded boxing teams; Cuba, Mexico, and 
Guatemala had full eight-men squads, while Colombia, Jamaica, Panama, and Nicaragua had 
five, three, two, and one boxing entries, respectively.138 
The Cuban team – led by trainers Luis Sarría and Wee Wee Barton, both respected 
former prizefighters – won three gold medals, two silvers, and three bronzes, or one in each 
weight division on offer. While that record appears to be impressive, a closer look reveals 
that no Cuban boxer won more than two fights, since no weight class featured more than six 
competitors. The gold medalists were Enrique Lamelas at paperweight (46 kg/101 lbs.), a 
division that was making its first appearance at the Central American and Caribbean Games 
and had four competitors; Cirlio Gómez at middleweight (75 kg/165 lbs.), with five 
competitors; and Julio Mederos at light heavy (81 kg/178 lbs.), with three competitors. 
Evelio Caballero won a silver medal at bantamweight (54 kg/119 lbs.) without winning a 
bout, as there were only three men in his weight class and he was given a bye to the finals. In 
the featherweight division (57 kg/125 lbs.), which had six competitors, Félix Triana also 
earned a silver medal. Sergio Peñalver at flyweight (51 kg/112 lbs.) and Rosendo Brunet at 
lightweight (60 kg/132 lbs.) won bronze medals in brackets with five men apiece, while 
Gilberto Gutiérrez at light middleweight (71 kg/156 lbs.) picked up bronze after losing a 
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preliminary bout in his four-person division. Brunet also participated in the track and field 
competition.139 
 On the surface, the onset of dictatorship in 1952 seemed to change little in Cuban 
amateur pugilistic circles. Yet Batista’s funding priorities further weakened amateur sports in 
Cuba and reduced opportunities for international competition. Because of lack of funds, the 
Cuban delegation to the VII Central American and Caribbean Games – held in Mexico City 
in March 1954 – was smaller than the one that had traveled to Guatemala City in 1950. 
Although Cuba had won the baseball gold medal during the five of the first six Central 
American and Caribbean Games (it had to settle for the bronze in 1946), it did not bring a 
baseball team to the VII Games. It is hard to imagine that Cuba would not have won the 
1954 Central American and Caribbean Games had it brought a baseball team, but as 
historian Roberto González Echevarría has noted, the “great amateur era” of Cuban baseball 
was in decline after 1944, not to recover again until the consolidation of the Cuban 
Revolution. The end of World War II had brought a revival of the minor leagues, and many 
Cuban players were being recruited to play professionally in the United States, particularly in 
the Florida International League. The rise of the Mexican League and revival of the Cuban 
League in the mid-to-late 1940s also fueled the exodus of young Cuban players. In 1959, 
nine months after the start of the revolutionary regime, Cuba suffered its worst loss in 
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international amateur baseball competition to that point – coming in eighth place at the 
Chicago Pan-American Games.140 
It is likely that the growing demand for Cuban pugilists abroad fueled a similar plight 
in terms of both quantity and quality of amateurs available for international competition. Of 
the twelve delegations attending the 1954 Central American and Caribbean Games, seven 
fielded boxing teams. None brought a full squad, although Cuba, Puerto Rico, Mexico, and 
Venezuela each had seven-man teams. Panama brought six, the Dominican Republic five, 
and Guatemala four boxers. The eight weight classes had shifted somewhat from the 
previous Games. Gone was the paperweight division (46 kg/101 lbs); the lightest group now 
comprised flyweights (51 kg/112 lbs). The light middleweight division (71 kg/156 lbs) had 
been replaced with the welterweight class (67 kg/147 lbs). Finally, the heavyweight division 
(+81 kg/+178 lbs) was added, though only Puerto Rico and Mexico were able to field 
competitors big enough to compete in it. These changes did not help the Cuban squad 
much, if at all. In contrast to the Guatemala event, when it earned medals in every weight 
class, it emerged with just one silver, for bantamweight (54 kg/119 lbs) Sergio Cárdenas – 
the only Cuban boxer that year to win two bouts (in a seven-person bracket) – and a bronze 
for Reynaldo Tabío, who lost his first bout after receiving a bye to the flyweight semi-finals 
(a five-person bracket). Host country Mexico dominated the boxing finals, winning five gold 
medals, with Venezuela, Puerto Rico, and Panama earning one apiece.141 
Amateur accolades, then as now, hardly guaranteed one success in the prize ring. 
Cárdenas, Tabío, and their teammates – Pablo Cárdenas (featherweight), Severiano Herrera 
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     141 Domínguez, Boxeo cubano; Montesinos and Barrios, Centroamericanos y del Caribe, pp. 47, 48-55, 196-208. 
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(lightweight), Benigno Fernández (welterweight), Reynaldo González (middleweight), and 
Pablo Valderraín (heavyweight) – did not become as well known professionally as did their 
cohorts who went to Guatemala – Enrique Lamelas, Cirilo Gómez, Julio Mederos, Félix 
Triana, and Sergio Peñalver, all of whom turned professional in 1951. Tabío turned 
professional in 1954 and moved to Mexico in 1957 to continue his ring career. González 
turned pro in 1954 and fought in Cuba until at least 1958, while Valderraín was active 
professionally in Cuban rings at least through March 1961. I have found no record to 
indicate that Herrera and Fernández turned pro. The whereabouts of all these men after the 
Revolution remain in doubt. 
The 1953-54 Golden Gloves competition, which ran before and after the Central 
American and Caribbean Games, did attract several young pugilists who turned pro by the 
end of the decade, many of whom hailed from outside Havana, and a few of whom made 
their way to U.S. rings. Jose M. “Johnny” Sarduy, José Rigores, Lázaro Hernández Kessell, 
Lino Rendón, Joe Pedroso, and Paul Díaz were just some of the youths who participated in 
that year’s Golden Gloves events. Reynaldo Tabío and Benigno Fernández from the Central 
American and Caribbean Games also participated.142 
Among the top amateurs of the early to mid-1950s, only a few had significant careers 
abroad. One was Julio Mederos, though given his weight class (heavyweight), it would have 
been harder for him to find opponents in Cuba. Despite his strong amateur credentials – in 
addition to the gold at the Guatemala Central American and Caribbean Games, he was a 
Cuban Golden Gloves champion – Mederos was much less successful as a professional. As 
so many others of his caliber were, he was frequently used to test young contenders on their 
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way up to a title shot, or to mix with those who had never quite made it and were on their 
way down. 
In May 1955, Mederos was embroiled in a minor scandal in his rematch with Harold 
Johnson – who comprised the “up-and-coming” type of opponent and had already defeated 
Mederos by unanimous decision in Miami Beach the previous December. Their second bout, 
a nationally televised but sparsely attended affair in Philadelphia, had just begun when 
Johnson, then the number-one ranked light heavyweight contender and heavily favored to 
win the rematch, sank from his stool to the canvas after going to his corner at the end of the 
second round. After a ring physician stopped the bout, the referee awarded Mederos a 
second-round technical knockout, a decision that remains on the books today. Johnson was 
taken to the hospital, but that was hardly the end of it. Johnson, himself a Philadelphia 
native, claimed that an autograph-seeking stranger had offered him an orange several hours 
before the fight, and that it must have been drugged. Although initial reports cast doubt on 
his claim, a few days after the bout, Pennsylvania Governor George M. Leader announced 
that a barbiturate had indeed been administered to Johnson, who remained under police 
guard while convalescing at an area hospital. In the wake of the original “Philadelphia 
decision” which earlier that year had derailed Kid Gavilán’s welterweight reign, Leader 
instituted a stunning 90-day statewide ban on professional boxing so that the newly 
appointed State Athletic Commission could undertake “a most critical examination of the 
sport of boxing in Pennsylvania.” Only a few already approved bouts were given an 
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exemption to go on.143 Although the means (it wasn’t the orange), motives, and perpetrators 
of the drugging did not come to light, it was believed that it involved illicit gambling and 
bookmaking. By August, the Governor had signed a “clean boxing” bill passed by the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly, which put additional controls on out-of-state promoters 
and took a portion of closed-circuit TV receipts – a bill that was squarely aimed at the 
IBC.144 In the end, however, it would take a few more years, and a full-fledged federal 
antitrust suit, to prevent the IBC and its associated mobsters from further enriching itself at 
the expense of professional boxing. 
Neither of the pugilists appeared to be adversely affected by the scandal. Harold 
Johnson ended up becoming the NBA world light heavyweight champion in 1961 and the 
undisputed world light heavyweight titleholder in 1962, a title he held until losing a split 
decision to Willie Pastrano in June 1963. Johnson remained active in the ring until his early 
forties and was ultimately inducted into the International Boxing Hall of Fame, but he and 
Mederos – who in any case was a true heavyweight fighting nearly fifteen pounds heavier – 
never met in the ring again. As for Mederos, he became a hardy club fighter with a solid 
right hand and chin, winning roughly as often as he lost, losing rarely by knockout, and even 
beating a few top heavyweights of the day, such as Bob Satterfield. During the spring of 
1956, he also worked in New York as a sparring partner for Floyd Patterson, who at age 21 
became the youngest world heavyweight champion ever when he knocked out the great 
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veteran Archie Moore that November.145 Mederos continued to battle with veteran pugs and 
up-and-comers alike until one night in Chicago in May 1958, when a vicious jab by Sonny 
Liston – then slicing a terrifying swathe through the heavyweight division on an eventual 
collision course with Floyd Patterson and the world title – cut his lip badly enough that the 
ring doctor advised a halt to the bout after the second round. Mederos was just 25 years old, 
but his boxing career was over.146 
There is an interesting footnote to international amateur boxing in the revolutionary 
era, a period that would – at a cost that has yet to be ascertained in either economic or social 
terms – usher in a period of unrivaled amateur ring success. At a 1958 meeting of the 
International Amateur Boxing Association (known by its French acronym, AIBA), Cuba had 
been selected to host the third annual world Diamond Belt tournament the following year. 
Founded in 1936, the Diamond Belt had, like the Golden Gloves, originated in the United 
States as a series of regional tournaments that culminated in a national championship. In 
1957, it was transformed into an international competition under AIBA’s supervision. That 
year, in Seattle, three Cuban entrants in ten weight classes – featherweight Douglas Vaillant, 
light welterweight Antonio Zaldivár, and welterweight Sarvelio Fuentes – won International 
Diamond Belt titles, besting boxers from the U.S., Canada, China, Japan, and Mexico. Two 
other competitors, flyweight José Rigores and bantamweight Ultiminio Ramos, lost in the 
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finals and semifinals, respectively, but no doubt gained valuable experience. Only the U.S. 
performed better.147 
The 1958 event, held in Mexico City, had featured ten nations, including Cuba, and it 
was predicted that even more would attend the following year. But the sudden victory of 
Castro’s forces on New Year’s Day 1959 persuaded some of the tournament organizers that 
it was best to stay away from Havana. Their response came as a surprise to the new boxing 
assessor, Jess Losada, and director of sports, Captain Felipe Guerra Matos, who may have 
lobbied behind the scenes to keep the prestigious event in the capital. In March, however, 
after AIBA ratified the Diamond Belt tournament’s move to Mexico City “owing to the 
conditions in Cuba,” Guerra Matos announced that Cuba would boycott the competition.148 
What particularly rankled the Executive Committee of the Unión Atlética Amateur 
de Cuba (UAAC), Cuba’s foremost amateur association, was the implication that the present 
“conditions in Cuba” were to blame for what it felt was unsportsmanlike conduct by AIBA 
and the Mexican delegation. In a press release, the UAAC committee members conceded 
that, in August 1958, they had given up the right to host the 1959 tournament due to the 
political upheaval then taking place in Havana, but with the return of “la paz pública” (the 
public peace) and “un ambiante de libertad” (the atmosphere of freedom), they felt that they 
should regain it. Although AIBA’s general secretary appeared to agree with them, other 
influential members, including boxing promoters, had successfully pushed for the move to 
Mexico. The UAAC committee members were troubled as to why AIBA had deemed 
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Havana a suitable site for the tournament in 1958 but not in 1959. By way of consolation to 
any disappointed amateurs, assessor Losada stated that the national team would be attending 
an international event that year, most likely the Golden Gloves in the United States.149 
Although Cold War politics appear to have played a minor role in this spat, it is 
notable that the Castro regime’s first official decision to boycott an international athletic 
event took place just three months into its tenure. As participating nations took part in the 
International Diamond Belt competition in Mexico City that September, Cuba’s officials 
were attempting to nurture its professional as well as amateur athletic programs in line with 
the new ideals of revolution. 
 
This chapter explored some of the ways in which boxing remained incompletely 
integrated into the Cuban nationalist project. Although boxing in the 1950s remained an 
extremely popular sport, its appeal to the Prío and especially Batista regimes was primarily 
financial. As with other areas in which Cubans excelled, such as music and dance, there was 
an eagerness to export the country’s best talent to areas, particularly the United States, where 
they could earn the most money and glory for the nation. Yet most Cuban boxers abroad 
were far from successful in the ring or out of it – eking out meager existences, at the mercy 
of sometimes exploitative managers and promoters, by taking on too many fights with men 
they could not beat. The existence of a National Boxing Academy in Havana did offer a 
means by which to recycle retired pugilists for the benefit of the state, but most of them had 
few prospects after their ring careers were over. Moreover, although the national Golden 
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Gloves network offered valuable experience to many would-be professionals, the Batista 
regime repeatedly ignored or neglected opportunities to send amateur boxers abroad. The 
vaunted CND even opted out of sending boxers to the 1956 Munich Olympics, instead 
prioritizing the pursuit of tourist dollars through prizefighting and other professional sports.  
While a successful amateur boxing record remained the likeliest means to a successful 
professional career, judging by the illustrious names who emerged out of the Cuban amateur 
ranks in the late 1950s, its importance had diminished. The ability of underemployed young 
men to seek out poorly paid bouts elsewhere in the Caribbean, or in Central or South 
America or Mexico – or, if they were lucky, in Florida, where they might receive U.S. press 
coverage – meant that only the most talented, protected, or economically secure pugilists 
could stay amateur for long. Boxing in 1950s Cuba, in short, was valued by the state as a 
generator of foreign revenue rather than as a symbol of national unity or pride. Although 
boys might still seek to learn the craft of boxing out of sheer love for the sport, as many of 
them had in the first few decades of the century, its practice was increasingly commodified. 
Even the Batista regime’s desire to stage multiple world championship bouts in the capital – 
supposedly as a means to allow citizens to see their brightest fighters in action – was, first 
and foremost, a financial decision. As such, it ignored the realities of the emerging civil war 
and did not, ultimately, come to fruition. Despite the tremendous transnational popularity of 
Kid Gavilán, the singular Cuban world champion of this decade, his mugging for American 
cameras and much lauded victories could not conceal the patina of corruption that coated 
Batista’s illegitimate administration. 
Our last chapter examines how and why, with Batista’s ouster and the onset of the 
Revolution, Cuba’s still thriving prizefighting industry, humming along even in the throes of 
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civil war, would come to a complete stop by early 1962. Change was both gradual and swift, 
and incorporated ideological motives as well as practical ones, but the initial goal was 
modest: reform of the existing system. In later years, the Castro regime would paint a picture 
of its break from Batista-era boxing as having been both inevitable and necessary, but in 
1959 and into 1960, it was a break that was neither foreseen nor desired by the new 
government and its youthful leaders. 
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Chapter 6: Cuban Boxing at the Dawn of Revolution, 1959-1962 
 
Professional Boxing’s Slow Decline, 1959-1961 
 “People say, ‘Before the Revolution’,” the great Kid Chocolate once remarked, “but 
there was no Cuba before the Revolution.”1 Although he was speaking of the years of futility 
felt by many during the rule of Fulgencio Batista, he may as well have been invoking 
centuries of economic hardship faced by the majority of his countrymen and women, the 
scars of slavery and of entrenched racial discrimination against Afro-Cubans, and the island’s 
ongoing dependence upon outside nations for its political and economic survival. Kid 
Chocolate was hardly alone in seeing the Revolution as a break from all that came before. 
Millions of Cubans of all classes, colors, and ages have – since 1959 – rallied around 
opposing views of nationhood that are intricately tied to the Revolution. For at least the past 
45 years, there has been no discussing Cuba without reference to the disjunctions of its most 
admired and reviled Revolution – the “old Cuba” vs. the new. For many in exile – 
particularly those in Cuban enclaves such as South Florida and New York – the willfulness 
of remembering an imagined “old Cuba” is both political gesture and personal coping 
mechanism, a means of finding one’s way in another country while maintaining a mental 
foothold in the old. For those who chose to stay and embrace the Revolution as the means 
to a better life, even as its gains slipped away over time, old Cuba continued to signify 
corruption, racism, and enormous inequities. 
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 Despite the rhetoric of both sides, historians have long argued against viewing Fidel 
Castro’s triumphal ascension to power on January 1, 1959, as the dividing line between 
“before” and “after” in Cuba. There were many small moments in which Cuba stepped away 
from its past en route to a different future. In the realm of sports, and especially boxing, the 
dividing line is generally viewed to be March 1962. That is when – with National Decree 83a 
– the revolutionary state banned all professional sports. A few weeks later, the death of 
Cuban exile Benny “Kid” Paret to Emile Griffith after their world welterweight 
championship bout – in which Griffith administered to Paret, already damaged from earlier 
bouts, a vicious beating that was shown on live U.S. television – provided Castro with 
further rhetorical justification for cutting Cuba’s ties to prizefighting once and for all. 
 Although the decree was the final nail in prizefighting’s coffin in Cuba, the death was 
a slow one. Professional boxing had been in decline since 1960 for a variety of economic as 
well as political reasons. Once the ban was enacted, however, many active prizefighters were 
given a choice between a job in the state apparatus and permission to leave the country. 
While most chose the latter, a few – such as Sarvelio Fuentes, currently the national team’s 
head coach – gave up promising professional careers in order to help develop Cuba’s 
amateur talent. 
 Others became involved in the anti-revolutionary movement and suffered exile, 
death, or imprisonment as a result. Johnny Sarduy, Pedro José González, and Antonio 
“Puppy” García were three boxers who not only opposed the establishment of communism 
in Cuba but also took part in political or military efforts to defeat it. Sarduy and González 
were members of Brigade 2506, the 1,500-strong exile group that took part in the failed 
April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. García, once Cuba’s most popular boxing idol, became a 
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Havana-based agitator who served nine years in prison before ultimately leaving in the 1980 
Mariel boatlift. García, along with the gifted young Florentino Fernández, whose mother 
disowned him for leaving the family behind in Cuba, were branded as traitors to Cuba – and 
as washed-up pugs. On the contrary, a few boxers, such as the novice Giraldo Córdova 
Cardín – who died with anti-Batista forces in the 1950s before either the Revolution or his 
ring talents could be realized – and ex-amateur Lino Salabarría, who died in 1963 fighting 
counter-insurgency forces in Escambray – were immortalized as talented boxers and 
revolutionary martyrs and held up as examples for all of Cuba’s athletes. And years after 
1962, the state continued to valorize former prizefighters, most notably Kid Chocolate, as 
long as they did not openly criticize the new regime. 
 As Cuba moved toward communism, moreover, U.S. sportswriters and ex-fighters, 
most vocally exiles, spoke heartrendingly about “the end of Cuban boxing,” dismissing the 
Revolution’s soon-to-be highly vaunted amateurs as not worthy of carrying on its pugilistic 
tradition. (An aged, overweight, and long retired Niño Valdés, former contender to the 
heavyweight crown, once boasted, “put me in a telephone booth with [Olympic champion 
Teófilo] Stevenson and I’ll be the one walking out of that booth on my feet.”2) Exiles wrote 
adoringly of professional boxers who had built successful careers outside Cuba and pitied 
those who remained “trapped,” in their words, on the communist isle. The Castro regime, 
on the contrary, railed against the evils of prizefighting in republic-era Cuba and corralled 
dissenting current and ex-boxers in a variety of ways – for Kid Gavilán, agrarian “reform,” 
including appropriation of property, and short jail stints; for Puppy García, a long prison 
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sentence; for Puppy’s brother Lino, isolation and supervision; and for many of the active 
professionals who chose to leave Cuba, preventing their family members from leaving with 
them. Most interestingly, the state undermined anti-Castro boxers by disputing their boxing 
credentials in the press and history books. And both sides claimed to represent the best of 
Cuban boxing – a “golden age” that would ultimately prove to be the direction in which 
boxing as a sport needed to go. 
 This chapter explores the gradual transformation of the revolutionary state from its 
tentative efforts to embrace capitalist sports beginning in 1959, to its adoption of socialism 
and repudiation of professional sports by early 1962. The creation and implementation of 
new state institutions not only created a means for training and developing untapped talent 
but also sought to corral competitive sport into the revolutionary agenda. Although the 
survivors of this period are old men and women now, at this writing there continues to be a 
bitter stalemate between those who venerate Cuba’s role in amateur boxing as central to its 
transformative agenda and those who depict the elimination of professional sports as a 
tremendous betrayal – not only of individual athletes and trainers, but of the Cuban people 
as a whole. 
 
The Demise of the Social Clubs 
 From 1959 to early 1961, the state continued to work largely within the pre-
revolutionary apparatus to build up Cuba’s sports programs and open up recreational 
facilities to the public. In doing so, however, it departed significantly from the prior 
administration, which had delayed or opposed efforts to increase racial equality. On at least 
three occasions prior to what came to be known as Castro’s “Proclamation against 
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Discrimination” on March 22, 1959, the premier expressed concern with racial (as well as 
sexual) discrimination and recognized the importance of these issues to the Cuban people. In 
the Proclamation, Castro decried the often virulent racism that continued to be felt in Cuba 
and expressed his desire to deal with the segregation plaguing both the leisure and work 
sectors. This speech also announced the impending desegregation of all-white beaches (the 
best had been privatized by hotels or exclusive clubs, which excluded blacks).3 
 Three days later, Castro qualified his remarks somewhat – emphasizing equal 
opportunity in the workplace while downplaying that in leisure centers – to counter growing 
white fears that “blacks had become impossible” since his March 22 speech and would now 
demand integration of what had previously been construed as the private sphere of whites. 
The image of blacks and whites dancing together in a social club was especially scandalous, 
to elites and petit-bourgeoisie alike; Castro tried to tame these fears by stating, “People 
dance with whomever they want and… socialize with whomever they want.” Nonetheless, 
Castro continued to assert the need for racial integration and called for a national debate on 
racism. This campaign was supported by a wide cross-section of institutions in Havana and 
throughout the country – universities, churches, political and civil groups, and professional 
organizations. This process set in motion the dismantling of public and private desegregation 
in Cuba.4 Within a few months of taking power, the regime desegregated and nationalized 
beaches and private athletic clubs, which had been some of the most visible symbols of 
racism and class inequality during the Batista era. While they were more piecemeal and 
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gradual than may have appeared at the time, these changes seemed rapid to many Cubans 
and no doubt further fueled the desire of elites to leave the country. 
 In accomplishing the desegregation of white facilities, moreover, the state in 1961 
began to shut down most sociedades de color, which had long served as centers for Afro-
Cuban civic and cultural expression – since the “existence of racially defined associations 
was perceived by revolutionary leaders to be in blatant contradiction to the revolution’s goals 
concerning racial integration.” Alejandro de la Fuente argues that most of the affected 
sociedades at that time were “virtually dead already” due to sharp declines in membership, as 
new state institutions quickly assumed their role as centers for cultural, leisure, educational, 
and social activities. Yet unlike the opening of the all-white facilities to poor and nonwhite 
peoples, which was intended to accomplish class and race unity, the closure or 
marginalization of the sociedades de color was necessary not only so that the state could 
declare the end of discrimination in Cuba, but also so it might eliminate a potential 
competitor – less radical Afro-Cuban intellectuals who might call for cultural rather than 
class unity – over the hearts and minds of Cuba’s black populace.5 
 The new regime did not stop at desegregating athletic facilities and organizations but 
moved quickly to institutionalize major changes in the realm of sport. From early 1959 to 
early 1961, while working to construct a more permanent body to oversee Cuban sports, it 
passed the responsibility for overseeing athletics to municipal governments, sports 
federations, and eventually the Comités de Defensa de la Revolución (Committees for the 
Defense of the Revolution, CDRs).6 Established in September 1960 to uproot and defeat 
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“counterrevolutionary” tendencies in Cuban society and structured along geographical lines, 
the CDRs were racially integrated and heralded as “an instrument for promoting the unity 
and cohesion of the people.”7 Their use in supporting the development of a national sports 
program would be temporary, however. By 1962, the state had established an institutional 
body that would oversee Cuban athletic, physical education, and recreational programs for 
the next five decades. 
 
The First Olympian 
 Batista’s regime had been notorious for refusing to sponsor amateur boxers and 
other athletes to compete in international tournaments, notably the quadrennial Olympic and 
Pan-American Games, which required expensive travel and were not financially profitable 
for the state.8 Under the administration of Carlos Prío (1948-1952), Cuba sent a boxing 
squad to the first Pan-American Games in 1951, where welterweight Cristobal Hernández 
earned a silver medal. Yet it sent no boxers to the 1955 Pan-American Games in Mexico 
City, an event for which Batista had refused to provide funding.9 Unlike Castro, who viewed 
such venues from the outset as helping to build Cuban prestige at home and abroad, Batista 
made no major changes in amateur athletic policies during either period of his rule (1933-
1944 and 1952-1958) and used public funding for professional boxing events.10 Though it 
seems contradictory given his own status (albeit publicly unacknowledged) as Cuba’s first 
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president of Afro-Cuban descent, Batista not only allowed but also encouraged segregation 
to continue in full force at beaches, hotels, pools, and social clubs. Under his regime, Afro-
Cuban athletic societies and university teams were forced to establish their own sites for 
recreational and competitive activity; he even prevented Afro-Cubans from using the Hotel 
Nacional pool during a regional swimming competition.11 
 In prizefighting, while mixed-race bouts had been the norm before the 1915 
Johnson-Willard bout, the Unión Atlética Amateur de Cuba had excluded nonwhite Cubans 
from amateur competitions since its establishment in 1922. Afro-Cubans found other 
options to hone their pugilistic skills before turning professional, such as semi-pro bouts 
and, by the late 1930s, the annual Golden Gloves competition. The first annual Cuban 
Golden Gloves tournament began in 1938 and would serve as an important training ground 
for the professionals for the next two decades, among them Luis Galvani and Lino Garcia.12 
Yet it operated in Cuba at a time when southern Golden Gloves tournaments remained 
rigidly racially segregated. (Despite campaigning for inclusion since 1937, African Americans 
were not permitted to participate in the Washington, D.C., Golden Gloves until 1947.13) 
When in the 1950s the Cuban Golden Gloves was subsumed into the southern division of 
the U.S. Golden Gloves, Afro-Cuban boxers traveling to the U.S. for the final bouts were 
shocked by the racism and discrimination they experienced. Although the professional ranks 
in Cuba were not segregated, white prizefighters on average received more favorable 
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treatment from managers and promoters, who also tended to be white.14 And as noted 
above, the exclusion of Afro-Cubans from elite athletic facilities and athletic federations did 
not conclude until a few months after the onset of the Revolution.15 
 With its athletic institutions in flux, the revolutionary state continued to show 
support for professional boxing while taking tentative steps to encourage amateurism. A year 
and a half after Castro assumed power, his regime sponsored the entry of the first Cuban 
boxer in the Olympic Summer Games. The sport had been among the earliest to be 
incorporated into the modern Olympic movement, debuting at the St. Louis Games in 
1904.16 Fifty-six years later, Manzanillo native Estebán “Tevita” Aguilera Leiva was the sole 
pugilist – and one of only 12 Cuban athletes – to go to the 1960 Rome Games. In a 
preliminary lightweight (132 lbs/60 kg) bout, the 18-year-old Aguilera lost by a unanimous 
judges’ score of 5-0 to Danny O’Brian of Ireland.17 Aguilera was ill prepared for the bout; as 
no Cuban trainer had accompanied him, he had to rely upon Cuban trainers from other 
sports at the Games to staff his corner.18 Cuban Olympic chronicler Rolando Crespo also 
claims that Aguilera, affected by the unfamiliar climate, was also suffering from a bad cold.19 
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describes his relationship with patron Benito Fernández. Fernández housed Sarduy in his own home rather 
than in a nearby guesthouse, where Sarduy took his meals and where Fernández housed his other boxers. 
     15 Richard Gott, Cuba: A New History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), p. 174. 
     16 Boxing was not featured in the 1912 Stockholm Games because the sport was outlawed in Sweden. There 
were no Summer Olympic Games in 1916 because of World War I and in 1940 and 1944 because of World 
War II. 
     17 Rolando Crespo, Cuba en el boxeo olímpico (La Habana: Editorial Científico-Técnica, 1999), p. 14. A list of 
all 1960 Olympic lightweight boxing competitors is available at http://www.sports-
reference.com/olympics/summer/1960/BOX/mens-lightweight.html (accessed October 19, 2008). 
     18 Elio Menéndez, “Nuestro primer boxeador olímpico,” CubAhora, 5 May 2008, 
http://www.cubahora.cu/index.php?tpl=principal/ver-noticias/ver-ot_dep.tpl.html&newsid_obj_id=1025357 
(accessed October 20, 2008). 
     19 Crespo, Cuba en el boxeo olímpico, p. 14. 
 300 
 Revolutionary Cuba would manage a steep learning curve in Olympic boxing, 
however. At the 1964 Tokyo Games, it entered competitors in six of eleven weight classes. 
Four of the six lost in their first bout, while Fermín Espinosa and Félix Betancourt won two 
bouts apiece.20 In 1968, Cuba sent its first boxing referee, Waldo Santiago, and a full eleven-
man squad to Mexico City, where Enrique Regüeiferos and Rolando Garbey each earned 
silver medals.21 
 
A Special Relationship: Joe Louis and Cuba 
 In explaining Cuba’s poor showings at the Olympic Games, Castro in 1960 blamed 
the elite status of pre-revolutionary athletes – arguing that personal wealth was antithetical to 
athletic success: 
 
Of course, as the rich are not great athletes Cuba always looked ridiculous in 
any international competition. At the Olympics [before the Revolution] it 
was shameful to see the position occupied by Cuba because the rich, 
accustomed to good living, had not the necessary spirit of sacrifice to be 
good athletes. Good athletes must come from the people, from the working 
classes, from the lower strata, because they are capable of sacrifice; they can 
be consistent, tenacious; they can possess all the enthusiasm and interest 
needed to enter a competition and win.22 
 
 There were few boxers who better represented this “spirit of sacrifice” than Joe 
Louis. Born Joseph Louis Barrow, he was the son of Alabama sharecroppers who had 
emerged from deep poverty to become the first African American heavyweight champion in 
                                                
     20 Crespo, Cuba en el boxeo olímpico, pp. 15-19. 
     21 The number and definition of internationally recognized amateur and professional boxing weight classes 
have varied over time. In Olympic boxing, the number of weight classes has fluctuated between five and twelve 
since the sport’s introduction at the 1904 Games. The 2004 and 2008 Games featured eleven weight classes. 
     22 Sonia Castanes, Fidel, Sobre el deporte (Havana, 1975), para. 40 [1960], quoted in Pickering, “Cuba,” Sport 
Under Communism, p. 174. 
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over two decades when he defeated James “Cinderella Man” Braddock in June 1937. Louis 
held that title until his retirement in 1949, for nearly twelve years. Even accounting for the 
interruption of World War II, his longevity in the ring was astonishing. 
 As explored in earlier chapters, Louis had had a long relationship with Cuba, not all 
of it positive. In December 1935, his promoter, Mike Jacobs, traveled to Havana to explore 
conditions there ahead of a scheduled Louis bout there with Basque heavyweight Isidoro 
Gastanaga. While there, Jacobs postponed the bout, citing Louis’s fatigue from 
“overtraining,” but by the time he returned to New York City, canceled the bout “because of 
the unsettled political condition in Cuba.”23 The Cuban government, then under Batista’s 
rule, was outraged; it suspended Jacobs, Louis, and Louis’s manager, Julian Black, for six 
months for breach of contract and also fined Jacobs for improper behavior.24 
 Nearly a decade later, although Gastanaga never got a shot at him, Joe Louis thrilled 
Havana locals by taking part in a March 1947 exhibition there as the last stop on a lucrative 
Latin American tour. In what was billed as the largest crowd ever assembled to see a fight 
card in Cuba, approximately 25,000 people paid nearly $40,000 to see Louis “meat-axe” his 
sparring partners, Art Ramsey and Walt Hafey, on a fight card on which the main event was 
a match-up between Cuban featherweight champion Miguel Acevedo and veteran New York 
lightweight Lulu Constantino. Crowd size notwithstanding, the organizers of the bout 
reportedly lost $11,000 from the promotion.25 
                                                
     23 James P. Dawson, “Fight in Havana for Louis Is Off,” New York Times, 24 December 1935. 
     24 “Jacobs and Louis Suspended in Cuba,” New York Times, 27 December 1935. 
     25 Nat Fleischer, “Louis’s Tour a Financial Success for Joe Not Promoters,” The Ring 26:4 (May 1947), p. 3. 
The quote is from “25,000 See Louis Spar,” New York Times, 11 March 1947. Boxrec.com gives the attendance 
as 13,076. 
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 Once the Castro regime took power, Louis became a recurrent visitor to Havana and 
supporter of Castro. He was frequently quoted by the U.S. press saying favorable things 
about the Revolution – such as “there is no place in the world except Cuba where the Negro 
can go in the wintertime with absolutely no discrimination.”26 Louis and his new (third) wife, 
Martha, were among seventy featured guests at the elegant 1959 New Year’s Eve 
celebrations hosted by Fidel Castro in the Habana Hilton Hotel (now the Habana Libre) 
marking the one-year anniversary of the Cuban Revolution.27 
 In February 1960, Louis became vice president and one-quarter partner of an all-
black Manhattan public relations firm – Louis, Rowe, Fisher, Lockhart Enterprises, Inc. – 
that negotiated a $287,000 contract with the Cuban tourist board, INIT (Instituto Nacional 
de la Industria Turística, the National Institute of the Tourism Industry). Louis’s firm was to 
promote the island as a destination for African Americans.28 This was simply the latest in a 
long line of tourist schemes, many of them owned or operated by black businessmen, to 
attract U.S. blacks to Cuba. In examining this little-noticed tourist network from the early 
1930s to early 1950s, Frank Guridy explains how it differed from white U.S. tourism: 
 
Unlike white tourists who went to Cuba to experience a culture that they 
perceived to be fundamentally different than their own, African-Americans 
traveled to the island to see ‘their own people’ even as their understanding of 
Afro-Cubans was sometimes shaped by touristic gazes. 
 
                                                
     26 “Winning Friends,” Time, 18 April 1960. Rosalie Schwartz notes that, with the fall-off in tourism during 
the 1959 holiday season, INIT’s wooing of Joe Louis indicated a new interest “a previously ignored segment of 
the North American market” – African Americans. Schwartz, Pleasure Island, p. 202. 
     27 Martha sat next to Castro at the head table. See R. Hart Phillips, “Cuba Celebrates Year of Castro,” New 
York Times, 1 January 1960; “Castro Gracious in New Year Role,” New York Times, 2 January 1960. 
     28 “Joe Louis Agency Engaged by Cuba,” New York Times, 26 May 1960. 
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The ways in which they found such commonality with Cuba varied. From viewing Afro-
Cubans in top positions – many African Americans considered Cuban President Fulgencio 
Batista, who did not comment openly on his biracial heritage, to be a “Negro Leader” – to 
seeking out African cultural modes of survival, as motivated Langston Hughes, African 
American elites “sought to harmonize their desires for leisure with motives for cultural 
exchange,” he concludes. The 1933 Soldiers’ Revolt further accelerated African American 
tourism to Cuba, as it helped to usher in a period of increased demands for racial equality led 
by Afro-Cuban sociedades de color and the island’s Communist activists.29 
 This point is important to emphasize, for such tourism was not driven only by pent-
up African American longings to visit a more equal multiracial nation or the increased leisure 
time and resources available to a small class of black intellectuals, professionals, and 
businesspeople. As Alejandro de la Fuente demonstrates, by the early 1930s, the Partido 
Comunista de Cuba (Cuban Communist Party, PCC) and the Communist-influenced 
Confederación Nacional Obrera de Cuba (National Workers Confederation of Cuba, 
CNOC), an influential organization that militated for workers’ rights, sought to unify 
workers along class lines by ending workplace racial discrimination. In advocating for greater 
self-determination among Afro-Cubans, it condemned overt acts of racism in the U.S., 
including the notorious 1931 case of the Scottsboro Nine. Although African Americans in 
the 1930s were only too familiar with the conditions of their own oppression, the news 
coming out of Cuba regarding a possible social revolution – one that was foreshadowed by 
                                                
     29 Frank Guridy, Diaspora in Action: Afro-Cubans and African-Americans in the U.S.-Caribbean World, chapter 5 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, forthcoming); quotes on p. 263. I am grateful to Frank 
for sharing this chapter with me. 
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new President Grau’s decision to abrogate the hated Platt Amendment – must have been 
encouraging to those accustomed to rigid race hierarchies in their own nation.30 
 More than two decades later, the rise of the Cuban Revolution was met with 
jubilation among many African American journalists and intellectuals, who – long before the 
Revolution grew questionable in U.S. circles for its association with socialist or communist 
elements – saw it as a boost to their own liberation struggle and that of black peoples around 
the globe. Interestingly, as Van Gosse notes, most African American newspapers “ignored” 
the rebel movement prior to 1959, “[d]espite, or perhaps because of the heavy, highly 
favorable coverage of Castro’s guerilla struggle in the white press during 1957-58.” 
Following January 1, 1959, however, he identifies four major strands in positive African 
American press coverage on Cuba: the interracial nature of a revolution that depended upon 
black leadership as well as white; Adam Clayton Powell, Jr.’s “ostentatious” show of support 
for Castro; the strong rhetoric of the new Cuban leader in denouncing racism at home and 
abroad; and the “hypocrisy” of white U.S. leaders denouncing the executions of former 
Batista associates while tacitly approving or actively advocating for white-on-black violence 
in their own country.31 
 Although Joe Louis had apparently been making frequent trips to Cuba since the 
New Year’s celebrations, the story of his association with the Cuban government broke in 
the press a month before the Floyd Patterson-Ingemar Johansson heavyweight 
championship rematch fight at New York’s Polo Grounds on June 20, 1960, an event which 
                                                
     30 de la Fuente, A Nation for All, pp. 189-194. 
     31 Van Gosse, “The African-American Press Greets the Revolution,” in Between Race and Empire: African-
Americans and Cubans before the Cuban Revolution, ed. Lisa Brock and Digna Castañeda Fuertes (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1998), pp. 266-280 (quote on p. 267). The “white press” that Gosse signals out for 
favorable Castro coverage during 1957-1958 includes the New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, and magazines 
Time, Life, and Look. 
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Louis was hired to help promote. The president of the firm, William “Billy” Rowe – a 
former New York deputy police commissioner – attempted to disassociate Louis from the 
agreement. He noted that one of the partners, Maurice Lockhart, had begun to hash out the 
arrangement with an Afro-Cuban INIT representative in 1959, and that Castro and Louis 
did not discuss it during their New Year’s meeting.32 Nonetheless, the promoters of the 
Patterson-Johansson bout terminated the former champion’s association with their fight 
card, fearing that rising public anger at his Cuban connection might harm ticket sales.33 
 Louis himself seemed taken aback by such criticism. “We have nothing to do with 
Castro or politics; it’s just another publicity account,” he initially explained. Within days, 
however, the firestorm of negative media attention – some questioning his patriotism and 
calling him a “foreign agent” – forced Louis – on advice of his counsel, his wife Martha – to 
hold a press conference in which he announced that he would end his association with the 
public relations firm if it did not allow its contract with INIT to lapse. “I have been accused 
of selling out my country,” he remarked, noting that, despite the contract’s having earned the 
approval of the U.S. Embassy in Havana, the public’s reaction to the story had left him 
“depressed and confused” and with “only one decision I can make.”34 Although Rowe 
initially objected to terminating the contract, as the company was awaiting additional funds 
from Cuba, the firm notified the Cuban government in July 1960 of its unwillingness to 
continue the contract. Louis’s personal share of the losses came to approximately $1,500.35 
                                                
     32 “Joe Louis Agency Engaged by Cuba,” New York Times, 26 May 1960. 
     33 Barney Nagler, Brown Bomber (New York: World Publishing, 1972), pp. 197-199. 
     34 “Joe Louis Denies Ties with Castro,” New York Times, 2 June 1960. 
     35 “Fidel & the U.S. Negro,” Time, 13 June 1960. 
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 Although Louis appeared repentant at the time for violating the public’s expectations 
of “their” former champ, his 1978 autobiography offers a different take on his brief 
association with the Castro regime. Louis was irate that his firm “had the tourist contract 
with Castro before the United States got upset with Cuba because he’d lined up with the 
Russians” and that, when the contract was signed, “we [partners] weren’t getting bad vibes 
from anybody.” While ridiculing the idea that he shared Castro’s ideological bent (“Me, the 
lover of money and the best that money can buy, a Communist?”), Louis showed sympathy 
for the Revolution’s aims and for Castro personally, whom he thought “was a fine man.”36 
 Most of all, he chafed at losing a profitable source of income at a time when the U.S. 
government was still squeezing him for back taxes accrued during World War II. Though he 
donated $100,000 to Army and Navy funds from purses earned in fights and exhibitions 
during the war, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service had refused to forgive the taxes on those 
earnings. The Latin American tour was an early but failed effort to resolve the debt. After 
retiring in 1949 just shy of his 35th birthday, Louis reemerged in 1950 to challenge Ezzard 
Charles, unsuccessfully, for the heavyweight title. Though he won his next eight bouts, 
including two with Cuban heavyweight Omelio Agramonte, his final bout – with Rocky 
Marciano in October 1951 – made it obvious that Louis was well past his prime. He retired 
again, for good, and tried his hand at multiple endeavors that might have earned a quick 
buck – refereeing wrestling matches, playing on TV quiz game shows, working as a greeter at 
Caesar’s Palace in Las Vegas – but did not take care of the underlying debt. The Cuban 
tourist board venture was thus one in a long string of failed attempts by Louis and his circle 
of friends to ease his U.S. tax burden. Had not relations between the U.S. and Cuba 
                                                
     36 Louis, Joe Louis: My Life, pp. 242-243. 
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worsened as rapidly as they did, perhaps he might have succeeded in helping to develop 
Cuba as an African American winter paradise as well as returning to financial stability. In any 
case, with his wife’s intervention, Louis finally received a reprieve from the Internal Revenue 
Service, who stopped trying to collect from him while not officially retiring the debt. 
  Predictably, the fracas over Joe Louis’s apparently coerced repudiation of his ties 
with the Castro regime added tension to a quickly fraying U.S.-Cuban relationship. The 
Cuban government stepped up its propaganda war against the U.S., with radio commentator 
José Pardo Llada alleging that U.S. government pressure was placed on Joe Louis to end the 
contract. In doing so, Pardo Llada claimed, the U.S. sought to “prevent the Negro middle 
class of the United States from coming to Cuba to enjoy good hotels and beaches from 
which they are barred by discrimination in Florida.”37 
In what was likely the peak of African American solidarity with Cuba’s Revolution, in 
September 1960, Fidel Castro brought Cuba’s public relations machine directly to the people 
of Harlem by dramatically making the Theresa Hotel his base during a United Nations visit. 
In doing so, he “instantly created a crisis that exposed the omnipresence of racism in the 
United States,” states Cynthia A. Young. In her scholarship on a movement in the 1960s and 
1970s she terms “U.S. Third World Leftists,” Young examines how, in the post-World War 
II era, African American and U.S. Latino/a populations came to view decolonization and 
liberation struggles abroad as intricately tied to ending their own domestic oppression. 
Should the point not be clear enough to U.N. delegates, Castro made it explicit in his speech 
to the General Assembly, in which he called for “African American manhood” and equated 
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black Americans with his own cadre of revolutionaries, as well as those seeking nationhood 
on the African continent.38 
In a country that remained woefully behind on civil rights, it was feared that Castro’s 
appeal among influential African Americans such as Joe Louis, Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., 
and Robert F. Williams might make the black population as a whole open to his agenda.39 
Yet despite these and other attempts to woo black tourists to Cuba, the effort was doomed 
to failure. Rosalie Schwartz concludes, “Escalating antagonism over issues of sovereignty, 
property, and ideology threatened, and then ruptured, U.S.-Cuban relations. By the time 
Castro nationalized U.S. property in October 1960, most Americans already had scratched 
Cuba off their lists of desirable travel destinations.”40 With “patriotic” Americans of all 
colors, Louis among them, gradually pulling away from the movement, only a small cadre of 
white and black radicals remained in active support of Cuba. Most of them, too, gradually 
drew disenchanted with the revolution they found in practice. Although it quickly lost 
mainstream African American support, the Cuban Revolution would seek to affiliate itself 
with African liberation struggles over the next decades.41 
The repudiation of the Revolution by an icon like Joe Louis, then probably the most 
beloved former heavyweight champ in the world (and still years away from his descent into 
destitution and mental illness), also boded poorly for the future of professional sports in that 
country. After all, if Cuba really were communist, as Louis’s critics had alleged, then it was 
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     41 For a critical look at Cuba’s Africa policy, see Carlos Moore, Castro, the Blacks, and Africa (Los Angeles: 
Center for Afro-American Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, 1988). For one tale of a black radical’s 
disillusionment with the Castro regime, see John Clytus with Jane Rieker, Black Man in Red Cuba (Coral Gables, 
FL: University of Miami Press, 1970). 
 309 
only a matter of time before the island followed down the path of the Soviet Union in 
eliminating capitalism and imposing draconian limits on leisure activities. By mid-1960, 
tourism from the U.S. to Cuba was dying out as “the novelty of the revolution wore off.”42 
Yet the Castro regime’s October 1960 nationalization of foreign businesses seemed to prove 
these critics correct, reducing what remained of American tourism to a trickle and – for 
perhaps the first time in the sport’s history on the island – making Cuban boxing, as such it 
remained, an almost entirely Cuban affair. Although the last Cuban prizefight occurred 
sometime in 1961 or very early in 1962 – there is still no clear consensus on when it 
occurred – the business side of the sport began to die out with the loss of critical foreign 
tourism. Ironically, although an excessive government focus on the tourist industry and 
athletes’ and artists’ open access to U.S. markets had initially served to fuel the exodus of 
these performers abroad, the reverse process – tourism’s slow death and the closing of 
Cuban borders to foreign travel – would bring about an entirely different exodus, this time 
not of transnational citizens willing to overlook the republic’s racial and social inequalities 
because of their own privileged status, but of exiles angered by the loss of their families, 
possessions, and homeland. While most Cuban exiles in the early 1960s were upper- and 
middle-class whites who resented the expropriation of their property and other state 
intrusions, the boxing elites who fled tended to be (but were not exclusively) Afro-Cuban. 
Without perhaps intending to, they served as a useful Cold War weapon in criticizing the 
supposedly discrimination-free Cuban Revolution at a time when race relations in the U.S. 
(and in the South, particularly, of which Florida was a part) remained seriously strained. We 
look at the processes by which Cuba lost much of its boxing brain trust (trainers, seconds, 
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managers, and promoters) and athletic talent, mostly but not exclusively to Miami, in the 
next section. 
 
Defections in the Ranks: Cuban Fighters in the United States 
 The sociologists Nelson Amaro and Alejandro Portes have depicted the migration of 
Cuba’s exiles to the United States as occurring in distinct waves, from “those who wait” to 
“those who escape,” and from “those who escape” to “those who search.”43 The first wave, 
from 1959 to 1962, involved Cuba’s elite, the “upper and upper-middle classes [who] were 
not tied to Batista’s government but were bound to a political and economic structure that 
was completely interpenetrated by the demands and initiatives of American capital.” Their 
flight was in response to the nationalization of American property, worsening U.S.-Cuba 
relations culminating in a diplomatic break, and agrarian reform laws that stripped many 
landowners of their property.44 Following the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, the next exodus, 
“those who escape,” were largely middle class but also included blue-collar workers, the 
petit-bourgeoisie, and thousands of children sent to live in the United States without their 
parents via “Operation Pedro Pan.” This migration, which began as a “small flood,” slowed 
after flights were suspended following the October Missile Crisis of 1962. The last wave of 
the pre-Mariel period, “those who search,” lasted from 1965 to 1974 and largely comprised 
economic refugees who were more “pulled” by the opportunities to be found abroad than 
“pushed” by political circumstances at home. Thus, Pedraza concludes, “Cuban migration 
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has always been characterized by an inverse correlation between date of departure and social 
class of the immigrants.”45 
While most of Cuba’s top boxers and trainers were not “elite” in economic terms, 
their status in the Batista administration carried on in the early years of the Castro regime. 
They thus were given additional opportunities to travel and work abroad and eventually, to 
defect. These opportunities did not transfer to those whose bouts were mostly regional in 
nature, outside of the Havana fight center. Nor did it tend to apply to “club fighters,” who 
made up the majority of active pugilists. These were considered worthy opponents for up-
and-coming competition or perhaps for foreign boxers visiting Havana, but who lacked the 
talent or connections to be valued for their ring skills abroad. As for former amateurs and 
prizefighters who had not become highly demanded trainers, they were not usually accorded 
opportunities for travel unless they already achieved influence and status or unless, as with 
members of the all-white social clubs, their amateur activities had correlated with wealth and 
privilege. Some active and former boxers and trainers began to leave with the first wave of 
immigrants, but the exodus did not gain force until mid-1961. By that time, not only did 
relations between the U.S. and Cuba appear to be at the breaking point, but the very future 
of prizefighting was in serious doubt. The term “those who escape” characterizes this 
generation of exiles quite well. 
Nonetheless, throughout 1959, 1960, and the first months of 1961, the state-run 
media furthered the notion that little had changed in Cuba’s pugilistic universe. Indeed, the 
move away from prizefighting was piecemeal. The regime at first appeared quite willing for 
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professional sports to continue as before, although it was unable to quell the uneasiness felt 
by tourists and other visitors. Recalls Angelo Dundee, trainer to world heavyweight 
champion Muhammad Ali and to numerous Cuban exiles – some famous, many not – at his 
5th Street Gym in Miami: 
 
I was in Cuba three days after the revolution… I stayed at the Hilton, where 
Castro stayed. At that time, Castro still wanted things to go on as usual and 
he wanted there to be a boxing show. He was at the card and so was his 
brother Raul and Che Guevara. The atmosphere was always sensational at 
the fights in Cuba. But now, there were soldiers with machine guns at the 
fights too. One guy, his machine gun went off straight up in the air. What a 
scene that caused. That last time I went, when I was going through the 
airport, security was very tight. They checked everything but the kitchen sink. 
I said to myself, I’m not coming back anymore.46 
 
 Throughout 1959, 1960, and into 1961, despite appearances to the contrary, the 
state-run media furthered the notion that little had changed in Cuba’s pugilistic universe. The 
Spanish- and English-language dailies continued to detail all manner of professional fights, 
whether held at Havana’s Palacio de los Deportes, in the United States, or in far-flung places 
such as England and Japan. Local prizefights continued to be broadcast on television and 
radio. (Even Fidel Castro was mindful of not overshadowing major fights; on May 27, 1960, 
he cut short an interview so that Cubans could watch the televised broadcast of the Benny 
“Kid” Paret-Don Jordan title fight, taking place that evening in Las Vegas.47) The Golden 
Gloves remained active in Cuba. And in early 1961, the state awarded one of its three 
“Figuras del Año” (Person of the Year) athletic awards to Paret, winner in the professional 
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category (the other categories were amateur and women’s sport), for having wrested the 
world welterweight title from Jordan. Cuba’s first world champion, the beloved Kid 
Chocolate, was on hand to pass out honors at the Gran Fiesta de los Deportes, where the 
athletes were being celebrated, as was Kid Tunero (Evelio Mustelier), a former top 
middleweight contender active in Europe who would later move to Spain.48 
 Months before the formal end of prizefighting in revolutionary Cuba, an 
extraordinary crop of boxers, trainers, managers, promotes, and officials began to desert 
Cuba. The most notable fighters among them were Luis Manuel Rodríguez, Benny “Kid” 
Paret, Ultiminio “Sugar” Ramos, José Angel “Mantequilla” Nápoles, Florentino Fernández, 
Douglas Vaillant, José Stable, José Legra, Orlando Zulueta, and Angel Robinson García. 
They would come to form the faces of Cuban boxing after 1961, even as they embraced new 
lands, new families, and new ways of life. While most simply wished to be able to pursue 
their profession, their decision to live abroad would come to be viewed as a betrayal by the 
state. Before the U.S. and Cuba broke off diplomatic relations in early 1962, however, it 
remained possible for North American exiles to travel back and forth to Cuba and to delay 
any final decisions about which land they would ultimately reside in. 
 
INDER, the First Playa Girón Tournament, and Prizefighting’s End 
 On February 23, 1961, Law 946 established the Instituto Nacional de Deportes, 
Educación Física y Recreación (National Institute for Sports, Physical Education, and 
Recreation, INDER). Headed by José Llanusa Gobel, Havana’s former mayor, INDER was 
granted the power to “direct, orient, and plan the development of sports, physical education 
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and recreation as an integrated whole.”49 Specifically, it was tasked to disseminate sport and 
recreation to the masses; discover and develop promising athletes; and to introduce new 
sports.50 
 INDER would be responsible for implementing and overseeing an interconnected, 
two-pronged mission that came to be known as masividad (mass participation): to create an 
elite athletics program that could be spotlighted in international amateur events and bring 
acclaim to the Cuban state, particularly from developing nations; and to universalize 
participation in physical education, sports, and recreation that would not only lead to the 
development of future athletes but would strengthen the Cuban people and further invest 
them in the Revolution’s cultural and symbolic achievements. The latter aim was emphasized 
through the widely used government slogan, el deporte es salud (sport is health).51 
 In pursuing both a nationalist and internationalist agenda through sports, INDER 
was modeling itself upon the examples of communist countries, in whose orbit Cuba had 
been gravitating for some months and would officially enter the following year. On a policy 
level, the Cuban leadership style was to borrow program ideas from the Soviet bloc as they 
might work on the island and modify them as needed.52 In ideological aims, however, there 
was a great similarity between these two visions on the role of athletics in modern society. 
Central those aims, as James Riordan notes of the Soviet Union – and could be said of the 
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     51 Paula Pettavino and Philip Brenner, “The Dual Role of Sports,” in A Contemporary Cuba Reader: Reinventing 
the Revolution, ed. Philip Brenner, et. al. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), pp. 379-380. 
     52 Pettavino and Pye, Sport in Cuba, p. 15. 
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revolutionary Cuban state as well – “sport has been accorded the vital rôle of helping to change 
society.”53 
 In Russia, as early as 1917, Vladimir Lenin called for the establishment of a High 
School for Sports and Physical Culture.54 In 1930, the U.S.S.R. opened the All-Union 
Physical Culture Council to oversee the organization of sport on the level of workplaces, 
such as factories and schools. By the mid-1930s, the Soviet state had decided to stratify its 
athletic program into popular and elite levels, thus creating a quasi-professional class of 
sportsmen and women whose achievements would serve as inspiration for the masses.55 
Following World War II, the Soviet Union imposed its two-pronged athletic system onto its 
Eastern European satellite states, such as Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic 
Republic. Although the comparison is not exact – the Soviet Union’s devastating loss of 20 
million people in World War II reinforced its growing emphasis on physical training on the 
mass level as critical for strengthening national security – it is instructive. For one, the Soviet 
athletic apparatus early on sought to develop athletes in sports that lacked a strong tradition 
in Russia and outlying areas – such as basketball and volleyball – as well as ones such as 
gymnastics and weightlifting that enjoyed deeper traditions there.56 Similarly, Cuba beginning 
in the late 1960s sought to widen its athletic specialties to introduce nontraditional athletic 
endeavors – which was indeed one of the stated purposes of INDER. 
 In boxing, as in baseball, however, INDER was hardly working with a blank slate. 
While the talent was unquestionably there, far less so had been opportunities for young 
                                                
     53 James Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” in Sport Under Communism: The U.S.S.R., Czechoslovakia, The G.D.R., China, 
Cuba, ed. James Riordan (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2nd ed., rev., 1981 [1978]), p. 15 
(emphasis in original). 
     54 Don Anthony, “Introduction,” in Sport Under Communism, p. 6. 
     55 Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” in Sport Under Communism, pp. 23-25. 
     56 Riordan, “The U.S.S.R.,” in Sport Under Communism, pp. 27-28, 31. 
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boxers of all classes and colors to compete on the amateur circuit. Cuba had been active in 
Golden Gloves competition since 1938, had sent boxers to the Pan-American Games, and 
had sent athletes to the 1960 Olympic Games. Yet amateur boxing had taken a decided back 
seat to its professional variant, particularly since the early 1950s. 
 INDER moved quickly to establish a national tournament that would not only 
feature the best the nascent state had to offer, but would soon begin to serve as a site for 
international competition as well. The first Torneo Nacional Aficionado Playa Girón (Playa 
Girón National Amateur Tournament) was organized under INDER auspices in October 
1961, several months after Cuba had successfully repelled a spectacular invasion attempt by 
U.S.-based Cuban exiles.57 This tournament determined Cuba’s first national amateur boxing 
champions in the revolutionary era, most of whom would go on to compete at the 1962 
Central American and Caribbean Games, Cuba’s first international tournament as a 
communist country.58 
 INDER’s importance to the development of Cuban sport grew stronger with the 
promulgation on January 4, 1962, of Resolution 67-D, suspending professional boxing in the 
island. It was the first professional sport to be singled out for suppression, though not the 
last. The Frontón, long a center for Havana’s jai alai activity (and, by extension, of its 
                                                
     57 The failed invasion has come to be known in U.S. English shorthand as “Bay of Pigs” because the exiles 
arrived in the Bahía de Cochinos in Matanzas province. Cubans refer to it as “Playa Girón,” the name of the 
beach where some of the exiles first made land. 
     58 The first Playa Girón tournament winners were Robert “Chocolatíco” Pérez (flyweight, 112 lbs/51 kg), 
Osvaldo Riverí (bantamweight, 119 lbs/54 kg), Benigno Junco (featherweight, 57 kg/125 lbs), Moisés Vives 
(lightweight, 132 lbs/60 kg), Lázaro Montalvo (light welterweight, 63.5 kg/139 lbs), Virgilio Jiménez 
(welterweight, 67 kg/147 lbs), Waldo Santiago (light middleweight, 71 kg/156 lbs), Gregorio Aldama 
(middleweight, 75 kg/165 lbs), Marino Bofill (light heavyweight, 81 kg/178 lbs), and Raúl Díaz (heavyweight, 
+81 kg/+178 lbs). These were the weight classes in use in Olympic boxing between 1952 and 1964. See 
Alfonso, Puños dorados, p. 117. 
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gambling), was shuttered soon afterward.59 Nor was baseball, Fidel Castro’s own passion, 
exempt from the government’s zeal against capitalism in sports. Resolution 67-D was quickly 
followed up with National Decree 83a on March 19, 1962. With this, the Castro regime 
sought to strengthen “nuestra Revolución Socialista” (our Socialist Revolution) by 
permanently repudiating the country’s link to professional sports, which were now viewed to 
be a remnant of an exploitative and racist capitalism. Referencing the prior resolution, the 
decree declared prizefighting, in particular, to be “a completely noxious activity and contrary 
to the development and state of health of the boxers who practice this sport.” It claimed that 
professional sport “foments the exploitation of man by man and breaks the spirit that should 
animate the practice of athletic endeavors.”60 
 Cuba was hardly the only country in the early 1960s to consider ending prizefighting. 
(Iceland has had a ban in place since 1956.) There had been calls to regulate or ban 
prizefighting in the United States long before the 1950s, calls which grew louder and 
stronger with the high-profile deaths of Benny Paret in 1962 and Davey Moore in 1963. 
While little changed in the U.S., Sweden and Norway did end up instituting bans (Sweden 
has since lifted many of its restrictions). 
 What made revolutionary Cuba’s position on prizefighting unique, of course, was its 
decision to ban all professional sports. For practical purposes, the ban principally affected 
two sports – boxing and “slavery baseball,” as Castro termed it. Given all else that had been 
going on in Cuba since Castro’s rise to power, the ban itself was anticlimactic. Prizefighting 
                                                
     59 Sugden, Boxing and Society, p. 150. 
     60 The full text of the law is available in Alfonso, Puños dorados, p. 80. The original excerpts read, respectively, 
“una actividad totalmente nociva y contraria al desarollo y estado de salud de los atletas que practican este 
deporte” and “fomenta la explotación del hombre por el hombre y lo desvincula del espíritu que debe animar la 
práctica de las actividades deportivas.” 
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– and tourism – was already dead. But the country’s move toward communism dictated the 
unhinging of sport from capitalism, just as had been done in the Soviet Union and its 
Eastern European satellites. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that many popular accounts of 
the end of prizefighting in Cuba refer to 1960 as the year in which the Castro regime 
instituted its ban. By early 1962, the political battle lines – in boxing as in many other areas 
of Cuban life – had already been drawn, and they would only continue to harden as the Cold 
War wore on. 
 
The Death of Benny “Kid” Paret 
 Even deceased boxers were not exempt from the political tug-of-war between the 
Cuban state and its enemies abroad. This was most vividly illustrated in the sad case of 
Benny “Kid” Paret, who lost his life several days after being knocked unconscious by Emile 
Griffith during their televised welterweight championship bout at Madison Square Garden, 
New York, on March 24, 1962. 
 The details of the bout are well known. It was to be a “rubber match” between the 
Santa Clara native and the U.S. Virgin Islander, both transplants to New York. They had 
fought twice the previous year (on April 1 and September 30), with Griffith winning the first 
bout by 13-round knockout and Paret the second by split decision. Though Paret was still a 
young man, his career was already on the decline; he had lost four of his prior six bouts and 
had recently experienced a severe beating at the hands of Gene Fullmer. He came into the 
last Griffith fight most likely brain damaged from his prior bouts, but because of his 
reputation as someone who could “take a punch” and who had a “good chin” (terms used to 
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indicate someone who can remain on two feet, and perhaps even pull out a victory, while 
taking a punishing beating), Paret was an especially vulnerable target. 
 Following his death, his brother traveled to the U.S. to claim his body for burial in 
Havana. Castro critics claimed that the dictator planned to put on a “show” of 
prizefighting’s brutality there using the body as his showpiece. In any case, Paret’s young 
widow, Lucy – a New Yorker of Puerto Rican descent – refused to permit it. According to 
Johnny Sarduy, Paret had expressed a desire not to return to Cuba, “ni muerto” (not even 
dead) while the Castro regime was in place; Sarduy and Luis Manuel Rodríguez spoke up on 
the widow’s behalf.61 According to her wishes, her husband’s body is now buried in Saint 
Raymond’s Cemetery in the Bronx, New York. Griffith, deeply regretful over Paret’s death, 
was not welcomed to attend his funeral.62 The political struggle over Paret’s corpse (which 
Sarduy sarcastically called “el trofeo” that the Castro regime was unable to obtain63) is now a 
little-known element of this sordid tale, which ruined the career of the referee, Ruby 
Goldstein, who failed to stop the fight, devastated Griffith personally and affected his career 
for a time, caused legal investigations into Paret’s inexperienced Cuban manager, Manuel 
Alfaro, and others involved in promoting and arranging the bout, and strengthened the anti-
boxing lobby in the U.S. and elsewhere. 
 In Cuba, Paret’s death provided Castro with further rhetorical justification for 
cutting Cuba’s ties to prizefighting (“el boxeo rentado”) once and for all. In the United 
States, however, Paret’s death – like Davey Moore’s a year later at the hands of Cuban exile 
                                                
     61 Sarduy, De Tierras Nuevas, p. 149. 
     62 Ron Ross, Nine… Ten… and Out!: The Two Worlds of Emile Griffith (New York: DiBella Entertainment, 
2008), pp. 65-66; Martin Mulcahy, “Resting places of boxing icons,” 24 August 2005, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/sports/boxing/news/story?id=2141018 (accessed on February 21, 2008). 
     63 Sarduy, De Tierras Nuevas, p. 149. 
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Ultiminio “Sugar” Ramos – brought about little reform of the sport despite much public 
hand-wringing. Indeed, in an unforeseen twist of fate, Paret’s death has – since the release of 
the documentary Ring of Fire: The Emile Griffith Story (2005) – become notable in the U.S. 
primarily for what it has to say about the tragic consequences of homophobia.64 Paret called 
Griffith a “maricón” and made obscene gestures toward him at the weigh-in prior to the 
fight – their third, a “rubber match” to determine the welterweight championship after each 
had racked up a victory over the other in 1961. An enraged Griffith took his anger out in the 
ring, winning by technical knockout in the twelfth round, though referee Goldstein could 
have stopped the fight much earlier. Though later cleared of any wrongdoing by a special 
NYSAC report to the governor on the causes of Paret’s death, Goldstein would never live it 
down, or escape it even in death. Nearly half of his 1984 two-column obituary in the New 
York Times discussed the death of Paret.65 In an autobiography published in 1959, the referee, 
himself a former highly touted prizefighter, had unwittingly predicted his own future: 
 
If you, as a fan, do not remember who refereed the last important fight you 
saw, in person or on television, count that as a point in the referee’s favor, 
for it means he must have done his work efficiently, keeping out of the way 
of the fighters and attracting no attention from the spectators. Yet there are 
times when, through circumstances beyond his control, the referee’s name 
will always be associated with a fight, or fights.66 
 
                                                
     64 Ring of Fire: The Emile Griffith Story, directed by Ron Berger and Dan Klores, Anchor Bay Entertainment, 
2005. For an example of commentary linking Paret’s death to his anti-gay slurs, see “Boxer Benny (Kid) Paret 
died because of homophobia,” Pam’s House Blend web log, http://www.pamspaulding.com/weblog/2005/ 
04/boxer-benny-kid-paret-died-because-of.html (accessed on February 22, 2008). 
     65 Thomas Rogers, “Ruby Goldstein, Ex-Fighter and Controversial Referee,” New York Times, 24 April 1984, 
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     66 Ruby Goldstein as told to Frank Graham, Third Man in the Ring (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1959), p 
153. 
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Despite the senselessness of Paret’s death, as many contemporary observers 
concluded, it was the product not so much of Goldstein’s inaction or Griffith’s fists but of 
the cumulative effects of prior ring wars, especially the beating Paret had experienced three 
months prior at the hands of the larger and stronger Gene Fullmer. With a family to support 
and limited other employment skills, there were simply too many financial incentives for 
Paret to keep fighting, even if he were aware on some level that he might be risking his life. 
Regardless, this shocking tragedy helped to spur safety improvements in U.S. prize rings – 
including the increase in glove weight from eight to ten ounces and the addition of a fourth 
rope enclosing the ring. These changes, ironically, were first made during the Emile Griffith-
Luis Manuel Rodríguez welterweight championship bout at Madison Square Garden on June 
8, 1963. Unfortunately, on this night of triumph for Rodríguez, Paret’s good friend, these 
changes were not enough to prevent another ring death. In the very next bout, in attempt to 
defend his featherweight championship, Davey Moore lost his life after a one-sided beating 
and knockout by yet another Cuban exile, Sugar Ramos. It had been just over a year since 
Paret’s death.67 
 In spite of having paid the ultimate price for his homophobia, the young, uneducated 
Paret – the man who lost his homeland and died at age 25 – is today, in many quarters, much 
less of a sympathetic figure than Griffith, who has for decades expressed regret over Paret’s 
death and who has recently come out as being non-heterosexual (the U.S. Virgin Island 
native tends to avoid labels, such as “gay” and “bisexual,” other than to admit when pressed 
                                                
     67 “Formal Inquiry of Ring Fatality Opened by Pennsylvania Board,” New York Times, 9 April 1963, p. 76; 
Ross, Nine… Ten… and Out!, p. 91. 
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that he has had sexual relations with both men and women68). In an ironic footnote, Griffith 
too nearly died after a savage beating – at the hands of unknown assailants in the summer of 
1992 who attacked him after he left a New York City gay bar – and which led to injuries that 
were initially explained in the New York Times as the result of a fall.69 
 
Boxers Taking Sides: Revolutionaries and Counter-Revolutionaries 
 In the months after the propagation of National Decree 83a, active or current boxers 
who sought to defend the old system – or worse, to propagate it abroad – were viewed as 
traitors to the state. Those who appeared to embrace the new regime were held up as 
examples for all Cubans despite their ties to the old system. Kid Chocolate was especially 
praised for having been Cuba’s first professional world champion and refusing to leave his 
home despite numerous calls to defect. The state honored the Cerro native by renaming a 
Havana stadium for him. The other great Cuban pre-revolutionary champion, Kid Gavilán, 
who had retired from prizefighting in 1958, also initially chose to remain. While he retained 
some privileges, he would ultimately lose much of his land and, for stretches at a time, his 
freedom, for attempting to proselytize as a Jehovah’s Witness. He was given emigration 
papers for the United States in 1968, where he lived for the rest of his life. 
 The state saved its greatest praise for those who had abandoned sports altogether in 
order to fight for a new Cuba. Giraldo Córdova Cardín, a young amateur boxer, died as part 
of the anti-Batista insurgency – reportedly in the fabled Moncada Barracks attack of July 
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1953. According to the mythology that the revolutionary state would build around him, 
Cardín had won all of his amateur bouts up to that time and suffered his only defeat at the 
time of his death, for “failure to present” (no-show).70 Cardín, a mulato71, is depicted as being 
far ahead of his time – as a boxer with tremendous talent and dedication, but with no 
interest in professionalism, believing that “el deporte era el deporte” (sport was sport) and 
that “los pesos se los iba a buscar en otra parte” (he was going to look for money 
elsewhere).72 Revolutionary Cuba would honor his sacrifice by naming his neighborhood 
CDR after him73 and by inaugurating an annual amateur boxing tournament in 1968 bearing 
his name. Similar treatment was given following the death of former amateur Lino 
Salabarría, who joined the national revolutionary militia in 1962 after 45 amateur fights, most 
of them victories. Salabarría’s death while combating counter-insurgency forces in 
Escambray in 1963 gave the Revolution another boxing martyr.74 As with Cardín, he was 
remembered through the renaming of institutions, such as an EIDE (School for the 
Initiation of Scholastic Sports), and in the creation of a boxing tournament bearing his 
name.75 
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CubAhora, June 9, 2008, http://www.cubahora.cu/index.php?tpl=principal/ver-noticias/ver-not_dep.tpl.html 
&newsid_obj_id=1026064 (accessed October 21, 2008). 
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 The state even attempted to change the language of boxing in order to remove both 
its ties to the English language (nocaut, ring, etc.) and to prizefighting. These efforts were 
ridiculed by the Miami-based Unión Deportiva de Cuba Libre (Free Cuba Sporting Union), a 
group of exiled athletes and sympathizers formed in 1962 that protested Cuba’s participation 
at the Central American and Caribbean Games in Kingston, Jamaica. The Unión Deportiva’s 
alarmist literature claimed to speak for all of Cuba’s athletes burdened by communism. In 
boxing, it lampooned the Cuban press’s avoidance of the phrase “technical knockout,” in 
English shortened to “TKO” and in Spanish to “KOT”: “Nowadays in Red Cuba, the 
official rules prohibit the use of the word TKO. They substitute ‘involuntary rest’.” Unión 
Deportiva de Cuba Libre’s propagandists viewed such language modifications as a sign of 
the communists’ “fear” of the English language and desire to replace it with Russian in 
influencing Cuba’s everyday vernacular.76 In this instance, ironically, the International 
Amateur Boxing Association (AIBA) would follow Cuba’s lead; in amateur competition, the 
terms “knockout” and “technical knockout” were replaced with RSC (referee stopping 
contest). 
 In contrast to such martyrs, the state excoriated those who had failed to live up to 
their revolutionary potential as athletes in the public eye. One of the ways in which it tried to 
discredit disgruntled active or former boxers was by attacking their credentials inside the 
ring. The smear campaign against an imprisoned Antonio “Puppy” García was particularly 
vicious; he was depicted as a talentless brawler who was notable primarily for bleeding (and 
occasionally fainting) in his fights. While García fought all but three of his fifty professional 
                                                
     76 Unión Deportiva de Cuba Libre, El deporte sin libertad no es deporte: el deporte comunista es un instrumento político 
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fights in Cuba – the others were in Caracas, Venezuela – he was a beloved national 
featherweight champion who had experienced three ring wars with compatriot Ciro 
Moracén. Shortly after the Revolution occurred, he was being prepped for his first U.S. bout, 
a title fight in Miami’s Orange Bowl.77 According to Cuban exile and boxing historian 
Enrique Encinosa, “At the age of twenty-seven, waiting for a world title fight, Puppy Garcia 
had to decide between his career and his country.” He claims that García “retired from the 
ring, but not from fighting, for by 1960 he was involved in the resistance against Castro, 
transporting weapons, hiding covert operatives, driving cars in urban guerrilla operations.” 
García was sent to the Isle of Pines prison in 1961. Refusing to accept “rehabilitation,” 
which would have required him “to issue a public apology asking forgiveness for opposing 
the revolution, attend Marxism classes and if requested to teach the ideology to other 
prisoners,” García spent the next nine years there, emerging at age 36 with a smashed ankle 
(the result of an attack by his guards) and unable to box any longer. He was finally able to 
leave Cuba as part of the Mariel boatlift in 1980 and lived in Florida until his death from 
stomach cancer in 2005. García was heralded among the exile population in and around 
Miami and given a remunerative position as sports director of the Sweetwater, Florida, Parks 
and Recreation Department.78 His death occasioned many heartfelt, albeit florid obituaries 
by exiles about his courageous stance against the communist regime. Puppy’s older brother, 
Lino, also a former prizefighter, was not so lucky; he is apparently still in Cuba, an ailing old 
man, said by exiles to have been isolated by the state. 
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http://cyberboxingzone.com/boxing/0001-enrique.html (accessed February 11, 2008). 
 326 
 At least two former boxers, Johnny Sarduy and Pedro José “Huesito” González, 
converted themselves into “boxeadores-brigadistas” as part of Brigade 2506, the CIA-backed 
group of Cuban exiles who unsuccessfully attempted to invade Cuba in April 1962 as part of 
the Bay of Pigs invasion (referred to by the Cuban state as Playa Girón). In his 2005 memoir, 
Sarduy details how he gave up a solid career as a Miami-based prizefighter – a young Cassius 
Clay once served as a preliminary fighter for a main event featuring Sarduy – to begin 
training with the brigade in Louisiana. After returning to the United States unharmed, Sarduy 
at age 24 decided to give up boxing, dispirited by the low purses to be earned in Miami’s 
rings – which he remembered as being less than half of what he made in Havana – and 
concerned with raising enough money to bring his family in Cuba to live with him.79 His 
memoir glosses over the decades he spent becoming a millionaire drywall contractor in 
Miami and instead focuses mostly on his early years in boxing and on the fates of his peers, 
“la generación de los cincuenta.”80 While revolutionary Cuba has had little to say of Sarduy, 
he has plenty to say about it – and about the way it has treated its boxers, in particular. He 
claims that 90 percent of Cuba’s boxers left the island by the end of 1961 and takes 
particular pains to detail the sad trajectories of boxers imprisoned by the Castro regime and 
those whose careers ended in drunken poverty while in exile, their lives ruined by the loss of 
their homeland and families. Sarduy frequently offers his bona fides for offering such a 
critique – one, that he was born poor in Las Villas (a poverty that, in his mind, negates his 
                                                
     79 Sarduy, De Tierras Nuevas, p. 115. 
     80 Ibid., p. 131. 
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relative privilege as a white boxer in a mostly black sport); and two, that he was, in his own 
estimation, the second-best bantamweight produced in Cuba, after the gifted Luis Galvani.81 
 Similarly, the Cuban state sought to discredit those anti-revolutionary exiles whose 
successful ring careers made them impossible to ignore by attacking both their quality as 
fighters and their ties to family and nation. Florentino Fernández was widely heralded in 
Cuba for taking middleweight champion Gene Fullmer the distance in their August 1961 
bout. Fernández was close to his family and would return to Cuba after every bout. But 
when he decided to remain in the United States after the Fullmer bout, Fernández was 
disowned by his mother and labeled a traitor in the Cuban press. A service station he owned 
in Havana, valued at approximately $35,000, was appropriated by the state. Fernández’s close 
ties to Cuba also came under fire in the U.S., where a photograph of him in Cuban militia 
uniform was published. In response to this controversy, Fernández publicly aligned himself 
with the United States.82 In retaliation, the Cuban sportswriter Elio Menéndez published a 
December 1962 diatribe against Fernández in Semanario Deportivo LPV, the Revolution’s 
equivalent of Sports Illustrated. It read, in part: 
 
Florentino Fernandez, según informes recibidos, trabaja como portero en un Circo 
Mexicano. El traidor Florentino, que viene en vertiginoso descenso, habiendo perdido 
sus últimos tres combates por nocaut, sigue la misma ruta de otros tantos. Suerte para él 
que su último combate no tuvo el mismo desenlace que el de Paret.83 
 
                                                
     81 Ibid., p. 132. Sarduy minimizes his own perceived achievement, however, by describing Cuba’s weakness 
in the flyweight and bantamweight divisions in the 1950s; he notes that he only fought three Cubans in main 
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     83 Quoted in Unión Deportiva de Cuba Libre, El deporte sin libertad no es deporte, p. 10. Fernández had actually 
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Florentino Fernandez, according to received reports, works as a janitor in a Mexican 
Circus. The traitor Florentino, who has experienced a vertiginous decline, having lost his 
last three fights by knockout, continues along the same route of others like him. It was 
lucky for him that his last fight didn’t have the same denouement as did that of Paret. 
 
The Unión Deportiva de Cuba Libre rebuffed this image of Fernández, publishing a 
photograph of him happily driving a convertible in Miami, with the following caption: “Here 
we have Florentino. The glory of our boxing. The photo is from Miami, where he is 
acclaimed by an international fan base, and where he also contributes to the liberation of 
Cuba.”84 In the end, however, Fernández remained caught between the dueling propaganda 
machines, unable to find the success he had dreamed of in the United States or to 
disconnect himself from Cuba. As one commentator put it, “Habit sent Fernandez to the 
Fifth St. Gym in Miami Beach each day. But he might as well have saved the effort. He 
didn’t have to put on boxing gloves to fight himself.”85 
 Although Fernández was symbolically pulled between two different countries, Luis 
Manuel Rodríguez was physically so. In July 1961, the pianist-boxer who had been lionized 
in the early revolutionary press for representing the best of what Cuban athletes had to offer, 
found himself, along with masseur and trainer Luis Sarría, on a hijacked Eastern Air Lines 
flight from Miami. Bound for Tampa, New Orleans, and ultimately Dallas, where Rodríguez 
was to face Curtis Cokes, it was instead diverted by gunmen to Havana in late July 1961. The 
passengers were allowed to return to the United States a few days later. Rodríguez and Cokes 
                                                
     84 Ibid., p. 10. The original text read, “Aquí tienen a Florentino. Gloria de nuestro boxeo. La foto es de 
Miami, donde es aclamado por una fanaticada internacional, y donde también contribuye a la liberación de 
Cuba.” 
     85 Putnam, “No More Trouble Within,” p. 15. 
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did fight in Dallas soon afterward, but the plane remained in Cuba.86 Sarría and Rodríguez 
both made permanent homes in the Miami area, working – like so many other Cuban exiles 
of this and later generations – out of the Dundee brothers’ 5th Street Gym. 
 While prizefighters are infamous for having unhappy endings, and while there were 
individual success stories, Cuba’s pugilistic exiles seemed to be especially unlucky – with 
experiences such as untimely deaths, lifelong family separation, ongoing physical problems, 
mental health issues, jail sentences, obscurity, poverty, unemployment, and divorce more 
often the norm than the exception among the top fighters of the 1950s and 1960s. There is 
no way to quantify their suffering, of course, but anecdotal evidence suggests that the road 
of most exile prizefighters was a difficult one, and that financial and personal stability were 
extremely hard to obtain. As just one example, José Stable lost his one shot at fame and 
fortune – a welterweight title bout with Emile Griffith, the man who had inadvertently killed 
his close friend Benny Paret. In a double main event card at Madison Square Garden (also 
featuring José Torres-Willie Pastrano) on March 30, 1965, one that broke the 1947 Joe 
Louis-Joe Walcott record for fight receipts, Griffith endured a slugging contest with a valiant 
Stable over fifteen rounds, retaining his welterweight title by decision.87 For their efforts, 
Griffith earned $70,000, Stable a career-high $10,000. Yet this payday, which nearly matched 
the $12,000 he had earned the previous year in three main-event fights, did little to help the 
24-year-old Cuban immigrant, who had a young family to support and did not know English, 
to achieve the American dream. A total of $1,600 was taken out for training expenses (food, 
                                                
     86 “Luis Manuel Rodriguez... un boxeador que debió ser pianista,” INRA, January 1960, pp. 74-77; “U.S. 
Plane Seized; Flown to Havana,” New York Times, 25 July 1961; “33 Passengers Listed Aboard Seized Airliner,” 
New York Times, 25 July 1961. 
     87 Robert Lipsyte, “Torres Halts Pastrano and Griffith Beats Stable in Title Bouts at Garden,” New York 
Times, 31 March 1965, p. 30; Ross, Nine… Ten…and Out!, p. 133. 
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lodging, sparring partners, equipment, tickets to the fight for friends and family, and the 
like). Ten percent of the remaining $8,400 went to Stable’s lead trainer, Victor Valle, and 
one-third of the ensuing amount went to his manager, Manny Gonzalez. Of the $5,040 
remaining for Stable, slightly over half the original purse, he received only $540 in cash up-
front and the remainder in small weekly installments. As a New York Times reporter 
concluded, for a “middle-range fighter” like Stable, “even the big pies turn out to be small 
potatoes.”88 
As for Stable’s career, it was never the same after the Griffith beating. The loss of his 
only title shot demoralized him, and he sank into a lifestyle of drinking and adultery, 
deserting his family when his wife was pregnant with their third child. The money that he 
had sought to earn so he could bring his extended family to the United States from Cuba 
never materialized; he ended up fighting for purses of $250 or less before retiring in 1967. 
His story ended tragically, with a life sentence in prison for the attempted murder in late 
1981 of a policeman in Florida.89 
 
 Although surviving exiled prizefighters who left Cuba behind in the 1960s have long 
since retired from the ring, their stories continue to resonate nearly five decades later. The 
waning Castro regime (now under the leadership of Fidel’s younger brother, Raúl), though it 
has instituted some minor reforms of late, continues to embrace many of the principles upon 
which it has ruled for fifty years, including a ban on professional athletics. In the intervening 
                                                
     88 Robert Lipsyte, “Too Many Hands Often Spoil the Boxing Pot of Gold,” New York Times, 4 April 1965, 
pp. S1-S2. 
     89 Various articles, IBHOF file on José Stable; “Sports People: Former Boxer Charged,” New York Times, 18 
November 1981; “Stable, Ex-Boxer, Sentenced to Life,” New York Times, 20 August 1982; Ira Berkow, “The 
Images of José Stable, Jr.,” New York Times, 30 September 1982, p. B19. 
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years, the regime’s amateur boxing and other athletic programs have achieved an astonishing 
level of international success. Yet the lack of personal liberty and relative poverty that such 
institutions exact upon their participants has, since the end of the Cold War, been one that 
athletes (particularly boxers and baseball players, those most likely to achieve lucrative 
professional careers abroad) are increasingly unwilling to pay. In the Conclusion, I briefly 
explore the trajectory of Cuba’s amateur boxing successes since 1963 and consider whether 
prizefighting might be reinstated there in the not-too-distant future. 
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Conclusion: The Ascendancy of Cuba’s Amateur Boxing Program 
and Its Uncertain Future, 1963 to the Present 
 
Framing the Republic Era in Revolutionary Terms 
 Histories of republic-era Cuba run the risk of projecting ahead to the Revolution, of 
analyzing this earlier period in light of what came after it. Throughout this dissertation, my 
close attention to the nature of U.S.-Cuban relations and the ways in which it shaped the 
growth of boxing on the island has helped me to maintain my focus on the neocolonial state 
rather than upon the rebellions that would ultimately overthrow it. In doing so, I do not 
wish to imply that the long Cuban insurgency had no bearing upon the world of boxing; as 
evidenced by the previous chapter, boxers were often at the forefront of the revolutionary 
and counterrevolutionary movements, leaving behind stylized combat for the genuine article. 
Yet it is impossible, perhaps, to avoid the republic-revolutionary dichotomy altogether, for 
the point-counterpoint of the second Batista administration and the early Castro regime – 
and, more broadly, of the neocolonial and socialist state – offer a kind of symmetry that is 
difficult to ignore. In acknowledging it, however, we must be careful not to give in to 
caricatures but rather to draw attention to the nuances of each. 
 It is true, for instance, that the Batista regime sought to maximize revenue from 
prizefights and encouraged the export of talented athletes (as well as musicians and others) 
abroad. Still, it did not entirely ignore the opportunity to gain national prestige at less costly 
regional amateur tournaments; nor did all amateurs choose to enter the professional ranks. 
Similarly, the Castro regime did not initially elect to eliminate prizefighting, but rather sought 
to find a way to reduce the influence of foreign business interests and to minimize 
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exploitative practices that put boxers at risk for injury or death. Its decision to ban 
professional sports must be viewed in light of worsening U.S.-Cuban relations and the 
concomitant destruction of the Cuban tourist sector. 
 This Conclusion briefly considers the fate of Cubans who continued to work as 
boxers or trainers after 1962, whether for their native country or for new lands. It is ironic 
that, while rejecting prizefighting as corrupt and violent, the Castro regime has sought to 
incorporate amateur boxing into its nationalist agenda. This attempt has met with rejection 
by exiles who argue that amateurism as practiced by the socialist state is professionalism 
under another name. No level of Olympic success, in their view, can justify individual 
athletes’ loss of personal liberty and of the ability to profit financially from their talents. 
Perhaps what is most striking about Cuban boxing after 1962, however, is not its 
blurring of the line between amateur and professional, but rather the absence of 
contemporary U.S. influences in its manner and methods of fighting. Under former national 
team coach Alcides Sagarra, the Cubans developed their own school of boxing, influenced to 
some extent by the Soviets, which proved difficult for opponents to beat. Relying heavily 
upon defensive techniques, including incremental head and hand movements and rapid 
footwork, as well as furious precision punching, this style owes something to earlier Cuban 
prizefighters like Kid Chocolate but may be characterized as “scientific” rather than flashy, 
seeking to overwhelm an opponent not so much by power or even speed as by totality. With 
every new administrative change in amateur scoring, including a transition from calculating 
victories by the number of rounds won toward a computerized system that credits a boxer’s 
cumulative number of “clean” punches, the Cubans have modified their style accordingly. 
However one views what the Cubans have accomplished in amateur rings since the 1962 ban 
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on professional sports, it is worthy of attention that, under the regime of Fidel Castro, 
boxing has finally become “Cubanized” in a way that the earliest advocates of Muscular 
Christianity on the island could never have anticipated. Exiles who decry the current style of 
Cuban amateur boxing as bloodless or uniform fail to note that what is considered the 
pinnacle of international amateur boxing today varies vastly from what was in practice five 
decades ago, when competitors did not wear headgear and judging was based upon a variety 
of factors, such as the nebulous concept of “ring generalship,” beyond the number of clean 
punches connected. Those changes were not Cuba’s doing, but it has capitalized upon them. 
For if the motive is winning while expending the least amount of energy, without doing 
long-term physical damage either to the competitor or his opponent – in order to bring 
prestige to the nation, demonstrate superiority over capitalist systems, and sustain linkages 
with international sport –, then the Cubans, until very recently at least, have found their own 
ways to do it. With a fairly new crop of Olympic-caliber defectors honing their skills in U.S. 
and German gyms, however, it remains to be seen how well this style will translate into 
success in the prize rings. 
 This project has argued that the trajectory of boxing in republic-era Cuba, while 
heavily influenced by the new nation’s dependence upon and cultural ties to the United 
States, nonetheless developed along internal rather than external lines. The Johnson-Willard 
bout brought with it a tremendous amount of publicity that might have helped to lift Cuba’s 
nascent boxing culture from obscurity to acceptance. But with the end of that history-
making moment, the national government not only failed to capitalize upon the growth of 
interest in the sport, it actually sought to suppress it. The legalization of boxing spectacles 
was largely accomplished by middle-class men who, perhaps swayed in part by the Muscular 
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Christian ideals brought to the island by American missionaries and businessmen, sought to 
tie the practice of pugilism to the cultivation of a modern masculinity – one that rejected 
prior forms of colonial-era combat, such as knife fighting. 
Despite U.S.-led efforts to ban interracial bouts as potentially divisive for a nation 
only a few decades out of slavery, aficionados were able to prevent drawing the race line in 
prize rings, thus giving Afro-Cubans a meaningful venue to personal as well as professional 
advancement and, not incidentally, providing a showcase for top African American fighters 
for whom opportunities were limited at home. While the YMCA and exclusive athletic 
associations prevented the participation of Afro-Cubans in their instructional classes and 
amateur competitions, the initiation of the state-run Golden Gloves tournament in the late 
1930s provided the impetus for blacks and poor whites throughout the island to secure 
critical experience in amateur rings before making the transition to the professional, or semi-
professional, ranks. 
These promising developments notwithstanding, boxing was incompletely integrated 
into the Cuban nationalist project. Having initially ignored or rejected its potential to serve 
nationalist ends, the state would eventually attempt to exploit boxing – particularly 
prizefighting – for financial gain. It accomplished this primarily through the export of talent 
abroad. Although amateur and professional boxing remained popular pastimes in Havana 
and the provinces well after the overthrow of the Batista regime, by the 1940s the most 
talented pugilists found they had to leave the country if they wished to make their mark at 
the highest levels – or, in many cases, to eke out a living at all. The state encouraged their 
outmigration throughout the Americas, but especially to the United States, rather than 
attempt to develop a homegrown market for international sports tourism that might have 
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brought long-term benefit to average Cubans. Men and women of the middle class – 
businessmen, writers, editors, students, housewives, and the like – had played a major role in 
the popularization of the sport, with a few hardy young souls even joining the prize rings in 
the days when there was little difference (in terms of skill levels) between amateurs and pros. 
By the 1940s, however, prizefighting had become firmly established as a sport for the poor, 
one that attracted “negritos” like Kid Chocolate and Black Bill as well as poor whites like 
Johnny Sarduy, as well as underemployed semi-professionals such as Guantánamo’s Kid 
Chicle. Except for those who made their living from commenting upon or organizing bouts, 
and the small numbers of amateur practitioners in exclusive athletic clubs, the middle classes 
were no longer participants, but merely consumers, of boxing. 
The creation of a privileged class of transnational fighters, whose personal exploits as 
well as ring results were reported in the U.S. and Cuban press, helped to cement the notion 
that the best way to achieve success on the island was to leave it behind, at least during one’s 
peak years. Undoubtedly, many of these men, foremost among them Kid Chocolate and Kid 
Gavilán, brought their fellow citizens a great deal of pride, as well as a source of enjoyment 
during difficult political and economic times (of which, unfortunately, there were many). 
Nonetheless, the vast majority of Cuban boxers who sought their fortunes abroad won 
neither fame nor fortune but were instead little more than manual laborers earning wages 
with their fists. Only the best or luckiest among them could expect to earn a living through 
boxing – as trainers, referees, or instructors, perhaps – once their own careers were through. 
Even the most fortunate of them could expect to suffer from lingering health problems 
from years of fighting week after week, month after month, without significant medical 
intervention or safety regulations; not all, in fact, lived to be able to retire from the ring. 
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Those who did might have viewed their sacrifices as worthwhile, however, in order to have 
been able to see something of the outside world and to have experienced a few fleeting 
moments of glory that only an athlete can understand. 
 As with other entertainers and athletes, Cuba’s boxers faced a unique series of 
challenges in coming to terms with the revolution that engulfed their country in the 1950s. 
Some took up arms in defense of or against the Batista regime; others attempted to remain 
above the political fray, hoping not to have to choose between profession and home. Those 
who made their political preferences known were at risk for being used for propagandistic 
purposes, whether or not they chose to be. As prizefighting began to die out in the early 
1960s due to frigid U.S.-Cuban relations and a dearth of foreign tourists, it became 
increasingly evident that the industry could not continue to thrive on the island for the 
foreseeable future. By the time the state instituted its 1962 ban on professional sports, most 
of its top pugilists had already left Cuba, resuming their professional careers in exile – in the 
United States, Mexico, Spain, and other locales. A small but influential number of active 
fighters stayed behind, retiring from competition in order to help build the new amateur 
athletic program. Former members of the pugilistic fraternity had wider options, although 
many of them, too, depended upon prizefighting for a living. Some of those who stayed, 
such as Kid Gavilán and Kid Chocolate, would find themselves marginalized in later years, 
viewed as embarrassing remnants of a time when the earlier dictatorship had championed 
the most exploitative forms of professional sport – and co-opted the support of famous 
black celebrities while squashing opportunities for most Afro-Cubans at home. 
One could argue, though sympathizers of the Castro regime might vehemently 
disagree, that the Revolution’s ideological insistence upon separating sport from labor while, 
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at the same time, using athletics as a diplomatic wedge, has actually turned amateurs into a 
new class of semi-professionals. In return for their victories, the state has rewarded them – 
in varying amounts, depending upon how flush its treasury was at the time and how 
important the athlete was considered to be – with tangible goods, services, and stipends but 
without the freedom to negotiate their wages. As we briefly review the trajectory of amateur 
sport in the Castro years, it is important to remember that the Revolution did not begin its 
sports programs with a blank slate but that it built upon systems already in place. Moreover, 
for a number of years its sports program benefited from financial and technical support 
from Soviet bloc countries, a subject that largely falls outside the time frame of this project. 
Yet by any standard, what revolutionary Cuba has achieved in the amateur realm in its first 
five decades has been phenomenal. Whether the cost has been worth it – and whether the 
pursuit of excellence in amateur athletics will remain at the forefront of a post-Castro 
regime, one that grapples with crippling economic problems and a discontented populace – 
is another question entirely. 
 
The Island of Olympic Champions 
 In the amateur realm, Cuban boxing undoubtedly achieved its greatest victories – in 
terms of quantity as well as quality – well after the 1959 assumption of power by Fidel 
Castro and the 1962 ban on professional sports. Clearly, this did not occur by accident but 
was the product of an institutionalized amateur program that sought out the most promising 
athletes from a young age and cultivated them for competition at the regional, national, or 
international levels depending on age, ability, desire, and the vicissitudes of luck. In spite of 
recent setbacks in international competition that have cast doubt on the actual depth of this 
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seemingly well regimented system, the Cubans remain the single greatest powerhouse in 
men’s amateur boxing since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1992. For perhaps no 
other country since the end of the Cold War has achievement in the amateur ring portended 
so much for the legitimacy of the regime in power. Nor was boxing exceptional in this 
regard; for the Cuban state post-1964, the only sports worthy of financial and technical 
assistance – with the major exception of Cuba’s national sport, baseball – were those that 
were officially included in Olympic competition.1 
 Having only sent one boxer to the 1960 Olympic Games, Cuba sent a larger squad of 
six to the 1964 Games in Tokyo. By 1968, when Cuba began regularly sending a full squad 
of eleven men to the Summer Games, Cuba earned its first medal in boxing competition 
when light middleweight Rolando Garbey defeated Boris Lagulin of the Soviet Union for a 
silver medal. Munich 1972, saw Cubans taking three home three golds – at bantamweight 
(Orlando Martínez), welterweight (Emilio Correa), and heavyweight (Teófilo Stevenson) – as 
well as one silver and one gold. Stevenson’s performance, in particular, was the start of an 
improbably string of consecutive Olympic victories (for a single defeat would have 
eliminated him from competition) that lasted eight years; he also won the gold in Montreal in 
1976 Montreal and Moscow in 1980. At Montreal, Cuba won its largest medal tally to date – 
three golds, three silvers, and two bronzes – a number it would surpass in 1980, when the 
U.S. boycotted the Games. Moscow witnessed Cuba’s acquiring an astonishing six gold 
                                                
     1 Although included as an exhibition sport on several previous occasions, baseball was included as an official 
sport in the Summer Olympic Games held from 1992 to 2008, inclusive. It was announced recently that both 
baseball and softball will be dropped from the 2012 London Games, possibly to be reincorporated into the 
2016 Games. Whether women’s boxing is admitted to the 2012 Games is a decision on which the IOC is 
expected to rule by August 2009. Should that happen, the Cubans will have less than three years to build a 
competitive amateur female team if they choose to field one, although whether that will be a priority for the 
Cuban national boxing program at a time when its men’s program seems to be in jeopardy remains to be seen. 
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medals, two silvers, and two bronzes – leaving only flyweight Jorge Hernández on the squad 
without a medal. After Cuba boycotted the Los Angeles 1984 and Seoul 1988 Games, it 
quickly reclaimed a position of dominance in Barcelona in 1992. The Cuban team there 
performed as well as any had previously when faced with both Soviet (competing as the 
Commonwealth of Independent States) and U.S. competition. In what may well be the single 
greatest performance by Olympic boxers since that sport was first included in the 1904 
Games, the Cubans earned seven gold medals and two silvers. By then, the competition had 
expanded to include twelve weight classes, and Félix Savón – as a heavyweight – had begun 
his own unlikely string of Olympic victories. In 1996 and 2000, competing in the 
superheavyweight division, he repeated his Barcelona performance. Although Cuba may 
have lost at least one gold medal with the defection of Joel Casamayor in Atlanta in 1996, it 
still managed to come away with four golds and three silvers.2 
Those who believed the last days of the Cuban communist state were near – that the 
“Special Period” incorporated since the removal of Soviet subsidies at the end of the Cold 
War – hoped that the Cuban boxing performance in Atlanta, however impressive on the 
surface, was a sign of what was to come. Despite the much-publicized “Team Freedom” 
made up of Casamayor, Ramón Garbey, and other Cuban exiles, however, there were no 
major boxing defections from Cuba between 1997 and 2005.3 The 2000 squad in Sydney 
won four golds and two bronzes in twelve weight classes, while the Athens participants in 
                                                
     2 For detailed information on each Cuban squad at the Olympic Games from 1960 to 1980 and 1992 to 
1996, see Crespo, Cuba en el boxeo Olympic. 
     3 Some defectors during the 1997-2005 period had limited professional success, however, such as Yanqui 
Díaz (formerly known as Yamplier Azcuy Díaz), a heavyweight who failed to make the Cuban Olympic team. 
In what was probably the highlight of his pro career, Díaz won a surprise first-round TKO victory over much 
heralded fellow Cuban defector Juan Carlos Gómez in 2004. For background on Díaz, see Dean Juipe, “Yanko 
[sic] Díaz on the Road to Becoming Cuban Superstar,” Las Vegas Sun, 5 February 2004. 
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2004 did even better, earning five golds, two silvers, and a bronze out of only eleven weight 
classes.4 
It appeared that with the island’s gradual recovery from small-scale entrepreneurship, 
an increased push for tourism, and beneficial bilateral relationships with countries such as 
Venezuela (from where it received oil subsidies) and Spain (which financed the construction 
of many of the newer Havana hotels) had made life in Cuba bearable enough for its athletes 
that fewer chose to take the risk of defecting. (This was not always true for baseball, 
however, due to aggressive scouting.) By the mid-2000s, and particularly after July 2006 
when Fidel Castro was forced by health considerations to step away from his previously 
unrivaled position of power, however, this situation has begun to change, as more defections 
appear to be as inevitable, if equally unpredictable, as the gradual opening up of the Cuban 
state to democratic reforms and increased political and economic interaction with the United 
States. The most obvious evidence of the uncertain future that faces Cuba’s amateur boxing 
program is its dismal performance at the 2008 Summer Games in Beijing. For the first time 
since 1968, Cuba was shut out of Olympic boxing gold, winning four silvers and four 
bronzes. While Fidel Castro and others protested vehemently that the true reason for this 
stunning reversal was politics rather than a demonstration of the national team’s youth and 
relative inexperience, many commentators outside Cuba speculated that it would take that 
                                                
     4 Beginning with the 2004 Summer Games, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) required that the 
International Amateur Boxing Association (AIBA, known by its French acronym) reduce the number of 
athletes in boxing competition to allow four weight classes of women’s freestyle wrestling to be admitted as an 
official sport without increasing the total number of athletes. AIBA responded by cutting the total number of 
boxing weight classes from 12 to 11. Rather than eliminating the superheavyweight category, as it had initially 
proposed, AIBA instead increased the maximum weights in several divisions, thus causing a larger gap between 
classes than had traditionally been the case. 
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nation several years to rebuild the boxing program that so dominated the international 
sporting scene for over three decades.5 
It may be premature to conclude that Cuba’s amateur boxing program has seen its 
best days and is on an inevitable decline – one that will be arrested only when U.S.-Cuban 
relations improve to the extent that the embargo or blockade (as it is known in the U.S. and 
Cuba, respectively) has ended and Cuban citizens can freely travel to other countries. 
Without travel restrictions, of course, promising amateurs might achieve a path to 
professionalism, and all of the fame and riches that may come with it, without having to give 
up their Cuban citizenship. Yet while the Cuban program appeared to be able to hold onto 
most of its top competitors for a decade after the embarrassing desertion of teammates Joel 
Casamayor and Ramón Garbey shortly before the 1996 Olympic Games, the past three years 
have seen a number of high-profile defections that have undoubtedly affected the caliber of 
the Cuban boxing team. 
In December 2006, Athens Olympic champions Yan Barthelmy, Yuriolkis Gamboa, 
and Odlanier Solis fled while in training in Caracas for that city’s Pan-American Games. 
Perhaps more damaging was the loss of Guillermo Rigondeaux, 2000 and 2004 Olympic 
bantamweight champion who was widely viewed to be Cuba’s best hope of tying Teófilo 
Stevenson’s and Félix Savón’s remarkable feat (first accomplished by Hungary’s Laszlo 
Papp) – of winning three Olympic golds in boxing. Rigondeaux and another Olympic 
hopeful, world welterweight amateur champion Erislandy Lara, appeared to defect while at 
the Rio de Janeiro Pan-Am Games in July 2007, but ultimately claimed to have just gone off 
                                                
     5 Cuba’s shocking semi-final loss in the 2009 World Baseball Classic, similarly, is viewed as a sign of things 
to come as the nation struggles to deal with the defection or retirement of its best players. See, for instance, 
Alan Schwarz, “Whispering Farewell to Cuba’s Dominant Past,” New York Times, 20 March 2009. 
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for a little (unauthorized) fun. While enjoying themselves at a Brazilian resort, they were 
arrested for lack of travel documentation and deported back to Cuba. The Cuban 
government was not amused and removed both from their coveted spots on the national 
team. Regardless of their talent, both Rigondeaux and Lara needed to be made examples of, 
as did Héctor Vinent over a decade before.6 As an ailing Fidel Castro summarized in one of 
his regular columns for the Cuban daily Granma, “An athlete who abandons his team is like a 
soldier who abandons his fellow troops in the middle of combat.”7 Ultimately, both Lara and 
Rigondeaux succeeded in defecting to Miami, in 2008 and 2009, respectively.8 
 
In Search of the American (or Spanish, or Mexican) Dream: Boxers’ Lives in Exile 
 There are no universal set of experiences common to Cuban exiles, even if they have 
the same occupation in common. When they left, whether they were still competing at the 
time of their defection, how well they performed as boxers or trainers, what health issues 
they battled, and how strong their support networks were are all factors in how well Cuban 
boxers did during their lives in exile. Similarly, there is no easy answer as to why some 
former Cuban professionals and top amateurs were satisfied with their choices to remain on 
the island. One of the most important factors, of course, is the relationship of each fighter to 
the state. Despite Teófilo Stevenson’s famous declaration that the love of ten million Cubans 
                                                
     6 Vinent was the gifted junior welterweight champion who won his division’s gold medal in Barcelona in 
1992 and Atlanta in 1996 but had later been removed from the team for being close friends with, and having 
possibly considered defecting with, Casamayor and Garbey at Atlanta. He was removed from the national team 
in 1997. 
     7 “Bad Boxers: Castro: Cuba May Skip Boxing Meet Due to Defections,” Sports Illustrated.com, August 8, 
2007, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2007/more/08/08/bc.boxing.cuba.castro/index.html (accessed April 
25, 2009). For Vinent’s story as told by a sympathetic Sports Illustrated reporter, see Price, Pitching Around Fidel, 
pp. 261-268. 
     8 Santos A. Perez, “2004 Olympic Boxing Gold Medal Winner Guillermo Rigondeaux Defects from Cuba 
to Miami,” The Miami Herald, 24 February 2009. 
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was more valuable than a million U.S. dollars (the sum that was supposedly proffered to him 
to fight Muhammad Ali in the 1970s), communist Cuba has a spotty track record in how well 
it has treated its former ring greats. Cuba’s two greatest world champions, Kid Chocolate 
and Kid Gavilán, experienced sad declines upon their return to their native country. 
Although he had been feted early in the Castro regime, Chocolate by the 1980s had come a 
shell of his former self, living in squalor in the Miramar neighborhood, malnourished and 
neglected, and possibly suffering from dementia. The British journalist Jonathan Rendall 
immortalized this devastating version of Chocolate in his memoir, This Bloody Mary Is the Last 
Thing I Own, when he went in search of the famous ex-champion a few weeks before the 
latter’s death in August 1988.9 
Having retired in 1958, on the eve of the Cuban Revolution, and converted to the 
Jehovah’s Witness religion, Gavilán’s fantastic prizefighting career could not save him from 
becoming an outcast in his own country. In the 1960s, he frequently found himself on the 
wrong side of a Cuban jail cell when his religious beliefs, or rather his refusal to give up 
proselytizing them, brought him in opposition with the atheist state. He lost his finca to 
expropriation and the eyesight in one eye due to cataracts. A physically diminished but still 
hopeful Gavilán was finally allowed to depart for the United States in 1968.10 Yet the 
American dream continually eluded him in the 35 years he spent in this country before dying 
in Miami in 2003.11 
 Gavilán was one of many exiles who found life in the United States difficult. José 
Stable, another top-ranked welterweight – albeit one who deserted his native country while 
                                                
     9 Rendall, This Bloody Mary Is the Last Thing I Own, pp. 37-53. 
     10 Steve Cady, “Gavilan Returns, A Champion of Truth,” New York Times, 26 September 1968, p. 68. 
     11 “Kid Gavilan, 77, Welterweight Champion in the Early 1950s,” New York Times, 15 February 2003, p. 23. 
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still in his prime as a professional fighter – was convicted of murder in 1982 for murdering a 
police officer in Florida.12 Luis Manuel Rodríguez died of pneumonia in 1996 in poverty, 
despite having attained the world welterweight championship. Not all exiles found their new 
lives as challenging. In Mexico, Ultiminio “Sugar” Ramos and José Ángel “Mantequilla” 
Nápoles made promising new careers and lives, winning their featherweight and 
welterweight world titles, respectively, under the Mexican flag. The “Pocket Cassius Clay,” 
José Legra, too, earned his featherweight world title fighting out of a third country – Spain – 
where he was trained by former middleweight contender Kid Tunero. And more recent 
exiles, such as Joel Casamayor, Diosbelys Hurtado, Juan Carlos Gómez, and – most recently, 
Odlanier Solis – were able to win world championships in their weight divisions while 
residing in the U.S. and Europe.13 
 
Telling the Stories of Those Who Remained 
 Although no scholarly work has been carried out on the lives of Cuban boxers who 
pursued prizefighting or training careers abroad, U.S. sports journalism and popular history 
are replete with their stories, some of it laudatory, some of it tragic. With the exception of 
three-time Olympic champions Stevenson and Savón, much less is known about the lives of 
those who chose to remain in Cuba, pursue promising amateur careers, worked as trainers or 
administrators once they retired in their 30s, had families, and continued to survive – in a 
few cases, thrive – despite the numerous challenges of living on the island since the early 
                                                
     12 “Stable, Ex-Boxer, Sentenced to Life,” New York Times, 20 August 1982. 
     13 Of this group, Casamayor is the most heralded. With only eleven prior professional bouts, Solis won the 
vacant World Boxing Council world heavyweight title on October 11, 2008, after defeating little-known 
Chauncy Welliver by ninth-round TKO. Although Solis is no doubt a promising heavyweight who has already 
successfully defended his title (in January 2009 against Kevin Burnett), his rapid accession is yet more 
testimony, as though any more were needed, as to the weakness of the heavyweight division in recent years. 
 346 
1960s. A true assessment of their stories is not possible at present, for the limits of free 
speech in Cuba today prevent hearing their voices without the heavy hand of an ideological 
filter, one that shapes its athletes into heroes, martyrs, or (tacitly, by erasing their memories 
should they defect) villains. Yet one hopes that, with the thawing of the western 
hemisphere’s last Cold War, one that includes a move toward greater democratic reforms in 
Cuba and a more humble, more cooperative foreign policy by its long-term nemesis, the 
United States, it will soon be possible to highlight the voices of the many athletes, artists, 
musicians, actors, and others who have so shaped the nation’s modes of cultural production 
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